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The Greater Middle
East and the Cold

US Foreign Policy Under
Eisenhower and Kennedy

i. it. i u in s

Roby C. Barrett

The Greater Middle East
and the Cold War

US Foreign Policy under
Eisenhower and Kennedy

Roby C. Barrett

I.B.TAURIS

LONDON - NEW YORK

Published in 2007 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan
a division of St. Martin’s Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

The right of Roby C. Barrett to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the
author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not
be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the publisher.

Library of International Relations 30

ISBN: 978184511 393 3

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
From camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

To Eli and Gus
In Memory of Roby Eli Barrett

Contents

List of Abbreviations

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgments

xvii

Preface

xix

Introduction

Chapter 1: The Greater Middle East 1953-1958

Preemption and Iran 1953; Defusing a crisis and sparking
another - Egypt, 1953-1954; A peace for the Arab-Israeli
conflict; Running afoul of non-alignment; Nehru and Bandung;
Nasser and Bandung; Middle East policy: after six years,
rethinking the paradigm

Part I: 1958 - The New Order and Reconsiderations 40

Chapter 2: The Wave of the Future 43

The Egyptian-Syrian Union, and saving the Middle East from
Communism; A change in plans: fighting Communism with
Nasser; A pro-Western alternative?; Britain’s Middle East
domino theory; Nasser at the pinnacle; Clouds on the horizon:
the Lebanese and Jordan crises

Chapter 3: ‘The Tempest’ 64

The gathering storm: die Lebanese crisis; Macmillan’s tempest:
the Baghdad coup; Revolution in Iraq and a second honeymoon
with Cairo; Coming to terms with revolutionary Iraq; Betting on
the northern tier

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

viii

Chapter 4: The ‘Center of All Problems’ - Iran and 1958 80

Containment through reform and economic development; Iran
modernization: the race against time; Playing the Soviet card; The
Baghdad coup and Iran; A new relationship with Tehran

Chapter 5: Controlled Democracy - Pakistan and 1958 93

Straddling die fence: the US, Pakistan and India 1956-1958; 1957
and the Kashmir dispute in the UN; Pakistan and the search for
stability; The Baghdad coup and Ayub Khan

Part II: Revising Containment, 1959-1960 104

Chapter 6: The Arab Cold War and US Policy 107

Nasser and die revolution in Iraq; Conflict with the Soviet
Union; Iraq and the Syrian connection; Washington’s ‘Red Scare’
over Iraq; Coming to terms with Qasim; Soviet problems with
their clients; Communist eclipse in Iraq; Nasser’s Syrian labyrinth

Chapter 7: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel - the Bystanders 127

Jordan’s premature obituary; Hussein dangles the Nasser card;
Jordanian-UAR relations reach boiling point; Containment
policy: Jordan and aid; Saudi Arabia: surviving Nasser’s surge;
Paranoids with real enemies: Israel and the Arab Cold War; US
aid and relations with Israel; Israel’s insurance policy: nuclear
weapons

Chapter 8: Iran and Pakistan Cash In on Iraq 149

US aid and the Persian bazaar; Playing die Soviet card; US aid
and complications; Political instability and increased Soviet
pressure; The situation improves?; The future of Iranian-US
relations; Pakistan’s ‘controlled democracy’; Paying the Pakistani
bill; Ayub: faithful ally and voice of moderation; Difficulties for
India: Pakistan and China; Developing the Soviet option; The
non- Arab Middle East and the end of the Eisenhower era

Chapter 9: 1960 - JFK vs. Nixon, and die Greater Middle East 174

Campaign rhetoric and South Asia; Concerns about JFK in
Tehran; 1953 reborn: JFK and peace in the Arab Middle East;
JFK’s campaign rhetoric: a fundamental difference?; Changing
the guard with new - old ideas

Part III: Lessons from the Past — the Middle East 1961-1962 190

Chapter 10: Courting Nasser, 1961 - New Beginnings? 193

Nasser: the Kennedy view; Nasser fails in Jordan; Siding with
feudalism and colonialism; The Syrians call it quits; Nasser’s

Contents

‘declaration of independence from advice’; Israeli complications;
Revolutionary Arab nationalism reborn; The Israeli half of the
peace equation; Repeating the past: the end of Kennedy’s Middle
East peace

Chapter 11: Iran at ‘the Eleventh Hour’ 212

Soviet threats and Iran; The Shah’s perspective on US-Iranian
relations; Doing something about Iran; The eleventh hour
arrives?; Support for Amini; Amini: ‘the last hope’; Amini takes
the reins; Amini, reform, and the reaction in Washington; Talbot
chooses sides; Amini on the slippery slope

Chapter 12: The Shah Ascendant 229

The Shah, military assistance, and Julius Holmes; Holmes: the
Shah’s ambassador; The Shah comes to Washington; The end of
the Amini era; The aftermath of Amini; Kennedy and the Iranian
reality; Crisis over - almost

Chapter 13: Pakistan, India, and Priorities 246

Nothing new under the sun; The Harriman mission; The
Johnson mission to South Asia; Mending fences with Ayub;
Problems with India; Nehru: ‘the worst official visit’; Menon and
Goa; Pakistan reacts to Goa; Nehru’s ‘doubts and misgivings’;
Nehru explores the Soviet option

Part IV: Frustrations of the Fall - JFK and 1963 264

Chapter 14: The Best Laid Plans 267

September surprise: Egypt and the Yemen coup; The allies react;
YAR-UAR diplomatic offensive; The advice of friends;
Recognition of the YAR

Chapter 15: India, Pakistan, and China - Eastern Opportunities? 278

Nehru’s miscalculation; The Chinese teach Nehru a lesson;
Washington attempts to take advantage; Problems with Pakistan;
Another Harriman mission; New tactics for die pro-India
faction; A solution to Kashmir

Chapter 16: 1963 - The New Frontier in Tatters 293

Searching for a balance: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the UAR; A
new dynamic: changes in Iraq and Syria; Soured relations with
the UAR; Iran: another year, another crisis or two; India and
Pakistan; The legacy of 1963

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 314

Lessons in containment and economic development, 1953-1958;
Containment revamped 1958-1960; Kennedy’s Middle East and
the Eisenhower legacy

Notes 328

Bibliography 457

Archives and Collections 457

Published Document Collections 457

Interviews 459

Published Works 459

Dissertations 472

473

Index

List of Abbreviations

AAC

Asian-Africa Conference Asian- African

African Republics

AID

Agency for International Development

ANL

Australian National Library

APOC

Anglo-Persian Oil Company

ARAMCO

Arabian American Oil Company Arabian- American

AUC

American University at Cairo in Cairo

AUFS

American Universities Field Staff

AUFS-SAS

American Universities Field Staff — South Asia Series

AWD

Ann Whitman Diaries

AWF

Ann Whitman File

B.M.T.

Boston Metropolitan Transportation Authority

CAB

Cabinet Notes

CDF

Central Decimal File

CENTO

Central Treaty Organization

CFPF

Central Foreign Policy File

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA/FBIS

CIA/Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Colonial Office

COF

Central Office File

CPO

Central Plan Organization

CRES

Central Intelligence Agency Resource Extraction Systei

CRO

Commonwealth Relations Office

DDE

Dwight David Eisenhower

DDEL

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

xii

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

DEA

Department of External Affairs

DMI

Department of Military Intelligence

DMK

Dravida Munnetra Ka^hagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation)

DOD

Department of Defense

DOS

Department of State

EDC

European Defense Community

EEC

European Economic Community

FBIS

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Foreign Office

FRUS

The Foreign Relations of the United States

GATT

General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

GOI

Government of India

GOJ

Government of Jordan

GOP

Government of Pakistan

GRDOS-59

General Records of the Department of State - 59

GTI

Greek, Turkey, and Iranian Affairs

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IBRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICBM

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICC

International Control Commission

ICP

Iraqi Communist Party

IDF

Israeli Defense Forces

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INR

Bureau of Intelligence and Research

IPC

Iraqi Petroleum Company

JFKL

J ohn F. Kennedy Library

JFK

John F. Kennedy

LBJ

Lyndon Baines Johnson

LBJL

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

MAG

military assistance group

MAP

military assistance program

MAPAI

Israeli Labor Party

Middle East

MEA

Ministry of External Affairs

MEDO

Middle East Defensive Organization

MI 6

British foreign intelligence

MilAsst

Military Assistance

NAA

National Archives of Australia

Abbreviations

xiii

NACPM

NAI

NATO

NEA

NEA/INC

NEA/SOA

NIACT

NIE

NPIC

NS AM

NSC

NSF

NUC

NUP

NYT

NZNA

OCB

OPEC

PDB

PDP

POF

POL

PPDDE

PPJFK

PPLBJ

PRO

PSD

RCC

SAG

SAGF

SARG

SAVAK

SEA

SEATO

SHAPE

National Archives II - College Park, Maryland
National Archives of India
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Near East

Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Office of India, Ceylon, Nepal and Maidive Islands Affairs

NEA/South Asian Affairs

National Front

night action immediate

National Intelligence Estimate

National Photographic Intelligence Center

National Security Action Memorandum

National Security Council

National Security Files

National Unity Committee

Nationalist Union Party

New York Times

New Zealand National Archives

Operations Coordinating Board

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Presidential Daily Brief

Peoples’ Democratic Party

President’s Office Files

Political Affairs

Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower

Papers of President John F. Kennedy

Presidential Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson

Public Records Office

Psychological Strategy Board

Revolutionary Command Council

Saudi Arabia p 634

Saudi Arabian Government

Saudi Arabian General Files

Syrian Arab Republic Government

Sa^man-e Httelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar ( ‘Iranian secret police’)
Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Supreme Headquarters NATO

xiv

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

SNIE

Special National Intelligence Estimate

SOA

Office of South Asian Affairs

UNO

United Nations Organization

UAR

United Arab Republic

United Kingdom

United Nations

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNPCC

United Nations Palestine Control Commission

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

US or USA

United States

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USARMA

US Army Military Attache

USG

United States Government

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WDC

Washington, DC

WHO

White House Office Files

YAR

Yemen Arab Republic

List of Illustrations

1 Eisenhower and Dulles discussing Suez, 1956 11

2 Nasser and Nehru Post-Bandung 32

3 Eisenhower and Nehru Official Visit, 1956 35

4 Nasser and Syrian President Quwatli 45

5 King Hussein and King Feisal, 1958 51

6 Eisenhower and King Saud 53

7 Raymond Hare 60

8 Dulles and Robert Murphy 7 1

9 Iraqi coup leaders Aref and Qasim 108

10 Meeting of British and Americans over Middle East, 1959 116

11 Eisenhower and King Hussein 130

12 Eisenhower and Nasser at UNGA, 1960 138

13 Eisenhower and Herter, 1959 145

14 Eisenhower and Shah of Iran, 1959 160

15 Kennedy with Myer Feldman 183

1 6 JFK and Prime Minister Macmillan 199

17 Kennedy with King Saud 208

1 8 Chester Bowles and Philip Talbot 21 8

19 Chester Bowles and Julius Holmes 227

20 Shah of Iran Publicizing Land Reform 238

21 Ayub, Eisenhower, and Kennedy 252

22 Nehru and Kennedy 256

Acknowledgments

I owe the greatest debt of gratitude to my wife Cheryl for tolerating and
even encouraging this project and my other academic adventures. I owe heart-
felt thanks to my father Roby E. Barrett for the storytelling that instilled a love
of the past; to my mother Carol Ward Barrett for making education so
important; to my daughter Tracy Barrett-Learn for lively scholarly exchanges,
and entertaining research advice; to Michael Learn for rescuing me from my
computer; to my friend Allen Keiswetter for comments and encouragement; to
my friend Nancy Casey for her support, and to my colleague and friend Lisa
Lacy for timely advice. My sincere thanks to Professor W. Roger Louis for his
time and patient support; he provided counsel and encouragement that can
only come from a true teacher and educator. Professor Louis also provided
invaluable advice and encouragement during the publishing process. This
effort might never have come to fruition without the early support,
encouragement, and interest of Professor Margaret Omar Nydell and Professor
John O. Voll of Georgetown University. Professor Nydell did her best to teach
me Arabic at FSI. My thanks go to Professor Voll for his interest in tire topic
and investment of time and effort. His on-going investment of time and effort
was fundamental to the success of this research project. I also want to thank
Phillips Talbot, William ‘Bill’ Lakeland, General Andrew Goodpaster,
Mohammad Hakki, Christopher Van Hollen, and the late Walt W. Rostow for
their willingness to sit down and explain their view of events described in this
work. Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank the Eisenhower Foundation
for its generous award of the Dwight D. Eisenhower and Clifford Roberts
Graduate Research Fellowship, which made much of the foreign archival
research in this work possible.

Roby C. Barrett
3 April 2007

Preface

The idea for the structure of dais book came to me more than a decade ago
while evaluating the potential impact of a specific project on a business client’s
broader interests on a major project in what in a country in what I have
defined here as the Greater Middle East. The immediate considerations were
largely tactical and bilateral, but long-term the implications of die project were
strategic and multi-lateral and potentially far more important than the specific
project at hand. Given those ‘immediate considerations’, obtaining real
consideration of the broader context and the longer-term perspective was
difficult, but the effort paid off ultimately when taking die longer view allowed
a more rewarding strategy to emerge. It was an exceptional event because
whedier in government or business, my experience had been that the
immediate interests almost always trumped the strategic. At the time, I was
reading Keith Kyle’s Sue prompting me to consider the degree to which
tactical decisions driven by ‘immediate’ pressures faced by US administrations
and the foreign policy apparatus often risked or sacrificed US strategic
interests. The answer appeared to be - usually. The events of the last few years
have tended to put an exclamation point on that conclusion. Widi this thought
in mind, I began to think that a systematic study of a given period of time
might be a rewarding and stimulating endeavor. A key consideration of such a
study would be the degree to which narrow perspectives or preconceived ideas
about immediate problems or crises prevented a greater awareness of the
content in which problems occurred and thus undermined a prudent
consideration of strategic interests?

This brought another observation, namely, that area studies and
international relations tended to narrow die policy to the point that perspective
on the broader context was lost. It also occurred to me that this had an effect
on historical writing on die Middle East. Rarely did authors attempt to deal
with the region within a context that reflected the fundamental organizational
structure of the policy making and implementation organizations within the US

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

government. That is to say that when John Foster Dulles described the Middle
East as stretching form ‘Morocco to India,’ this statement reflected not only
the reality and linkages on the ground but it also reflected the organizational
structure within the US government that dealt with it. The Near East and
South Asia Bureau and divisions within other government agencies reflected
the connectivity across the region that I have chosen to describe here as the
Greater Middle East. Historical writing on the topic tended to be broken into
very focused monographs on bilateral relations, the Arab world, Iran, or South
Asia. Few if any attempted to holistically deal with the region. The insistence
by the Bush administration over tire last six years that various issues across the
region are unconnected and can be successfully dealt with on an independent
basis, i.e. Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, radical Islam, etc., also
sparked a desire to explore the recent past and evaluate the experience of
previous administrations in attempting to deal with tactical problems against a
more strategic backdrop. How successful had they been at dealing with
problems in the Greater Middle East as insolated rather than interrelated,
coupled issues?

At tire same time, I became increasingly interested in the 1950s and the
struggles that accompanied the US’s emergence as the dominant western
power in the Greater Middle East. This interest brought me to the relationship
between President Eisenhower and his two Secretaries of State, John Foster
Dulles, and Christian Herter. As my interest grew from casual reading to
focused research, die idea came to me that a comparison between Eisenhower
and Kennedy policy with regard to die Middle East might be worthwhile.
Originally, I believed that die comparison would contrast die realist and, at
times, ideological hard-line Cold War policies of Eisenhower against a broader,
more flexible and open approach to the region under Kennedy. With a few
exceptions, this was the view reflected in what scholarship existed. As I delved
into the research materials, what I found was surprising. The administrations
had far more in common than one would suppose. In fact, both were driven by
very similar views of the best course for maintaining pro-western states and
achieving modernization in the developing world. Both were committed to
stability over political and economic reform. The real story laid not in the
differences between the two administrations but in the similarities.

At this point, I concluded that only an in-depth research effort could
adequately make the point. This effort would have to explain the policies of
both administrations from the broader context of a Middle East that
fundamentally covered the geographical area from North Africa to India. In
addition, to dealing with the region at the macro level, the study would have to
delve into the details of the relationships and key events in order to glue the
overall argument together. Beginning in 2001, that effort involved a global
three year research project to obtain a clearer understanding of what actually
happened and to cast light on the real policy relationship between the
administrations of Eisenhower and Kennedy. The research represented here is
a broad selection of sources and materials. It includes multiple archives,

Preface

XXI

collections, interviews, and libraries. It is an effort to interpret events and
policy from a wide-angle perspective and support those views by telescoping in
on key events, decision makers, and their motivations. Many of the topics
discussed here have been dealt with within individual monographs, but their
scope has been largely limited to single states or bilateral issues between two or
three states; the dimension of the broader geo-political context is generally
missing.

To accomplish this, tire initial research effort focused on unpublished
source materials. From the unpublished materials the research effort
progressed to published collections, interviews, memoirs and first person
accounts, and then secondary source materials. For example, rather than
examining The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) first and then working
back into the archives, this effort took the opposite approach by examining
archival materials first followed by a later examination of FRUS. The reader
will find citations from the National Archives that are in FRUS, but those
documents were first located in die files at the Archives. Where the document
was found first in FRUS, then the citation is FRUS. Why do it this way? By
going directly to the raw documents, I determined the historical significance
uninfluenced by a previous judgment. It then became possible to compare a
broader segment of documents to ascertain what actually happened and why.
This methodology was also used at the Eisenhower, Johnson, and Kennedy
presidential libraries. When combined with the research effort at the British,
Egyptian, Indian, Australian, and New Zealand national archives, the historical
shadow cast by published documentation sometimes took a different, and
hopefully, more accurate form. With regard to referencing,, I have also culled
duplicate footnotes from the text. If there were three endnotes in succession
from the same source and pages, I eliminated the first two and kept only the
last reference. In practical terms this means that in some cases a notation
might refer to the information in multiple preceding paragraphs within the
same section. Transliterations reflected common usage, i.e., Nasser, not Nasir,
and a simplification of Arab names, i.e., Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim to Qasim.

Despite the linkages and broadened geographical conceptualization, some
regions and countries receive only passing mention. The North African states
of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are a case in point. This limited
treatment results in part from the more peripheral role played by North Africa
in the political action from 1958-1963. King Hassan II of Morocco and King
Idris of Libya were included on Nasser’s list of ‘feudal states.’ President Habib
Bourgiba of Tunisia ranked almost as high as Nuri Sa’id in the Egyptian
president’s hierarchy of reactionary leaders, but these states were not central to
the struggles of the late 1950s and early 1960s. They were central to the
struggle for North African independence but that had its own much more
European overtones. In Algeria, the liberation movement drove French
participation in Suez in 1956 and later support for Israel but, by die late 1950s,
there was growing acceptance that France would eventually have to seek an
accommodation with local resistance leaders. Turkey also receives limited

xxii Greater Middle East and the Cold War

attention. This study takes the position that Ankara is a special case. Turkey’s
primary orientation was European. As a member of NATO, Turkey had
special status and priority that dramatically differentiated it from even tire other
pro-western states of the Middle East despite its membership in both the
Baghdad Pact and CENTO. Had Iran and Pakistan collapsed or joined the
neutral camp Turkey would have stayed in the Western orbit of NATO and
Europe. For this reason, Turkey is treated as more of a peripheral element.

In examining the historiography, there is no single historical work that
compares in scope to this study, but the list of historical writings dealing with
various aspects of this study is lengthy. My purpose is to create an historical
mosaic as opposed to a narrow study. L. Carl Brown’s International Politics and
the Middle East to some degrees introduces this idea of a mosaic and provides
an overview of the ‘Eastern Question’ from the eighteenth century to the
1980s. Brown argues that the Middle East is a ‘thoroughly penetrated society.’
He goes on to state, ‘The Middle has been so continuously interlocked
politically with the West as to have become almost an appendage of the
Western power system.’ Brown convincingly asserts that the Cold War
competition in the Middle East constituted merely an extension of the Eastern
Question that had plagued European powers since the beginning of Ottoman
decline in the early 1700s, and that tire United States is merely the latest new
player. Assuming this is correct, the broader context of US involvement needs
elucidation.

The current coverage of US policy in the Middle East during the formative
years of the late 1950s and early 1960s comes in the form of limited treatments
in articles or works on the Eisenhower and Kennedy years. None have dealt in
depth with the late Eisenhower administration, and most tend to take the
position that Kennedy brought in a completely new progressive approach.
Warren Bass’ Support Any Friend provides an interesting look at ‘Kennedy’s
Middle East’ from the perspective of the relationship with Israel, but
consistently understates the impact of the pro-Israeli lobby on the
administration. Bass also underestimates the understanding of Arab policy to
be gleaned from memoirs, contemporary literature, and by triangulation
through extensive multiple archival research. Douglas Little wrote several
interesting articles on the Kennedy era including ‘A Fool’s Errand: American
and the Middle East, 1961-1969,’ ‘The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser,
and Arab Nationalism,’ and ‘From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed: Seeking
Order in die Middle East.’ While insightful, these articles are very narrow in
scope. In American Presidents and the Middle East , George Lenczowski provides a
series of short policy summaries. He points out that Kennedy reaffirmed
Eisenhower’s policy along the ‘northern tier’ — Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan —
with its obvious implications for India and Kennedy’s efforts widr the UAR.
No comprehensive work exists.

On the Arab world, Malcolm Kerr’s outstanding essay, The Arab Cold War:
A Study of Ideology in Politics perhaps comes closest to offering a snapshot of the
inter-Arab confrontation of 1958 to 1967. Kerr also produced the excellent

Preface xxiii

article, ‘The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt,’ in The Middle Eastern
Journal in early 1962. This article is particularly interesting for its informed,
ground level view of Nasser’s attempt to establish an ideological basis for his
regime. Kerr’s article also meshes well with Mahmoud Hussein’s work, Class
Conflict in Egypt: 1945-1970. Hussein, an avowed Communist, argues that die
Nasserist regime represented the triumph of a lower-middle class based ‘state
bourgeoisie.’ Egypt adopted the ideological weapons of class struggle widiout
the content.

Uriel Dann’s Iraq Under Oassem and King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab
Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 are examples of the often solid works of limited
scope diat deal with the period targeted by dais work. Published in 1969, the
Qasim work is dated and lacks access to more recendy declassified archival
resources. Both the Iraqi and Jordanian works are useful and take advantage of
published and periodical documentation from the period. The collection of
essays by William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, A Revolutionary Year: The
Middle East in 1958, offers interesting views of die emergence of the United
States as the preeminent Western power in the Middle East, but limited
references to Iran and Pakistan are the only ventures outside the Arab Middle
East. Robert McNamara in Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle
East, 1952-1967 discusses the British relationship with Nasser but the
chronological span leaves treatment of key issues at a cursory level and does
not examine the impact across South Asia.

The various biographies of Nasser, Anthony Nutting’s Nasser, Said K.
Aburish’s Nasser, The East Arab, Robert Stephen’s Nasser, and Jean Lacouture’s
Nasser provide insight into the Arab Middle East equation and some
understanding of Nasser and non-alignment, but all suffer from the limitations
imposed by narrow biographical focus. Wilton Wynn’s Nasser of Egypt deserves
mention because it is a sympathetic, contemporary account of the Egyptian
leader by a journalist who knew him and Egypt in the 1950s. Wynn takes the
view that handled correctly a Middle East peace could have come to fruition in
1955 following Anthony Eden’s Guildhall speech that the Israelis scuttled. This
and other sympathetic views of Nasser earned Wynn’s work banishment from
the political and journalistic mainstream. Nevertheless it is an interesting work
that offers an informed alternative view of die Egyptian regime. Useful works
target national history but these usually provide an overview of some of the
specific issues affecting Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt;
no work attempts to examine the period.

With respect to Iran, Jim Bill’s work, The Eagle and the Eton, focuses primarily
on the 1979 revolution. His treatment of the Eisenhower period is cliche in the
sense that it borrows from generally accepted later interpretations of the
Kennedy administration. Bill argues that Eisenhower coddled the Shah with
military and security support and created the Iranian animosity and hatred of
the regime that ultimately led to 1979. Bill’s emphasis not only underscores die
problems associated with interpretations of the relationship between the
Eisenhower and Kennedy policies but also contributes to the idea that the

XXIV

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

United States might have brought about a different outcome. A recent article
by April Summit in The Middle Eastern Journal entitled ‘For a White Revolution:
John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran,’ comes much closer to the
fundamentals of Kennedy policy toward Iran. The article does not adequately
explain die struggle over policy formulation between the White House activists
typified by Robert Komer and the State Department led by Ambassador Julius
Holmes, nor does it explain how the resolution of that struggle pushed the US
down die road to 1979.

In fact, M.E. Yapp’s work, Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and
Afghanistan, 1798-1850, offers a useful perspective on Persia in the nineteenth
century that applies almost equally as well to die Iranian situation of the 1950s
and 1960s. Writing about early nineteenth century British alliances with Iran to
deflect Russian threats in the region, Yapp states, ‘The Iranian alliance [was] an
expensive and unwanted albatross which had been hung around their necks.’
Both Eisenhower and Kennedy saw Iran as an albatross as well, but in the
competition with the Soviet Union both were unwilling to risk potential
consequences of aggressively pursuing an alternative to die Shah’s rule. Much
of the post-1979 writing on Iran suggests that the United States might have
prevented 1979, an interesting ‘Salvationist’ idea diat seems to imply that the
US was more responsible for Iran than the Iranians. Others take the less
popular view that the Shah was actually in control and used the relationship
with the US to his own ends. In ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era,’
William Griffith writes that the Shah’s ‘positive nationalism’ from 1953 to the
early 1960s was ‘quite successful in terms of the Shah’s objectives.’ He
stabilized his personal rule, modernized his army, and assured himself of
enough US support to allow him to undertake reforms to undercut his
opposition. This included less reliance on Washington and land reform.

To the east, Pakistan and India were inseparable from the Middle East
political and diplomatic dynamic of 1958-1963. Despite voluminous writing on
India, Pakistan, and the conflict over Kashmir, there is little scholarship linking
the escalation of the conflict to events in the Arab Middle East. The best
existing historical writing on this period comes in the form of biographies of
Nehru. The most recent, Judith Brown’s Nehru: A Political Ufe, concludes that
Nehru’s insistence on personally conducting Indian foreign policy provided the
innovation of the ‘non-aligned’ concept but ultimately impeded
implementation because of poor management and the flow of new ideas in a
shifting diplomatic environment. The author asserts that, unfortunately, Nehru
was extremely difficult to deal with. Difficult or not, Brown’s quote of Dean
Acheson explains Western willingness to cultivate Nehru despite the
difficulties: ‘He was so important to India and India’s survival so important to
all of us, that if he did not exist - as Voltaire said of God - he would have had
to be invented.’ On the issue of connectivity with the Arab Middle East,
Brown argues that it was Nehru’s relationship with Nasser that allowed him to
attempt mediation at Suez and to work closely with Eisenhower who forced
the British and French withdrawal. The author points out that as a result of

Preface

XXV

Suez, Nehru came to believe that Eisenhower was actually ‘flexible’ with regard
to non-alignment. The author also blames Nehru for V.K. Krishna Menon’s
gaffs and for the pathetic performance of the Indian defense establishment
during the border war with China. Brown’s treatment of foreign policy
represents the best overview of Indian foreign policy of any of die biographies.

With regard to the border war with China, Neville Maxwell’s India’s War with
China is superb, well balanced, and broad in its scope of inquiry. The 1970
publication date prevented Maxwell from accessing significant declassified
research materials but interviews with participants more than compensate.
Other works discuss Indian foreign policy and non-alignment but in a much
less organized fashion. Sarvepalli Gopal’s three-volume biography of Nehru
explains Indian policy predominately in terms of Pakistan and China. Gopal’s
rationalizations of Nehru’s shortcomings detract from an otherwise factually
interesting work. In Nehru: The Making of India, Muhammad J. Akbar gives
foreign policy a relatively low priority but he alludes to the issue of regional
connectivity stating, ‘It is an interesting point that India and the USA could not
create a friendship that would have been eminently logical . . . not because of
any direct conflict of interest, but because of different perception of third-party
problems: communism, Korea and from there, China, Indo-China, and, of
course Pakistan.’ Gopal’s is the stronger work with regard to the Middle East
and US foreign policy, but both Gopal and Akbar suffer from the limitation
imposed by the biographical narrative.

In the case of Pakistan, several works discuss 1958 to 1963 within the
context of its relations with India, the United States, and the members of the
various western alliances to which Karachi adhered. Of these, most focus on
the issue of military rule. These include Ayesha Jalal’s The State of Martial Ride,
Tawrence Ziring’s The Ayuh Khan Era, and Hasan Askari-Rizvi’s The Military &
Politics in Pakistan. Ayub Khan’s autobiography, Friends Not Masters, is also an
explanation for the military role in Pakistani politics from the former Pakistani
president himself. As one would expect, Ayub is highly critical of Kennedy’s
‘betrayal’ of Pakistan in 1962 and 1963. The best overall study of Pakistan that
correlates with this study is The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 by Dennis
Kux. This work addresses the history of US-Pakistani relations paying
particular attention to the Eisenhower and Kennedy years.

In a final comment on the formation of US policy, this work attempts to go
beyond the normal historical analysis that focuses on the principals or
‘decision-makers’ in US foreign policy. ‘Decision-makers’ as we have learned of
late often exhibit more the characteristics of a vacuous, empty vessel to be
filled with information and ideas from the sources that they choose. This
choice can make all the difference. In the Kennedy administration, Robert
Komer exemplifies how a knowledgable, frenetic, and prolific fountain of
memos and papers placed in a key position on the NSC can at times influence
the policy process out of all proportion to his perceived position. For this
reason, his oral history and files at the Kennedy Library are a highly
informative and instructive. Particularly, in the first two years of die Kennedy

XXVI

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

administration, Komer’s voice often informs the policy-making apparatus to a
degree that is disproportionate to the stature of his position and his overt
political clout. Kennedy’s distrust of the traditional foreign policy appartus and
his desire to create a new policy paradigm magnified the influence of officials
of Komer’s ilk. This occurs to some degree in every administration but it was
particularly pronounced in the early Kennedy years; thus a balanced well
informed policy depended on the mental acuity and intellectual rigor applied by
senoir administration officials and particularly the one in the Oval Office. In
the case of the Kennedy administration, the fundamental, pragmatic
intelligence of the President allowed him recognize policies gone awry and then
to flexibly adjust. In late 1962 and 1963, Kennedy salvaged the US policies in
the Middle East by shifting back to his predecessor’s pragmatic model. It is an
interesting process that this book attempts to describe. Kennedy grasped that
world was not what he had conceived it to be in 1961. This is all the more
interesting when viewed in light of other chief executives who have been
hampered by the apparent inability to understand the difference between the
world as they have conceived it to be, the reality that exists, the interests of the
United States, and the necessity to adjust policies to avoid looming policy
debacles. History may not repeat itself but it certainly contains some interesting
parallels and comparisons.

This review in no way represents a comprehensive discussion of all the
scholarship related to this topic, but these works are typical of the current
scholarship in the field in that period. This study is an attempt to provide a
fundamentally different perspective. Its goal is to provide a breadth and depth
in analysis that connects events, movements, and leaders across the Greater
Middle East. It discusses the motivations that drove the complementary
policies of Nasser and Nehru during the early 1950s. It includes an explanation
of the profound impact that the Baghdad coup of 1958 had not only in the
Arab world, but also in Iran, Pakistan, and India as well. It contains a careful
examination of the similarity in the policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations, and the frustrations that faced the latter as he attempted,
apparently in ignorance, to reinvent the policy initiatives that failed under
Eisenhower between 1953 and 1956. This study takes all of these issues and
places them in the larger regional context to which they belong. In doing so,
The Greater Middle East and the Cold War offers new facts and a detailed re-
examination of the events and key players from a fresh, more holistic
perspective. Hopefully, the reader will find it useful and informative, but most
of all, in light of the current myopic policies and unwillingness to see the
connectivity between issues, the demonstrable historical interconnectivity of
events across the region during the 1950s and 1960s will provide provocative
perspective on the ideas and policies of the recent past.

Introduction

The Greater Middle East and the Cold W ar: US Foreign Tolicy under Eisenhower and
Kennedy examines American foreign policy in the Middle East from 1958 to
1963. It also examines the Eisenhower experience between 1953 and 1955 as
the basis for the more realistic approach to the region following Aswan
decisions, Suez and mixed reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Tltis work’s
implicit lack of emphasis on die Suez war reflects the view that while certainly
attention-getting, the flash and bang of 1956 represented an interlude, the
exception rather than the rule in political, diplomatic, and even military
interaction between the US, its Western allies, and die various states in the
Greater Middle East. Much more typical and thus more central to an overall
understanding of the policy interaction during the Eisenhower and Kennedy
years were the periods before and after Suez. Both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations continuously searched for ways to sway countries of
the Muslim Middle East to cooperate and participate in Washington’s
campaign to contain the Soviet Union and Communist influence. Both
administrations promised rewards for countries that would come to either a
formal arrangement or, in some cases, just a working arrangement with the
United States, if it benefited containment. Initially, the ‘promises’ were most
often heavily weighted toward economic aid and development assistance, but
after 1958, security and military aid received increasing emphasis. This study of
US foreign policy in the Greater Middle East examines the attempts, some
successful and some not, to enlist the Muslim world in Eisenhower’s and
Kennedy’s Cold War struggle to contain the Soviet and Communist expansion
in the Greater Middle East.

It reevaluates and challenges many of the fundamental assumptions
associated with the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods. By accessing a
multiplicity of archival sources, it also places those policies within a broader,
more complex regional context. At the same time, the work examines the
political and diplomatic interaction behind this policy formulation at a level of

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

significantly greater granularity, thus providing a more detailed view of the
actual events and how policies related to those events developed. The ultimate
aim of US global policy remained absolutely consistent for over 40 years: the
containment of the Soviet Union, of Communist China, and of the spread of
Communism. US policy in the Middle East, which, for the purposes of this
study, includes die Arab Middle East, Iran, and the South Asia subcontinent,
reflected this commitment. Containment in the region was the top priority of
both administrations; Kennedy was no less a ‘Cold Warrior’ than Eisenhower.
Despite these similarities, the Kennedy administration has consistendy been
given credit for more nuanced, sophisticated, reform-oriented policies. In
contrast, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, his foreign policy confidant and
lightning-rod, are often viewed as bumbling, coercive, and less astute than
Kennedy and his team of policy experts. In reality, both administrations
practiced containment in a remarkably similar manner. Both were
uncomfortable with non-progressive, traditional regimes; both had a strong
faith in and desire to see controlled reform in the region; and both, when faced
by the possibility of anti-Western instability, supported anti-democratic
elements and measures. As the most recent US administration is in the process
of learning, liberal democractic notions of representative politics and economic
development are much more easily talked about than realized throughout most
of the region. In those cases where popular democracy did exist, it often ran
counter to Western interests in general and US interests in particular.
Eisenhower and Kennedy found the more democratic progressive regimes,
Musaddiq’s Iran and Nehru’s India, at odds with Western interests, and
exhibited a noted preference for authoritarian and even reactionary elements
because of the stability they offered. Both administrations followed die mantra
of imposed stability as the basis for ‘controlled’ political reform and economic
development.

These reform-based policies and their faith in economic development as a
buffer against Communism and Soviet influence, owed a theoretical debt to
early ‘modernization theory’. Policymakers in both administrations borrowed
eclectically from the precepts of ‘modernization theory’ to create a set of
policies that supported economic development as a means to economic, social,
and political reform. Military, in rare instancesdirect support for a regime,
covert and overt internal support for security organizations, and a push
towards economic development and political reform comprised the major
elements of American containment policy. In fact when all these elements are
evaluated, economic development emerged as the preferred path to political,
economic, and social reform, and thus pro-Western stability. Influential foreign
policy advisors, including Walt W. Rostow, were intimately involved in both
administrations and advocated policies that approached an almost absolute
faith in the efficacy of economic development as a fundamental pillar of
political stability and containment. This faith in economic reform also carried
with it a steadfast belief that when necessary political stability had to be
maintained by force in order to create a secure environment for development,

Introduction

but it was economic development that would provide the engine for long-term
pro-Western social development and political liberalization. For example,
Rostow had a glimpse of the future when he described ‘the Amercan interest’
as something that ‘transcend(s) the problem of countering Communist
aggressive objectives and techniques’. He added: ‘It seems altogether possible
that the United States could be confronted with a major danger even if
communism should wither away as an effective force. The danger is that the
underdeveloped countries develop along lines hostile to the West and Western
tradition. Should their basic orientation be anti-Western and anti-American, the
United States would confront a very grave set of problems as the presently
underdeveloped societies were modernized and strengthened.’ 1 An opinion
expressed in 1957, the accuracy of which the West now can better appreciate.

Simply put, this theory described an approach to the developing world in
which strategically placed economic aid could create the ‘preconditions for
economic growth’, bringing countries to an economic ‘take-off point’. While
‘fluctuating’ and ‘sometimes painful’, the theory held that this ‘take-off point’
would lead to prosperity in a final stage of ‘self-sustaining growth’. 2 This
growth constituted the path to social and political reform, fostering democratic
political institutions and social justice. Spurred by the perceived success of
post-war economic and development aid in thwarting Communist influence in
Western Europe and Japan, these views became the Western democratic
version of economic determinism, an answer to Marxist-Leninism. ’

Both administrations adopted these arguments more or less as ground-truth.
For both, economic aid was the preferred type of assistance in the Greater
Middle East, accompanied, to varying degrees, by advocacy of political and
social reform. Both administrations saw economic development and reform as
the only way to establish stable societies and governments, the most effective
bulwarks against Communist expansion. Both administrations pushed for
political, economic, and, to some degree, social reform as the preferred means
of preventing Communist expansion and of limiting Soviet, and to a lesser
extent, Chinese influence. Economic development and reform became
fundamental corollaries of Cold War containment. Whether the emphasis fell
on economic modernization or political reform depended almost entirely on
Washington’s perception at any given point in time of die course that would
best contribute to pro-Western stability. Eisenhower and Kennedy were also
quick to drop calls for reform and to support repressive governments through
military and security assistance when they perceived drat reform would induce
instability and threaten Western interests. Given these similarities, a question
naturally arises: why have the historical interpretations of these two
administrations diverged?

The Kennedy ‘mystique’ or ‘myth’ left an indelible imprint on outside
perceptions. The understandable urge to canonize Kennedy and his policies as
exceptional certainly had a major impact, but timing also played a significant
role. In terms of the Middle East and Asia, Kennedy’s tenure in office fell
between the era of chaotic policy formulation in the mid-1950s and the

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

realization in the late 1960s that his policies in Southeast Asia had been a
fundamental mistake. If the relationship between Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s
policies is to be properly calibrated, understanding the chronological context is
critical. In the early 1950s, Eisenhower faced the task of constructing a US
policy in the developing world largely from scratch. This task was considerably
more complex than that faced by the Kennedy administration. The initial
learning curve in the Middle East was steep, and the Truman had
administration left no blueprint. In 1953, die United States was feeling its way
through the Middle Eastern labyrinth. From Truman, Eisenhower, much to his
chagrin, inherited Israel and an ill-defined set of policy ideas, including Middle
East Defense Organization (MEDO) and ‘northern-tier’ concepts. Washington
had largely relied upon the former colonial powers, principally the British and
the French, to protect Western interests, and the US tended to follow their
policy lead. The events of 1955 to 1958 increased the complexity of
Washington’s responsibilities in the Middle East. The period 1958 to 1963
witnessed the beginning of an even more profound change in the nature of
British and French influence in the region. The British and French now made
consultations and coordination with the United States a fundamental part of
their policy formulation in the Middle East. Ironically, in the case of the
British, these consultations tended to increase their influence in Washington, as
US responsibilities in the region increased.

To adequately understand these developments and relationships, they must
be examined within a chronological progression. Understanding Eisenhower’s
accomplishments in the 1958 to 1960 time-frame requires a review of his early
years, from 1953 to 1955. The dashed hopes for economic development and
political and social reform during the early administration and the chaos of
1956 and 1957 resulted in the emergence of the pragmatic, workable US
policies of 1958-1960. Thus, in 1961, Kennedy and his advisors inherited a
largely functional set of policies and alliances. Tty as they might to represent it
in another light, Kennedy and his team essentially followed the course set by
Eisenhower. Their attempts to deviate from the 1958-1960 models invariably
failed, for one of two reasons. First, Kennedy’s team failed to recognize that
their policy initiatives were often replications of earlier, failed Eisenhower
initiatives that ran fundamentally against the political grain in the region.
Second, Kennedy often overestimated the impact of personal presidential
diplomacy and his ability to use it to manage regional conflicts. Of these two
problems, the most egregious was the unwillingness of Kennedy and his
advisors to give credit where credit was due with respect to Eisenhower. As a
result, the Kennedy administration dissipated much of its strength and
influence in the Middle East trying to resurrect long-dead policy initiatives.
Under both Eisenhower and Kennedy, regional issues, leaders, and forces
determined the agenda, and for these, parochial regional interests took
precedence over Washington’s fixation on containment.

The shift toward regional influences reinforces the need for an examination
of events within a significantly broader geographical setting. This geographical

Introduction

context exceeds the limitations imposed by traditional area studies. It reflects
Dulles’ repeated references to die Middle East as the region stretching ‘from
Morocco to Pakistan’, thus drawing India into the equation. This expanded
geographical view of the ‘Middle East’ is a particularly effective vantage point
for viewing the 1950s and 1960s. The advent of non-alignment and positive
neutralism overlaid an often ignored historical connectivity with a loose
ideological and political framework. At the same time, Washington’s global
commitment to containment and its support for political and economic
modernization further reinforced this more holistic conceptualization of the
region. In 1958, events in Iraq affected relations with Egypt and India, as well
as with neighboring Iran and Jordan. In like manner, problems between India
and Pakistan complicated US relations with Egypt. Colonial control had tended
to isolate problems, whereas its removal resulted in a reemergence of historical
regional connectivity. As a result, policymakers in Washington had to adjust to
a situation in which decisions in one area of the Greater Middle East often had
immediate and pronounced repercussions in another.

The Anglo-American alliance added an additional level of complexity.
Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the British, of all the Allies, exerted the greatest
influence on Washington’s practice of containment. Policy differences,
sometimes major, existed, but each recognized that they needed the other. In
the Persian Gulf and Arab Middle East, where British interests were
paramount, London’s influence created a series of fluctuations in US policy.
The confusion, disagreements, and sometimes cross-purpose policies, as well
as the areas of cooperation between Washington and London, are central to
any evaluation of the evolution of the Anglo-American relationship.
Fundamental changes in their abilities to project power brought on the
confounding and always perplexing task of rethinking long-held assumptions.
As Britain’s unilateral ability to protect its interests collapsed, the British
adjusted their tactics and began to use their influence with Washington to
achieve many of those same goals. Eisenhower and Kennedy often found
themselves modifying policy because of British influence. Good relations with
London constituted the bedrock of US Cold War strategy, and global
containment depended on it; therefore, British interests in the Greater Middle
East had to be considered, even when they ran counter to US plans and views.

With Winston Churchill as its initial practitioner, the British learned early on
that US concerns over Communist inroads could be exploited in a way that
directly benefited the interests of Her Majesty’s Government. The Suez crisis
in 1956 taught London that the failure to manage Washington could have
serious and humiliating consequences. To this end, Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan used his relationship with Eisenhower to reestablish British
influence in Washington. This influence most often aggravated US relations
with revolutionary nationalist regimes and resulted in a clear US tilt toward the
traditional rulers of the region. 4 British policy also influenced indigenous
regional dynamics. In general, the British saw aid not in terms of political and
economic modernization, but as a means of influence and maintaining the

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

status quo. Thus, they consistently urged the US to desist from providing aid to
revolutionary regimes, or what Washington often viewed as die more
progressive states in the region, and urged an aid policy drat fostered traditional
regimes and British interests. The British focus on influencing Washington
became particularly acute following the 1958 debacle in Iraq. The British had
their pet regimes and interests, and they were adept at using their influence in
Washington to protect them.

In addition to Anglo-American relations, Israel and oil also influenced the
practice of US foreign policy and containment. Israel and Zionism constituted
the only issues upon which all of the Arab states and Muslim populations in
the region could agree. Even Hindu-dominated India shunned Israeli
participation in the non-aligned movement because of the potential political
and diplomatic fallout. The Jewish state was a clear liability for US hopes in the
region. Both Washington and London viewed Israel as a policy albatross, an
obstacle to a successful policy in the Middle East. Despite this problem, the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations clearly supported Israel’s survival.
Both administrations attempted to orchestrate peace settlements and both
failed. Beyond the generalities, Eisenhower contrasted sharply in his Arab-
Israeli policies with Kennedy. The Republican administration attempted to
pursue a balanced policy between the Arabs and Israel. Kennedy, after
considerable internal debate, succumbed to domestic political pressure and
increasingly pursued pro-Israeli policies for domestic political reasons. From
1958 to 1963, the so-called Arab Cold War had sublimated die Arab-Israeli
dispute to a degree; however, the Palestinian refugees and die Arab-Israeli
conflict remained a fundamental regional issue. The revolutionary regimes in
the Arab Middle East had all achieved power in part as a result of the inability
of their predecessors to deal successfully with the Zionist issue. Across the
region, being a good Arab, a good Muslim, or, for that matter, a non-aligned,
anti-colonial regime in good standing, required opposition to Zionism as a
colonial creation. Fundamental to the struggle for power, influence, and
leadership in the Arab and Muslim worlds was the question of who would best
confront expansionist Zionism. Israel as an issue existed at or near the surface
of any US attempt to further its influence in the Middle East. As a further
complication, Tel Aviv pursued its own interests regardless of the
consequences to the US, and the Israelis consistently undermined any US
attempts to bring about a more pro-Western stance on the part of the secular,
more ‘progressive’, revolutionary Arab regimes.

Oil constituted the other background influence on US policy. Oil definitely
contributed to the US obsession with containing the Soviet Union in the
Middle East. The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations not only grasped
the immediate, critical petroleum requirements of their European and Asian
allies, but they also understood the long-term implications of growing oil
consumption in the United States. The British played the more immediate and
significant role in the equation. British oil interests in the region provided
petroleum products to European markets and, at the same time, propped up

Introduction

the British economy. European, Japanese, and British willingness to partner
with the United States in the global containment of tire Soviet Union depended
on oil. With the exception of post-1958 Iraq, states ruled by traditional regimes
possessed most of the petroleum resources of the region. Advocating reform-
oriented modernization as the corollary of containment in those oil-producing
states carried risks. Reform could bring instability and even collapse; therefore,
while theoretically committed to reform, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations were reluctant to push reforms that might threaten the flow of
crude. Oil was a thread periodically pushed to the forefront as Washington
attempted to deal with crises in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. It explained US
support for British interests in the Gulf, and it underscored Washington’s
increasing support for ‘white revolutions’ and ‘controlled democracy’.

These themes, taken in aggregate, underscore the fundamental connectivity
between the Eisenhower and Kennedy policies of containment and
modernization in the Greater Middle East. They also demonstrate US
susceptibility at any given time to the influences of indigenous forces, the
British, oil, and Israel. By taking an initial short digression, we will see how
Kennedy’s administration attempted to reinvent Eisenhower’s failed policies of
1953-1954 and found itself limping back to what remained of Eisenhower’s
bequest. In the mid-1950s, Eisenhower and Dulles learned the pitfalls of an
ideologically motivated activist policy. Failing to appreciate adequately the
experience of his predecessors, Kennedy repeated many of those same
mistakes in the early 1960s. In these two experiences, we will hear a warning
echoed against well-intentioned policy activism that presumes to impose
simplistic foreign solutions on very complex, well-established political,
economic, and social structures. From the US perspective, the end results of
such policies in the Middle East have rarely been predictable, with the
exception that they have almost always created unpleasant situations that
complicated relations.

While this study focuses on the period from 1958 to 1963, the seeds of
these events were sown between 1953 and 1955. In 1953, Joseph Stalin died,
the Korean War ended, the French were preparing a knockout blow against the
Viet Minh in Indochina, the situation in Europe was improving, and a new
administration took office. In 1953, events in Iran seemed to offer a reassuring
model for dealing with regional nationalism run amuck. In Iran, Muhammad
Musaddiq, Time magazine’s Man of the Year in 1951 and the man who
nationalized British oil interests, symbolized the threat that secular nationalism
posed to Western interests if it was not managed correctly. Although he was
thoroughly Westernized and a reformer, Musaddiq’s nationalism threatened the
British-dominated status quo in Iran and encouraged other potentially anti-
Western nationalist elements in the region. More problematically, Musaddiq’s
tolerance of leftist political groups seemed to promise increased Soviet
influence, or the potential for a neutral Iran. 5 As will be seen, this increased
Iranian political ferment, and instability initially provoked distinctly different
reactions from Whitehall and the White House.

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

In Egypt, agitation over the Suez Canal, while a nuisance, appeared to be
nothing more than a new version of historical frictions that had always afflicted
Egyptian society and official Egypt’s love -hate relationship with the West. In
1952, the collapse of die regime of King Farouk I at the hands of a group of
largely British-trained military officers was hardly a national tragedy. The
emergence of General Muhammad Neguib and the Revolutionary Command
Council under the control of Colonel Gamal Abd-al-Nasser held both risks
and promise. It looked as though American influence and aid might protect
British interests, and at the same time enlist Egypt in a pro-Western mutual
security 7 arrangement. Washington hoped that the withdrawal of British forces
from Suez would dampen political unrest and anti-Western, if not anti-British,
agitation. In South Asia, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru continued to preach his
brand of ‘neutralism’, while he struggled to maintain the central government’s
control over fractious Congress Party associates and over die impoverished
polyglot state inherited from the British. Despite periodically 7 tense relations
with the West, Nehru understood diat the economic development of India
depended on Western aid and his relationship with the United States and
Britain. To that end, India continued its participation in the British
Commonwealth. In Iraq, the situation actually appeared to improve. The
Baghdad government began various projects designed to raise the standard of
living for die general population. Problems in the region appeared manageable,
and while there were clouds on the horizon, most expected that the Western
allies would maintain their ascendancy. In 1945, future Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan had made two observations: ‘In die Middle East, Britain was still a
Great Power’, and the United States supported the ‘strength and prestige’ of
Britain in the region. Given that only the Suez Canal treaty negotiations with
Egypt were a serious point of contention, it appeared that Macmillan’s
observation would hold true in the 1950s as well. 6

Against this backdrop, the freshly-minted Eisenhower administration was
determined to show its superiority over the outgoing Truman establishment.
Eisenhower wanted to create a new paradigm for relationships with emerging
nations, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. He also wanted the British to
change their posture outside of Europe. Eisenhower viewed Truman’s close
association with die British as a major mistake. The new president was
absolutely certain that he could better manage the mess created by Truman.
Eight years later, Kennedy and his set of advisors held the same negative view
of Eisenhower. In fact, both Eisenhower and Kennedy were acting well within
the policy parameters of containment and economic development. To
understand this parallel experience, this study 7 first looks at how the Middle
East dynamic, complicated by the necessity of cooperation with London,
unstrung die policy plans of die Eisenhower administration between 1953 and
1955. Then, in the series of chapters that follow, die study will explore
Eisenhower’s 1958-1960 accommodation with the new Middle Eastern
political reality 7 , as well as Britain’s deft adjustment to its own receding power
and influence. Subsequent sections will examine Kennedy’s policies and

Introduction

highlight the remarkable similarities and nuanced differences that existed
between the policies pursued by the two presidents. By tracing and examining
the similarities and differences between their two administrations during this
critical period in the context of the dynamics created by regional leaders,
revolution, non-alignment, the British, Israel, and oil, the study will analyze the
degree to which Eisenhower and Kennedy operated within die same
fundamental set of policy parameters.

Chapter 1 : The Greater Middle East

1953-1958

Placing US policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s in historical context
requires an analysis of the policy initiatives and attitudes in the early
Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower and Dulles, whose nomination as
Secretary of State had been opposed in London, arrived in office with
decidedly anti-colonial attitudes and predispositions. 1 This anti-colonial bent
put them at cross-purposes with long-established British interests. Despite the
realities of post-war empire, London had intended to preserve its system of
political influence and economic interests, and no-one was more committed to
the preservation of this system than Winston Churchill. In 1951, after six years
of Labour rule, he once again resurrected the Conservative Party’s political
fortunes, and cobbled together a government after six years of Labor rule. The
economic benefits of the remnants of empire provided Churchill with all the
incentive necessary to press Eisenhower to acquiesce to British policies and
interests in the Middle East.

The critical first meeting between the President-elect and Prime Minister
proved a harbinger of tilings to come. Wasting no time, Churchill used the
excuse of visiting a friend, Bernard Baruch, and traveled to New York in early
January 1953 for pre-inauguration talks with Eisenhower. 2 The discussions
covered a range of topics — the Communist threat, European economic and
defense issues, and trade with the Communist bloc. Eventually, the
conversation turned to the situation in the Middle East. Eisenhower raised the
issue of a defensive alliance modeled on tire North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and designed to contain Soviet expansion and
Communist inroads into what Dulles defined as the Middle East, the region
from Morocco to Pakistan. 3 The Labor government of Clement Atlee had
attempted to create a MEDO but the stench of colonial domination had
effectively undermined every attempt. Given the Arab states’ lack of

The Greater Middle East, 1953-1958

Courtesy of National A rchives
Eisenhower and Dulles discussing Suez, 1956
Eisenhower with John Foster Dulles discussing the Suez Crisis. The British
opposed Dulles’ appointment as Secretary of State, but Eisenhower saw Dulles as a
loyal instrument whom he could use to execute his foreign policy and a lightning-
rod to divert criticism from the Oval Office. Despite rumors to the contrary,
Dulles was Eisenhower’s creature, not the reverse.

enthusiasm and Egypt’s outright hostility, an alternative that would become
known as the ‘northern tier’ emerged. 4 The Truman administration had toyed
with the idea, but Secretary of State Dean Acheson left it to the incoming
administration to decide how to proceed. In his talks with Churchill on 6
January 1953, Eisenhower broached the subject of the ‘northern tier’ as an
alternative should MEDO ‘prove unfeasible’. 5 Unlike London, Eisenhower and
Dulles retained some hope that, with US sponsorship, a regional defensive pact
which included Egypt might be feasible. The mere fact that the new
administration in Washington might attempt to directly insert itself into the
region was disquieting enough, but the lectures on the necessity of respecting
regional nationalisms were nothing short of alarming.

During the campaign, both Eisenhower and Dulles had made numerous
pronouncements on the passing of empire and the rise of nationalism in the
developing world. In the meeting with Churchill, Eisenhower made it clear that
they were very serious about supporting the emerging states and their national
aspirations. When Churchill raised the issue of joint action in the Middle East,
Eisenhower reacted negatively and quickly pointed out to the Prime Minister
that Iris joint proposals with Truman on Iran had backfired and only served to
taint Washington with British colonialism. The President-elect told Churchill:

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

‘All that [Churchill] did was to get Mossadegh to accuse [the United States] of
being a partner of the British in “brow-beating a weak nation”.’ Eisenhower
elaborated: ‘Nationalism is on the march and world Communism is taking
advantage of that spirit of nationalism to cause dissention [sic] in the free
world. Moscow leads many misguided people to believe that they can count on
Communist help to achieve and sustain nationalistic ambitions.’ With regard to
Churchill’s concerns, Eisenhower allowed, ‘[I]n some instances immediate
independence would result in suffering for people and even anarchy .’ 6 Despite
his concern about ‘immediate independence’, the message was clear. The new
administration intended to chart its own course, and clearly viewed British
opposition to emerging national movements and association with London’s
colonial past as a liability.

Eisenhower also told Churchill that he viewed persuasion and the more
aggressive use of US economic and military aid as the basic levers of foreign
policy in the region. The heavy emphasis on economic aid reflected the
influence of advisors, including Walt Rostow and other technocrats, who
believed that through economic aid the United States could bring developing
nations to the point of economic self-sufficiency and thereby foster pro-
Western democratic institutions and societies. Advisors like Rostow would
later migrate to die Kennedy and Johnson administrations and effectively
promote similar policies there . 7 The meeting also heightened Eisenhower’s
concerns about the British and his old comrade-in-arms, Churchill. He believed
that Churchill was ‘trying to relive die days of World War II . . . sitting on some
rather Olympian platform with respect to the rest of world, and directing world
affairs’ with another American president. Eisenhower added:

Winston does not by any means propose to resort to power politics and
to disregard legitimate aspirations among weaker peoples. But he does
take the rather old-fashioned, paternalistic, approach that since we, with
our experience and power, will be required to support and carry the
heavy burdens of decent international plans, as well as to aid infant
nations towards self-dependence, other nations should recognize the
wisdom of our suggestions, and follow them.

Eisenhower commented that while Churchill’s view might be ‘true — in the
abstract’, the reality of the situation dictated the use of ‘persuasion and
example’, ‘patient negotiation, understanding and equality of treatment’, and
not a ‘take it or leave it’ approach. Strategic cooperation with London was
critical, but Washington had every intention of avoiding the baggage of British
colonialism, while promoting a ‘slower and more orderly progress towards
independence’ for the developing world . 8

The new administration believed that immediate, or what Eisenhower
referred to as ‘momentary independence’, brought the threat of instability and
potential Communist takeovers, but it clearly supported an ‘orderly’ transition
to full independence and an appropriate expression of constructive nationalism

The Greater Middle East, 1 953-1958

for developing nations. 9 On 10 January 1953, Eisenhower and Dulles
confirmed that the priorities for US policy in the Middle East would be
containment of the Soviet Union and of Communist influence through
economic development, covert assistance to pro-Western elements, and, if
necessary, military assistance. Resolving the ‘critical’ problem of Iran was
second on the list. Next came a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian impasse over
basing rights in the Suez Canal, followed by a solution to the Arab-Israeli
dispute. 10 In each case, economic and development aid were to be the
fundamental incentives. The similarities, in terms of both policy planning and
practical application, between Eisenhower’s intended policies in 1953 and
those of the Kennedy administration in 1961 were uncanny. In 1953, the Suez
Crisis (1956) and the Iraq Coup (1958) had yet to undermine the aura of
London’s expertise and dominance in the Middle East; yet the new
administration was leery of Britain’s colonial baggage and particularly reluctant
to support Churchill in the disputes with Iran and Egypt. In February 1953,
Eisenhower told British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that the ‘somewhat
frightening phraseology’ of Churchill’s private correspondence left concerns
that London would ‘tie our hands in advance’ in Egypt. 11 Egypt was the
centerpiece of US policy plans for supporting progressive regimes and for the
potential revival of MEDO. In contrast, Churchill viewed the Middle East as
traditionally a British sphere of influence, and its oil as a necessity for
continued British influence in the world and for prosperity at home. The
thought of a concerted Yankee intrusion on behalf of emerging progressive
regimes and the potential threat that such a move posed to British interests was
to say the least distressing.

Preemption and Iran 1953

In early 1953, and ironically again in 1961, Iran constituted a serious
immediate concern. The policy of containment required the maintenance of a
pro-Western Iran tied to the US through Western security arrangements. In
1953, the Iranian crisis drove a series of US policy decisions that made a
Middle East collective security arrangement based on the ‘northern tier’
increasingly attractive. Musaddiq’s political roller-coaster and his confrontation
with London over the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) substantially
increased Iranian instability. While die administration lamented the inability of
the Shah, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to hold his own against Musaddiq
and die National Front, Dulles stated: ‘Prime Minister Mossadegh could not
afford to reach any agreement with the British lest it cost him his political
life.’ 12 Dulles underlined the word ‘any’ indicating that he clearly understood
the Iranian prime minister’s lack of political options. The Secretary of State
flatly stated that Musaddiq was not a Communist and, in doing so, cited ‘secret
radio’ attacks on him by the Communists for being ‘a vile servant of the Shah’.
Nevertheless, with British whispers about the Communist threat and prodding,
Washington began increasingly to fear that a dictatorship under Musaddiq
could bring die Communists to power through his assassination or a coup. The

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

administration’s proposed solution was to strengthen Musaddiq’s position
through additional economic assistance. 13 The British used the 1951
assassination of the moderate Prime Minister, General Sephabod Haj Ali
Razmara, by purported elements of the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party,
to increase anxiety in Washington about what might happen to Musaddiq,
nevertheless Eisenhower continued to resist British calls for intervention. 14
The role of oil in propping up the pound sterling drove British anxiety over
Iran. In contrast, Eisenhower’s cabinet, and in particular Secretary Dulles,
believed that the oil issue could be managed with the Musaddiq government in
power. Despite rising concern about what might happen, the Eisenhower
administration preferred an alternative to intervention.

The British took a dim view of any US plans to strengthen Musaddiq.
London vociferously complained that US support would result in an
irreparable loss of British face. 15 Still, attempting to avoid intervention,
Washington instigated an anti-Communist ‘psychological strategy program’ as a
part of a broader anti-Soviet campaign designed to stir up anti-Tudeh
sentiment. 16 Nothing quieted the unrest. With the pro-Western propaganda
campaign failing, direct aid blocked by British protests, increasing instability,
and the exaggerated specter of a Communist takeover, London’s arguments
that the Musaddiq government had to be replaced gained traction with
Eisenhower. The fear of what might happen drove the decision to take
preemptive action. 17 What resulted was the confused, circus-like coup of 16-20
August 1953. With the support of most of the Shi’a religious establishment,
military elements led by General Fazlullah Zahedi overthrew die Musaddiq
government. Zahedi restored the Shah to the throne, crushed the Communist
Tudeh, suppressed the National Front, and handed Iranian petroleum to an
Anglo-American consortium. From the perspective of the Eisenhower
administration, the coup may have defused the immediate crisis, but it hardly
solved the problem of Iranian stability. The administration continued to view
economic development and social and political reform as die only real
insurance against instability and Communist subversion. At the 30 December
1953 NSC meeting, Dulles’ comments continued to reflect the administration’s
desire for fundamental reform in Iran. The Secretary complained that the Shah
and Zahedi had accomplished litde in the way of ‘critical’ economic and social
reform. While a solution to the dispute over oil appeared to be in the offing,
none of the problems that brought on the instability had been addressed.
Dulles went on to say that the only bright spot was the suppression of the
opposition. Most of the Tudeh leadership was in jail, die National Front ceased
to be an immediate factor, and British-Iranian relations had resumed with ‘no
serious domestic repercussions’. 18

The success of the Iranian coup established a mindset in Washington. The
reform policies of nationalist politicians in the Middle East tended to create
political instability, which, in turn, opened the door for Communist and Soviet
inroads. Regimes that relied on conservative military officers appeared to
provide a lower-risk path to economic development and political and social

The Greater Middle East, 1 9534 958

reform. Despite later protestations to the contrary, the administration’s faith
lay in General Zahedi, not the Shah. As a result, the Eisenhower administration
pointedly maintained a degree of separation between its policies and personal
support for the Shah. For good reason, die administration supported the
territorial integrity of a pro-Western independent Iran, not the Pahlavi dynasty.
There were serious questions about die Shah’s ability to rule. Real faith lay in
the conservative military and security services, not only as the foundation for
stability, but also as the potential instrument for controlled reform. Finally,
Islam and the religious establishment across the region constituted a natural
enemy of Communism, and thus another potential ally in die Cold War. This
support for religious conservatives served the US well for almost four decades
in combating Soviet influence and hostile nationalist regimes. 19 The Iranian
coup also moved Washington toward a view of Western interests in the region
that was more closely aligned with British views. Eisenhower and Secretary
Dulles now had confidence that, when necessary, the US had the capability to
control the political situation through covert action.

Defusing a crisis and sparking another — Egypt, 1953-1954

Unfortunately for Churchill and the British government, Egypt was not
Iran. In January 1953, when Eisenhower arrived in the White House, the new
revolutionary government in Egypt stood at the center of two pressing
problems in the Middle East: die Anglo-Egyptian dispute over Suez and the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Initially, Eisenhower considered the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute over the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal zone as a more
acute problem than either the Arab-Israeli dispute or Musaddiq’s rogue
government in Iran. The new revolutionary government was under the official
leadership of General Muhammad Neguib, but was dominated from behind
the scenes by Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The
Egyptians demanded British withdrawal from the Canal zone and threatened
guerrilla war if London refused. Given the administration view that Egypt was
the key to Western fortunes in the Middle East, Washington made it clear that
the British presence was an impediment to US interests. Eisenhower and
Dulles wanted to pursue a policy of economic assistance, including support for
the Egyptian plans to dam the Nile at Aswan. They believed that economic aid
would make the new Egyptian government look inward toward economic and
social reform, and resolve the ‘failure of successive governments to deal with
the dangerous internal economic and social situation’. Eisenhower held that
Egypt was ‘obviously the key’ to the issues of Sudan, the Suez Canal, MEDO,
the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the Palestinian refugee problem. 20 In 1961,
Kennedy’s assessment and plans with regard to Egypt were virtually identical
to those of Eisenhower. Egypt was the ‘key’ to US policy goals.

In May 1953, Eisenhower characterized the Anglo-Egyptian crisis over the
Suez Canal as the ‘most dangerous’ situation in die Middle East and dispatched
Dulles to assess tire situation. For the British, tire thought of John Foster
Dulles loose in their sand box was maddening. Now, in addition to the US

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Ambassador to Egypt Jefferson Caffery giving ‘aid and comfort’ to the
Egyptians, Harold Macmillan groused, “No doubt the Egyptians (who already
rely on the American Ambassador Caffery) . . . are hoping to get something out
of Dulles, who is due to arrive in a day or two. . . . Dulles is sure to make a
‘gaffe’ if it is possible to do so.’ 21 Churchill’s government fumed over pressure
to come to terms with the Egyptians. Undeterred, Dulles reported: ‘if unsolved
situation [between Britain and Egypt] will find Arab world in open and united
hostility to West and in some cases receptive to Soviet aid.’ 22 US pressure
sparked a row with London. In a bid to moderate this pressure, Churchill
threatened an Anglo-Israeli alliance to intimidate Egypt. A skeptical but
cautious Dulles reported that such a British move would undermine ‘any hope
of extending United States influence over tire Near East and building at least a
minimum of strength here’, and would lead to die ‘accomplishment of one of
primary aims of Soviet Russia’. To appease the British, Dulles pressed Neguib,
Nasser, and the RCC to postpone alleged plans for a guerilla war and promised
that the US would press to ‘moderate the British position’. This is exactly what
Churchill had feared and Macmillan had prophesied. 23

Following a meeting with Neguib, Dulles met separately with Nasser on 11
May. Both the US embassy and the CIA had consistently reported that Nasser
was die real power in the RCC and thus, the de facto leader of Egypt. Hoping to
gain a new hearing for MEDO, Dulles promised additional pressure on the
British and more economic aid. Dulles broached the idea of MEDO, and
Nasser asked against whom the defense pact was aimed. Dulles replied:
‘Against the Soviet Union’. Nasser asked Dulles: ‘How can I go to my people
and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the
Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife 5,000 miles away?
They would tell me first tilings first.’ 24 Byr die end of the meeting, Nasser
believed that Dulles clearly understood Egypt’s rationale for declining to enter
a defense pact. Nasser also believed diat despite his refusal on MEDO, the US
would provide modern arms for the Egyptian army, allowing unofficial
cooperation between Washington and Cairo. 25 Dulles reported that while the
Egyptians were ‘most agreeable, it does not (repeat not) correct deep basic
distrust of British which is dominant consideration overriding any fear of
Soviets.’ The Secretary then concluded that MEDO as envisioned was
‘impracticable’ due to ‘recurrent’ tensions and British pressure against
economic and political aid. 26 This did not change the view that Egypt was
central to US policy interests. On the next leg of his trip, Dulles reported from
Damascus that the instability of die regime of Adib Shishakli underscored that
there was ‘no adequate substitute for Egypt’ as a partner in the Arab world. 27
Concluding that an Egyptian-based MEDO might constitute a ‘future rather
than an immediate possibility’, Dulles stated ‘the northern tier of nations shows
awareness of the danger’ of Soviet expansion and thus, the Secretary breathed
new life into the an idea first floated during the Truman administration, namely
a defensive alliance based on the ‘northern tier’. 28 He also concluded that Arab
participation in a Western military alliance would create problems in the Arab

The Greater Middle East, 1 953-1958

world that ran direcdy counter to US interests. 29 Dulles correctly concluded
that ‘the Arabs were more fearful of Zionism than of Communists.’ 30

Dulles’ view that the British constituted the main obstacle to the success of
US policy in the Middle East brought increased pressure from Washington on
London over the Canal. Anglo-American relations worsened proportionally. In
late May 1953, the State Department reported that relations with Britain were
‘worse than at any time since Pearl Harbor’. Warning that US pressure
threatened his government, Churchill hinted that a Labor government might
suspend US basing rights in Britain. At boiling point, Churchill muttered about
setting up high-level talks with the Soviets on the Egyptian situation, and
blamed Dulles and Ambassador Caffery for die lack of progress on the new
Canal treaty. Few took the threats seriously, but the administration unhappily
concluded: ‘We have to play along with die British for the time being, and take
the beating, which would inevitably result through our association with an ally
whom the Egyptians and other Arab states hated as imperialists.’ 31 The
Eisenhower administration walked a tightrope in attempting to avoid a break
with London or with Egypt that would benefit the Soviets. In December 1953,
Churchill sent a thinly-veiled, alarmist warning to Eisenhower:

I am very much worried at the idea of the grant of American economic
aid to Egypt at a time when our differences with them are so acute. It
would, I am sure, have a grave effect in this country on Anglo-American
relations. The Socialist opposition would use it to urge us to press for the
inclusion of Red China in U.N.O. and might class it with trade to that
country upon which subject [Joseph] McCarthy’s unjust charges are
already much resented. The frontier of the Suez Canal zone shows very
much the same conditions of unrest and potential warfare, as does the
frontier in Korea. So much for the opposition. On our Conservative side
too we have a disturbed and increasingly angered section who could at
any time cancel our modest majority. . . . Whether in your policies and
immense responsibilities you would get much help from a Socialist
Government, I shall not attempt to predict. . . . What I fear, however, is
that the offended Conservatives might add their voices to that section of
the Socialist Party who criticize the United States. 32

Just for good measure, Churchill added that a Socialist government would
likely recognize Communist China as well. Annoyed by the ‘somber tone’ of
Churchill’s letter, Eisenhower responded that recognizing ‘Red China’ was
hardly a threat since the British were already trading with them. 33 Still,
London’s alarm and Churchill’s growing aggravation gave Washington pause.

The President wanted Churchill to commit that if the US withheld aid and
Egypt agreed to the terms discussed by the Prime Minister and President at
their earlier meeting in Bermuda, Britain would then settle its differences with
Egypt. 34 The Prime Minister reassured Eisenhower: ‘If the Egyptians accept
our present terms we shall certainly abide by them. But we do not think you

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

ought to give them moral and material support while they threaten and assault
our troops and conduct a campaign of hatred against us.’ 35 In 1954, die Anglo-
Egyptian treaty over die Canal allowed a British military presence until 1956,
and the right of reoccupation if the Canal were threatened. In reality, the
British, no longer able to to maintain large forces in Egypt, were willing to
settle for die right of reentry. The problem revolved around defining what
constituted an emergency. Eventually, the Egyptians grudgingly accepted the
right of reentry in the event of a war that included an attack on Turkey. 36
Although unforeseen at the time, the inclusion of Turkey would provide a
flashpoint that ultimately unraveled the British position in Iraq and accelerated
the collapse of British prestige in die region. On 27 July 1954, the Egyptians
and the British signed an agreement that provided for the phased withdrawal of
British forces. 37 Finalized in October 1954, the treaty seemed to resolve the
Anglo-Egyptian impasse and cleared the way for closer Egyptian ties with the
West. In November 1954, Nasser removed Neguib and took direct control of
the government.

In reality, the treaty, coupled with Dulles’ alternate strategy for containment
along die ‘northern tier’ unintentionally undermined the administration’s early
hopes for Western gains. Nasser and the RCC had needed US help in getting
an agreement with Britain; thus the completion of the treaty reduced Cairo’s
dependence on Washington. The treaty also provoked a revolt by the Muslim
Brotherhood, forcing Nasser to take a public anti-Western stance. The fact that
the propaganda campaign was largely orchestrated with CIA assistance was
beside the point; Nasser could not openly pursue pro-Western policies after
the treaty than before it. 38 Relations between Cairo and Washington were
further complicated by dashed Egyptian expectations. Nasser believed that
Dulles had promised massive US economic and military aid in return for
compromises with the British. 39 During the winter of 1954, it became
increasingly evident that any aid would have strings attached, a situation that
Nasser, politically could not afford. 40 From Nasser’s point of view, the utility
of a relationship with Washington was rapidly decreasing. Washington alluded
to economic aid, and military aid was limited to security assistance for internal
purposes, not modern arms for the Egyptian army.

At this point, Dulles’ ‘northern tier’ substitute for die Egyptian-based
MEDO crashed head-on into US-Egyptian relations. With Washington acting
as the mid-wife, on 2 April 1954 Pakistan and Turkey had announced their
‘Agreement of Friendly Cooperation’. Rumors had circulated for months about
the potential for an alliance. At the eastern end of the region, the arming of
Pakistan would galvanize Nehru into a frenzy of opposition to US policies, but
the response in the Arab Middle East was muted on the condition of non-
participation by Arab states. On 1 August, at Egyptian prodding, the Arab
League issued a statement opposing the inclusion of any Arab states in a non-
Arab defensive alliance. Iraq adhered to the Arab League declaration only
when speculation about membership in the Turkish-Pakistani pact resulted in
nationalist rioting in Baghdad, and the British supported the Iraqi decision. The

The Greater Middle East, 1 953-1958

British government feared that US influence in Iraq would increase as it had in
post-coup Iran and post-revolutionary Egypt. 41 At this juncture, the terms of
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty altered the course of events in the Arab Middle East.
The treaty linked Egypt to Turkey and the British defense of the Canal by
stating that British forces could reenter the Suez Canal zone in the event of an
attack on Turkey. The fact that the Egyptians had strongly opposed this clause
was lost on tire Iraqis. Nuri Sa’id interpreted the treaty as a tripartite defensive
arrangement between Turkey, Egypt, and Britain, with Iraq effectively out in
the cold. To recoup Iraq’s position, he moved to form his own alliance with
Turkey. In early January, Iraq and Turkey announced their intention to enter
into a defensive alliance.

The Egyptian reaction was swift and decidedly negative. Nasser called for a
ministerial-level Arab conference in Cairo. Viewing the Iraqi move as a direct
challenge to Egypt’s leadership and an indication of the continued British
divide-and-conquer policy, Nasser moved to form an Arab defense
arrangement that isolated Iraq. The Cairo Conference of 22 January was a
humiliating failure. Only Yemen and Saudi Arabia supported Egypt, while
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon refused to condemn Iraq. The failure of the
conference brought a vitriolic propaganda campaign aimed at Nuri Sa’id, Iraq,
and anyone else that supported the ‘Anglo-American stooge’. It caused
Washington to reconsider support for Iraq’s inclusion in any Western defense
scheme. 42 Having specifically warned the US about the inclusion of Arab states
in its defensive alliances, Cairo began to view the US role with greater
suspicion. Nuri Pasha had managed to place the Eisenhower administration’s
security plan on a collision course with the very country that Washington
viewed as the ‘key’ to the region.

Recognizing an opportunity to separate the US from Egypt, the British now
supported the inclusion of Iraq and other Arab states into die defense alliance.
London threw caution to the winds in its Iraqi policy by undermining the Arab
nationalist credentials of the Hashemite regime. Still hoping for US economic
aid, support for the Aswan project, and US arms, Nasser wanted to preserve
his relationship with Washington; however, the potential for Iraq’s inclusion in
a Western military alliance raised serious questions about the potential threat
that Eisenhower’s containment policy posed to Egyptian interests in the
region. In Washington, Eisenhower and his advisors were beginning to grasp
the limitations that the political realities of the Middle East placed on the
influence to be gained through economic assistance and on local participation
in its plans to contain the Soviet Union. Largely in deference to Cairo’s
negative reaction to Iraq’s inclusion in what became the Baghdad Pact,
Washington provided support but refused to join, while still hoping to gain
something positive from its courtship of Nasser.

A peace for the Arab-Israeli conflict

Eisenhower and Dulles, in essence, agreed with Secretary of State George C.
Marshall’s assessment that the recognition of Israel had fundamentally been a

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

policy made for emotional and political reasons during the presidential
campaign of 1948. By 1953, the creation of Israel was so much spilt milk, but it
threatened to sour relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds. The problem
now centered on how to neutralize Israel as a stumbling block to US-Arab
relations. Eisenhower clearly understood the problems associated with any
attempt to foster improved Arab-Israeli relations:

There is no doubt that American initiative in the establishment of the
Israeli State and the resulting Arab refugee problem has led to increased
anti-Western feeling throughout the Arab countries and has embittered,
in particular, Arab-American relations. It may be, too, that the aid which
Israel has received from the United States has delayed the possibility of a
setdement by enabling Israel to avoid facing the issue that, unless she
trades with die Arab countries, she cannot be a viable State.

With regard to the situation in Egypt, the President viewed the Arab-Israeli
dispute as a distraction from the proper focus on economic progress. He
stated: ‘It is doubtful, therefore, if any Egyptian Government could risk settling
these international questions without ... at least having made a start with
economic policies designed to raise the miserable standard of living of the bulk
of the Egyptian people.’ 43 Eisenhower, like Kennedy in 1961, believed that
economic development coupled with a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute
was not just desirable, but mandatory in order to protect the long-term
interests of the US.

With this in mind, on his Middle East mission in May 1953 Dulles stated:
‘We had come here with belief Egypt afforded best opportunity for Arab
leadership toward better relations with Israel and the West.’ 44 Eisenhower
believed that an Arab-Israeli peace was possible as long as the US could
maintain a relatively neutral stance and could induce both the Arabs and
Israelis to focus on economic development. Against tire backdrop of the
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over die Suez Canal, the administration attempted
to leverage the Egyptian regime into breaking the impasse over an Arab-Israeli
peace settlement. Eisenhower had repeatedly stated that his administration
intended to ‘do what it thought was right’ and not, as Vice-President Richard
M. Nixon put it, ‘kowtow’ to domestic Jewish political pressure. Washington
believed that it could use economic leverage and manipulate the valve on
foreign aid to control Israel. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson suggested:
‘when a horse gets too frisky you should cut down on his oats.’ 45 The
administration believed that it could use economic leverage to drive die Israelis
to the bargaining-table and to force them to compromise with the Arabs.

A solution to the refugee problem was to be the first step. 46 The plan also
called for guarantees on the part of Israel ‘against any further expansion at the
expense of neighboring nations’. It included compensation for Palestinian
refugees and the right of return for refugees. Lastly, it called for a settlement of
the Jordan River water-usage issues and a joint program to develop water

The Greater Middle East, 1 9534 958

resources in the region. Washington clearly linked an agreement on the
development of the Jordan waters, the setdement of the refugee problem, and
just for good measure, the internationalization of Jerusalem as the basis for
peace in the region. 47 During his Middle East trip in May 1953, Dulles
broached the topic of refugees with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.
Ben-Gurion quickly disabused Dulles of any hopes of Israeli cooperation.
Rejecting a comprehensive peace settlement, Ben-Gurion wanted a ‘de facto’
peace with an end to ‘economic hostilities’. In addition, he made it clear that
Israel had no intention of allowing the ‘right of return’. Dulles quickly drew the
only conclusion possible, namely that any hope for peace rested on the success
of a step-by-step approach. 48

Wanting to scuttle compromise and knowing full well that the Arabs would
reject it, Ben-Gurion wanted to offer an Israeli proposal. His goal was to place
the Arabs at a ‘moral disadvantage and thereby neutralizing growing American
interest in Arab friendship’. 49 The administration recognized the ploy for what
it was and pressured the Israelis to withhold any initiative. Concluding that the
refugee problem was a dead issue, Washington then focused on the Jordan
waters issue as a first step in getting an agreement between the two sides. 50 The
administration understood that die Arabs would not sign an agreement that
recognized Israel’s right to exist, and Eric Johnston, the chief negotiator,
worked diligently on a plan to circumvent this issue. 51 The British had warned
that in pressing too hard for the water-sharing agreement, the United States
would ‘risk a major loss of prestige and position’. 52 Johnston reported that he
believed that he could get die Israelis to agree but would have problems with
the Arabs. In point of fact, Johnston obtained an agreement from the Arabs,
but the Israelis changed their position, jeopardizing the entire negotiation. 53
Johnston fell back on entreating die Israelis to review his proposals so ‘that
your painstaking and serious consideration will bring us closer to the end we
are seeking’. 54 At this point, the Israelis effectively removed the potential for
any settlement with Egypt and undercut the possibility of participation by any
Arab state in any agreement with Israel through military action. On 28
February, Israeli forces mounted a raid into Gaza, in retaliation for minor
border incidents. Dozens of Egyptian soldiers and police were killed. 55 Not
only did this make an agreement with Israel unthinkable, but it also brought to
a head the issue of modern arms for die Egyptian army. From Nasser’s
perspective, the Iraqi issue and the Gaza raid made it appear that the West
intended to strengthen Egypt’s enemies and undermine his prestige throughout
the region. Nuri Sa’id and Ben Gurion had succeeded in undermining the
lynchpin in Washington’s Arab policy. 56

Although efforts related to the refugee problem and the Jordan waters
lingered, by 1956 it was apparent that no agreement would be forthcoming. 57
Despite the Eisenhower administration’s good intentions, it simply
underestimated the complexity and intractability of the problem. None of the
parties involved were interested in a compromise setdement. The Israelis in
particular viewed any compromise as a threat to their goal of creating a Jewish

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

state and excluding the Arab population. In a note of cynicism about the
prospects for the plan, an anonymous bard penned the following for the State
Department tile:

Flow Gently Sweet Afton

Come quickly Sweet Arabs
Let’s meet while we can
We’ve something enticing
‘Tis Johnston’s own Plan
We only entreat you
Be ready to sign
We’ll furnish the paper
And the dotted line.

Now all that we ask you
Is simple and sweet
Just have full authority
Whenever we meet
So you all may sign up
And then we will tell
Those waters of Jordan
To steam heat all Hell. 58

The Jordan-waters plan collapsed; domestic political concerns outweighed any
economic benefit. The British had never the liked the project, US officials
ascribing this to London’s ‘pique’ at not being ‘sufficiently’ consulted before
Johnston undertook his mission. Washington believed that the British were
‘loathe to take an action which they [felt] would put all their eggs in one
basket’. London only got on board at the end because they feared a loss of
prestige if the American plan worked. 59 British reluctance turned out to be
justified. Eisenhower and Dulles had a plan, but no-one was willing to
participate in it. With the failure of the Jordan- waters effort, the Eisenhower
administrations efforts to establish a peace process effectively ground to a halt.
Economic incentives were simply insufficient inducements to outweigh the
associated political risks. This was not only true in the Arab world, but in Israel
as well, where the Arab ‘threat’ became the criticalinternal political issue. Fear
politics and exaggerating that threat became the political bread-and-butter that
paid off in Knesset seats. Thus, Arab and Israeli fear of a settlement trumped
any gain that might accrue from increased economic aid. This clearly
demonstrated the limitations that economic aid could play as an inducement to
an Arab-Israeli settlement.

Running afoul of non-alignment

In late 1954, the Eisenhower administration looked with justifiable
satisfaction on its overall Middle East policies. The situation in Iran, while

The Greater Middle East, 1 953-1958

leaving much to be desired in the way of political reform and economic
development, was stable. However grudgingly, Egypt and Britain had signed a
new treaty that would remove British forces from the Suez Canal zone.
Economic pressure and incentives showed promise as the first steps toward a
possible Arab-Israeli peace. At the same time, a rudimentary alliance system to
contain the Soviet Union seemed to be emerging. Issues and problems
remained, but on the whole, the marriage of containment and economic
development appeared to be working. In reality, these tactical successes had
begun the process that would turn US relations with the ‘progressive’ regimes
in the Middle East on their ear.

Just as the linkage between Turkey and Egypt in the Anglo -Egyptian treaty
of 1954 had unintended consequences, the inclusion of Pakistan in the
Western defense structure alienated India. At the same time, it made New
Delhi an integral part of the Middle Eastern power struggle. Ironically, Nehru’s
marriage of political democracy and economic development in India largely
followed the model that Eisenhower and his advisors saw as so central to pro-
Western development in Asia, and yet the requirements of containment would
foster an increasingly problematic relationship between the world’s two largest
democracies. These problems also contributed to growing political and
diplomatic synergy between India and Egypt; neither Nehru nor Nasser were
willing to trade national interests for arms or economic assistance from the
West. 60 Given their deep-seated distrust of Great Power machinations
stemming from their colonial experiences, India and Egypt absolutely refused
to enter a Western military alliance.

Nehru had made it clear that he envisioned a new political order for Asia
that rejected the traditions of Realpolitik. At the 1947 Asian Conference, Nehru
stated: ‘Asia far too long had been petitioners in western courts and
chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on
our own feet.’ 61 In India during the early 1950s, Nehru began to reverse the
trend toward diffusion of political power following independence. He was
consolidating power at the ‘Center’. The power of regional political chiefs
threatened to fracture the unity of die republic. Nehru believed that external
alliances would provide ammunition to his internal political opponents and
undermine Congress Party rule. Just as important, he was ideologically
committed to non-alignment. Non-alignment, or ‘neutrality’ in Washington’s
parlance, had a clear anti-American, almost pro-Communist tint. It flew in the
face of the ‘with us or against us’ attitudes that framed the Cold War
diplomatic and security mentality. Despite this, Nehru’s India was too
important to ignore or totally to alienate. The Eisenhower administration had
pronounced concerns with respect to non-alignment, but in the case of India,
Washington had prudently announced a policy of ‘respect for, but non-
acceptance of, neutralist policy’. 62 India was the largest democracy in the world,
a potential Asian counterbalance to Communist China, and Nehru had
innumerable admirers, including key members of the US Congress.
Eisenhower and his advisors recognized tire necessity of a working relationship

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

with New Delhi. In addition, India had played a key role in Korea, and chaired
the International Control Commission on Indochina. Having carefully
monitored US-Pakistani bilateral developments. New Delhi expressed
immediate concern when Dulles, following his Middle East tour in May 1953,
referred to an alternative defensive alliance on the northern tier and explained
that this meant Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. 63

No-one in Washington had any illusions about the desirability of avoiding
involvement in the Kashmir dispute. The Eisenhower administration viewed it
as an issue for British management because it ‘involvefd] two members of the
British Commonwealth’. This was more or less consistent with the British view
that tire Commonwealth provided a potential venue for quiet mediation away
from the glare of the United Nations (UN) and public posturing. 64 Officially,
the US based its policy on two conditions: first, India and Pakistan should only
employ peaceful means in settling their disputes; and second, a plebiscite in
Kashmir, preceded by demilitarization, should determine the final disposition
of the disputed area. New Delhi adamandy opposed the second condition. In
January 1953, the State Department reported die following to the White
House: ‘There [is] no present indication diat Nehru and the Indian
Government are prepared to reach [an] agreement’ on demilitarization or a
political solution ‘except on their own terms.’ 65 Thus, Nehru’s commitment to
non-alignment and his hard position on Kashmir offered Washington little
room to maneuver in building its containment of the Soviet Union or in
removing Kashmir as a potential regional flashpoint.

In December 1953, concerned that the administration lacked a real option in
dealing with Nehru’s position, Eisenhower wrote to a friend that he saw a
looming clash between US policy and non-alignment:

In between these two extremes (Left and Right) is a vast center group,
which in basic beliefs has much in common, and, for this reason, should
be a closely-knit organization. In point of fact this vast center or ‘Middle
of die Road’ group prefers to shut its eyes to die dangers represented in
the extremes — in the current state of affairs, the only direatening extreme
is Communism. The group of nations of which diis center is constituted
constantly indulges in all kinds of divisive arguments and name-calling
that grow so important in their cumulative effect as to nullify any attempt
toward unity in working against the common enemy.

Pakistan was a case in point. Eisenhower pointed out: ‘India would rather see
Pakistan weak and helpless in front of a Russian direat than to see that country
grow strong enough to give substance to its hope of annexing Kashmir.’ 66 The
White House decided that despite the potential fallout with India, US security
required a defensive military arrangement with Pakistan. Anticipating New
Delhi’s reaction, the administration pinned its hopes of managing India on the
importance of massive US aid. The US was the largest contributor of economic

The Greater Middle East, 19534 958

assistance, by a wide margin, and Nehru’s plans for economic development
were totally dependent on that aid.

Viewing this economic leverage as insurance against a radical Indian
reaction, the Eisenhower administration encouraged the formation of a
defensive alliance between Turkey and Pakistan. In December 1953, Nehru
expressed his opposition to arms for Pakistan to Vice-President Richard Nixon
during the latter’s visit to India. On his return to Washington, Nixon argued
strongly that the US could not afford to ‘back down on this program solely
because of Nehru’s objections. . . . Because such a retreat would cost us our
hold on Pakistan and on many other areas in the Near East and Africa.’ 67
Arguably, Nixon’s assessment tipped the balance in favor of providing arms to
Pakistan. 68 On 16 February 1954, die administration welcomed Pakistan and
Turkey’s decision to ‘study’ defense collaboration. President Eisenhower called
it ‘a constructive step towards better ensuring the security of the whole area of
the Middle East’. Eisenhower approved Karachi’s simultaneous request for
military aid, stating that he was ‘gravely concerned over the weakness of
defensive capabilities in die Middle East’. In hopes of mollifying India, the
President pointed out that the weapons were for ‘defensive’ purposes only and
not ‘in any act of aggression toward any other country’. 69

The White House interpreted Nehru’s professed fear of Pakistani aggression
as a stalking-horse for Nehru’s real motivation, to increase his own power and
prestige by attracting more countries to the Afro-Asian ‘neutralist bloc’. The
administration understood that New Delhi would be unhappy with arms for
Pakistan, but Nixon’s somewhat naive and oversimplified view of managing
Nehru resonated with the administration: ‘The best way to handle [Nehru]
would be for a special envoy to die President to go to New Delhi and explain
to Nehru firmly and forthrightly just why we thought it desirable to give
military assistance to Pakistan, and to offer reassurances as to our intentions
vis-a-vis India.’ Dulles hoped to hide behind the collective security agreement
of what the State Department termed the ‘so-called northern tier’ in order to
claim diat military assistance to Pakistan was not bilateral. 70

By March 1954, Eisenhower had tired of trying to mollify India and made it
clear that the security requirements of the US would determine the status of
military aid to Pakistan. Eisenhower sent a personal letter to Prime Minister
Nehru stating that ‘improving Pakistan’s defensive capability’ served the
interests of regional security and assured him, What we are proposing to do,
and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India.’ The
President pointedly reminded Nehru that India received ‘substantial economic
and technical aid’ from the US and dangled military aid ‘of a type contemplated
by our mutual security legislation,’ meaning, of course, aid to allied partners,
should India desire it. 71 Again, he reassured New Delhi that the US would take
‘appropriate action’ in the event that Pakistan attempted to direct this military
aid toward India. Washington implicitly understood how this news would play
in Delhi. In an effort to ‘counteract some of the . . . irritation in India at the
prospect of US military aid to Pakistan’, Washington commended the Indian

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

government and military for its ‘exemplary performance’ in handling
disengagement operations in Korea . 72 Rostow’s evaluation of containment and
Communist China underscored the consensus existing in Cold War
Washington. No matter how problematic relations might be, the success of
India’s ‘democratically engineered rural revolution’ and the ‘evolution of solid
military, political, and economic policies in Free Asia’ were vital if the West was
to deny Beijing ‘military and ideological primacy in Asia .’ 73 Rostow’s analysis
underscores the segued strategic view of Asia held by both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations.

Nehru reacted with a vehemence that surprised all but the most experienced
India hands in the foreign policy community. The Indian Prime Minister
claimed that the US had completely altered die ‘roots and foundations’ of any
proposed settlement on Kashmir. With broad public support in India, Nehru
argued that the US had taken Pakistan’s side in the dispute and was now
assisting Karachi in its ‘encirclement’ of India . 74 Nehru attacked both the
Americans and die Pakistanis for bringing the Cold War into South Asia and
creating the very instability that the alliance purportedly sought to prevent . 75
Nehru chastised Washington for attempting to pressure India into a military
alliance with the US by arming Pakistan and making it ‘practically a colony of
the United States ’. 76 Nehru threatened an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of USTndia
relations and hinted at acquiring arms from the Soviet Union . 77 Taken aback,
Washington attempted to minimize the Indian reaction. In India, senior
officials termed Eisenhower’s letter of explanation ‘condescending’ and praised
the Prime Minister’s ‘dignified response ’. 78 Nehru pointedly demanded that US
observers in Kashmir leave because ‘the US had ceased to be neutral as a result
of [its] military assistance to Pakistan .’ 79 He then publicly and contemptuously
dismissed Eisenhower’s personal letter of explanation . 80 From Eisenhower’s
perspective, Indian neutrality had become ‘neutrality against the West’, as
Nehru increasingly refused to differentiate between the Soviet and US political
systems. To further harass Washington, India became stridently critical of the
US refusal to allow UN membership for Beijing, with Nehru publicly claiming
that the US had ‘little understanding of Asian nationalism ’. 81 Despite his pique,
Nehru resisted more radical action against US interests. He understood that the
loss of US economic aid would have disastrous consequences for Indian
economic growth . 82 This situtation left Washington with policy schizophrenia.
Pakistan, where no amount of economic aid provided stability, was vital to
Western defense, and in contrast, India, which refused all entreaties to join a
Western alliance, represented the test case of ‘whether underdeveloped
economies can achieve progress by Western liberal means’. Nehru’s ‘socialist’
leanings notwithstanding, his vision appealed to Washington’s belief in
economic prosperity and reform as the surest counterbalance to Communist
expansionist . 83

The situation frustrated Nehru as well, but US aid prevented a head-on
confrontation with Washignton. He would find other ways to vent his
unhappiness with US policy. The arming of Pakistan contributed directly to a

The Greater Middle East, 1953-1958

vigorous Indian campaign to assert its prerogatives and emphasize its
independence from Washington, and to show its overall displeasure with
Western military alliances. Coincidentally, Nehru had at his disposal the perfect
instrument for harassing the Americans. This instrument left no doubt as to
the origin of the message but provided Nehru with a fig leaf of deniability. 84
Nehru had appointed Vengali Krishnan Krishna Menon to the Indian
delegation at the United Nations, following his controversial tenure as head of
the Indian High Commission in London. An avowed leftist, inspired by the
Hindu radical Lokmanaya Bal Gangadhar Tilak and the Bolshevik Revolution,
Menon had served as Nehru’s friend, publicist, and personal representative in
Britain during the 1930s and 1940s, where he became the self-styled
‘Ambassador of St. Pancreas’. 85 Menon described himself well, when he stated:
‘I never chase controversies, controversies chase me.’ 86 Arriving in New York
almost simultaneously with Eisenhower’s arrival in Washington, Menon’s high-
profile attacks on the West coupled with his pro-Soviet leftist views served as a
lightning rod for criticism and friction. Opponents of aid for India and critics
of ‘non-alignment’ transformed Menon into India’s American face. 87 By
claiming that he had authored the term ‘non-aligned’ and by his
uncompromising hostility to the West, he managed to further taint non-
alignment as pro-Soviet. 88

Concurrently, the Geneva Convention on Indochina was convened, with
India as the chair of the International Control Commission. Understanding full
well the implications and probable outcome, Nehru placed Menon in the
Indian delegation at the conference, where he managed to severely antagonize
Washington. 89 Chester L. Cooper, a member of die US delegation in Geneva,
described Menon’s contribution thus: ‘Krishna Menon, who blew in and out of
Geneva on short notice, was clearly the Super Star of die Geneva Follies and
relished his role. He consciously and conspicuously played to audiences well
beyond die confines of the Palais des Nations. He was wordy, windy, and
exasperatingly oratorical.’ 90 Menon made it clear drat he was implementing
Nehru’s policies. 91 Despite differences in style, Menon was, in fact, the more
radical and strident expression of Nehru’s positions. US assistance to Pakistan
aside, Nehru abhorred Eisenhower’s commitment to Asian leaders like Chiang
Kai-Shek and Sygmund Rhee. In non-policy areas, Nehru increasingly resented
what he viewed as the attitude of ‘American superiority’, and pushed for
limiting US influence. ‘I dislike more and more diis business of exchange of
persons between American and India. The fewer persons that go from India to
America and from America to India, the better.’ 92 Widely despised in the US,
Menon became a symbol of India’s and Nehru’s leftist tendencies, and of the
danger posed by the non-aligned movement. 93

Nehru and Bandung

Nehru’s commitment to non-alignment accelerated and intensified the
deterioration of Indian relations with the West. The geopolitical and military
aspects of US containment policy began to overshadow the initial commitment

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

to economic development as the initial central theme in combating Soviet,
Chinese, and indigenous Communist influence. In much of the developing
world, Washington’s linkage of military and economic policies under the
containment umbrella transformed perceptions of the US, from the champion
of emerging nationalism to a neo-colonialist interloper tied to a very British-
like policy of indirect colonialism. In January 1954, Shri Morarji Desai noted
the growing British influence on US policy in the region and commented to
Nehru: ‘There is smug satisfaction in Britain at the US dropping its anti-
colonialism.’ 94 Comments from senior British officials encouraged this
perception. On 14 January, British Deputy Labor Leader Herbert Morrison
told D.N. Chatterjee, the Indian High Commissioner in London that: ‘It is sad
but if India keeps out of all essential defense arrangements then I suppose
facilities in Pakistan will have to be used.’ 95 The Indians also understood that
the issue of arms for Pakistan had created a new political dynamic. In another
dispatch, Chatterjee stated: ‘Pakistan has moved somewhat into the American
orbit of influence’ and ‘India [had] broken with America,’ which put London in
a difficult situation given that ‘the menace of Russia against interests in the
Middle East is such that only with American help can Britain hope to
counteract it.’ 96 As Nehru described it: ‘Somehow the exigencies of the cold
war [led] the US to indirectly encourage colonialism.’ 97 Non-alignment not only
came to symbolize independence and freedom of action to Nehru, but it also
provided a means to indirectly tweak the Eisenhower administration for its
policies. Nehru’s unhappiness also placed a greater emphasis on pressing
forward with a major non-aligned initiative.

The 1954 Colombo and 1955 Bandung conferences were directly stimulated
by Nehru’s objections to the system of Western alliances. The 28 April to 2
May 1954 Colombo conference was a relatively limited affair; however, it
quickly took on broader overtones. Key participants quickly recognized it as a
path to greater stature and independence of action. Krishna Menon’s
attendance with Nehru became a major divisive note. Menon urged Nehru to
take extreme positions and, at one point, rudely interrupted the Pakistani Prime
Minister Muhammad Ali telling him: ‘We are sick and tired of your
submissions.’ 98 Nehru also lost his temper with the Pakistani Prime Minister,
stating that further discussion was useless ‘with America represented here’. Not
to be outdone, Ali shouted back, calling Nehru and Menon ‘stooges of Chinese
and Russian imperialism’. The Indians and Pakistanis disagreed on everything,
from condemnations of Communism and anti-Communist movements to the
order in which the ‘US, the UK, China, and USSR,’ (the Indian version) or
‘China, the UK, the US, and USSR’ (the alphabetic Pakistani version) were to
be listed in the call for non-intervention in Indochina. Apparently, Nehru’s
experience at the Colombo conference created something of a quandary for
him. Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali acquitted himself well, holding
his own against an overconfident Nehru: ‘Nehru underrated his young but
dynamic opposite number in Pakistan and overrated his own ability to hustle
the other Prime Ministers into meek compliance.’ 99 Already leery of a follow-

The Greater Middle East, 1 9534 958

on Afro-Asian conference the next year, Nehru set about finding additional
international support to counteract Pakistan before he committed to attend.

Nehru’s lukewarm support for an Afro-Asian conference in 1955 raised
doubts that it would occur. Initially, the Eisenhower administration believed
that the effort would likely collapse; however, by late 1954, it had become
apparent that Nehru intended to proceed and on a clearly anti-American note.
He stated: ‘I do not like either Communism or colonialism. Communism is
only a threat. Colonialism is a fact.’ Nehru made it clear that the principle
agenda at Bandung would be colonialism. 100 While public pronouncements
were somewhat muted, the press, particularly the Indian press, carried the
undiluted themes of die conference: ‘From championing the cause of freedom
in Asia, [the five] Colombo powers [were] slowly moving toward [an]
ideological crusade against colonialism.’ The commentary went on to bemoan
the American ‘vested interest in . . . decaying empires and, despite her anti-
imperialist record in past, has now put herself in the false position of defending
these anachronisms in name of fighting Communism.’ 101 Taking die diplomatic
initiative by inviting Beijing to attend, Nehru sent Britain and the United States
scrambling for a response. In fact, the potential diplomatic and political
ramifications were so broad drat the Eisenhower administration had great
difficulty in formulating a strategy at all.

On 14 January 1955, Dulles called a meeting of key State Department and
CIA officials in an attempt to come to some resolution concerning die proper
course of action for Washington. His younger brother, Allen Dulles, Director
of the CIA, expressed serious concern about the purpose of the Bandung
meetings. Director Dulles argued that given the combination of Chou En-lai
and Nehru many of ‘the relatively inexperienced Asian diplomats’ would be
‘ensnared’ into supporting anti-colonial resolution ‘seemingly in favor of
goodness, beauty and truth’. In addition, Washington feared that ‘the Bandung
meeting would provide Chou En-Lai with an excellent forum to broadcast
Communist ideology to a naive audience in the guise of anti-colonialism.’
Suggestions for dealing with the ‘rigged conference’ ran the gamut from
delaying it to organizing a boycott to supporting the attendance of solidly pro-
Western nations in the region. The sole point of agreement was the necessity
of undermining the Indian and Chinese positions and of achieving this by
working ‘hand-in-hand with the British’, given that three of the five sponsoring
nations were in the Commonwealth. 102

Washington worried about the potential for an anti-Western tone and
increased acceptability for Communist China in the world community. The
conference also highlighted the differences between the non-aligned and pro-
Western camps in Asia and the Middle East. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu
denied that it would be ‘anti-Western per se’, but allowed that in the context of
discussions about colonialism there would undoubtedly be ‘disparaging
remarks about colonial powers and those are mostly Western powers.’ In
Washington, the Dulles brothers, with die White House’s blessing, searched
for a way to encourage the ‘development of Sino-Indian rivalry at Bandung’. In

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

a hand-written comment on the intelligence report, an official stated: ‘On the
other side of coin, U.S. has not been idle. For several months a working group
chaired by State has been active preparing specific counter-actions.’ 103 The
administration feared that the conference might turn into a ‘regular affair’
dominated by India and China with the ‘likely by-product [of] a very solid
block of anti-western votes in the United Nations’. Secretary Dulles concluded
that, given the exclusion of Israel from the conference, Arab attendance would
determine its success or failure. He reluctantly discussed using US ‘influence’ in
Cairo to prevent Egyptian attendance: ‘If, without using strong-arm methods
we can prevent the Conference from taking place we would welcome this
outcome; but we are not prepared openly to oppose it or to threaten lest such a
posture elicit an unwanted counter-reaction.’ Instead, Dulles proposed that
should the conference actually take place, the United States, working with
Britain, should use attending friendly states to ‘propose courses of action
which would embarrass Communist China’ and minimize the possibility of the
formation of an Asian-African bloc.

The Secretary’s first priority was to determine the British position toward
Bandung and to coordinate strategies with London. 104 From London, the
administration received mixed signals. On 15 January, the British Ambassador
in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, was quoted in the Indian Express as stating
that there was ‘no tiring sinister in forthcoming conferences in Asia’. 105 At the
same time, the Foreign Office had instructed its embassies to ‘discourage
attendance’. 106 The Eisenhower administration took the public view that
Bandung was an ‘opportunity’ for the US to use surrogates to make the
‘Chinese Communists prisoners of their own pious professions. Resolutions
opposing aggression, intervention, subversion, and so on will tend to
strengthen, for what it is worth, the “moral containment” of Peiping.’ 107 When
the Bandung conference actually convened on 18 April 1955, the US and
Britain had already lobbied friendly nations intensely, and now believed that it
might ‘result in a more peaceful attitude on the part of the Chinese
Communists’. 108 The administration also concluded that Afro-Asian unity and
cooperation could work to the US’s advantage. The overt outcome was more
or less benign, with the predictable statements on colonialism and recognition
of various liberation movements, including the FLN in Algeria. 109 Despite
some hopes for the contrary, Washington concluded that the conference had
tended to reaffirm his leadership role in the non-aligned world, particularly in
Africa and Asia. 110

Nasser and Bandung

The Colombo Powers committed relatively early on to an Afro-Asian
conference at Bandung; however, in late 1954 and early 1955 it was unclear
how successful the conference would actually be. Washington viewed the
participation of the countries in the Arab Middle East as the litmus test of
success. Initially, die US subjected Egypt to the ‘strongest pressure’ not to
attend. The Indians believed that Washington wanted to use an Egyptian

The Greater Middle East, 1953-1958

refusal to attend as the springboard from which to convince most of the Arab
states to boycott the conference . 111 Unfortunately for the Eisenhower
administration, US influence in Cairo had taken a downward turn, and Nehru’s
courtship of Nasser seemed to pay off. On 21 January 1955, Kermit Roosevelt,
the CIA conduit to Nasser, informed Washington that not only had the
Egyptians definitely decided to attend the conference, but also that Nasser
himself would probably head the delegation . 112 It was no accident that Nasser
decided to attend Bandung on die eve of die Cairo conference on the Turkey-
Iraq agreement. Left with no alternative, the State Department urged the
British ‘to revise their position’ and support the conference as well . 113 Then, on
28 February, an Israeli raid on Gaza effectively pushed Nasser into the same
political boat as Nehru. In Nasser’s mind, Western aid for Israel and Iraq
created a similar reaction to that Nehru’s view of weapons for Pakistan. In
addition, Nasser needed modern arms for the Egyptian army. In an attempt to
compromise with Nasser’s opposition to Arab participation in Western
political alliances, the British promised a ‘moratorium’ on the entry of other
Arab states, with the exception of Iraq. By the eve of the Bandung conference,
Nasser had concluded that he had to challenge the British, Iraq, and Israel to
survive politically . 114

Nehru found the Western alliance system equally intolerable. Pakistan had
become the eastern pillar of the Baghdad Pact and the western pillar of the
Soudieast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). India and Egypt now faced a
British-led, American-sponsored and -financed anti-Soviet alliance that was
arming their principal regional adversaries. Nasser’s acceptance of Nehru’s
invitation to attend the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, held on
18-24 April 1955, became a foregone conclusion. Realizing that the conference
would, in fact, occur, the Eisenhower administration encouraged pro-Western
states in Africa and Asia to attend in an attempt to transform the conference
into a pro-Western display of solidarity. Fearing that Pakistan would attempt to
assume ‘the self appointed role of spokesman of the Arab countries — or rather
the Muslim World,’ the Indian government needed tire presence of a staunchly
neutral Egypt. In return, Nehru was prepared to give Egypt’s leader equal
billing with other prominent non-aligned leaders, elevating his stature over that
of the other pro-Western attendees . 115 By enticing Nasser to Bandung and
engineering Communist Chinese representation in the form of Chou En-lai,
Nehru demonstrated his displeasure with the Western alliance system in
general and US policy in particular.

At Bandung, Nasser found himself feted and flattered by Nehru and by
Achmad Sukarno of Indonesia. After the conference, Nasser announced from
New Delhi that: ‘the only wise policy for us [Egypt and the Arabs] consisted in
adopting positive neutralism and nonalignment .’ 116 From an Egyptian
perspective, Nasser ‘went to Bandung an Egyptian and returned a world figure
and revolutionary ’. 117 Initially, Eisenhower and Dulles were not overly
concerned with the results of Bandung; it appeared that the pro-Western states

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Corbis

Nasser and Nehru Post-Bandung

Nasser and Nehru following the Bandung conference in April 1955. The caption
read ‘Please You First’ referring to their decision to simultaneously recognize
Communist China, much to the chargin of the Eisenhower administration. This
relationship would come to symbolize ‘positive neutrality’ and non-alignment in the
Greater Middle East.

had held their own. Others were less sanguine. Charles Habib Malik, who
attended as a member of the Lebanese delegation and later became Lebanese
foreign minister, warned the Dulles brothers’ special envoy, Wilbur Eveland,
that Tito, Sukarno, and Nehru would unite the developing nations of Africa
and Asia to oppose the Western alliance systems and create a potentially anti-
Western bloc in the United Nations. Malik also described Nasser as
‘mesmerized’ by non-alignment and beguiled by the attention showered on
him. To the annoyance of the White House, Malik’s concern took concrete

The Greater Middle East, 1953-1958

form when Nasser proclaimed Egyptian adherence to non-alignment. The
aggravation caused by this move paled in comparison to the announcement
that would follow.

At the conference, Chou En-lai appeared totally reasonable to the delegates,
someone ‘with whom one could do business’. 118 In secret discussions with
Nasser, Chou offered to raise the issue of arms for Egypt with Moscow.
Shortly after Nasser’s return from Indonesia, the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt,
Daniel Solod, offered not onty modern weapons on generous payment terms
but also help with the Aswan Dam project. Initially suspicious, Nasser held
back, hoping for an American counteroffer. When none was forthcoming, he
negotiated the so-called Czech arms deal, signing the agreement on 27
September 1955. 119 Nasser told Miles Copeland, his CIA contact, that the Arab
world understood that die Baghdad Pact did not offer freedom of action for
defense against Israel: ‘Any regional military agreement which did not take this
attitude into account would be a fraud.’ 120 Nasser was correct, and the fact that
the US only offered arms to support internal security merely served to confirm
this. 121

The Czech arms dealt a double shock to the Eisenhower administration. In
the minds of many^ in Washington, it irretrievably linked ‘non-aligned’ and pro-
Communist policies, but perhaps more importantly, it directly affected US-
Soviet relations. Eisenhower believed that at die Geneva conference 1955, he
had achieved an ‘understanding’ and ‘basis for a working relationship’ with the
Soviet Union with regard to spheres of influence. This ‘understanding’
included the Middle East in the Western sphere. The Czech Arms agreement
amounted to a Soviet double-cross and demonstrated diat the new leadership
in Moscow could not be trusted to abide by its agreements. 122 Understanding
or not, the Soviets armed Nasser. Perhaps Nasser would have found his way to
Moscow without Nehru’s help, but Nehru certainly paved the way. He
provided Nasser with an ideological justification and international support for
his actions. The Indian Prime Minister also facilitated a diplomatic imbroglio
between the US and the Soviet Union. Together, they sent the US and Britain
scrambling for new approaches to die region and a new policy paradigm. 123

The Soviet arms agreement widi Cairo had other troubling repercussions.
The Shah and his ‘pro-Western’ advisors revised their assessment of Iran’s
value to American interests in the region. They found the threat of neutralism
or non-alignment to be an effective shield against pressure to reform and
useful leverage for additional economic and military aid. On 13 September
1955, John D. Jernegan, Deputy Secretary of State for NEA, and Norman B.
Hannah, Desk Officer for Iranian Affairs, met with Sir Robert Scott and Willie
Morris of the British Embassy in Washington. In a ‘gloomy’ summary of
affairs, they discussed the ‘internal drift’ in Iranian domestic programs. More
ominously, the British informed die Americans that the Shah was making
‘exorbitant demands ... as the price for adherence to the Baghdad Pact’. The
British wanted the US to intervene widi additional aid and pressure on the
Shah to reform his government. Jernegan demurred, stating that pressure on

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Iran to join die Baghdad Pact might result in even greater demands for aid. 124
The Iranians finally joined, but the situation in Tehran showed litde
improvement. By early 1956, die US assessment of the Shah’s government
stated:

It would be a mistake to think that this Government, unless it drastically
changes its character, can or will provide the firm leadership for the
successful execution of important reforms — political, economic or
administrative. At one time it appeared that the Shah was moving directly
toward the establishment of a clanking military dictatorship which would
soak the rich and attempt to break up the land-owning aristocracy in
order to win the favor of the ‘people’. But from all reports and from a
study of his moves, the Shah does not have die capacity to make a
sustained effort in the direction of basic social reforms, and an attempt
by him to embark on such a program would probably have chaotic
results.

The British Embassy in Tehran observed that while the Shah would ‘use every
means short of open blackmail to obtain money from the United States
Government ... it is unlikely that he would in the conceivable future openly
flirt with the Soviets.’ 125

The Embassy underestimated the Shah’s alacrity in adjusting to the Nehru -
Nasser model. Two months later, news of a Soviet ‘good neighborly’ visit by
the Shah to the Soviet Union filtered in from Tehran. In addition, the Soviets
were now openly supporting historic Iranian claims to Bahrain, and comparing
it to Nikita Khrushchev’s support for India over Kashmir and the Afghan
Pushtuns in their territorial disputes with Pakistan. The Soviets billed the
Shah’s planned visit as ‘the prelude to a new phase in the friendly and peaceful
relations between Iran and Russia’. Alarmed, the US Embassy opined: ‘The
Embassy fears the Russian campaign may prove to be pretty heady stuff to a
people who are almost pathetically grateful for any gesture inflating their
national prestige and to a Shah who is notoriously vulnerable to flattery.’ 126 At
the same time, Iranian officials sought assurances that events like die Nehru
visit to Washington did not portend lessening of US support for the Baghdad
Pact. 127 The Shah warned that Iranian support for US initiatives and the
Baghdad Pact would wane ‘if the neutral or doubtful countries in the Middle
East fare better than Iran and the other . . . Baghdad Pact members in the new
aid program.’ 128 In typical Pahlavi fashion, the Shah vacillated between
challenging the United States by improving relations with the Soviet Union and
worrying that the arguments of neutralists like Nehru might undermine Iran’s
principal source of military support, the Baghdad Pact. With the memory of
Nasser’s accommodation with the Soviet Union painfully fresh, Washington
worried that Iran might also seek its own version of an arrangement with
Moscow.

The Greater Middle East, 1 953-1958

Courtesy of National Archives
Eisenhower and Nehru Official Visit, 1956
Eisenhower welcoming Nehru to the White House for his 1956 official visit.
Despite differences over policy matters, at a personal level both leaders seemed to
share great respect for each other, in contrast to the icy relationship between Nehru
and Kennedy. Nehru saw Eisenhower as an equal. He did not view Kennedy in the
same light.

Middle East policy: after six years,
rethinking the paradigm

The experience of the Eisenhower administration between January 1953 and
the consummation of the Egyptian-Czech deal for Soviet arms in September
1955, followed by the chaos and frustrations of 1956 and 1957, forced a broad
reassessment of US policy across the Middle East. In pursuing a policy of
containment, the Eisenhower administration had linked economic
development, political reform, and military assistance to prevent Soviet
expansion and Communist influence in the region. Economic development
was the key to bringing long-term, pro-Western stability to the region. In 1953,
Eisenhower and his advisors borrowed the ideas and terminology from the
progressive economic development theories of American academia that would
dominate a generation of US policy makers. They believed in creating ‘take-off
points’ and in the ability of the US to use economic and development aid to
make emerging national states, even those with revolutionary regimes, ‘look
inward’ and focus on domestic development instead of regional rivalries. The
Eisenhower foreign policy establishment was niggardly in its provision of
military assistance, attempting to limit military aid to security assistance and to

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

support internal security without providing offensive capabilities. While
Washington viewed economic development as the best means of assuring pro-
Western stability and preventing Communist expansion, economic reform
merely represented the preferred path to containment. Eisenhower’s
administration, like that of Truman before and of Kennedy after, was
committed to containment by any means necessary. When Washington
believed that the tactical situation dictated short-term methods, then the
administration was absolutely willing to use military aid, security assistance,
covert assistance, and, in rare cases, direct intervention to maintain repressive
regimes. To the policy makers, political expediency demanded die immediate
maintenance of pro-Western political reliability, even at the expense of long-
term stability.

Eisenhower came to Washington believing that colonialism was dead and
that the West had to make accommodations with growing nationalism in the
developing world. On the one hand, the US recognized the importance of
good relations with their traditional European allies, but on the other wanted
to distance themselves from die heritage of colonialism in the developing
world. From the very 7 beginning, Eisenhower made it clear to Churchill and the
British that he believed their focus should be on European affairs and that they
should give up the trappings of empire in places like Egypt and Iran. The
administration initially resisted British calls for intervention in both Iran and
Egypt. The intervention in Iran came only after Washington concluded that
Musaddiq’s continued rule had the real potential to result in a pro-Soviet
coup. 129 In the case of Egypt, the administration infuriated London by
consistendy taking the Egyptian side and pressuring Britain to compromise
with the new revolutionary regime. Eisenhower and Dulles viewed the
traditional regimes supported by the British as anachronisms soon to succumb
to the rising tide of nationalism. Despite this preference for progressive
regimes, Eisenhower’s lack of success in using economic incentives and the
promise of future military aid to induce key states, like Egypt and India, to
enter Western defensive alliances created frictions that over time boded well
for increased British influence in Washington. Eisenhower found that the
traditional regimes and a British presence provided die only real basis for
Western alliance systems in the region. It also provided a screen behind which
the US could support pro-Western elements and avoid overt participation.
Obviously, diis system fooled no one, and increased US friction with various
nationalist movements. It appeared that the US had abandoned support for
nationalism and opted for neo-colonialist policies that followed a basically
British model. 130 The Eisenhower administration’s obsession with containment
of the Soviet Union through defensive alliances and selective economic aid
created a series of conflicts that placed the most influential leaders in the
region, Nehru and Nasser, and many emerging nationalists at odds with US
policies.

For Eisenhower, it had been a calculated risk from the beginning. The
White House understood that US support for the 1954 Turkish-Pakistani

The Greater Middle East, 1 9534 958

defense arrangements would evoke a negative reaction in New Delhi, but they
failed to gage the intensity. They believed that economic aid to India would
mute Nehru’s criticism, and to some degree they were correct: Nehru did not
break off relations. Even had they predicted die extent of Nehru’s
unhappiness, they most likely would have proceeded with arms for Pakistan
anyway. Later that year, the move by Hashemite Iraq to join, and British
support for Iraq’s inclusion in the defensive alliance with Turkey surprised and
annoyed Washington. It further strained the relationship between Washington
and Cairo, but friction or not, Washington supported the combining of the
various bilateral agreements and the enticement of Iran into a defense alliance.
At the same time, the administration did not back away from supporting die
British lead in the alliance, thus firmly identifying ever-increasing American
involvement in the region with Britain’s colonial past. The creation of the
‘northern tier’ alliance, known as the Baghdad Pact, firmly attached the very
neo-colonial label that Eisenhower and Dulles had so assiduously attempted to
avoid, and it alienated Nehru and Nasser.

This alienation of Nehru and Nasser also undermined, in the minds of
policy makers in Washington, one of the levers on which the early Eisenhower
administration had constructed containment: the efficacy of economic aid as a
means of controlling or channeling the policies of developing national states.
From the very beginning, in words to be echoed eight years later when the
Kennedy administration took office, Eisenhower and Dulles had believed in
the seemingly irresistible logic that economic development and the benefits of
improved standards of living would entice the states of the Greater Middle
East to abandon their internecine disputes and focus inwardly on creating
prosperity for their people. The Holy Grail of economic development would
bring pro-Western, political stability. Having reduced regional tensions, this
inward turn would eliminate the need for massive arms buildups, allowing
member states to rely on the US defense umbrella for protection against the
Soviets and for security assistance to protect against Communist subversion.
This long-term strategy for pro-Western stability in the region ran counter to
short-term political reality. Political self-preservation tended to be a short-term
issue. The experiences of 1953-1955 basically turned the administration’s
containment policy on its head. 1953 to 1955 shattered Eisenhower’s faith in
economic development as the cure-all for Western influence.

Increasingly, political stability rested on the loyalty and pro-Western
orientation of the military and security forces. Even in the case of traditional
monarchies, the loyalty of the military became the primary issue associated with
pro-Western governments. Stability had become the watchword, and the
military was the key. Eisenhower had not abandoned his support for other
reform policies. To the contrary, political and economic reform remained
highly desirable, but rather than being die lead elements of containment policy,
political reform and economic development would now only be pursued within
the context of a stable, pro-Western environment. When economic or political
reform threatened to destabilize a Western ally, die focus immediately returned

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

to the loyalty of the security forces, the maintenance of order, and the
suppression of threats to the particular regime. Controlled, top-down reform
became the only acceptable model for the region.

In addition, consummation of the Czech arms deal in late 1955 undermined
confidence in US policy in the Middle East, and led to broad criticism of
Eisenhower and Dulles. It also underscored the limitations of economic aid as
a primary bargaining tool. Nasser’s discussion with Chou En-lai at Bandung
and the subsequent Czech arms deal happened as a result of internal Egyptian
political requirements, even with US support for the massive Aswan Dam
project hanging in the balance. Nasser determined, and correctly, that the Gaza
raid and repeated provocations by Israel required the acquisition of modern
arms for the Egyptian army. At the other end of the Greater Middle East,
economic aid for non-aligned India had not prevented Nehru’s attacks on US
policy or Indian acceptance of Soviet economic assistance. Nehru’s clear
support for the Egyptian position emphasized the potent political synergy
between Egypt and India, and impressed on the Eisenhower administration the
necessity for the US to chart a course of action independent from that of the
colonial powers. 131 Despite Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal,
Washington made it clear to London that die United States would not be a
party to any coup attempt against Nasser. 132 When the British, with their
French and Israeli allies, launched the Suez war to unseat Nasser, Nehru played
a key role in inciting world opinion against British, French, and Israeli
intervention. 133 When the war ended in disaster for Britain and France, not
only was Nasser’s stature elevated to mythic proportions, but it also made the
United States the principle arbiter of Western policy in die Middle East. 134
Never again would either Britain or France take major unilateral action in die
region widiout clear US agreement. The British Ambassador to Egypt at the
time, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, concluded: ‘The basic cause of our failure was
that what we could do in 1882, we could not do in 1956. We no longer had the
same power in the world.’ 135

After Suez, the White House understood that it faced a difficult new reality
in which long-term economic development and stability had to give way to
short-term reality. Containment of the Soviet Union and its fellow traveler,
Nasser, now rested on the survival of pro-Western regimes, no matter what
their internal political system, state of economic development, or social
structure. On 23 November 1956, the OCB concluded: ‘It is likely that for the
time being Nasser will remain the leader in Egypt.’ The report observed that
relations with Egypt ‘seem to indicate that the United States cannot
successfully deal with President Nasser’. 136 Eisenhower and Dulles believed
that to protect Western interests, the United States would have to become
directly involved. In January 1957, the President made a speech that became
known as the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’. He referred to a ‘power vacuum’ in the
Middle East. Intended as a holding action to discourage Soviet adventures, die
speech brought a sharp reaction. 137 Nasser warned: ‘If there is any power
vacuum in the Middle East, it will be filled by Arab nationalism.’ 138 The year

The Greater Middle East, 1953-1958

1957 also witnessed a parallel development that further aggravated relations
with India. Pakistan insisted on dragging up the issue of Kashmir in the United
Nations, against US and British wishes. The resulting marathon speech by
Krishna Menon attacking Pakistan and its colonial backers, Britain, and die
United States, created another low point in relations with India. Positive US
contributions, including successful US pressure on the British and French to
withdraw from Suez and on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, received litde or
no credit in die non-aligned Middle East. 139

1957 stood as die low point in US relations in the Middle East. A constant
barrage of negative propaganda from Arab nationalists, the non-aligned states,
and the Communist bloc on the one hand, combined on the other with attacks
by domestic right-wing critics, Israel and the Jewish lobby, and the British and
French sent the Eisenhower Administration searching for a new policy
paradigm through which to promote containment and recoup lost US
influence. 140

Part I: 1958 — The New Order
and Reconsiderations

The events of 1958 confirmed the validity of John Foster Dulles’ more
holistic view of die Greater Middle East as the region stretching from Morocco
to Pakistan. Developments in Cairo and Damascus sent shock waves across the
Arab world, ultimately bringing down the Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad.
The collapse of the pro-Western regime in Iraq in turn rippled through Tehran,
Karachi, and New Delhi, as well as die Arab Middle East, causing a series of
reactions and counter-reactions that laid the foundation for more than four
decades of friction and conflict. For that reason, 1958 stands as the pivotal year
in American foreign policy across the Greater Middle East. Nasser and Nehru
stood at the apogee of non-alignment and positive neutrality, representing a
‘third way’ between competing superpowers. Their policies demonstrated that
charting an independent course had political and material benefits.
Increasingly, non-aligned and aligned states borrowed their tactics to extract
aid and support from their power-bloc sponsors. In addition, 1958, more than
1956, heralded the end of colonial power and die beginning of the
contemporary era. British attempts to indirectly control the Arab Middle East
following World War II had failed. The Arab League as an instrument of
British foreign policy had backfired and, as feared, turned into ‘Dr.
Frankenstein’s monster’. The idea of a Middle East Defense Organization
under British leadership was a non-starter. 1 The Canal treaty of 1954, a shotgun
wedding with Uncle Sam presiding, further demonstrated the inability of
Britain to control events. The flash and bang of Suez merely confirmed an
existing reality. Regardless of die success or failure of Anthony Eden’s
adventure with his friends in France and Israel, the British were going to have
to get out of Egypt. Suez also affirmed the close connection between the
political and regional aspirations of the primary non-aligned powers, Egypt and
India. The political institutions of Nehru’s India and Nasser’s Egypt diverged
widely, but their style of charismatic leadership, the jealous protection of

The New Order and Reconsiderations

independence, the obsession with national honor, and the shared colonial
experience created a synergy that was real. Despite their very different
temperaments and backgrounds, Nehru and Nasser were pragmatic politicians,
motivated by revolutionary idealism and a belief in their leadership roles in the
Greater Middle East. At the time, many blamed the failure of the Suez on
Washington, 1958 exposed for all to see Britain’s weakened stature and
circumscribed options in the Middle East.

By 1958, both Nehru and Nasser had amply demonstrated their
determinatrion to pursue policies tailored to what they saw as their own
political priorities. Nehru’s expulsion of US observers attached to the United
Nations contingent in Kashmir, the harangues of Krishna Menon against
Pakistan and the West, and Nehru’s sponsorship of Communist China left little
doubt about Indian willingness or ability to act independently. Nevertheless,
Nehru’s position on everything from Indochina to military alliances in Asia and
Africa may have been problematic to the West, but he opposed the
Communist party in India and led the largest democracy in the world. In short,
he was a useful window on the non-aligned and developing world and a
Western-educated leader to be cultivated and tolerated. Nasser was another
matter. Far more impatient and insecure, Nasser demonstrated his
independence and non-alignment in his reaction to the ‘northern tier’, to
Western support for Israel, and in attending the Bandung conference. He
turned to die Soviet Union for arms, and when the United States refused to
support die Aswan Dam project, he nationalized the Canal, sparking die Suez
imbroglio. Nasser demonstrated that he had to be taken seriously, because
failure to do so invited unanticipated and often unpleasant developments.
Thus, it was Nasser who set the tone for the pivotal year of 1958. Since
Eisenhower’s declaration of January 1957, relations with Egypt had been
particularly strained; however, at a fundamental level, the Eisenhower
administration continued to view Egypt as the key to the Arab Middle East and
desired a working relationship with the Egyptian leader.

The developments of early 1958 forced the Eisenhower administration to
accelerate plans for a new formula for US policy in the Greater Middle East.
Containment required the preservation of pro-Western states and the
encouragement of truly neutralist policies on the part of the non-aligned. In
dealing with the latter, Eisenhower and his advisors turned again to economic
assistance as the most effective lever for maintaining some semblance of
normal relations with the radical nationalist states of the region and as a vehicle
to find an accommodation with Nasser. To some extent, long-standing US
policies toward Nehru and India served as the model for this accommodation.
Despite problems, die relationship with New Delhi had proven useful, and a
tactical case-by-case approach to issues had maintained ties and influence in
New Delhi. Economic aid had also prevented a total breach with India over
military aid to their neighboring rival, Pakistan. A similar approach to Egypt,
based on renewed economic incentives, appeared to hold the potential for like
results. Decreased tensions with Egypt also might to some degree undermine

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Soviet influence and perhaps aleviate Nasserist pressure on die ‘northern tier’
alliance, particularly on Iraq and other pro-Western Arab states and Iran.

US policy evolved in a less ambitious, less ideological, and more pragmatic
approach. Between 1953 and 1955, Washington had set its goals high, too high,
hoping to solve long-standing Middle East disputes over Kashmir and
Palestine while coaxing Egypt and India into defensive alliances against the
Soviet Union and China. The policy approach of 1958 were more modest and
aimed at reducing Egyptian and Indian opposition to the Baghdad Pact and
SEATO and at undermining Soviet influence. As this policy adjustment got
underway events in Baghdad struck Cairo, Tehran, Karachi, New Delhi,
London, and Washington like a bolt from the blue. The varying reactions
would have repercussions that would carry into the 21 st century.

Chapter 2: The Wave of the Future

By the end of 1957, the situation in the Arab Middle East had reached a
revolutionary ‘watershed’. Nasser and Nasserism appeared to be die ‘wave of
the future’. Having assailed the Eisenhower Doctrine for its assumption that
the departure of Britain had created a ‘vacuum’, Nasser now appeared poised
to thwart Washington’s plans to use its ‘agents’ in the region to ‘split and
enslave the Arabs’. These ‘agents’ included the monarchies, the Gulf emirates,
and Israel. 1 Nasser probably recognized that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not
per se a plot to ‘get’ him or undermine ‘positive neutralism’ by force, but
basiling Washington was a useful a vehicle for rallying regional support. 2 In
addition, despite this hostility, policy makers continued to view Nasser as the
key to US influence in the region. His ‘victory’ at Suez had made him the
standard by which Arabs judged their leaders. The confluence of Nasser’s
simplistic ideas on revolutionary Arab nationalism and his pronouncements on
non-alignment and positive neutralism formed an ill-defined ideological pot-
pourri. This very lack of definition and systematic ideological structure worked
in Nasser’s favor. 3 Nasserism promised something to everyone, while
challenging the traditional ruling elites, many of whom were aligned with the
West. By 1958, Nasser had not only navigated Egypt into the post-colonial
period, but had also become the symbol of radical change in the Arab world.
Now, the central question was how to proceed.

In one sense, Nasser’s success confirmed the accuracy of State Department
and CIA assessments. Both had predicted that Egypt was the most important
Arab state and that Nasser alone determined the course of Egyptian policy.
Eisenhower and Dulles subscribed to this assessment. Unfortunately, the
relationship with Nasser and thus Egypt had not gone well. In Washington,
ideological prejudices had made the relationship virtually unworkable. The
White House believed that Nasser had become a Soviet proxy during the
preceding five years. Still, Washington faced the conundrum of coming up with
a policy for the future. Any improvement in relations, given the political bent

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

of the Republican Party’s right wing, required an ideological justification.
Given Nasser’s arms relationship with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower reverted
to economic aid and financial incentives as the basis for regenerating
normalized contacts with Cairo.

In London, the Macmillan government also wanted an accommodation with
Nasser and a settlement of claims resulting from the Suez crisis that would
allow for the reopening of the Canal. Wary, London believed that the West
would have to confront and thwart Nasser’s more aggressive policies, but
wanted to see the chapter on Suez closed. Improved relations or not, neither
Britain nor the United States had any illusions about Nasser’s intentions to
undermine Iraq, Jordan, die Gulf emirates, and the Aden Protectorate. For the
British, their oil concessions in Iraq and the Gulf were critical. London
believed that any further erosion of its position and prestige in die Arab Middle
East, whether in oil-barren Jordan or in Aden, would threaten its position in
the Gulf states, but the British also understood that in the post-1956 order any
action against Nasser required the clear agreement of the United States. Thus,
British confrontations with the Egyptian leader became indirect affairs carried
out by proxies and colored by die cynical British view of Nasser’s intentions.

1958 witnessed an unusual situation in which Nasser, Eisenhower, and
Macmillan were all attempting to define Nasserism. Nasser wanted to chart a
course for the future of the Arab world. In the face of right-wing Republican
opposition, Eisenhower needed a definition diat would justify a working
relationship widi Cairo. London wanted a definition that would, when
necessary, garner American support in containing revolutionary Arab
nationalism. Given that so much rode on diis exercise, a brief examination of
Nasser’s accumulated ideological baggage as of 1958 is in order. Nasser may
have lacked a structured, clearly articulated framework for ruling, but he
possessed a crude set of ideologically-based principles. These simplistic ideas,
expressed in his 1952 manifesto, resonated with the Egyptian people, radical
Arab nationalists, and with many emerging nation states. He called for
destroying imperialism and its ‘stooges’; ending feudalism; ending monopoly
and capitalist domination of government; bringing social justice to the masses;
creating a strong national army; and creating a ‘sound democratic life’. 4 In
1953, Nasser contributed his own ideas on a revolutionary creed. He published
Philosophy of Revolution, a rambling polemic about the nature of ‘permanent
revolutionary struggle’. 5 Nasser’s successes between 1955 and 1958 meant that
the serious pursuit of these goals resulted in varying degrees of trouble for the
Western powers. For the United States, Nasser’s successes were largely an
annoyance; for the British, Nasser’s success could mean catastrophe. Nasser’s
success confirmed the US administration’s long-held assumption that Egypt
and its leader were the barometer of the Arab world for the foreseeable future.
For two years, US policy in the Middle East had gone into free fall; the
‘vacuum’ that resulted in the Eisenhower Doctrine now resembled a policy
‘black hole’ stretching from North Africa to Pakistan. 6 Nasser’s success,

The Wave of the Future

Corbis

Nasser and Syrian President Quwatli

Nasser and Syrian President Shukry Quwatli in February 1958, celebrating the
Egyptian-Syrian Union and the formation of the United Arab Republic. Although
not apparent until much later, this would mark the hightide of Nasser’s pan-Arab
ambitions. The union added a sense of urgency to US plans to reconstruct a
working relationship with Nasser.

largely at the expense of the West, now pushed Washington toward an
accommodation.

The Egyptian-Syrian Union, and saving the
Middle East from Communism

In early 1958, Nasser’s growing influence combined with US domestic
criticism of the administration forced Eisenhower to reexamine its policies
toward Nasser. Looking for areas of potential cooperation, Eisenhower and
Dulles focused on Nasser’s shared antipathy for Arab Communism. This

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

initiative received a boost when talk of Arab unification under Egyptian
leadership began to take concrete form. Syria’s call for unification with Egypt
surprised policy makers. Popular agitation in other Arab capitals added weight
to die view that Nasserist influence might actually culminate in some form of
broadly unified Arab state. In addition, the weakness of pro-Western Arab
regimes lent an air of inevitability to the Nasserist triumph and placed
additional pressure on the administration to come up with new policies.

This reevaluation of US policy also required an assessment of the problem
presented by US-Israeli ties. In a January 1958 review of US policy, Secretary
Dulles pointed out that both the State and Defense Departments had opposed
the establishment of Israel because they had envisioned die very situation that
now confronted the United States. Dulles blundy stated that because of the
‘potency of international Jewry’, not even the Soviet Union advocated an end
to the Jewish state. He concluded that ‘no greater danger to US security’
existed than that posed by die Arab-Israeli dispute, viewing it as the means by
which die Soviet Union might eventually^ gain control of the Middle East. With
evident exasperation, Dulles commented: “We are confronted with a clear
threat to the security of the United States, and we cannot present a clean-cut
practical solution. Accordingly, we are in fact reduced to following the old
British formula of “muddling through.’” He grudgingly added that this policy
had worked ‘thus far with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon’. In
evaluating Arab unity, the administration saw some benefits, including an
increased sense of security among the Arabs, but feared that true unity might
result in an outright attempt to destroy Israel, or even worse, a ‘uniform’
regional oil policy that threatened the ‘vital oil supply of Western Europe’. To
protect Western interests, the administration concluded that the US had litde
choice but to increase economic and military assistance to states in die region,
including neutrals, ‘in order to develop local strength against Communist
subversion and control and to reduce excessive military and economic
dependence on the Soviet bloc’. 7

Washington concluded diat it needed an arrangement with Nasser. 8 Thus,
moves toward improved relations were already under consideration when, in
January 1958, the Syrians agreed to unification on Nasser’s terms. In fact, the
details of the agreement surprised even the Syrian Ba’thists, army officers,
politicians, and also Egyptian officials. 9 Skeptics pointed out the inherent
conflicts between Egyptian and Syrian political practice. Syrian President
Shukri al-Quwatli allegedly warned Nasser: “You have acquired a nation of
politicians; fifty percent believe themselves to be national leaders, twenty-five
percent to be prophets, and at least ten percent to be gods.’ 10 Nasser believed
that Syrian acquiescence to his demands for a centralized state on the Egyptian
model, including the dissolution of all political parties, would overcome the
potential for problems.

In Syria, die Ba’th Party agreed, but its leadership had the clear expectation
of becoming Nasser’s political partners and the ideological arbiters for the new
state. 11 Michel Aflaq, the key Ba’th party official, argued: ‘We will be officially

The Wave of the Future

dissolved but we will be present in the new unified party, the National Union.
Born of the Union of the two countries, this movement cannot be animated by
principles other than those of die Ba’th.’ 12 Of course, Nasser had no intention
of sharing power with the fractious Syrian politicians. Nevertheless, on 1
February 1958, from die balcony of the Abdin Palace, Nasser and Quwatii, the
President of the Syrian Republic, proclaimed the creation of the United Arab
Republic, announcing that Nasser would be its first president. Rejecting a
federal system, Nasser believed that centralized control would eliminate the
possibility of collapse, and in fact make the ‘ungovernable’ Syrians
governable. 13 Events in Cairo sparked widespread popular agitation for union,
economic and political change, and the removal of traditional leaders across
the Arab world. 14 Nasser was proclaimed the ‘new Saladin’. 15 To the suspicious
West, Nasser presented the union as a move by Syrian Ba’thists to forestall a
Communist coup. Fie argued that the abolition of political parties reduced
instability and leftist influence by shifting the focus to ‘Arab unity’. 16 Union
also gave die Egyptian president a leg-up on his rival, Nuri Sa’id, in Baghdad.
Thus Nasser agreed to a union with Syria, a country in which ‘he had never set
foot’. 17

Seeing die handwriting on the wall, Washington took a positive position to
avoid being criticized for opposing the sacred cow of Arab unity. The
administration also viewed Nasser as more palatable than die chaotic political
situation and the threat posed by the Syrian Communist Party. The secret US
position held: ‘[T]he question of Arab unity [was] a matter to be determined by
Arabs themselves and the US would support unity or any form thereof which
results from freely expressed wishes of Arab peoples concerned.’ 18 Dulles
successfully opposed any public statement reflecting this view, because it might
have facilitated Egyptian domination of the Arab world and spread positive
neutralism. It also had the potential to undermine pro-Western Arab regimes
and discourage possible anti-union moves by pro-Western Arab regimes. 19 In
the confusion, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia publicly welcomed the
union despite that they might create an opposition group. Although
pessimistic, the Eisenhower administration wanted to keep its options open.

While these four countries may privately oppose union, it is doubtful
whether they will be able to adopt any common line of action concerning
the formation of a common line of action to constitute effective
opposition to the union. ... Jordan’s efforts to interest Iraq and Saudi
Arabia in a closer association of the three Kings to which Lebanon could
adhere have so far fallen on barren ground. However, in order to be
ready in the unlikely event that the four Arab states come up with a
common position of opposition, which is feasible and acceptable to us,
we are giving urgent consideration to appropriate ways in which we could
assist those states in the implementation of their common action.

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

In reality, Washington was in no position to openly oppose or deny recognition
to the UAR. ‘The long-term risks of our being openly identified with
opposition to the United Arab Republic or with its possible collapse are ...
greater than the short-term risks of establishing correct diplomatic relations
with it at the outset.’ On 7 February 1958, the Egyptian desk at the State
Department recommended that the US explore the potential for improved
relations with Cairo, stating: ‘Although the Egyptian attitude could not be
called particularly friendly, ... it is certainly less unfriendly than previously.’ 20

A change in plans: fighting Communism with Nasser

To belay any potential opposition, Nasser dangled a tempting carrot in front
of Eisenhower. Playing the reluctant suitor, he argued that he had been forced
to accept union to prevent a Communist takeover. He asked Washington for a
three-month moratorium on criticism in order to allow him a free hand in
dealing with the Communist threat. Much to the US’s pleasure, Nasser
promptly declared the Communist Party, along with other parties, illegal, and
launched a campaign in both Syria and Egypt to suppress Communist
elements. 21 Suppression of die Communists resurrected, albeit in more modest
form, plans in Washington to provide Egypt with economic aid and financial
incentives. In response to the ‘more neutral’ international stance from the ‘new
republic’, Secretary Dulles recommended that ‘a schedule could be drawn up in
which certain actions by us could be taken without delay in response to
positive actions by Nasser’. This list included trade, cultural exchanges,
economic assistance, military training, CARE programs, and grain under Public
Law 480. 22 Only a matter of weeks before, Nasser had been reviled as a Soviet
agent in the Middle East; now he was to be the recipient of US economic aid.
Using the thin veil of the ‘schedule’, the United States moved quickly to take
advantage of Nasser’s promise to do something about the Communists in
Syria. The administration began immediate preparations to ease relations,
provide him with aid, and normalize the relationship, even as a crisis in
Lebanon loomed on the horizon. Ironically, die administration had so
thoroughly vilified Nasser that some saw the anti-Communist campaign as a
ruse approved by Moscow to further Soviet interests. As the The Nation put it,
‘Officials in Washington are straining their eyes to find advantages for the
United States in the fusion of Egypt and Syria into a single nation. It’s a
strenuous exercise and may afflict its practitioners with a permanent squint.’ 23
Newsweek stated: ‘As long as Syria and Egypt continued to accept massive
Soviet aid, they can hardly claim to be stemming Communist influence.’ The
display of Arab unity in Damascus and Cairo upstaged talks between Jordan,
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. At the Baghdad Pact conference in Ankara, the US
again refused to join, and offered only $10 million in military aid, a miserly sum
in comparison with the military aid from the Soviet Union to Syria and
Egypt. 24

In the Arab world, both supporters and opponents of die Egyptian-Syrian
union criticized Dulles and the administration for their ‘negative, unimaginative

The Wave of the Future

and contradictory’ policies . 25 ‘Communists and radical nationalists’ described
Dulles as ‘senile’, ‘bloodthirsty’, and an ‘Arab baiter’. Pro-Western Arabs
bitterly blamed Dulles’ handling of the Aswan Dam project, tire denial of arms
to the Egyptians, and US support for Israel for causing Nasser’s turn toward
the Soviet Union. There was also considerable criticism for pressuring
countries into defensive pacts. The generally pro-Western Beirut newspaper he
Jour stated: ‘Arab relations with Dulles have been like a dialogue with the
deaf .’ 26 As Washington and Cairo prepared to embark on another courtship,
Lebanon, or so it appeared, would become the test case for US-Egyptian
cooperation. The administration hoped that contacts in Beirut, via the
Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, Abd-al-Hamid al-Galib, with Abd-al-Hamid
al-Sarraj, Nasser’s Syrian intelligence chief, might prevent a confrontation in
Lebanon . 27 Observers on the scene were not that optimistic. As one diplomat
put it: What else can we expect? To hope that die Lebanese won’t resort to
violence is like hoping dogs won’t chase cats .’ 28 Egyptian Ambassador Ghalib
became an important conduit for extra-official contacts with Cairo. Dulles
instructed US officials in Beirut on ‘the importance of not giving Ghalib any
reason to believe that he is being used as a channel in connection with US-
Egyptian relations’. The Secretary then provided a detailed list of policy
positions to be given to Ghalib, knowing full well that he would immediately
forward them to Cairo, and probably to Sarraj. The Beirut channel attended to
the negative policy chores vis-a-vis Nasser so that embassy contacts in Cairo
could be more positive.

Dulles’ ‘instructions’ to the US Embassy in Beirut laid out the US position
in detail. As an olive-branch offer, Ghalib was told: ‘The door to improved
relations with Egypt is open.’ The instructions expressed a desire to focus on
the ‘broader issues’ in the relationship and argued that the real US position on
‘neutrality and nationalism’ had been either misrepresented or misunderstood
in Egypt. Dulles expressed support for ‘association with other free nations for
collective security’ but made it clear that ‘the US does judge nations by their
acts.’ Ghalib was told that Egypt had not been neutral and had attacked
independent countries which had merely banded together to protect
themselves from Communism. “Whatever their intent, these Egyptian actions
and propaganda have benefited International Communism and, in this sense,
Egypt has not, in practice, been neutral.’ The instruction singled out Nasser’s
insistence that countries opt for ‘positive neutralism’ in lieu of ‘collective
defense’ against Communism, and stated that when Egypt accepted the right of
others to determine their own method of self-defense, ‘one of die principle
causes of current difficulties with the US will be removed.’ The instructions
asserted that the Eisenhower Doctrine merely supported die ‘very integrity and
independence, which Egypt has sought and treasured’, and denied plans for US
economic dominance in the region. Washington then offered to unblock
Egyptian assets in return for a settlement of the Suez Canal Company’s claims.
It ceased calling for accommodation on the ‘broader’ issues to focus on
specific problems . 29

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

In a creative reaction to the formation of the UAR, the British managed to
agree with Washington’s position and simultaneously take a potshot at Dulles.
Preditably, they had considerably more misgivings about the union than
Washington. First, they feared increased pressure on Hashemite Iraq and
Jordan, and second, they questioned the competence of die Secretary of State
by expressing concern that he would be hoodwinked by Nasser’s anti-
Communist rhetoric. The British agreed with the US position that the current
position should be neither support nor condemnation. 30 As to the Egyptian
claim that they were saving Syria from the Communists, the British pointed out
that General Afif al-Bizri, a well-known associate of the Communists,
supported the agreement. Concerned about any US accommodation with
Nasser, die Foreign Office commented: ‘The line that Nasser is saving Syria
from Communism will doubdess be pushed hard with King Saud [ibn Abd-al-
Aziz al-Saud], as well as with the Americans.’ 31

The union created other problems for the British. At the Baghdad Pact
meeting, Nuri Sa’id, the Prime Minister of Iraq, suggested that the majority of
the Syrian people in a ‘free election’ would elect for union with Iraq and not
Egypt. He then sounded out the council about support for Iraq’s claims to the
districts in the ‘Mosul vilayet’ ceded to Syria but belonging historically to Iraq.
At first, Dulles seemed to encourage such an Iraqi initiative, with US backing if
‘some part of Syria might wish to secede and join Iraq.’ 32 The prospect of the
United States, and particularly Dulles, embroiling Hashemite Iraq and its
British oil concession in a perilous adventure struck a nerve in London. British
attendees reported to London: ‘We are disturbed by Mr. Dulles’s ready
response to Nuri’s hint that the opportunity might be taken to incorporate
parts of north-eastern Syria into Iraq.’ In London, the FO rejected die idea of
any support for Iraqi expansion, arguing that it would serve to consolidate the
union with Egypt and provide opportunities for expanded Soviet influence.
Iraq was simply too weak, even with Jordanian help, to challenge Syria and
Egypt. The British believed that, left to its own devices, the union would
generate its own set of disruptive forces in Syria and create serious problems
for the Egyptians and their Syrian supporters. 33 From London’s perspective,
the principal aim was containment of the union.

A pro-Western alternative?

With Iraq discouraged from adventures, Lebanon came to center stage as
the most immediate crisis confronting the West. Lebanese President Camille
Nimur Chamoun, a Maronite Christian, had, with Western assistance, rigged
the election of 1957, paving the way for his reelection to the presidency in
1958. Under the National Pact of 1943, a president could not succeed himself,
and the next president had to be a Sunni Muslim. Frightened by the Egyptian-
Syrian union, Chamoun plotted to retain power, and at the same time to
embroil the West in supporting him with troops, if need be. In the name of
‘stability’, he decided to disregard the conditions of die National Pact of 1943

The Wave of the Future

Corbis

King Hussein and King Feisal, 1958

King Hussein 1 of Jordan and King Feisal II of Iraq in early 1958, discussing the
creation of the Arab Union to counter Nasser and the UAR. Their youth
underscores Western fears that they were no match for Nasser and the rising tide
of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Feisal’s death in the Baghdad coup of July 1958
put an exclamation point on those fears.

and retain the presidency for another term . 34 Chamoun’s Foreign Minister,
Charles Malik, believed that unification between Syria and Egypt meant the end
of Lebanese independence unless the West, meaning principally the United
States, actively opposed Nasser. Fie argued that the union would increase anti-
Western Arab nationalist ‘intransigence’, and create new balance of power in
the Middle East that favored the Soviet Union and increased pressure on
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. He warned that without outside help, Lebanon
would not survive . 35

London’s attitude to the union continued to be partially colored by their
immediate unwillingness to believe that it was ‘real’. The British recognized the
threat posed by a true union, but realistically, they also saw an upside.

While tire whole thing is still so fluid we feel that there is no need to be
unduly alarmed at the prospects. ... A union, which resulted in any real

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

unification of Egyptian/Syrian administrative and diplomatic services
etc., would leave a good many Syrians out of a job. Resentment in Syria is
likely to be exacerbated by the Egyptian tendency to treat their smaller
allies in a cavalier fashion, and Syrians find it hard to work harmoniously
for any length of time with other Syrians let alone Egyptians.

The FO predicted an ‘initial honeymoon period’ followed by ‘disillusion and
dissension’. London dismissed Malik and the Lebanese as unduly alarmist, but
sought out American views on the Lebanese request for ‘military assistance’
just the same. 36 Consultations between London and Washington concluded
that the Lebanese were overreacting, and that verbal reassurances to the
Lebanese government were sufficient for the time being. 37 Chamoun and his
supporters would have to wait for outside support.

After some discussions, the British finally agreed with the fundamentals of
the American position laid down by 7 Dulles in Ankara. The Western powers
would not directly intervene. Only another Arab state could initiate
intervention, which precluded moves by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Finally, the
United States would buttress any Arab initiative, but if that failed, Washington
would take no action. 38 On 30 January 1958, members of the Baghdad Pact
and the US finally agreed on the ‘restrained’ response. They would neither
support or openly 7 oppose the union. While Syrian resistance should be
discreetly 7 encouraged, neither the British nor the Americans would take the
lead. In addition, at London’s urging, Washington agreed that it would
encourage Baghdad to refrain from unilateral opposition. The preferred course
of action would be for Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon to actively
pursue an ‘alternative expression of Arab unity’, with Baghdad Pact support.
The agreement encouraged member states, a euphemism for Iraq, to approach
other states and ‘urge upon them the desirability of the earliest and most
effective action they are willing and able to take’. 39 In very short order,
Washington realized that no effective opposition to the union existed in Syria
and that only King Saud of Saudi Arabia showed any inclination to oppose it. 40
Even Saud’s opposition would be short-lived.

The reaction of other Arab leaders to the union underscored die potency of
Nasser’s message. While publicly supporting the union and discussing the
possibility of an alliance with Nasser, the Saudis plotted to permanently curtail
Nasser’s activities. At King Saud’s urging, Saudi officials attempted to bribe
Sarraj, the Syrian intelligence chief, to assassinate Nasser and stop die union.
Sarraj accepted the money, but unfortunately for Riyadh, King Saud had
misjudged his man. 41 Sarraj could not be bought. Nasser had made Sarraj and
his associates in the security 7 apparatus the basis for centralized control in Syria
because of their loyalty. 42 Nasser used the attempted compromise of Sarraj to
embarrass Saud and his advisors. The UAR propaganda attacks on Saud
sparked pro-Nasser unrest in the Kingdom and placing Saudi vulnerability on
public display. There was also unrest in Tunisia. Habib Bourgiba, President of

The Wave of the Future

Courtesy of National Archives

Eisenhower and King Saud

Eisenhower with King Saud during the King’s official visit to the US.

Tunisia, claimed that his security services had uncovered a Nasserist plot to
assassinate Bourgiba and take over the government. In Iraq, an alarmed King
Feisal II reappointed Nuri Sa’id as Prime Minister and announced the
federation, with British backing, of Jordan and Iraq in an Arab Union . 43
Embarrassed by the Sarraj affair and facing significant internal Nasserist
pressure, Saudi Arabia refused to join . 44 Nasser labeled the Union as nothing
more than a belated attempt to shore up feudal regimes.

In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Feisal Ibn-Abd-Al-Aziz forced King Saud to
give up responsibility for defense, foreign affairs, and finance. Nothing if not
shrewd, Feisal placated domestic unrest by supporting an accommodation with
Nasser while he sought to ‘clean up the Augean stables of Saudi finances’ and
save the monarchy. Because the educated classes viewed Nasser as the ‘only
Arab leader worth following’, Feisal charted a policy that followed Nasser’s
lead in non-Arab affairs while avoiding confrontations on Arab matters . 45
Feisal embraced ‘positive neutrality’ and promised cooperation with both the
Iraqi -Jordanian Arab Union and the UAR . 46 To broaden support for the
Kingdom, Feisal conditionally offered to reestablish relations, broken off over
territorial disputes and the Suez War, with France and Britain. As a gesture to
Nasser, Feisal criticized the US position on free passage for Israel in the Gulf
of Aqaba, calling it ‘aggression against Egypt’ and contrary to international law.
In the face of Egyptian demands that Saudi Arabia end US ‘basing rights’ at

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Dhahran, Feisal demurred, stating the status of US ‘transit rights’ would not be
changed. 47

The exposure, on 6 March 1958, of die Saudi plot against Nasser and the
resulting crisis in Riyadh sent tremors through Washington. The administration
considered King Saud a pro-Western stalwart, and, President Eisenhower had
hoped that Saud’s influence might one day rival that of Nasser. Instability in
Riyadh was disturbing. 48 In a meeting with Eisenhower, Secretary of the
Treasury Robert B. Anderson urged a declaration that NATO and US ‘would
not tolerate the prospect of die loss of Middle Eastern oil to the West’.
Describing the situation as ‘very grave indeed’, Dulles lamented that instability
in Riyadh also undermined the Iraqi and Jordanian regimes. He added: ‘It was
plain that Nasser had caught the imagination of the masses throughout the
entire area.’ 49 On 13 March 1958, the weekly NSC meeting reflected an
ominous foreboding with regard to the Saudi regime. The administration
feared a collapse, or perhaps a formal alliance with Cairo on the Syrian model.
Citing the presence of over 10,000 Egyptians in die Kingdom, Eisenhower
questioned the Secretary of State about the legalities of invoking the
Eisenhower Doctrine, and Dulles, the lawyer and this time the voice of reason,
commented that the Doctrine pertained only to the direct threat of
‘International Communism’. Obviously frustrated, but taking the hint that the
Saudi situation looked like an internal Arab matter, Eisenhower unhappily
groused: ‘Even so, we simply could not stand around and do nothing and see
the whole area fall into the hands of Communism.’ 50 The administration
continued to have difficulties making die mental adjustment from Nasser, the
Communist agent, to Nasser, die Arab nationalist. Misunderstanding the
situation, Eisenhower also expressed his concern about Saud’s replacement by
his ‘pro-Nasserist’ brother, Feisal. 51 Trepidation about weakness and instability
in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, coming on the heels of the
formation of the UAR, caused die White House to forge ahead with a
cautiously pragmatic ‘live and let-live’ policy toward the UAR. Nasser was
officially out of the ‘deep-freeze’. 52 Washington moved to counter Moscow’s
influence and regain it own lost influence in Cairo, perhaps limiting Nasser’s
own expansionist plans. 53 US policy refocused on containment in a manner
fundamentally consistent with that of Eisenhower’s early administration.

Britain’s Middle East domino theory

In his memoirs, Harold Macmillan aptly described 1958 as ‘More Arabian
Nights.’ Now, two years after Suez, the British government was attempting to
conclude negotiations with the UAR to settle outstanding claims from the Suez
crisis and resume diplomatic relations with Cairo. Neverdieless, Macmillan and
his advisors still viewed Nasser as a real threat to Iraq and Kuwait. British oil
interests in these two states determined to a great extent the economic health
of Britain itself. Aden, Jordan, and the Gulf emirates also played an important
role for British interests. Whitehall believed that should any of these states
succumb to Nasser’s Arab nationalist agitation, the damage to British prestige

The Wave of the Future

would encourage nationalist elements in Iraq and Kuwait and might well
presage a collapse of the entire British position in tire Middle East. Although
less acutely, the British also feared Nasserist agitation in Lebanon and Sudan. 54
If Lebanon collapsed, Nasser and the Syrians would concentrate their
subversive talents on Iraq and Jordan. The inclusion of Sudan in Arab Union
might very well reverse hard-won Egyptian recognition of Sudanese
independence, and further enhance Nasser’s prestige. Fearing any increased
stature for their nemesis on tire Nile, the British lamented the US decision to
resume aid and worked assiduously to minimize it.

As noted in the immediate aftermath of tire formation of the UAR, the first
British priority was to prevent Nuri Sa’id, encouraged by promises of US
support, from leading Iraq into militarily debacle by opposing Nasser.
Macmillan commented that Nuri was ‘full of plans — some of them rather
dangerously vague — for detaching Syria from Egypt’. Macmillan summed it up
thus: ‘The problem we have is to head Nuri off impossible or dangerous
schemes, which are bound to fail, without losing his confidence or injuring his
will to resist Egypt and Russia.’ 55 At the Baghdad Pact conference, Dulles’ off-
hand remarks on detaching parts of Syria were alarming because the Iraqi
government viewed them as US support for Nuri’s schemes. Suez was
obviously fresh in Macmillan’s mind. Fearing that Dulles would court disaster
and leave the Iraqis out on a limb, London cautioned Sa’id in the strongest
possible terms not to follow Dulles’ lead. As if tilings were not complicated
emough, the Iraqi Prime Minister chose this moment to raise the issue of
Kuwait, long claimed by Iraq, in the context of forming an Arab union to
counter the UAR. Sa’id wanted London to pressure the Kuwaitis to join the
proposed Iraq-Jordan union. The British, for a number of reasons, were
horrified by any Iraqi mention of a union with Kuwait, and moved to quash
that idea. By the spring of 1958, it appeared that London had managed to get
the Iraqi situation in hand.

In contrast to Iraq, Yemeni scheming and UAR-sponsored subversion
directly threatened British control in Aden. Yemen and Egypt had had an on-
again off-again relationship since 1955, based on various treaties of friendship
and cooperation. Yemen’s ruler, Imam Ahmad, and his heir apparent, Crown
Prince Muhammad al-Badr, saw Arab nationalism as a vehicle to press Yemeni
claims over Aden and the Protectorate. Borrowing rhetoric from Radio Cairo
and using an Egyptian-supplied transmitter, Radio Sanaa began to broadcast
colorful nationalist slogans, including: ‘The Arab giant will drive imperialism
into die pit’, and the more evocative: ‘The claws of death have clutched at the
imperialists.’ 56 Using Badr as die catalyst, Nasser engineered a Yemen-UAR
alliance and brokered military and economic support from the Communist
bloc. In return for ‘federating’ with the UAR, Nasser ended the ‘vitriolic’
attacks from the Cairo-based Voice of the Arabs Radio, and curbed
Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri’s anti-Imamate Free Yemeni movement. 57 In
December 1957, the Imam’s unhappiness with the American-sponsored
Yemeni Development Corporation caused him to decline American

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

agricultural experts, road-construction assistance, and an aerial survey of
Yemen.

The British were of two minds about this down-turn in US-Yemeni
relations. Seeing an opportunity to enlist US support against the Imam and
Crown Prince, British Colonial Office officials in Aden and diplomats in
Yemen wanted the US to participate in an ‘anti-Communist’ propaganda
campaign. Unwilling or unable to provide its own aid, tire Foreign Office
wanted the US to increase economic and development assistance to Yemen as
leverage to force the Yemenis to moderate their policies toward Aden. The
British took exception to US indifference to the prospect of a long-term
Egyptian-style economic and military relationship with the Soviets and
Chinese. 58 The British wanted Washington to establish a consulate in Ta’iz and
to provide additional economic aid to the Yemenis. They were extremely
concerned that Soviet and Egyptian penetration of southern Arabia would
bring increasing pressure on Aden and the Protectorate. 59 When on 25 January
1958 Zaidi tribesmen allegedly attempted to overthrow the Imam, tire British
became the scapegoat. Oliver Kemp, the British Consul, dejectedly wrote to
London saying: ‘It now seems probably that the Imam will accept the Soviet
loan and open a Soviet legation.’ 60 London chimed in with the observation:
‘Whatever the truth about the origin of the plot the effect will be detrimental to
the efforts of the US to establish any sort of position in the Yemen.’ 61 The lack
of American alarm was enormously frustrating. In fact, resigned to chronic
problems in Yemen and a long-term Soviet and Chinese presence, the
Eisenhower administration preferred to use aid to gain some influence at the
source of the problem, in Cairo. 62 At the British Foreign Office, D.M.H.
Riches groused about the Yemeni situation: ‘The US attitude is rather strange.
They are almost making way for the Russians.’ 63

As if to heighten London’s concerns, on 28 January 1958, the eve of the
Egyptian-Syrian union, Badr, speaking from Damascus, declared Yemeni
solidarity with Nasser: “Yemen’s fate is tied to Syria and Egypt, and Yemen will
fight imperialist pacts with all her power.’ 64 Thoroughly alarmed, the Colonial
Office lobbied intensely for military operations to stop border incursions. In
London, key Foreign Office officials, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar and D.M.H.
Riches, explained to Sir William Hayter that it was no longer that simple. The
days of unilaterally bashing tire natives were past. Commonwealth countries
had to be kept informed. The Canadians, who chaired the UN Security
Council, had to be on board. 65 As Sir H.J.B. Lintcott put it:

There is some tendency in Canada to think that it is no longer necessary
or possible for us to maintain our special position in the Middle East, and
this is not less true when it comes to defending a colonial position in
Aden by means of attacks (however provoked) on foreign soil, than in
defending the kind of arrangement we have with the Persian Gulf states
and Muscat. We are engaged in an exercise to tty to bring Canada round

The Wave of the Future

towards our point of view on Middle East policy generally; but it will take
time. 66

Of course, Washington also needed to be apprised of the situation. These tasks
completed, the British launched a vigorous spring campaign against rebellious
tribes and military units along the border with Yemen.

By late spring 1958, the Yemenis began to shelter artillery in populated areas
along tire border, increasing the possibility of escalation, civilian casualties, and
serious political fallout. London told Washington: ‘Another success for Nasser
in this area would have serious consequences for Western prestige throughout
the Middle East. All of this increases the need for coordinated action by Britain
and America.’ 67 At this point, Macmillan got some unwelcome advice.
Believing that the Imam wanted a way out, that Badr was in disgrace, and that
Soviet influence was waning, Washington told the British to bring in the UN
and negotiate. 68 If Whitehall was skeptical, the Colonial Office was apoplectic;
they believed that ‘die tide in the Yemen over the last 18 months flowed
steadily in the direction of more Soviet and Egyptian influence’ and adamantly
opposed UN involvement or bilateral talks with Yemen. 69 Nevertheless, in
June, both sides agreed to limited talks concerning the border demarcation, but
not the status of Aden or the Protectorate. 70 London hoped to ‘satisfy the
Americans and Mr. [Dag] Hammerskjold [UN Secretary General] and ease the
pressure in Parliament for a time. We shall give the appearance of doing
something. . . . The only danger would be a refusal to accept a proposal, which
the Yemenis could subsequently quote against us.’ 71 The results were better
than expected. Horace Phillips, die leader of the British delegation, reported
that the discussions had ‘yielded no less, and perhaps a little more, than I
expected them to’. Ever wary, Phillips assumed that the Imam might not want
a settlement, but rather a ‘breather’ so that he could ‘gather his strength for a
bigger and better effort to sabotage the federation’. 72 Just as the US had
predicted, the Yemenis wanted to reach an accommodation. 73 Issues like
Yemen combined with other British setbacks encouraged the Washington’s
view that London’s policies were often outmoded and created unnecessary
problems for the West. 74

Nasser at the pinnacle

Problems in the Arab Middle East aside, the Soviet direat to containment
provided die final push for a new policy toward Nasser. The Soviets had
followed up their military and economic aid by inviting Nasser to visit
Moscow; he accepted. Although the US Ambassador in Cairo, Raymond A.
Hare, prophetically pointed out that Nasser’s greatest successes had come
while he was ‘the irresponsible champion of Arab nationalism’, and that
‘disenchantment’ in Syria might result in the ‘possible deflation of Nasser’s
ego’, the White House was less certain. 75 On 21 February 1958, Washington
informed members of die Baghdad Pact that the US intended to recognize the
UAR because ‘withholding recognition would be politically disadvantageous’. 76

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

During March, Washington sought to engage Cairo on a number of questions,
including Suez canal claims, hostility toward Iraq and Jordan, and Yemen
issues. 77 On 20 March, in a meeting with Ambassador Hare, Nasser stated that
he intended to concentrate on ‘domestic matters’ and had no intention of
interfering with states like Jordan and Iraq. 78

Five days later, the administration began its second attempt in five years to
use economic incentives to gain leverage in Cairo. Requesting Embassy
comments, Washington suggested a staged plan that included cultural
exchanges, unfreezing Egyptian assets, Public Law 480 grain, capital
investment projects, and even the possible of military training for Egyptian
officers. The goal was clearly stated:

We would not contemplate adoption of policies proposed in this stage in
absence of basis for significant improvement in our relations with UAR.
While we would not expect Nasser to turn pro-West, we would wish
convincing signs that he had become alive to danger of international
Communism and evidence that he had abandoned efforts to undermine
pro-Western Arab regimes. 79

The administration attempted to enlist West Germany in a plan to offer ad hoc
economic development aid. 80 At a press conference on April 8, 1958, a
reporter pointedly asked Secretary of State Dulles to comment on the US
choices vis-a-vis Nasser, ie either ‘to block the further spread of his influence
... or to tty to get along with him’. Dulles responded: ‘I think that we are
getting along with him as far as I am aware.’ For added emphasis, Dulles
denied that the US opposed Arab unity, asserting only that it opposed unity by
force. 81 This statement was the first public acknowledgement that something
‘new’ was afoot between the United States and Egypt.

Not to be outdone, the following day Senator Hubert Humphrey, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to William M. Rountree,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs:

It appears that the time may be at hand for a re-evaluation of our
relationships with Egypt. ... In light of the growing power of Egypt since
the formation of the United Arab Republic, I am sure that our country is
giving the utmost drought and consideration to what should be our
future relationships. Are we considering the reestablishment of the
CARE program in Egypt? I think we should. Are we considering
releasing the impounded Egyptian funds? I believe that this should be
done. Are we considering extending technical aid to Egypt? I feel that
this should be given favorable consideration. And, finally, has Egypt
made any request for the purchase of agricultural products under the
terms of Public Law 480? If so, I hope that such a request will be
honored. I will welcome your advice and counsel on these matters. 82

The Wave of the Future

The Democrats saw an opportunity to emphasize Republican foreign policy
setbacks in the fall elections. On 17 April, Rountree responded to Humphrey,
saying that all options were under review, including PL 480 grain and the
CARE program. He pointed out that the release of frozen assets awaited only
the formal acceptance of the Suez canal settlement. Rountree reassured the
Senator that the United States sought better relations with the UAR as a means
‘to strengthen the stability and security of the Near East’. 83 The rapprochement
with Nasser was under way. Reacting to the surprise announcement, tire media,
particularly in the Middle East, linked the new US policy to Nasser’s upcoming
Moscow visit.Pro-Western newspapers, like Al-Nahar in Beirut, ‘criticized
Washington for engaging in [an] “auction with Moscow” over Nasser’s
friendship’, and called the new policy ‘Nasser’s victory over the United States’.
They labeled Dulles’ attempt to economically isolate Nasser a failure. Others
were cautiously optimistic: ‘The US can, if really willing, turn a new page in
[the] history of [the] Middle East.’ Many Middle East observers argued that die
Eisenhower administration lacked the key ingredients for success, namely a
respect for ‘neutrality’ and non-interference in the region. The skeptics argued
that concessions from Israel were mandatory: ‘If not, what can [Dulles] hope
to get out of his friendly overture to President Nasser?’ 84 The New York Times
described US-Egyptian relations as in the ‘deep freeze’, stating: ‘Whether a
genuine rapprochement was in the offing or not, ...[tjhe Egyptians are
particularly eager to get their financial assets in the United States, frozen since
President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, released.’ The article
also pointed out: ‘This let-up may be merely a pause between rounds.’ 85

The situation now had to be explained to the British. On 9 April 1958,
Washington had approached London about its planned first stage to free
frozen funds and resume limited aid programs. 86 The British responded with a
resounding lack of enthusiasm. The Foreign Office informed the State
Department that while they did not mind the licensing of quasi-military items
and other items like radios and civilian aircraft, they objected to $400,000
worth of road building and communications equipment. They reasoned that a
resumption of the US aid program to Egypt would have an ‘adverse’ effect on
the Iraqi -Jordanian Arab Union. In the interest of cooperation, the Americans
dropped the bulldozers and offered Fulbright studentships and folk dancers
instead. 87 Experience tempered the administration’s hopes for better relations
with Cairo:

We have decided that effort should be made to place US-UAR relations
on more normal basis. Although under no illusion that Nasser’s basic
philosophy or objectives can thereby be effectively altered to reflect pro-
Western orientation, we nonetheless believe that removal of certain
points of friction and minor irritants might help achieve this purpose and
that it might place us in position to exert more effective influence over
UAR policies.

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Fearing a backlash from pro-Western states in the region, Dulles warned US
missions against ‘magnifying’ the significance of the new policy: ‘The steps we
are taking are relatively minor and are not repeat not to be viewed as a major
policy shift.’

As a result of British concerns, Dulles instructed the US embassies in
Baghdad and Amman thus: ‘You should reaffirm to Iraq and Jordan
Governments our support for the maintenance [ot] their independence and
integrity and our willingness [to] provide appropriate assistance to them in their
efforts [to] build [a] strong and lasting union.’ The embassies were to stress
that Nasser’s behavior toward Iraq and Jordan would be a major factor in
determining the course of Egypt’s future relationship with Washington. 88 After
the US released Egypt’s frozen assets, on 26 April, Ambassador Hare again met

Courtesy of National A rchives

Raymond Hare

Raymond Hare, US Ambassador to Egypt during the rehabilitation of relations
with Nasser in 1958.

The Wave of the Future

with Nasser. The Egyptian President wanted assurances that tire US would not
attempt to remove his regime. As Nasser put it: ‘I want to feel that my back is
safe.’ 89 He blamed Egyptian-Iraqi hostility on the Hashemites, and stated that
he foresaw no specific US-UAR problems in the future and that he was not
opposed ‘in principle to American objectives’. Nasser pointedly told Hare that
the Soviets had always been more receptive to non-alignment, and that
therefore he did not anticipate any problems with Moscow. Hare reported to
Washington that Nasser’s confidence during the meeting made him uneasy.
The Ambassador wanted to respond to Nasser’s question about US intentions
vis-a-vis the UAR before the Moscow trip, but could think of no way to
accomplish that without ‘undue and perhaps undignified haste’. 90

Delayed because of Suez, Nasser’s official visit to the Soviet Union was an
impressive event. Nasser was the first non-Communist to receive the ‘guest of
honor’ salute in Red Square. He announced: ‘The Arab people intend to get rid
of every foreign domination. They believe in non-alignment.’ Rivaling the
welcome accorded Tito and Nehru, Nasser listened to students chant from
Lenin’s tomb: ‘Hail to die leader of die Arab world.’ Perhaps more telling was
the total lack of official criticism from the West. As one commentator put it:
‘Swallowing hard, the U.S. tried to act as if it did not mind - so as Nasser did
not go too far.’ 91 Aldiough well aware of Egypt’s weaknesses, in May 1958
Nasser undoubtedly felt that he controlled his destiny and die destiny of the
Arab world. Many in the Arab world shared his vision and enthusiastically
embraced it, while the leaders of traditional regimes feared its effect on their
restive populations.

Clouds on the horizon: the Lebanese and Jordan crises

Even as Nasser was being feted in Moscow, UAR pressure on Lebanon and
Jordan intensified. Both the Chamoun government and the Hashemite
monarchy faced growing instability. The building crisis in Lebanon pitted pro-
Nasserist, pan-Arab elements against the pro-Western Chamoun, who now
faced Nasserist Arab nationalism in addition to age-old Syrian ambitions
toward Lebanon. 92 Both Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus broadcast open
invitations to revolt. Egyptian arms shipments to the rebels, and the
participation of Syrian military personnel as instigators in Lebanese riots, fueled
the instability. 93 As late as 7 May 1958, Chamoun minimized the threat posed
by Nasser and the unrest generated by his attempt to succeed himself as
President. Noting Egyptian-inspired attacks in the ‘venal press of Beirut’ and
on Damascus Radio, as well as Syrian arms-smuggling, he stated that he saw
‘no evidence of a concerted UAR plan’ to topple his regime. 94 As events
spiraled out of control, Chamoun became increasingly alarmist about Syrian
involvement. 95 With the crisis mounting, Washington faced some unpleasant
choices. Wary of intervention given the lack of a viable exit strategy, Dulles
pointed out to Eisenhower: ‘Once our forces were in, it would not be easy to
establish a basis upon which they could retire and leave behind an acceptable
situation; that might create a wave of anti-Western feeling in the Arab world

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

comparable to that associated with the British and French military operation
against Egypt, even though the circumstances were quite different.’ 96 At some
levels, the Foreign Office expressed similar views: ‘In fact we hope just as
much as they do that no military intervention will be necessary. It is fraught
with all sorts of problems and dangers for us, for example, if a Syrian pipeline
was blown up again.’ 97 Intervention had to be a last resort.

As if Lebanon were not enough, the situation in Jordan took an unexpected
turn for the worst. There was widespread unrest, and Jordanian security
arrested a number of officers and enlisted men for plotting to overthrow the
monarchy by assassinating both the King and Samir al-Rifai, the Prime
Minister. The regime in Amman made a compelling case that the plot
originated with UAR agents in Syria, and emphasized the similarities between
UAR subversion in Jordan and in Lebanon. King Hussein hammered home the
view that if Chamoun fell, Nasser would ‘emerge in the eyes of the Arab world
as the victor’. Such an eventuality would encourage every ‘malcontent’ in the
region ‘with [the] definite probability [that the] entire Middle East will be lost
[to the] free world.’ 98 The Lebanese and Jordanian arguments were steadily
gaining traction in London and Washington.

On 17 May, following his return from Moscow, Nasser met with
Ambassador Hare in one of their now regular exchanges of views. Claiming the
he had been ‘out of touch’, Nasser stated that he had instructed UAR officials
in Cairo and Damascus to take no action regarding Lebanon during his
absence. At die same time, he argued that Washington was ‘ignoring the facts’
in Lebanon. Whether or not ‘out of touch’, Nasser was remarkably well-
informed. He pointed out that well-known pro-Western Christians opposed
Chamoun and his constitutional gambit, and contended that this fact
underscored the existence of ‘genuine internal opposition’. He argued that
every former Lebanese Prime Minister opposed Chamoun and his plan, stating:
‘It was pure nonsense to imply that the U.A.R. was in any way responsible for
the revolution, which had spontaneously broken out. It was high time the West
realized that Arabs everywhere, whether Christian or Moslem, were tired of
being exploited.’ He added: ‘The U.A.R. had always respected, and would
continue to respect, the independence of the Lebanon.’ 99 Blaming Chamoun,
Nasser wanted Lebanese General Fuad Chehab as a compromise replacement
for Chamoun, and no reprisals against the rebels. 100 Miles Copeland, who was
working for the Dulles brothers, believed that even Nasser feared that his
Lebanese adventure was getting out of hand: ‘Setting off such an operation is
like starting a forest fire, it is easy to start but difficult to stop.’ 101 Nasser
wanted turmoil, but not Western intervention; it was a fine line. In preventing
intervention, he hoped once again to take credit for saving die Arab world
from imperialism. Nasser complained to Hare that Western policies in
Lebanon unfairly targeted die UAR and its supporters. 102 Nasser accused the
US and Britain of trying to ‘humiliate’ the UAR, and decried the conspiracy to
undermine his ‘new prestige’ and ‘neutralize him in order [to] stab him in [the]
back’. Hare responded by telling Nasser the US had the records of

The Wave of the Future

organizational and financial plans to prove direct Syrian military involvement.
Nasser’s only response was to look at the ceiling and drop the subject . 103

Washington and London concluded that, at a minimum, Nasser wanted a
temporary truce and amnesty for the rebels ‘to have their hands free to start all
over again when the time seems propitious’. Nasser also sought to forestall any
plans for Western intervention. His instincts told him that if the West refused
to intervene and the UAR mediated the dispute, his Lebanese opposition
would be severely weakened and eventually collapse . 104 He had neutralized
King Saud, and left Iraq and Jordan dangerously isolated . 105 The trick now was
to isolate Lebanon and Jordan from foreign support. Nasser believed that
without such support, Lebanon, Jordan, and even Iraq would succumb. Dulles
agreed with Nasser’s assessment. He argued that intervention was a high-risk
proposition but concluded that the United States could not allow anti-Western
forces ‘to take control of Lebanon by force without our intervention, this will
in any case be the prelude to a series of further coups, the political death of
Nuri and Hussein, and the final collapse of any Western position in the area .’ 106
In a vacuum, Nasser’s faith in Arab unity, Arab nationalism, non-alignment,
the will of the Arab people, and the inevitable collapse of traditional regimes
was justified, but events were not occurring in a vacuum.

Chapter 3: ‘The Tempest 5

During the first half of 1958, Nasser’s power and influence achieved its
pinnacle. The positive shift in US policy and his trip to Moscow convinced him
that he was immune from outside intervention. 1 His prominence in die non-
aligned movement provided him with a legitimacy unthinkable only three years
before. The Syrian union, coupled with pro-Nasserist agitation against his Arab
opponents, appeared to portend the inevitable collapse of traditional Arab
regimes and the continued spread of his influence. It was understandable that
Eisenhower and Dulles would conclude that Nasserism, or some similar form
of radical Arab nationalism, was the ‘wave of the future’. It was in this
atmosphere that Washington dusted off its policies of 1953-1955, modified
them, and basing them on carrot-and-stick economics attempted to build a
realistic working relationship with Nasser. This renewed effort to improve
relations with Cairo reaffirmed Washington’s long-held view that Egypt, for
better or worse, was indeed the most important country in the Arab Middle
East, and that the tottering traditional regimes would likely come under the
influence of Cairo or fall to pro-Nasserist elements. Given the Cold War
paradigm that viewed Communism, albeit incorrectly, as monolithic, the White
House tendency to view revolutionary Arab nationalism and Nasserism as also
monolithic was consistent, if similarly flawed. In 1958, events would reveal a
more complicated reality.

Despite rapprochement with Nasser, US concerns about Lebanon and the
potential for UAR expansion left the impression in London that Eisenhower
actually regretted his decision not to back the British at Suez in 1956. 2
Eisenhower no doubt had second thoughts from time to time but
fundamentally believed that the British had mishandled the crisis from start to
finish; this reality was lost on Whitehall. London convinced itself that die US
now clearly recognized Britain’s superior Middle East expertise. In this regard,
in late May 1958, the Foreign Office telegraphed the British Embassy in
Washington:

“The Tempest”

In connexion with possible action in the Lebanon, various plans must be
made in the closest cooperation with the United States. Because of our
greater experience in the Middle East, die suggestions must often come
from us. I am, however, particularly anxious that we should avoid giving
the impression that we are trying to push the American into an
operation. 3

The British believed that the Eisenhower Doctrine and the US reaction to the
Lebanese situation represented the precise policies that they had advocated at
the time of Suez. Prime Minister Macmillan stated: ‘The new American policy
could hardly be reconciled with the Administration’s almost hysterical
outbursts over Suez.’ 4 On 14 May, Macmillan chaired a cabinet meeting to
discuss American preparations to deploy troops and preserve ‘the integrity and
independence of the Lebanon’. 5 Heartened by the belief that Washington
actually intended to move to curtail Nasserist activities, Macmillan stated: ‘If
the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957 represented a marked change from the
attitude of the American Administration in 1956, the interpretation now to be
given to it in 1958 was not merely in worlds but in deeds, a recantation - an act
of penitence — unparalleled in history.’ 6 London concluded that Eisenhower
and Dulles had recognized their Suez blunder and had no intention of
repeating it. The British clearly missed the point: Eisenhower wanted to avoid
intervention at almost any cost, and had little faith in London’s influence in the
Middle East. 7

The gathering storm: the Lebanese crisis

While London worked on gaining Commonwealth support, Washington
contemplated the next step and how to avoid intervention. 8 Eisenhower
viewed a military operation as very high-risk. As mentioned, there was the issue
of an exit strategy. At the same time, having just initiated a new policy based on
economic incentives with Nasser, tire possibility of Cairo engineering the
collapse of an independent Lebanon through their Syrian partners presented an
equally unappealing and embarrassing possibility. Dulles wanted Chamoun to
compromise. He told the Foreign Office that given die dangers associated with
military action, ‘Chamoun should do everything possible to maintain control
without it.’ The British government was split, with some supporting and others
opposing intervention. Those in London wanting action against Nasser
groused: ‘[US] eyes are fixed too much on the hope that intervention will be
avoided and too little on the measures necessary to ensure its success. They
want to avoid a direct clash with Nasser.’ 9 In Washington, Dulles painted a
gloomy picture for the NSC. Beirut was quiet but the standoff between
government troops and rebels continued around Tripoli. Infiltration continued
unabated across the ‘wide open’ Syrian border. Worse still, Dulles saw a
Nasserist takeover as the only real alternative to Chamoun. 10 By early June,
unrest in the countryside threatened to engulf Beirut. On 10 June, Macmillan
met in Washington with Eisenhower. In addition to possible courses of action

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

in Lebanon, they discussed ways to assist Iraq and Jordan. 11 They agreed that a
successor to Chamoun had to be found, given that Chamoun himself had
sparked the current crisis. 12

On 14 June, Chamoun and Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik asked the
Eisenhower administration if it would intervene militarily should the Lebanese
government request it. Washington equivocated, stating that any intervention
would be to protect American lives and property and to preserve the
independence of Lebanon, not to support any particular faction. Given the
presence of UN observers, Washington sought to avoid the appearance of
conflict with UN Security Council peace initiatives. In contrast, the British,
wanting intervention, offered a counter-proposal:

Our idea is that the Lebanese should ask for an emergency meeting of the
Security Council at which they would appeal for the despatch of a U.N.
military force. We and the U.S. would support this suggestion and offer
contingents. Once it was vetoed, we should be free to go to die direct
assistance of the Lebanon on our own account, at the same time taking
the Lebanese case to the Assembly under die ‘Uniting for Peace’
procedure. 13

The British now seemed to push for intervention and, needing US
concurrence, scrutinized every cable from Washington and crafted every
response in an effort to create an environment that would increase the odds on
US action.

In a reversal of policy, the British now attempted to arrange quiedy for
Jordanian and Iraqi participation in any potential Lebanese intervention.
Perpetually annoyed with Dulles, London became increasingly frustrated with
the Secretary’s desire for French participation. London was certain that a
French ‘gate-crash’ as they put it, meant that neither Iraq nor Jordan would
participate. As tilings would turn out, London would have been far better off
had the Hashemites stayed out of it. London also opposed Dulles’ near-
fixation on ‘extending’ Chamoun’s tenure beyond the 24 July date for new
elections. The British Embassy in Washington complained: ‘Mr. Dulles is
rather obstinate about this, and I find his reasoning unconvincing and in places
alarming.’ London wanted Chamoun’s political career expeditiously buried.
Finally, Whitehall and the Foreign Office became increasingly concerned that
Eisenhower was waffling on intervention. 14 Dag Hammerskjold warned Dulles
against intervention, arguing that a UN solution was far preferable, but the UN
Secretary General conceded that should the UN or Lebanese fail to resolve the
matter, Western intervention at the request of the Lebanese government would
be ‘legal’. 15 In a news conference on 25 June, Chamoun added weight to
Hammerskj old’s argument. He stated that the Lebanon would provide time for
the UN observers to carry out their mission, but added: “We will not accept
this U.A.R. attempt to lay its hand on Lebanon.’ 16

“The Tempest”

On that same day, the eve of his departure for a non-aligned conference in
Yugoslavia, Nasser received a pointed message from Washington via
Ambassador Hare. Hare’s instructions from Dulles were clear: ‘US attitude
toward UAR cannot but be affected by attitude of UAR toward other
independent states of area ... leave no doubt of this in his mind.’ To make
certain that Hare understood, Dulles added an additional sentence under his
personal signature: ‘Essential thing at moment is to bring end to Lebanese
crisis.’ 17 By early July, little had changed. The White House vacillated between
apprehensive optimism about Chamoun’s chances for survival and the hope
that Nasser, heeding US warnings, would end support to the rebels. At the
same time, Washington apprehensively coordinated a contingency strategy for
intervention with its allies. 18

On 1 July, in a meeting with Chamoun, the US, British, and French
ambassadors told him that only a political solution held any chance of ending
the civil war. They pressured him to drop attempts to succeed himself as
President. When asked about Washington’s position, US Ambassador Robert
Mills McClintock informed Chamoun that the US was committed to the
preservation of Lebanon’s integrity predicated upon Chamoun’s earlier
statements that he would not seek a second term. Angrily pointing out that his
current difficulties resulted from his steadfast support of die West, Chamoun
warned that a Nasserist triumph in Lebanon would encourage rebellions and
the overthrow of the regimes in both Jordan and Iraq. 19 Once notified,
Washington was unhappy that the American Ambassador had been associated
with the Anglo-French demarche. Apparently the representations made at the
meeting had exceeded a previous agreement. Rountree complained to Viscount
Samuel Hood (Lord Hood) at the British Embassy in Washington, who agreed
that it was an ‘unfortunate incident’. Hood then relayed the British Foreign
Secretary’s concern over the ‘lack of concrete evidence of UAR interference in
Lebanon’. 20 The US, France, and Britain may have been somewhat at odds
over the meeting, but there were indications that Chamoun had gotten the
message and was lining up his replacement, General Fuad Chehab, tire Chief of
Staff of the Lebanese Army. Fortunately, Chehab was Nasser’s compromise
candidate as well. 21 It appeared that the crisis might dissipate and the
intervention could be avoided.

Macmillan’s tempest: the Baghdad coup

During the first six months of 1958, the situation in Baghdad appeared to
improve. In March 1958, the US Embassy there had reported that Hashemite
opposition in Iraq, while having dabbled in various forms of ‘neutralism,
leftism and nationalism’, was ‘at tire moment enthralled by only one important
commodity - Nasserism’, but that it was ‘neither particularly significant nor
effective’. 22 The British had maintained their position in Iraq, come what may,
for over 30 years. Iraq stood as the bulwark of the British political, economic,
and military position in the Middle East. When Nasser announced the creation
of the UAR, the British assessed the situation in Baghdad, dividing the Iraqis

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

into three groups. First, the Embassy described the opposition, first, as the
‘unthinking public’, ‘students’, and ‘some politicians’ who saw Nasser as an
Arab hero and welcomed the announcement ‘uncritically’. Second, there were
the ‘active politicians’ who were largely suspicious and resented his claims to
Arab leadership. Then: ‘Finally, the Palace, the members of the Government
and the many officials and professional men who have a broader
understanding of the situation see the Union as a threat to Iraq, to its oil
revenues, to its development programme, to its monarchial regime and all that
it stands for.’ 23 London subscribed to this latter view.

To provide an alternative to Nasser’s vision for Arab unity, the Iraqi
government immediately began to explore union with Jordan, Kuwait, and
Saudi Arabia. Nuri Sa’id expected King Saud to ‘sit on the fence’. 24 London
quickly blocked Kuwait’s participation, fearing that it would ‘probably backfire’
and make Kuwait a target for Nasserist agitation. The Foreign Office observed
that the Ruler of Kuwait, by maintaining ‘a delicate balance’ had prevented a
‘collision with Arab nationalists’ and the younger generation in Kuwait.
Adherence to the Baghdad Pact would probably be ‘repugnant’ to Kuwaiti
progressives and bring calls for unity with the UAR. This would be a disaster,
since Kuwait provided the British with a petroleum safety net and price
leverage against other oil producers. 25 Nuri Sa’id also had his eye on
incorporating Kuwait into Iraq, and in conversations with the US Ambassador
to Iraq he demanded ‘money and Kuwait’, threatening to resign if he did not
get both. When Macmillan learned of the demand, he compared Sa’id to
Nasser, stating: ‘Nuri [has] been difficult for some time and was now
attempting a Nasser-type operation against Kuwait.’ The Prime Minister found
it a ‘great shock ... to learn that Nuri has out and out threatened Kuwait.’ 26
There was considerable apprehension at the British Embassy in Baghdad. In
February 1958, wanting more US economic and military aid for Baghdad, Sir
Michael Wright warned London that the long-term prognosis was problematic.

The Iraqis, with far too few exceptions, are not natural leaders and,
conscious that Iraq is a small and new state without much international
experience, they are all to inclined to look to others for inspiration: hence
much of the appeal of Colonel Nasser. This means that the Government
and the many in Iraq who believe in die Western alliance look to Britain
and America for leadership and help. ... if the West cannot give at least
some of the help that is needed, it will be extremely difficult in the long
term for the present regime to maintain itself in the face of die challenge
I have described.

The British and the Iraqi governments saw the Egyptian-Syrian union as a
direct direat to oil exports, given the pipeline stretching from Kirkuk across
Syria to die Mediterranean. 27 London wanted more support from Washington,
bodi financially and militarily, in propping up the Baghdad regime. Ironically,
the British and Iraqi fixation on the UAR would prove their undoing.

“The Tempest”

On 14 July 1958, the long-anticipated coup against Hashemite Iraq finally
occurred. Oddly enough, it came as a total surprise. As Christian Herter, die
Under Secretary of State, put it, die coup caught everyone ‘absolutely flat-
footed’. 28 It had been the event that never happened. Iraq had experienced so
much unrest, so many rumors of revolt and actual revolts, all of which had
failed to dislodge eidier the Hashemites or the British, that the ease and success
of the Bastille Day conspirators astonished even the most pessimistic. 29 It was
swift, violent, and conclusive. Brigadier Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim and his
cohorts had learned from the short-lived Rashid Ali coup of 1941. Taking no
chances, the plotters decapitated the regime, removing any figure around which
a cohesive opposition might coalesce. 30 Iraq put an exclamation point on Suez;
British power and influence in Iraq had vanished and Albion was clearly on the
defensive in the Persian Gulf. In Washington, the coup merely confirmed
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ conviction that the imperial British system in the
Middle East was at best outmoded, at worst detrimental to Western interests,
and now a thing of the past. 31

Adding insult to injury, the British had arguably shot themselves in the foot.
They had encouraged the Iraqi government to move military formations to the
Syrian border in an attempt to divert UAR attention from Lebanon.
Unfortunately, the Iraqi high command issued ammunition and arranged for
brigades commanded by rebel plotters to pass through, rather than around, the
capital. Proper security precautions were not taken, and no other loyal army
units were in the city. Rebel brigades detouring to besiege the palace,
occupying Radio Baghdad, and taking over the telephone exchange were the
first sign that something was amiss. The ease of the takeover, the liquidation of
government officials, and the murder of the royal family also surprised the
conspirators. They had expected a protracted struggle, and when rioting broke
out, they lacked an immediate plan to deal with the situation. Quickly
recovering, Iraq’s new leader Qasim declared martial law on 15 July, issued
shoot-on-sight orders, and restored order. 32 The new regime realized that
excessive rioting and damage to foreign interests would damage its credibility,
bring a departure of foreign technicians and invite intervention. No. 10
Downing Street concluded that a ‘small body of troops ... ran amok’,
murdering Nuri Sa’id, the King, the Crown Prince and other key officials. In
Macmillan’s words: ‘when the full account reached us it was clear that the
tragedy was complete.’ There had been no inkling of a real nature of the threat
from the military. 33 Macmillan expressed Whitehall’s shock: ‘All this was
devastating news destroying at a blow a whole system of security which
successive British Governments had built up.’ 34 Washington agreed that the
British ‘system of security’ in the Middle East had largely collapsed, and that
Nasser was behind it.

Following news of the coup, Eisenhower said, speaking to Dulles by
telephone: ‘It looks as if you have a solid Arab world against us because Jordan
can’t stick.’ The president did not say ‘we’. Dulles agreed and then added: ‘The
main problem is our relations with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. We always felt

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

we would lose the Arab world but did not want to under circumstances that
would lose the confidence of these countries.’ 35 In Washington, the complete
surprise and the lack of information about the new regime created a flood of
criticism. Senator J. William Fulbright complained: ‘It is possible that there
might be some legitimate excuse for being surprised about the rebellion. I do
not think there is any excuse to come in and say, “We do not know anything
about this government”. They have had several days. They ought to know a lot
about it if diey have any kind of organization at all. ... Here we are just
fumbling in die dark.’ 36

Facing harsh criticism from all quarters, the administration was under
pressure to act. Just as the failure to form MEDO in 1954 had provided the
impetus for the formation of a defense alliance based on the ‘northern tier’, the
Iraqi coup revitalized and inextricably linked containment policy to the survival
of that alliance. It was widi Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in mind that
Washington considered taking action in Lebanon. Both die State Department
and the CIA concluded that inaction would result in diree probable outcomes;
these conclusions went far beyond the Arab Middle East. First, Nasser, who
they believed was behind the coup, would take over the entire region. Second,
the United States would lose influence and probably critical bases, including
Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya and last, the US could lose someparticularly
sensitive intelligence sites in Iran and Pakistan that direcdy affected the
strategic defense of the continental United States. This assessment directly
linked the outcome of die situation in Lebanon to US global credibility. 37

In some quarters, there had been the initial assumption that the British
would intervene immediately to redress die situation; when it became apparent
that this would not be the case, the paranoia intensified. On 14 July, at a tense
and hastily convened NSC meeting, Allen Dulles briefed the CIA’s sketchy
intelligence on the situation in Iraq. Director Dulles confirmed that the Crown
Prince was dead and a ‘Leftist government’ headed by pro-Nasserist army
elements had taken over. 38 He told those present that the situation in Jordan
was ‘extremely critical’. There were fears of another Nasserist coup, and
concerns that an ‘extremely alarmed’ Israel might occupy all of ‘Trans -Jordan’
in the event of ‘disorder’. As the briefing continued, the Director became more
alarmist, stating: ‘The fate of Kuwait is presently in the balance.’ Dulles
reported that King Saud demanded ‘action at once, stating that if the United
States and United Kingdom do not act now they are finished as powers in the
Mid-East’. As for Lebanon, he stated that Chamoun had frantically asked for
US, British, and French intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours. Unwilling to
be outdone by his younger brother, the Secretary of State, participating by
telephone, became even shriller: ‘If we do not respond to the call from
Chamoun, we will suffer the decline and indeed the elimination of our
influence — from Indonesia to Morocco.’ 39

Despite mushrooming alarm in Washington, the US Embassy in Beirut
calmly reported: ‘As for hard evidence of an increased military threat to
Lebanon, it is difficult to find this morning.’ 40 The cacophony of concern easily

“The Tempest”

Courtesy of National Archives

Dulles and Robert Murphy

Robert Murphy, Special Envoy to the Middle East following the Lebanese crisis
and the Iraqi coup. Murphy’s association with Eisenhower dated back to the North
African campaign in World War II. He was a trusted trouble-shooter for the
administration.

drowned out the Embassy’s even-keeled evaluation, and Eisenhower ordered
troops into Lebanon . 41 He later stated that when he went into the meeting, his
‘mind was practically made up.’ After the decision was made, Eisenhower
telephoned Macmillan, who offered his complete agreement and cooperation.
Macmillan informed Eisenhower: ‘We have a request from the two little chaps.’

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

King Hussein had requested British troops as well. 42 In a follow-up telegram,
Macmillan promised Britain’s support and called for ‘urgent action’, but he
quickly made a point of London’s main concern. The Prime Minister warned
the president that attacks on British oil installations would surely result: ‘all of
which will inflict great loss upon the international companies and particularly
upon us who depend on sterling oil.’ Having pushed Washington to act,
Macmillan now urged caution because of the complexity of the situation. 43 The
message was not lost on the White House. On 18 July, Eisenhower cabled
Macmillan with a review of the situation, including his thoughts on the
situations in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf,
and Saudi Arabia. The President assured Macmillan: ‘We shall seek ways to
help diem be sturdy allies, first in quality and second in quantity, insofar as that
quantity can be usefully provided and maintained.’ 44 Clearly, Eisenhower and
Dulles were entertaining more aggressive assistance to pro-Western regimes in
the region. In addition, both agreed that the United States and Britain had to
mount coordinated and effective propaganda campaigns at the UN and against
the Communists in die Middle East who had appropriated Arab nationalism. 45

Revolution in Iraq and a second honeymoon with Cairo

Ironically, Nasser, who had worked diligently for the overthrow of the
Hashemite regime and Nuri Sa’id in Iraq, knew little more about what had
actually happened than Washington or London. Naturally, he assumed that the
coup was good news, and Egypt immediately recognized the new regime in
Baghdad. He then optimistically awaited an announcement from Baghdad of
solidarity with the UAR. In Yugoslavia, when the revolution occurred and the
British and Americans announced their interventions in Jordan and Lebanon,
Nasser believed that Iraq was next. On 17 July, he secretly traveled to Moscow,
seeking assistance. He was disappointed. The Soviets offered unlimited bluster
and moral support, but risking a nuclear war with the United States over some
Arab revolution in Iraq was not on their agenda. On 18 July, he flew to
Damascus and met with Sarraj, the UAR Syrian security chief, and an emissary
from Baghdad, Abd-al-Salam al-Aref, Qasim’s pro-Egyptian deputy. Qasim
had dispatched Aref to enlist Nasser’s aid. The meeting resulted in a pact of
mutual support and friendship. It would prove to be the first and last
agreement between Nasser and the new Iraqi regime. Convinced that Nasser
was behind the coup in Baghdad and having little insight into die political
dynamic between Baghdad and Cairo, Robert Murphy, Eisenhower’s special
envoy, went to die Middle East on a fact-finding mission shortly after the Iraqi
coup. Murphy met with Nasser, who denied rumors of an impending UAR
move against Amman. When Murphy told Nasser that King Hussein had faith
in the loyalty of his army, Nasser laughed and said: ‘I overthrew the King of
Egypt after plotting for five years, and nobody suspected anything. How can
Hussein be sure what is going on in his Army? You know what happened last
month to his cousin, King Faisal of Iraq!’ 46

“The Tempest”

Washington did not yet understand that the Iraqi revolution, as Nasser
would begin to ascertain, was just that - an Iraqi revolution. Qasim had no
intention of joining Egypt and Syria, primarily because he had every intention
of preserving Iraq’s oil wealth for Iraq. 47 In Baghdad, an internal debate
erupted over the nature of the relationship between Baghdad and the UAR.
While Qasim paid lip service to Arab unity, Kurdish groups in the north and
the large Shi'a population in southern Iraq opposed submersion in a super state
dominated by Sunni Arabs. In addition, the well-organized Iraqi Communist
Party (I CP), having witnessed Nasser’s dissolution and suppression of
Communist elements in Egypt and Syria, had no desire to suffer the same fate.
Also, Qasim had no intention of living in Nasser’s shadow. As a result,
Nasserists, like Qasim’s deputy, Colonel Abd-al-Salaam al-Aref, found
themselves increasingly isolated and alienated from the new regime. 48

During the fall of 1958, UAR-Iraq relations deteriorated as Qasim
suppressed pro-UAR elements. The arrest of Aref was a clear ‘slap in the face’,
and placed Nasser in uncharted territory. Attacking the ‘feudal’ Hashemites or
Saudis was one tiring, but dealing with an Arab nationalist rival with solid
revolutionary credentials was another. 49 In addition, to counter Nasserist and
Ba’thist influence, Qasim opted for greater reliance on Communist support.
From Washington’s perspective, this reliance made Qasim vulnerable to a
Communist coup, the very reasoning that had prompted Eisenhower to take
action in Iran in 1953. 50 From Nasser’s perspective, Qasim’s alliance with the
Communists not only deprived him of Iraq’s potential membership of the
UAR, but it also raised concerns about the geographical and ideological
proximity of the Syrian and the Iraqi Communists and their mutual loathing of
the UAR President. This situation did not bode well for stability in an already
restive Syria. The Eisenhower administration concluded that Nasser’s
revolutionary activities would most likely moderate as he attempted to deal
with Iraq, and speculated that Qasim and his Communist allies ‘would
strengthen those Syrians who would prefer looser ties with Egypt and possibly
closer relations with Iraq’. 51 Qasim’s courtship of tire ICP also enhanced his
standing in Moscow, cooling the Kremlin’s relationship with Cairo. In reaction,
the Egyptian press and other Nasserist outlets began to focus editorials and
articles on the ‘dangers of Communism’ in the Arab world. 52 This growing
coziness between Iraq and the Soviet Union created friction between the
Egyptians and their Russian benefactors. 53 Success was breeding dissension
among the Arab Middle East’s ‘happy band of brothers in revolution’. 54

Thus, by the fall 1958, the Egyptians found their problems multiplying. Iraq
exhibited more hostility and all was not well in Syria. Nasser’s Ba’th Party allies
had grown more disillusioned with Egyptian rule. Jordan no longer appeared to
be easy pickings, since Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had made it
ominously clear that any change of regime in Amman would result in decisive
Israeli action to occupy the West Bank and to ‘make provision’ for the
Palestinian population there. 55 The Israelis ratcheted up the pressure by openly
shopping for support for just such a move in the event of a Jordanian

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

collapse. 56 The level of speculation over potential Israeli action against the
West Bank and even for possible moves east of the Jordan had a predictable
‘deterrent effect’. 57 Nasser found his options limited to covert undermining of
the Hashemite government in Jordan. By December 1958, Nasser’s year of
revolution was over. With the less desirable ‘revolutionary’ outcome in Iraq
and the Soviet tilt toward Baghdad, he, like Washington, needed a new ally.

Coming to terms with revolutionary Iraq

As for Lebanon and intervention, Washington, by now, was beginning to
understand what had really happened in Baghdad and how Lebanon fit into the
picture. The shrill voices of 14 July had receded. At the 18 July Cabinet
meeting, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the United States had opposed the
British folly of including Iraq in the Baghdad Pact. With some justification, he
stated that the strain placed on the Hashemite regime by its membership of the
Pact brought about its collapse. He concluded that oil supplies would be stable
so long as threats to Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia were quashed. A calmer
and more collected Secretary explained that the President’s decision to send in
troops was based on the ‘frightened’ appeals of Chamoun and Hussein. He
stated that it would maintain US credibility with ‘smaller nations’ but solve
nothing. Dulles stated: ‘We have no illusions that this response will solve the
problems of that area - in fact it may make them worse. It is not a popular
action and in fact it is pregnant with difficulties: To send in armed forces to try
to stem the tides of rabid nationalism. . . . But failure to act would have shaken
the foundations of the free world — from Morocco to the Western Pacific.’ In
something of a soul-searching self-indictment, Eisenhower concluded that the
US had not done enough to protect and aid their friends in the region or to
combat their enemies. Eisenhower stated that die US position had to be
‘rehabilitated’ in die region and diat would require money. 58 In an article
headed ‘What Now?’, The Nation hit the nail squarely on the head: ‘The news
from Baghdad sent us barging into Lebanon before we had received a second
report from the observers - before, indeed, we even know exactly what was
happening in Iraq.’ Facing a storm of criticism, the United States and Britain
now attempted to sort out what had actually happened. 59

On 16 July, John Hay ‘Jock’ Whitney, the US Ambassador to London,
reported that the landings in Lebanon had heartened Prime Minister
Macmillan. He hinted that the British had a much wider agenda. ‘British are
convinced US-UK must be prepared to follow through in Jordan and Iraq as
necessary to restore western position in entire area. In other words, British
believe that now we have started, we must see the job to a finish or we will be
in worse shape than before marines landed at Beirut.’ 60 In fact, Foreign
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd’s trip to Washington following the coup was based in
part upon the premise that the US and Britain must act quickly in both Iraq
and Jordan or ‘it would be too late.’ 61 At an 18 July dinner with the
ambassadors of the ‘Old’ Commonwealth, Lloyd tried to put the best face on
the situation and deflect Dulles’ criticism of British policy. He argued that ‘if

“The Tempest”

Britain had not gone in the Baghdad Pact would have collapsed, and Iran,
Sudan, Pakistan and perhaps even Turkey would have despaired and reinsured
with Russia.’ Lloyd also pointed out that Eisenhower had made the decision to
intervene in Lebanon on an ad hoc basis. 62 On 14 July, at the Foreign Office,
despite the hand wringing and flailing about, D.M.H. Riches, the Chief of the
Arabian Department, minuted his superior, Sir William Hayter, with a note of
reason.

If the revolution in Iraq succeeds, when the smoke clears we shall
presumably be left with a military dictatorship on the Nasser model. This
government will certainly express emotional solidarity with pan-Arabism
and therefore with Egypt; but it is likely to wish to preserve Iraqi oil
revenues for itself and therefore to maintain its separate identity. It seems
unlikely that it would even join the United Arab States — except perhaps
as a desperate last fling if it felt its position severely threatened.

Riches predicted that the new revolutionary government would ‘prosecute the
Iraqi claim to Kuwait with greater vigour than the previous Iraqi Government.’
With considerable prescience, he argued that in such a case, Egyptian would
likely support a Kuwait free of Iraqi control, either as an independent state or
as a part of the UAR, and he predicted that Saudi Arabia would have the same
goal. Riches stated that his views were based on a ‘rational attitude on the part
of Arab governments’. He cautioned that intervention might result in ‘Arab
policies, which on the face of it are contrary to the individual interests of the
countries concerned’ and ‘certainly contrary to Western interests.’ 63

The Colonial Office and British authorities in Aden took a narrow, hard
line, and a thoroughly alarmist view of events. Sir William Henry Tucker Luce,
Governor General in Aden, ‘fully’ endorsed the views of Arab notables in the
Aden Federation:

The events in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan constitute a crisis of the greatest
magnitude both for the future of the Arab world and for the West’s
relations with it. Unless there is swift and effective intervention by
Western powers to contain the expansion of Russian influence and to
curb Nasser’s ambitions, the Arabs would soon be united in bondage and
not in freedom as so many of them desire. They clearly regarded
suppression of the Iraq rebellion as an essential part of intervention. 64

The Colonial Office requested that the contents of the telegram be presented
in the situation briefing to the Foreign Secretary and brought to die attention
of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The responsible Foreign Office officials
commented that no one ‘need attribute very great importance to dais particular
reaction’ and that the request to make it a part of Selwyn Lloyd’s briefing was
‘absurd.’ 65

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

With Qasim’s ‘junta’ in control and expressing a desire for ‘friendly
relations’ with the United States, Washington adopted a wait-and-see attitude. 66
Still trying to understand the situation and offer some constructive
observations, Dulles concluded that Iraq needed to maintain good relations
with the West because of oil revenue and Nasser. In something of a
contradiction, he stated that he still believed that Nasser was the real ‘authority’
behind the Qasim regime and that the authority behind Nasser was the Soviet
Union. In contrast, the CIA believed that the Iraqi regime had no effective
opposition but would probably disappear within six months in a Nasserist
coup. The Agency also made it clear that they thought the long-term British
position in Jordan and Iraq was untenable, thus contributing to the view that
Jordan was a bad bet for US support. 67

Betting on the northern tier

Pointing out the advantages of his original 1953 concept of a ‘northern tier’
alliance, Dulles suggested that Iraq leaving the Baghdad Pact would remove the
Arab element, thereby opening the way for US participation in an alliance with
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Washington could then take a direct role in
protecting its regional interests. 68 In late July 1958, Dulles told an emergency
meeting of the Baghdad Pact that the US would join the Pact and significandy
increase assistance to Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. 69 The meeting also reinforced
the Secretary’s view that time might take care of Nasser’s prestige if die UAR’s
energy could be ‘channeled’ and allowed to dissipate. This view followed Allen
Dulles’ argument that the differences existing between types of Arab
nationalism and approaches to Arab unity spelled trouble for Nasser: ‘Many
Arab countries give lip-service to close relations with Nasser, but when it
comes to dividing up oil revenues or the waters of the Nile, it is a different
story.’ 70 The British understood US policy in only one dimension — that of the
damage that a US rapprochement could potentially do to Britain’s remaining
interests in the region. In fact, London’s decision to drop plans for
intervention and to recognize the Qasim regime, which Washington expected
to come under Nasser’s direct control, contributed to the US view that the
Arab world was an inevitable loss. 71

Disenchantment with the Eisenhower administration’s UAR tilt also
affected British views of the situation in Jordan. Angered by US policy toward
Jordan, Sir Charles Johnston, the British Ambassador in Amman, wrote to die
Foreign Office complaining that:

The State Department view . . . reflects that defeatist ‘Rountreeist’
philosophy, which has always seemed to me unworthy of a great country
like the U.S. It assumes what I call the double standard. Nasser is against
us, therefore we must kowtow to him and regard his triumph as
inevitable. Jordan is for us, therefore the task of preserving it is utterly
hopeless and we must see how we can hand it over to Nasser as
gracefully as possible. This theory blandly overlooks the fact that Nasser’s

“The Tempest”

regime is now at least as unpopular in Syria, and perhaps also in Egypt

itself, as Samir Rifai’s is in Jordan.

Johnston argued that: ‘The Americans should not allow any infantile anti-
Monarchist prejudices to blind them to this fact. Monarchy is a very ancient
and tenacious principle, in die Arab world.’ He went to say: ‘It would be naive
to think that, after living with it for millennia, the Arab world is suddenly going
to drop it because one Colonel and one Brigadier have shown themselves
successful military conspirators in 1952 and 1958 respectively.’ 72

Johnston could have given Washington a little more credit. The
administration had no illusions about Nasser, but it simply did not think
Jordan’s survival was worth the cost. Dulles believed that the West had to
‘sandbag’ its positions in Lebanon, Israel, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf against
an Arab nationalist ‘flood which is running strong’. Accepting Arab
nationalism and anti-Western policies as a fact of life, Dulles intended to buy
time until the flood subsidied. Choices had to be made, and the administration
believed that Jordan, in the direct path of the flood, had little chance of
survival. Dulles also wanted Jordan to make a soft landing because of Israel.
Washington feared that a violent collapse in Jordan would bring the calamitous
consequences of Israeli intervention. For this reason, Washington wanted the
British to leave voluntarily, believing that failure to do so invited another Iraq
and Israeli intervention. With the British gone, a transition could occur that
would avoid Israeli intervention, with its potential for regional conflict and a
possible nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. 73

While London and Washington struggled with die situation, it become more
apparent that unification with the UAR did not fit Qasim’s agenda, and
triangular friction developed between Cairo, Baghdad, and Moscow. This rift
caused Anglo-American policy goals to diverge. Even in die worst of times,
Eisenhower’s policies reflected a conflicted relationship with Nasser.
Washington erred in ideologically linking Nasser’s Arab nationalism and need
for arms from die Soviet Union to pro-Communist sympathies, but Nasser’s
suppression of die Communists in Egypt and Syria brought a more
sophisticated White House view. In addition, Iraqi opposition to Nasser
relieved many of the concerns about UAR regional hegemony. When pro-
Nasserist elements, led by Colonel Aref, prominent Ba’thists, and Rashid Ali al-
Gaylani, fell from power in Baghdad, US concern about Nasserism receded
even more. 74 An old fear took its place as Qasim turned to the Iraqi
Communists for support. 75 The situation in Iraq provided a situation in which
real Communists appeared to be on the road to political control.

Compared to the ICP in Iraq, Nasserism looked ideologically benign. The
developing ties between Washington and Cairo and growing US concern about
ICP influence in Iraq complicated the British campaign to normalize relations
with Baghdad and protect their interests in Iraqi oil. The US clearly intended to
use Nasser to counterbalance increasing Communist influence. NSC 5820
reflected this intention, stating that the US would ‘normalize’ relations with the

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

UAR: ‘Recognizing that U.S. accommodation with Nasser would contain
elements contrary to U.S. interests, deal with Nasser as head of the UAR on
specific problems and issues, area-wide as well as local, affecting the UAR’s
legitimate interests, but not as leader of the Arab world.’ 76 As for Jordan, die
directive proposed to ‘encourage such peaceful political adjustment by Jordan,
including partition, absorption, or internal political realignment, as appears
desirable to die people of Jordan’. In short, Sir Charles Johnston was correct:
Washington believed that the ‘controlled’ dismantlement of the Hashemite
kingdom constituted the only real option. 7 After literally years of soul-
searching, the administration came to a realistic policy toward Nasser: ‘The
main problem facing the U.S. in the area is not Arab nationalism, but Soviet
influence and activities.’ 78 It was a return to die fundamental policies of
containing Communism radier than nationalism.

With regard to Iraq, the administration concluded that while Qasim might
want to curtail Communist influence in Iraq, he was unable or unwilling to do
so because of the Ba’thist and Nasserist threat. Concern existed that
Communist influence might have already reached the point where Qasim could
not control it. 79 The less charitable views were positively alarming: ‘The Qasim
regime has shown no disposition to part company with the Communists even
though it is now relatively free to do so. ... The Qasim regime’s inertia in the
face of this Communist aggressiveness appears to have convinced most Iraqis
that Qasim has wholly surrendered to the Communists and must be removed.’
This clear focus on die Qasim regime and its Communist supporters promised
nodiing but complications for British attempts to keep the lid on its
relationship with the Baghdad regime.

As for Nasser, the report states that: ‘(Nasser) at last realizes that he cannot
divorce local Communist movements from the USSR and deal separately with
each on different bases. Circumstances are driving him to attack Qasim - and
at least indirectly the Soviet Union — as enemies of Arab Union, or risk losing
control of the union movement. . . . Refusal to face this issue carries die risk of
appearing weak or over-obligated, with a commensurate loss of stature.’ 80 The
Qasim regime lumped anti-Nasser and anti-US themes together. They
pervaded the Communist-inspired riot diat greeted Assistant Secretary
Rountree on his December 1958 visit to Baghdad. The riot also provided
additional impetus to the increasingly pro-Nasserist US tilt. In Cairo, Rountree
found the Egyptians as concerned as Washington about Communist influence
in Iraq because of its implications for Syria. 81 For Eisenhower, Nasser’s shift
was a long-delayed gift. Finally, Washington and Cairo saw eye to eye on
Communism. For Washington, Communism posed a global problem; for
Nasser, the revolutionary apostates in Baghdad threatened his view of Arab
nationalism and unity. For very different reasons, Nasser and Eisenhower
agreed on Qasim’s Iraq. 82

Cooperation widi Nasser put the US in bad stead in Baghdad, and
complicated relations with die Macmillan government on issues ranging from
Yemen to Jordan to Iraqi oil. By December 1958, die British concluded that,

“The Tempest”

despite Communist influence, Qasim represented the best guarantee against an
overt Communist takeover . 83 Qasim had followed through on his
commitments vis-a-vis the British-controlled IPC, an important if not ‘vital’
British interest . 84 The Macmillan government concluded that: ‘It is essential in
the interests of the maintenance of our economy and standard of living to
maintain our control of British oil interests in the Gulf, more particularly
Kuwait.’ For London, this interest included ‘occupying and running Kuwait as
a colony. ... So long as the Iraqis know that we can do without Iraqi oil if
necessary, by relying on Kuwait, drey have a strong inducement to come to
terms with us .’ 85 Wanting to avoid this extremity, the British sought to keep
US-Iraqi relations on even keel. London attempted to soften Washington’s
‘very gloomy’ view that Iraq had taken a ‘straight Soviet line ’. 86 The British
pushed dieir own ‘philosophy . . . namely that Qasim is our best bet and that
we can’t take any action which would make life difficult for him or provoke
him into taking an anti-Western line .’ 87 Despite die Macmillan government’s
best efforts, containment and not British economic interests would be
Eisenhower’s first priority. Eisenhower intended to take Macmillan’s concerns
into consideration and coordinate with London to extent possible, but the
President’s perception of US interests would be the driving force. The
Baghdad coup meant that the Qasim regime with its Communist supporters
would face US hostility and encouragement to Nasser. It also meant that the
Eisenhower administration intended to revitalize containment policy with
increased for military, security, and economicsupport Iran and Pakistan.

Chapter 4: The ‘Center of All Problems’
Iran and 1958

The coup in Iraq not only confirmed the fractious uncertainties of Arab
politics and die downward slide of British influence in the Middle East, but it
clearly demonstrated the interconnectivity of Cold War politics across the
Greater Middle East. The Iraqi coup had far-reaching consequences for US
policy in the region. Nowhere were these consequences more obvious than in
US relations with Iran and Pakistan. Qasim’s coup set in motion a series of
changes in US policy that complicated US relations for almost five decades.
While policies toward Pakistan and Iran had similarities, each had its own
unique characteristics. In some ways, the impact on Iran was the most
dramatic. To understand these changes, one must examine the pre-1958
political context, die immediate reaction to the Baghdad coup, and how the
coup fundamentally altered the relationship between Washington and Tehran.
Washington had always viewed Iran as geopolitically critical to US interests in
the Middle East, but by the mid-1950s sites in Iran had become strategic assets
in the Cold War directly affecting US security. In the mountains of
northeastern Iran, US installations literally overlooked the Soviet missile
development and test facilities at Turatom and Baiknour. These sites provided
direct signals and telemetry intelligence on Soviet missile tests and capabilities. 1
Given the technologies of the 1950s and 1960s, they were irreplaceable.

This situation dictated that the US had to do everything in its power to
maintain a pro-Western government in Tehran. Prior to 1958, this meant that
the Shah received military assistance and economic aid, and was put under
considerable pressure to enact fundamental reforms designed to stabilize and
broaden the base of his regime. The Eisenhower administration emphasized
economic development and reform while resolutely resisting the Shah’s
demands for massive military aid. Washington adhered to the premise that only
economic development could lay the foundation for the fundamental political,
social, and economic reform which would produce long-term stability in Iran.

The “Center of All Problems”: Iran and 1958

This dictated limited military and security assistance to provide the Shah’s
regime with the ability to maintain internal order and suppress any indigenous
Communist or anti-Western threats to the regime. It did not entail making Iran
into a real military power. 2 Eisenhower’s White House was just as convinced of
the efficacy of aid and development as an antidote to Communist influence as
the Kennedy administration, despite the fact that the latter received far more
credit for pushing economic development and reform. Walt Rostow’s views on
the efficacy of economic development, political reform, and the potential for
economic ‘take-off points’ fostering political democracy were just as in vogue
with Eisenhower as they were under Kennedy and Johnson. 3 This policy ran
directly counter to the Shah’s priority of making Iran the dominant military
power in the Persian Gulf and the military equal of Turkey. The history of the
Shah’s relationship with the Eisenhower administration is one of Iranian
demands for more military aid and Washington’s attempts to push tire Peacock
Throne toward economic growth and reform.

Containment through reform and
economic development

From the Shah’s 1953 restoration, the Eisenhower administration pressed
and chided the regime repeatedly about the lack of progress toward political,
economic, and social reform. This is not to say that Iranian military and
security services did not receive their share of funding and aid. Containment
strategy in its Iranian context required the maintenance of a stable political and
civil environment and sufficient military capability to maintain the border and
deter internal threats. Stability also required an efficient security apparatus to
protect the regime. The US plan never envisioned an Iranian military capable
of stopping, or even significantly delaying, a full-scale Soviet invasion.
Unfortunately, the Shah convinced himself that die latter was possible and that
the Eisenhower administration had promised exactly that as a quid pro quo for
joining the Baghdad Pact. This differing view between Washington and Tehran
spawned a periodically contentious relationship.

Early on, the US desire for reform focused on land reform and
redistribution as a method of solidifying die Shah’s rule. What seemed like a
good idea on the Potomac was a two-edged sword in Persia. Land reform
attacked the prerogatives and livelihoods of the large landowners who
supported the Shah against nationalist groups like the National Front and
Musaddiqists, and potentially undermined that support. Despite the risks, land
reform held odier attractions for the Shah. At some level, he wanted to free
himself from reliance on the traditional landowners and their influence. The
Shah believed that diis traditional source of political support also curbed his
ability to create a new, modern Iran in the image of Atatiirk’s Turkey.
Stubbornly opposed to reform, the conservative landowners, who tended to be
linked by blood and marriage ties to the bazarri and cherical classes, blamed US
pressure on tire Shah for his attempts to liberalize. They argued, and with some
justification, that rapid land reform would lead to chaos, which would lead to

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

drastically reduced production and the political instability associated with
‘problems feeding the cities’. All of this would open the door to the
Communist Tudeh. In addition, the landowners saw no practical difference
between US-backed liberal land reform and a Communist revolution and
collectivization. 4 The Shah’s ability to balance American pressure to reform, his
own desire to undercut the landowning classes, and the desirability of political
support from the traditional power centers determined the stability of the
regime.

In 1954 and 1955, with the encouragement of the Eisenhower
administration, the Shah supported land reform and an anti-corruption
campaign. This created a state of near political war between the Iranian
parliament, the Majlis, and the throne. In September 1955, to avoid a crisis, the
Shah abruptly moved to improve relations with the ‘conservative political
elements’. Observers, depending on their viewpoint, called it a ‘shrewd political
maneuver’ or ‘another indication of his unstable and emotional character’.
More likely, this political maneuvering reflected growing self-confidence, and
new-found leverage in resisting calls for reform by his foreign benefactors,
Britain and America. Whatever the reason, the Shah dropped the ‘talk of
widespread new reforms’. 5 He also placated secular elements in Iran, paving
the way for the repression of increasingly dissident conservative Shi’a clergy
and their anti-government activities. 6 The Shah’s move coincided with the
Soviet arms deal for Egypt, and with entreaties by the US and Britain for Iran
to join the Baghdad Pact. Here, a clear axiom of the West’s relationship with
Pahlavi Iran immerged: the more tire West needed Iran, the more latitude the
Shah exercised on the domestic front and the more leverage for aid. Having no
illusions about the fate of the monarchy should reformists or Communists
come to power, the Shah threw his political lot in with the West; however, the
Shah used the tactics employed by neutralists like Nasser and Nehru to
improve his situation. Pointing out that he had options, the Shah mixed
professions of loyalty and friendship with tire West with grousing about the
paucity of US aid and comments about the rewards of neutralism.

As for Iranian participation in the Baghdad Pact, the Shah had his price,
harping on his point that the pro-Western Middle East could not be defended
without Iran. He argued that: ‘A militarily strong Iran was therefore essential.
Iran would not become partner in regional pact until its armed forces had been
strengthened to point where it could take its place in the line on basis of at
least comparative equality.’ The Shah wanted additional economic aid as well,
which Iranian officials creatively justified by pointing out that Baghdad Pact
membership had a ‘serious effect on Iranian economy which depended to
considerable extent on its exports to Soviet Union.’ Knowing that London
considered Iranian participation in the Baghdad Pact critical, the Shah exerted
pressure to gain British assistance in acquiring the maximum American aid.
After a conversation with the Shah, die British Charge in Tehran commented:
‘It would appear that chief purpose of Shah’s summoning us was to put
himself in favorable light on both domestic and foreign issue and then appeal

The “Center of All Problems”: Iran and 1958

again for Western, i.e. US, military and also budgetary aid in order that he
might go ahead and adhere to Baghdad pact. It is possible, moreover, that Shah
felt that bringing in British on his appeal, he believed this might increase
pressure on U.S.’ 7 Using the specter of the Soviet threat and membership in
the Baghdad Pact as leverage, tire Shah believed he would get the aid he
demanded. 8 Despite hints of massive aid, the Shah actually received relatively
little, and most of that was directed toward internal security. However, he did
receive copious amounts of free advice from Washington about how funds for
direct budgetary and economic development should be employed.

There were even key disagreements on the economic front. In 1956, against
the advice of the Eisenhower administration, the Shah centralized economic
development in a Central Plan Organization (CPO) under a Shah loyalist, Abol
Hassan Ebtehaj. Rejecting US advice to pursue broad economic development
objectives aimed at raising die standard of living of the Iranian people, he used
the CPO to concentrate on infrastructure. Tehran presented the CPO as a
means to avoid graft and inefficiency by fostering foreign investment and
development in Iran. In effect, Ebtehaj became the father of what would
become massive foreign involvement in Iranian development. CPO policies,
coupled with foreign oil concessions and membership in the Baghdad Pact,
intensified xenophobic Iranian nationalism and magnified public perceptions
that the Shah had perpetrated a ‘sell out’ to Western interests. For tire Shah’s
opposition, it was a propaganda gold mine. They argued that the Shah gave the
West cheap oil, supported the Baghdad Pact, and then handed more than 60
per cent of Iran’s oil revenues back to Western firms by favoring them for
large-scale development projects. 9

By 1956, the Shah faced three major centers of domestic opposition: the
large landowners and merchants; the Shi’a clergy; and the various nationalist
groups nominally lumped together under the National Front. These groups felt
betrayed by the lack of opportunities for Iranians to participate in the new
economy, but fortunately for the Shah, die opposition groups distrusted each
other more than the regime. By electing to build a ‘heavy economic base’ in a
program that resembled Japan’s industrialization efforts of the late nineteenth
century, the Shah’s program under Ebtehaj largely ignored the rising
expectations of the people, creating widespread discontent. 10 In these
circumstances, the army and the newly created security agency, SAVAK
(Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar), constituted not only pillars of the
Shah’s personal rule, but also a prerequisite for the very economic
modernization and reforms sought by Washington. 11 The Eisenhower
administration preferred a different approach, but the Iranian monarch made it
clear that he had his own ideas about the approach to modernization.

Iran modernization: the race against time

Could the desire for economic betterment on the part of the Iranian people
be ignored without threatening the very existence of the Pahlavi dynasty?
Washington had its doubts. American officials believed that something had to

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

be done to improve the lot of the common Iranian, or ‘demagogues’ would fan
Iranian xenophobia into a ‘political storm alongside which the Mosadeq era
would appear a gende breeze’. 12 This focus on a ‘heavy base’ also created
budgetary problems and chronic shortfalls that were aggravated by the Iranian
government’s inability to deal with fiscal hard choices, particularly when they
involved die military. As a result, foreign aid became the routine anticipated
source for making die budget work. 13 These trends alarmed the Eisenhower
administration. Decisions about Iranian aid did not center solely upon a simple
binary question of support for the military versus support for economic
development; they became a more complex equation in which support for the
military translated into the stability needed for economic development. Pursuit
of the ‘heavy model’ for industrial development generated a need to strengthen
the coercive power of the state. In the administration’s view, the pay-off from
the ‘heavy base’ approach would not come soon enough to prevent
destabilization in Iran. Rising concern about the Shah’s ability to survive
resulted in discussions about alternatives: ‘The United States should then
review its policy towards Iran, taking into consideration whatever steps may be
possible to disassociate its own prestige from the prestige of die Shah and to
open better channels of communication and influence to opposition groups
than now exist.’ Thus, fearing that ‘die Shah’s position as a ruler may be in
jeopardy’, the Eisenhower administration continued to encourage more reform
and projects that directly benefited the people, while attempting to maintain
some distance from the Shah in the event he fell. 14

As chronic economic and budgetary problems generated a perpetual state of
crisis, the Shah careened from optimism to despair about die regime’s
floundering economy and security situation. The Shah’s ‘despair’, no doubt
sometimes real, also developed into an artform for extracting more military and
economic aid. Politically, the US pressured the Shah to ‘broaden’ his base
through controlled initiatives designed to foster political pluralism. To relieve
the pressure, the Shah, citing Reza Shah’s lament that his political legacy had
not been institutionalized, announced his decision to create political parties
‘whose politics stopped at the frontier’. The goal was to ‘canalize [the] energies
[of the] younger generation and to lead [the] people out [of] political illiteracy’.
The initiative was an embarrassing failure. Political projects du jour . , coupled
with increasingly exorbitant demands for aid, raised questions about the Shah’s
political sophistication and, periodically, his hold on reality. As a result, serious
questions arose concerning the viability of the regime. In July 1957, the US
Embassy in Tehran reported:

In a certain sense, the Shah lies at the center of all problems in Iran and
certainly is an extremely important factor in their solution. Most Iranians
recognize that the Shah has decided to rule personally as well as reign.
This giving up of a mere constitutional role in favor of the exercise of
power to make policy decisions for Iran has rather far reaching effects for
the Shah as a national symbol. His is the credit for success and his the

The “Center of All Problems”: Iran and 1958

onus of failure. He has deliberately removed himself from the apolitical
role of the constitutional monarch and put himself in the scales of
political survival in this country. As of now, his prospects for success
(survival) do not seem too sanguine. 15

The Iranian people had nothing to show for the Shah’s rule. No increased
feeling of security or justice had emerged. The Iranian government had
produced no visible results for the common people and economically, most
Iranians did not see any improvement in their lot. 16

This lack of progress and general lack of confidence in the Shah’s ability to
rule meant that ‘the Government, i.e. the Shah, the Crown, as a national
symbol and institution, could be seriously damaged’. 17 The Shah’s attempts at
Western-style education reform were having the opposite effect: ‘The grass
roots xenophobia of the average Iranian [is] perhaps the most sinister aspect of
Iranian life today. What is most disturbing, at least from the viewpoint of the
United States policy goals here, is that latent xenophobia flourishes among just
those groups, which have had the most contact with Westernization.’
Observers in Tehran believed that urban middle-class xenophobia resulted
from the superficial adoption of Western values without the underlying
acceptance of ‘community cooperation’, ‘individual freedom’, and ‘toleration’.
The US embassy reported: ‘If westernization proceeds in the same pattern as it
has up to now (and this seems not unlikely) it is not unreasonable to expect
that xenophobia will increase — and frighteningly enough, precisely in those
groups in which one would normally place the hope of Iran’s salvation from all
forms of extremism.’ The Shah’s non-Iranian origins and close association with
the US and Britain fueled this xenophobia. It was strongest among the
educated elite, who believed that in a meritocracy they would rule in place of
the Shah’s entourage of sycophants. By 1957, predictions of chaos and severe
damage to US policy interests were the order of the day. The survival of both
the Shah and the pro-Western orientation of Iran were very much in doubt. 18
As a result of dais pessimism, the Eisenhower administration quiedy worked to
keep its options open. Washington guaranteed die survival of an independent
Iran and its territorial integrity, but pointedly refused to extend that promise to
the Pahlavi dynasty, a point not lost on the Shah.

Seeing the potential for the Shah’s collapse, Washington viewed the Iranian
military as the most reliable pro-Western center of power. The military became
the guarantor of the Shah’s rule and the alternative to it. As for die Shah, he
had no illusions about his ability to rule widiout a loyal, coercive military, and
security apparatus at his disposal. Requests for military aid had as much to do
with ensuring loyalthy as with actual need. Believing that the Shah’s regime
faced a growing and perhaps insurmountable crisis, the Eisenhower
administration pressed for reform, even reforms that incurred potentially
serious risks to what remained of the Shah’s popularity. In referring to the
Shah’s speech on land reform, agricultural improvements, housing to meet

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

population growth, industrialization, consumer goods, and corruption, the
administration argued that:

Actions along the lines of his remarks will certainly be unpopular in Iran,
but they will be good for Iran. Since the Shah is already unpopular among
his people, it is most advisable for him to stop worrying about temporary
political reactions, carry on as a strong man with military support, and
give the nation the bitter medicine it needs. If he is to fall, this line might
hasten his fall, but it also opens up the possibility that if he lasts a few
years more, he will not fall at all.

Given this kind of support, it is little wonder that the Shah wanted more
weapons for the army and worried about US commitment to his regime. The
Shah expected criticism from ‘positive neutralists’ like Nehru and Nasser, but
the paucity of US aid and negative views of his regime were galling. 19 Aligning
with the West and pursuing pro-Western policies had netted the Shah
disappointing amounts of aid, growing domestic criticism, threatening foreign
criticism, and the increasingly negative evaluation of his allies. Despite the
Shah’s predisposition to paranoia and his inability to accept responsibility for
his own actions, he had real problems.

Playing the Soviet card

In December 1957, concerns about ‘growing’ Soviet influence in Tehran
came to the fore. Coming at the same time as rumors concerning a union
between Egypt and Syria, it placed additional pressure on Eisenhower and
Dulles. The British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Roger Bentham Stevens, reported
to both the Foreign Office and his American counterpart in Tehran on
‘excellent progress’ by the new Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai Mikhailovitch
Pegov, in improving Iranian-Soviet relations. Labeling it a Soviet ‘good
neighbor policy’, the British ambassador pointed to increased exchanges in
trade and cultural delegations and in discussions about Soviet technical
assistance. The British argued that given the ‘sensitive and suspicious’ nature of
the Iranian people and the perceived lack of tangible results from Iran’s
relationship with the West, significant Soviet gains were a real possibility. The
Soviet propaganda machine compared social and economic gains in the Soviet
Central Asian republics to the relative lack thereof in Iran. Stevens commented:
‘If the disparity is too great an explosive situation will build up.’

While the Soviets were making inroads, Sir Roger and the British had an
ulterior motive. They were pressing the US to either join the Baghdad Pact or
significantly increase military and economic aid to its members. Moscow, of
course, wanted Iran to withdraw from the Pact, to support Soviet policies in
the Middle East, and to declare neutrality. To achieve these goals, the Soviets
had altered their tactics from the stick to the carrot, with what the British
termed ‘impressive’ results. 20 Given the chronic concerns about the Shah and
Iranian stability, this report further alarmed Washington. Although contesting

The “Center of All Problems”: Iran and 1958

some of the details, the US Embassy in Tehran grudgingly agreed that the
Soviets had indeed been making headway. 21

In late January 1958, on the eve of the formation of the UAR, a concerned
Dulles visited Tehran for talks with the Shah. US aid had resulted in little real
economic improvement. The land tenancy and ownership system perpetuated
the enrichment of landowners at the expense of the peasantry. 22 Dulles hoped
to ‘pacify the Shah’ on the subject of aid before the Baghdad Pact meeting in
Ankara. 23 In meetings with Dulles, Prime Minister Manuchehr Eqbal and
Minister of Court Husain Ala raised the Soviet offers of aid and better
relations. The Iranian leadership pointed out that Soviet largesse in Syria,
Egypt, and Afghanistan had created a public, negative comparison with US aid
to Iran. They complained that the US had given $250 million to non-aligned
India and wondered aloud why Washington could not help its ally. Eqbal told
Dulles that the Soviets had offered to assist Iran in meeting its budget crisis.
He then argued that given tire Soviet danger, the United States needed to join
and actively participate in the Baghdad Pact. On tire defensive, Dulles blamed
Congress for limiting aid to Iran and for barring US entry into the Baghdad
Pact. 24 Some of the meetings were explosively contentious. At one point, in a
meeting with CPO Director Ebtehaj, Dulles point-blank refused to provide
$100 million to balance the Iranian budget and $100 million in loans. Ebtehaj
became angry and stated that he ‘did not mind whether he remained in his job
or not, to which Mr. Dulles replied that Mr. Ebtehaj must not suppose that he
himself or the U.S. Government minded either!’ 25

Through Pakistani Prime Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon, the Iranians let
it be known that they were considering withdrawing altogether from the
Baghdad Pact. Noon, of course, claimed that only his personal intervention
had prevented it. While Dulles conceded that the ‘psychology’ of increased
military aid to Iran in the form of tanks, artillery, and training programs might
have some positive effect, the Secretary told the Iranians that: ‘a new world war
would start with a Soviet attack on the United States, not on Iran. He did not,
therefore, consider that it was necessary for Iran to have a large army which
would only deflect her energies from economic development.’ 26 For economic
development, he offered the Iranians an additional $30 to $40 million in US
Development Bank loans to help with budget deficits over the next few years. 27
Relieved, Dulles reported to Washington that he ‘hoped’ the new aid would
take ‘a good deal of the heat off the [Baghdad Pact] Ankara meeting.’ 28 The
Secretary sweetened the offer of additional US aid by asking the Shah to make
an ‘informal visit’ to Washington for conversations with President
Eisenhower. 29 Despite the threats and pressure, Dulles steadfastly pushed
economic development as the primary means of maintaining Iranian stability
and containing the Soviet Union.

Despite his best intentions, Eisenhower felt obliged to put together another
‘limited’ military aid package in an attempt to appease the Shah and hopefully
get him to focus on economic development; tire risks of cutting the Shah off
from military aid were too great. In April 1958, British Foreign Secretary

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Selwyn Lloyd, an advocate of more US aid, accurately described the
importance that the West attached to maintaining the Shah’s regime, stating
that it was ‘largely benevolent and . . . more beneficial to Iran and to Western
interests than that of any conceivable alternative’. 30 During this period, the
Shah took a proactive hand in his quest for additional military aid. Just prior to
his July 1958 trip to Washington, rumors began to appear drat the formation of
a new Iranian cabinet, more friendly to the Soviet Union, might be in the
offing. The palace would neither confirm nor deny the rumors. 31 Although a
transparent threat, any mention of improved relations between Iran and the
Soviet Union caused concern.

Dulles warned Eisenhower drat the Shah, unhappy with repeated rejections
for military aid, might attempt to get a commitment in their one-on-one
meetings. 32 The fundamental objective was to convince the Shah that regional
security rested not on Iranian military power but on the US military deterrent. 33
In the meetings with the President, the Shah asked the US to ‘take a broader
view (of) his defense needs’. 34 He argued that a military buildup in Turkey,
Pakistan, and Iran would emphasize die US support for ‘constructive
nationalism’, as opposed to the ‘positive neutralism’ espoused by the non-
aligned camp. 35 He made it clear that he believed his support for the West and
participation in the Baghdad Pact had earned him better consideration.
Shrewdly, the Shah addressed military matters only in generalities, allowing
officials in his entourage to badger die State and Defense departments about
specific Iranian requirements. 36 On Arab issues, the Shah expressed his
opposition to US aid for Nasser and argued for programs to counter Nasserist
influence. He recommended that King Saud be ‘built up’ as the center for Arab
opposition to Nasser. 37 Had he been clairvoyant, the Shah could not have
better timed his visit or his requests for additional military aid.

The Baghdad coup and Iran

Iranians of all political persuasions had accepted die possibility, if not the
probability, of a coup in Baghdad. These views of Iraqi instability and rumors
of plots against the Baghdad regime had mirrored similar rumblings in Iran.
Nevertheless, the ferocity and rapidity of the coup in Baghdad stunned
everyone. Though truly frightened, the Shah recognized opportunity when it
knocked. Wasting no time, on 15 July 1958, the Shah informed the US
Embassy that: ‘Arms are life or death now.’ Arguing diat the Egyptians and the
Russians now had Baghdad Pact defense plans, the Shah predicted its collapse,
leaving Iran ‘alone’ to face the Soviets and their allies. 38 Also taken aback by
the reversal in Baghdad, Eisenhower wrote the Shah on 19 July, promising that
the United States now intended to bring die Iranian military up to ‘agreed
operational strength and to a high level of operational efficiency’, including
stepped-up deliveries of equipment and intensified training schedules. 39 On 20
July, the Shah cited the ‘changed situation’ and pressed the US Ambassador,
Edward T. Wailes, for a reassessment of the requests for military aid made in
Washington in the preceding week. The ambassador reassured the Shah, but

The “Center of All Problems”: Iran and 1958

emphasized the need for additional support in the field of internal security. 40
Eisenhower and his advisors had already discussed die fact that the Shah
apparently failed to comprehend that it had been the Iraqi army which had
overthrown the Hashemite regime; and it was the Iranian amy that the Shah
wanted to strengthen. In Washington, the administration authorized an
addition $50 million in assistance to Iran, and, fearing disaffection in the army,
placed the highest priority on promoting internal security. 41

The coup in Iraq also brought disturbing reactions on the street in Iran. The
coup shook what little shaky confidence existed in die Pahlavi regime. Middle-
class elements opposed to the regime were buoyed by the collapse of the
Hashemites, while pro-Western supporters of die Shah feared the worst. All
expected ‘something’ to happen in Iran as well. On the news of American and
British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, pro-Western elements
optimistically awaited Western action to ‘reverse the situation in Iraq’. 42 When
it became apparent that there would no moves against the Baghdad regime,
political supporters of die Shah predicted worsened relations with Iraq, in the
expectation of a Nasserist- or an increasingly Communist-dominated, pro-
Soviet regime. Opponents of the Shah’s rule, classified as ‘Mosadeqist
intellectuals and other representatives of the militant side of the urban middle
class’, agreed that relations with Iraq would worsen significantly, but they
welcomed such increased hostility. Discounting the Communist and Soviet
threat, the Shah’s opponents believed that hostility from Baghdad would
hasten the fall of the Shah and his ‘corrupt regime’. Sophisticated observers in
official Iranian circles had expected the Hashemite regime’s collapse for some
time, and despite some private misgivings, they recognized the new Iraqi
government in relatively short order — much to the consternation of many
Iranian conservatives. 43

Time seemed to increase the ‘concern and uncertainty’ of pro-Shah
elements, while anti-Shah groups appeared increasingly confident. Comments
about the assassination of the Shah could be heard in street conversations.
Rumors spread that the Shah was more and more ‘depressed’. Palace security
had been strengthened and arrests of army officers heightened tensions. 44 The
US Embassy warned that a move to force the Shah into a constitutional role
could be in the offing, and speculated that in that event the Shah would flee, as
he had in 1953. Although it seemed unlikely in the ‘immediate future’, the
Embassy also reported that: ‘The possibility of coup to overthrow the
monarchy cannot be disregarded.’ The lack of immediate substantive reforms
made ‘the overthrow of the monarchy likely’. 45 Washington redoubled its
efforts to force the Shah to enact reforms. 46 As die situation worsened, Iranian
requests became even more outlandish. In December 1958, Ebtehaj, the
Director of the CPO, began to argue for more economic and budgetary
assistance because of the ‘U.S. military’s pressing upon the Shah’s armed forces
in excess of Iran’s needs’. 47 The Iranians had obtained the military assistance
that Shah had sought for over five years, and now blamed it for Iranian

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

budgetary problems and demanded increased economic aid. Washington was
trapped in the labyrinth of a Persian bazaar.

The British analysis of the post-Baghdad-coup situation in Iran did nothing
to alleviate the general alarm. London compared the situation in Tehran to that
in Iraq. British Ambassador Sir Roger Stevens’ report that compared the
Hashemites’ long and ‘holy’ lineage, traceable to the ‘grandfather of the
Prophet himself, to that of the Shah, the son of an ‘upstart and illiterate
soldier’ prompted derision at the State Department. Stevens made the
interesting observation that the Shah had less in common with King Feisal II
than with the hated Crown Prince, Abd-al-’Ilah, the de facto Iraqi ruler. Abd-al-
'Ilah’s lack of contact with the people of Iraq and corruption made him an
unsympathetic figure. Stevens concluded:

There is every reason why what happened in Iraq should also happen in
Iran. In practical terms the Iranian regime is more oppressive, less
enlightened, and less efficient than its Iraqi counterpart. If this regime
does survive, it will not be due to its merits but to defects in the
organization of the opposition, to the absence of any explosive force
quite corresponding to Arab nationalism, and perhaps to greater vigilance
on the part of the authorities induced to some extent by the Iraqi
example.

The Embassy stated that the events in Iraq had ‘palpably increased’ the danger
to the Shah’s regime and encouraged more radical opposition to his rule. 48 Sir
Roger added that if he were ‘an ostrich’, he could paint a ‘rosy’ picture of
progress under the Shah, but ‘die extent to which the overt expression of
public dissatisfaction has grown in the last few weeks is truly remarkable.’
Stevens called 14 July 1958 ‘a watershed in Iranian thinking about their own
future’. 49

It quickly became apparent drat any competition for influence between
Tehran and die new regime in Baghdad would occur in Kurdistan. The turmoil
in Baghdad generated intensified interest in the Kurdish areas along the
Iranian-Iraqi frontier. With an estimated 1.5 million Kurds in Iran, two million
in Turkey, and another 800,000 in Iraq, the Kurds became a source of concern.
On the positive side, Kurdish unrest in Iraq constituted a potential lever to
pressure good behavior from die Qasim government; on the negative, Soviet
support and the strong leftist influence among Kurdish groups potentially
threatened Iranian territorial integrity. Fortunately for Washington and Tehran,
the Kurds in Iraq and Syria were far more affected by events than those in
Iran. Despite leftist tendencies among some Kurdish groups, diey generally
viewed pan-Arab nationalism as a threat to Kurdish autonomy, making
Kurdistan a more potent lever against Baghdad than Tehran. That said, the
Eisenhower administration discouraged Tehran from attempting to use
Kurdish nationalism against Baghdad, fearing that such a policy might backfire
in both Iran and Turkey. 50 While the Iranians wished to exploit the Kurdish

The “Center of All Problems”: Iran and 1958

view that they were ‘distinct from and superior to their Arab neighbors’, the
new regime in Baghdad also grasped its potential vulnerability and promised to
promote ‘Kurdish national rights within Iraqi unity’. 51 To counter Iraqi efforts
to co-opt the Kurds, the Iranian government sent General Timur Bakhtiar,
Director of SAVAK, to Kurdistan. He invited all Kurds in Syria and Iraq to
consider Iran their ‘motherland’. Predictably, the move to co-opt the Kurds
provoked more requests for Western aid to support infrastructure
improvements, roads and bridges, in the Kurdish regions of Iran. 52 The palace
argued that these improvements served the dual purpose of providing tangible
benefits to the local population while allowing better access to the region for
Iranian security forces. The Iranians held die short-term advantage in
Kurdistan, but fearing a pro-Soviet Kurdish tilt, the British and Americans
intensified monitoring of ‘leftist’ Kurdish elements, particularly those residing
in the Soviet Union. 53 In Iraq, Washington’s Kurdish efforts resulted in the
closing of the US Consulate in Kirkuk. Fearing an Iraqi and Soviet reaction, the
administration announced: ‘The United States can have no part in encouraging
any disloyal action by the Kurds in Iraq.’ Washington pressed the point with
the Shah that inciting Kurdish ‘dissidence ... would be a dangerous game’. 54
Eisenhower intended to avoid any actions that might destabilize the Shah’s
regime.

A new relationship with Tehran

Late 1958 found the Shah more dependent than ever on Western support,
but ironically more in control of the relationship that at any previous point.
The ‘Bastille Day coup’ in Baghdad, as Sir Roger Stevens called it, created new
realities in the Shah’s relationship with the West. No matter how problematic,
the Shah had to be placated and supported. Ever manipulative, the Shah had
learned that utterances about withdrawing from defensive agreements and
proposed trips to Moscow netted much more than quiet cooperation. Thanks
to Qasim, from 1958 onwards the Shah’s leverage in his relationship with the
US would steadily increase. Iraq irrevocably changed the nature of die Anglo-
American relationship with and over Iran. The Gulf had been something of a
British lake for 150 years but now the British found themselves in a defensive
posture, hanging on with Washington’s support. As a result, British diplomatic
efforts focused heavily on influencing Washington’s Iranian policy. US political
and military support for the Pahlavi regime became the guarantor of British
commercial and economic interests, not only in Iran but throughout die Gulf
as well. A symbiotic relationship developed between British policy
recommendations to Washington and the Shah’s requests for economic and
military aid. London wanted to keep the Shah happy and in power, and they
wanted Washington to pay for it. With regard to the Shah, the Foreign Office
believed that Britain could not afford to ‘return to our old practices of active
benevolence and unsolicited advice’, believing that Britain’s strength since 1953
lay in ‘non-intervention’. In contrast, die American Charge, John W. Russell,
got a two-minute audience in which the Shah asked: ‘Had the Iranian

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Ambassador in Washington lately been advising President Eisenhower on how
to run the United States of America?’ The Shah made it clear that he resented
US advice. In criticism, Russell commented to the British Ambassador: ‘After
all, who loves a governess?’ Apparently someone at the FO was more
sympathetic to the US’s predicament and penned in a marginal comment:
‘Most children!’ The British took the attitude that pushing reform in Persia was
a waste of time and usually counter-productive as well . 55

In contrast, Washington would not give up pursuit of a long-term solution
to Iran’s problems through reform and some form of political liberalization.
The Eisenhower administration truly believed that it not only had an obligation
to push reform, but that reform would work in the long run to stabilize Iran.
Shaken by Iraq and fearing the same in Iran, London encouraged Washington
to desist from its reform campaigns and to focus instead on specific policies
that affected Iranian relations with the West . 56 London viewed the internal
situation in Iran as irreparable, and reforms as a likely destabilizing factor. ‘The
shah remains the most important piece on the board. If he falls, the game is
over.’ London could not envisage any subsequent regime that would be
‘remotely tolerable’. The shaken British believed that, just as liberalization may
have played a role in the collapse in Iraq, in Iran liberalization would let the
‘Djinn . . . out of the bottle’ and invite a Bastille Day in Tehran . 57

Chapter 5: Controlled Democracy
Pakistan and 1958

As in Iran, the Baghdad coup altered the US relationship with Pakistan.
Pakistan formed die lynchpin connecting Western defense organizations in
Southeast Asia to those in the Middle East. A member of both SEATO and
the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan’s adherence to a pro-Western orientation
constituted a critical element in containment policy. As in Iran, US intelligence
sites, located near Peshawar, provided critical data on Soviet military activities,
including missile development and deployment. It also served as a base for U-2
flight operations over the Soviet Union. This reliance on Pakistan had grown
steadily during die 1950s to the point where the Eisenhower administration
could not, under any circumstances, contemplate the loss of Pakistan, either as
a member of the Western containment structure or as a physical platform for
intelligence operations targeted against the Soviet Union.

To a considerable degree, Pakistan’s policies vis-a-vis the United States
mirrored those of Iran. Karachi’s primary bartering chip was its willingness to
support Western strategic interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in return for
military and economic aid. Karachi then used US aid to compete widi non-
aligned India, its real regional rival. Using its leverage, Pakistan extracted not
only aid but also Western political and diplomatic support in its struggle with
India over Kashmir. As in Iran, so in Pakistan government officials speculated
and debated die benefits and drawbacks of non-alignment or improved
relations with Beijing or Moscow. There were also differences. Where Iran was
a relatively isolated issue, US support for Pakistan complicated relations with
India. As the interdependency of the US and Pakistan grew, Nehru became
increasingly antagonistic toward both. Short of placing US economic aid for
India at risk, Nehru strongly advocated non-alignment and UN membership
for Beijing to goad the Eisenhower administration. During 1956 and 1957,
increasing tensions between New Delhi and Karachi placed Washington in the
increasingly difficult position of maintaining good relations with the world’s

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

largest democracy on the one hand, and with an ally critical to containing
Communism on the other. The events of 14 July 1958 would push the value of
Pakistan as a Western ally to the fore and ultimately send India in search of
alternative partners to counterbalance the increasingly close ties between
Pakistan and the US.

Straddling the fence: the US, Pakistan and India 1956-1958

As pointed out earlier, US military assistance to Karachi and its adherence to
SEATO and the Baghdad Pact caused USTndian relations to take a sharp
downturn in 1954 and 1955. These frictions not withstanding, relations
improved somewhat in 1956 as a result of the Suez crisis. The Eisenhower
administration sought Nehru’s assistance in attempting to settle the Suez
controversy, and although this assistance was unsuccessful, due in large part to
Krishna Menon’s diplomatic shortcomings, Eisenhower and Nehru both
opposed Israeli, British, and French intervention. Hoping to exploit the
temporary confluence in US and Indian policy, Eisenhower invited Nehru to
Washington. 1 The administration wanted to explore future areas of
cooperation in die Middle East and Asia with Nehru. On 17-18 December
1956, Nehru and Eisenhower met and discussed the situation in the Middle
East, among other topics. 2 Nehru was clearly concerned about die safety of the
canal, given its importance as the principle trade route from India to Europe.
He downplayed concerns about Arab nationalists ‘responding to the whims of
a Nasser’ and the need for a counterbalance like King Saud. Nehru argued that
Nasser actually represented the lesser evil and served as a ‘brake’ on the more
radical elements in die Egyptian military. He also proposed the idea that the
US should consider supporting die Egyptian ruler, with the goal of
strengthening his internal position. At die same time, Nehru deflected attempts
to get him to influence Nasser to compromise with the West, saying: “We must
make an earnest attempt to settle the underlying grievances in the region.’ 3
Raising the issue of the Baghdad Pact, Nehru underscored Indian concerns
about the potential for a Pakistani attack using US supplied weapons. He cited
Pakistan as the principal cause of Indian ‘resentment’ toward the US. 4

When Eisenhower initiated a discussion of Kashmir, Nehru provided a
detailed summary of the dispute and offered the Indian view that die United
Nations need only accept the status quo, and Pakistan would follow suit, albeit
with some ‘grumbling’. Arguing that Pakistan and its stability were critical to
the Western defensive posture in die Middle East, Eisenhower attempted to
find some basis for a mutually acceptable settlement of the issue. Nehru simply
refused to discuss any solution except die status quo; 5 this unwillingness to
entertain any compromise did not bode well for the future. For internal
political reasons, neither Pakistan nor India could afford to compromise. For
Nehru, the risk of surrendering any Indian territory in a plebiscite invited
demands from untold numbers of groups wanting to assert their own regional
prerogatives. Nehru and the Congress Party could blame the British for the
creation of Pakistan, but would have only themselves to blame if a Kashmiri

Controlled Democracy: Pakistan and 1958

plebiscite favored Pakistan and opened the Pandora’s box of Indian regional
nationalisms.

1957 and the Kashmir dispute in the UN

The US position on Kashmir reflected Washington’s assessment that only
bilateral talks at the prime -minister level could possibly achieve a settlement;
the administration correctly believed that referral to the UN would simply
result in a Soviet veto, on behalf of India, of any constructive resolutions. 6 In
1957, the Indian parliament declared Kashmir an ‘integral part of India’,
sparking demands from Pakistan for tire long-delayed plebiscite and
questioning the legality of die accession of Kashmir to India. The Pakistanis
wanted the Security Council to pass a resolution against the integration of
Kashmir into India, dispatch UN troops to Kashmir to replace Indian and
Pakistani units, and immediately begin to set up a plebiscite. 7 The Indians
interpreted die Pakistani move as a British-inspired attempt to embarrass the
Indian government in retaliation for India’s support of Nasser during die Suez
crisis in 1956. Wanting to avoid a fight at the UN, the US and Britain obtained
a temporary compromise by getting Security Council support for sending the
President of the Security Council, Gunar V. Jarring, on a fact-finding mission
to the region. Jarring had been the Swedish ambassador in New Delhi and
knew Nehru well. Arriving on 14 March 1957, he shuttled between New Delhi
and Karachi for four weeks; he returned to New York and submitted his initial
report on 29 April 1957. The report called on Pakistan and India to adhere to
the decisions of August 1948 and January 1949. It criticized the lack of
progress and called for a plebiscite. It stated that bodi India and Pakistan
should ‘refrain’ from statements or acts that might ‘aggravate the situation’. 8
The plan called for a five-step process leading to a plebiscite. A ‘no war
declaration’ by both governments was to be followed by a UN force in
Pakistani Kashmir and die withdrawal of all but 6,000 of Azad Kashmir militia
from the region. An administrator would then oversee the plebiscite. 9

The Pakistanis now wanted a Security Council resolution. Knowing that the
outcome would be a Soviet veto, Washington and London delayed. Pakistan’s
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy vociferously complained that despite Pakistan’s
bilateral defense agreements with the US and die fact that ‘there was no
question about the action which should be taken on the Kashmir question’, the
Eisenhower administration was more concerned about its relations with
India. 10 US officials in Washington and New Delhi had hoped, to no avail, that
the Jarring mission would provide a respite from Indian criticism of the US
and an opening for some new approaches. 11 Now, as Pakistan made veiled
threats about its relations with the US, India rejected calls for a plebiscite and
labeled the Jarring report a pro-Pakistani document created by the British,
Americans, and their allies. As one observer put it, the Indians had no
intention of pursuing a course diat ‘might lead anywhere’. 12 London viewed die
oudook for avoiding a confrontation with India as ‘bleak’. 13 As US
Ambassador Ellswordi Bunker put it: ‘India will not agree to a plebiscite,

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

principally for the reason they can least afford to talk about, i.e., fear that this
would give rise to communal strife which might develop to uncontrollable
proportions affecting . . . the foundations of the secular state which they are
trying to establish.’ 14 Knowing they would be the ‘biggest losers’ diplomatically,
London and Washington searched for an alternative despite the fact that a
solution acceptable to one party would, by definition, be unacceptable to the
other. 15

On 10 July 1957, Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy visited Washington
and made an all-out effort to obtain US support for a plebiscite in Kashmir.
Eisenhower told Suhrawardy that the US would support Pakistan’s call for a
plebiscite in the UN ‘so long as no other solution is mutually agreed on by
both parties’. The president pointed out die likelihood of a Soviet veto, and
counseled patience on taking the UN route. 16 In a meeting with Suhrawardy,
Secretary Dulles told the Prime Minister that countries in the Middle East were
focusing on military aid to the detriment of economic development. 17 In the
end, Pakistan agreed to delay until Jarring submitted his final report. In
October 1957, Jarring formally reported to the UN, stating that he had made
no progress on a settlement over Kashmir because of the Indian argument that
Pakistan was in violation of the ‘cease-fire’ agreement. Pakistani Foreign
Minister Firoz Khan Noon then presented the Pakistani position, and a
proposed compromise resolution.

In response, Krishna Menon launched into a five-and-a-half hour speech
that ‘reiterated probably more intransigently than ever India’s stand’. 18 Menon
rejected a plebiscite because it inferred that Kashmir was neither a part of India
nor of Pakistan, declaring that ‘Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian
Union, separable only by an act of the sovereign Parliament of India.’ 19 Menon
delighted in categorically rejecting the Jarring report, stating: “We are open to
settle any matter peacefully and by negotiation. But the security of integrity and
unity of die nation are not matters for argument.’ 20 Knowing that US animosity
toward Menon made him the wrong messenger, the Indian government, on 9
October 1957, sent Tiruvallur Thattai Krishnamachari, the Indian Minister of
Finance, to ‘explain’ its position to Eisenhower, while seeking more economic
aid. When asked about Kashmir, Krishnamachari explained that the current
government in Pakistan was not ‘strong enough to assume responsibility for a
decision on Kashmir’. He then expressed the real fear in Delhi: ‘If Kashmir
should be lost to India the Congress party would fall from power.’
Krishnamachari then restated his request for additional US economic aid,
citing India’s defense requirement to counter the threat of US and other
Western arms shipped to Pakistan. 21

During 1956 and 1957, the Indian central government faced an increasingly
strong challenge from separatist groups, particularly in the south of the
country. In a report to the American Universities Field Staff in May 1957,
Executive Director Phillips Talbot discussed Indian issues in a state-by-state
format. While commending the Congress and Nehru on India’s progress
toward ‘unity in diversity’, he stated that the ‘politically fissiparous tendencies

Controlled Democracy: Pakistan and 1958

in free India’ showed just how far India and Nehru had to go. In an article
entitled Raising A Cry for Secession , he analyzed the ‘Ambitions of the Political
Dravidians’ in South India. Because of its unclear ‘ultimate’ goals and localized
political support, the Dravidct Munnetra Kaghagam or Dravidian Progressive
Federation (DMK) and its separatist message ‘portends to many thoughtful
persons the possibility of a future threat to a Indian unity’. While noting the
differences in context, Talbot compared the Tamil DMK to the Muslim
League of the 1 930s. His article included a DMK cartoon depicting Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi saying that Muhammad Ali Jinnah would give up his
demand for Pakistan and equating that with die Congress position on the
DMK. 22

The Tamil cultural identity traced its royal origins back to the Chola kings
(907-1310 CE). The political platform, a potential political bombshell, included
‘full freedom to secede from the Indian Union’, nationalization of industry,
readjustment of the five-year plans to industrialize South India, reductions in
defense spending, and the inclusion of all Tamil-speaking areas under the same
political organization, to be renamed Tamilnad. The DMK made other
demands as well. As a Madrasi Brahman commented: ‘That’s the one trouble
with India, each part of the country not only has its separate language and
literature but also its great royal tradition. These help feed the fire of
regionalism under our new democratic system. Each group wants to recreate
its past greatness.’ 23 Talbot clearly viewed regionalism based on language,
culture, and/or religion as a real threat to die Indian national polity. This
simultaneous threat from die DMK merely reinforced the determination of
Congress and its leadership to resist any notion of a plebiscite on Kashmir and
Jammu. Viewing compromise on Kashmir as a threat to the political existence
of the Congress Party and national unity, Nehru and India rejected calls for
compromise and relied on the Soviet veto. Under pressure from Pakistan, the
US and Britain supported the Pakistani position on the plebiscite only to see it
fall as predicted to Indian intransigence and die Soviet veto.

Pakistan and the search for stability

In October 1957, Suhrawardy’s government fell, in part because of the
machinations of Pakistani President Iskander Mirza, a major-general, who had
never been particularly happy with Suhrawardy and his policies. The collapse of
Suhrawardy’s government created a chaotic political situation as a multitude of
political parties vied for advantage. The economy also stagnated, undermined
by rampant corruption. In this environment, Foreign Minister Firoz Khan
Noon became Prime Minister, leading what the US Embassy described as a
‘wobbly’ ruling coalition with ‘yet anodier political crisis’ in the wings. 24
Pakistani instability increased, along with concerns in Washington about its
defensive alliances and the threat posed to containment. In Washington and
London, a consensus existed on at least one aspect of Pakistan’s future, namely
that the only real unifying factor was Pakistani fear of India. Pakistanis by and
large blamed die British and Lord Louis Mountbatten, who they believed were

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

in collusion with Nehru and had attempted ‘to undercut the foundations of
Pakistan at its inception by gerrymandering the border and by preventing
Pakistan from obtaining its allotted share of the partitioned assets’. 25 Street
opinion followed consistent themes: first politicians had little creditability
because they changed parties and programs on a regular basis for personal
political gain; second, a general frustration with political instability permeated
civil life; and third, corruption permeated all levels of society. As one frustrated
businessman put it: “We need a Hitler to get out of the mess we are in.’ In
addition, Pakistan had its own secessionist problems. The split between East
Pakistan, the Pashtun-Afghan areas, and West Pakistan created a significant
hurdle for the government in Karachi. On the positive side, die ‘government’s
writ’ controlled most of die country, the civil service worked well enough to
prevent collapse, the judiciary had maintained its independence, and the army
was ‘first class’. 26 This assessment of the military and its British-trained officer
corps would turn out to be the critical issue for the future.

London also worried that all the historical good will between Pakistan and
Britain was potentially at risk due to instability and a lack of progress on
Kashmir. In April 1958, the CRO official in Karachi, Sir Alexander Symon,
stated that the perceived lack of clear-cut Anglo-American support for
Pakistani with regard to Kashmir undermined relations. He worried that
faltering economic development would combine with estrangement from the
Muslim world and further aggravate these problems. Symon called for more
US aid, viewing it as the primary prop that maintained Pakistan’s loyalty to the
West. 27 The fact that India was viewed as ‘non-aligned’ and more successful
than Pakistan, which had ‘chosen to identify itself with . . . the free-world in
military alliances that Indian policy makers abhor’, raised questions in Karachi
about the benefits of partnering with the West. 28 Pakistani doubts intensified
when in April 1958 Nehru rejected a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister
Noon to discuss Kashmir. Nehru stated: ‘The kind of meeting suggested by
Dr. Frank Graham, the proposed UN mediator, would place the aggressor and
the aggrieved party on an equal footing.’ Nehru welcomed bilateral talks but
stated that the presence of a third party gave the appearance of mediation
when there was, in fact, nothing to mediate. 29

This rejection of UN efforts led directly to the personal involvement of
President Eisenhower. On 17 April, Dulles sent a memorandum to
Eisenhower suggesting that the United States attempt to facilitate a solution to
the problem of Kashmir. The Secretary recognized that friction between
Pakistan and India over Kashmir undermined the US and opened the door for
Soviet advances. Dulles proposed to link disputes over the Indus waters,
Kashmir, and arms, so that a ‘wider field for compromise will exist’. He told
Eisenhower: ‘This approach, I am convinced, could best be initiated by a
personal appeal from you to the leaders of both countries. In this we would, in
strict secrecy and without prejudice to our present position if the new
approach were unsuccessful, offer our good offices to assist them to reach
agreement on all three questions.’ 30 The president reacted enthusiastically,

Controlled Democracy: Pakistan and 1958

stating that he was ‘all for the approach’ but that it must be undertaken in the
‘utmost secrecy’. He offered direct involvement if the moment were right; ‘In
fact, if there should ever be realized sufficient progress in negotiations to
warrant die hope that a personal gesture might help assure success, there is no
inconvenience at which I would balk.’ 31 Eisenhower believed that a solution to
Kashmir would put US relations with India and Pakistan on a sound footing,
bring a focus to economic development, maintain Pakistan in the Western
defense alliances, and, most of all, preserve US intelligence bases in Pakistan.

On 14 May 1958, Eisenhower wrote to Nehru, proposing that the United
States send a ‘special representative’ to facilitate talks on Kashmir. The
President argued that perhaps the US might be well-placed to provide ‘good
offices’ because of its extensive aid and its good relations with both New Delhi
and Karachi. 32 The Pakistanis welcomed the offer, while Nehru stalled. He
stated that while he had problems widi certain aspects of the proposal, it was
interesting and that he would discuss it with his cabinet. Nehru countered that
the presence of a third party, while perhaps helpful, might result in leaks,
which, given the upcoming elections in Pakistan, which could increase its
‘unpredictability and uncooperativeness’. 33 On 8 June, Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker reported from Delhi that Desai, acting on behalf of Nehru, told him
that Nehru wanted to continue US involvement through normal diplomatic
channels — meaning Bunker in New Delhi and Ambassador James M. Langley
in Karachi. Bunker believed that the Indians saw that the ‘negotiations would
be a long-range operation’ and wanted to wait for the outcome of the Pakistani
elections. Recognizing die difficulties, Bunker added: ‘It may take a year or two
years or even more to reach desired solution but I think that patience,
perseverance and the logic of events will ultimately bring us to success.’ 34 In
reality, Nehru’s ‘leaving the door open’ was a stalling tactic pure and simple.
He did not want to tell Eisenhower no. 35

In Pakistan, time was running out for the parliamentary politicians. As early
as May 1958, General Mirza indicated to US Ambassador Langley that the
military were discussing a takeover to deal with the political instability. The
generals wanted to suspend parliamentary elections scheduled for the fall.
Officially, Langley informed the generals that such a step should only be taken
as a last resort, but that ultimately it was a Pakistani decision. 36 By summer,
Langley’s visits to President Mirza’s office had become so frequent that his
name was removed from the daily log of visitors. Pakistani newspapers
routinely published the list of visitors and Langley’s visits were drawing
attention. Langley’s access also became a conduit for Pakistani politicians to
deliver messages to Mirza. Aware of what was coming, Washington warned the
Ambassador that in the event of a coup, the US could not be seen as having
orchestrated it. 37 Clearly, the military had lost all patience with the politicians.
In May 1958, die US Consul in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, commented
that Mirza had created a stir widi talk of postponing the elections and
cautioned strongly against supporting a coup. He argued that a ‘Mirza
dictatorship’ would strengthen the hand of the Communists and provide a

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pretext for Indian agitation in Bengal, while destroying the US’s reputation. 38
Ideally, Eisenhower and Dulles preferred to avoid a coup, but should Noon be
defeated, Pakistan would continue to face political instability, economic
deterioration, and international problems, including, in the administration’s
mind, possible Communist penetration. 39 The fear of Communist gains in
staunchly Muslim Pakistan seemed overblown, but the fear of a weak
government opting for some form of non-aligned neutrality was a serious
possibility. By July 1958, the prospects for stability in Pakistan appeared
remote. Washington concluded that Pakistan needed at least temporary
political stability as a basis for economic development, the key to long-term
stability. The internal political situation, coupled with the Kashmir dispute,
undermined both. 40

The Baghdad coup and Ayub Khan

Washington was already on edge over stability in Pakistan when the Iraqi
coup pushed the administration over the brink. There was also talk that the
Karachi government might negotiate with the Soviet Union for economic
assistance in die form of a steel mill. This combination of events created
enormous alarm on the Potomac, that Soviet economic aid combined with the
collapse of Iraq might undermine the commitment of the Pakistani
government to die Western defense alliances and thus threaten containment.
Fearing the ‘gravest injury’ to US interests, Eisenhower and his advisors edged
toward the position that democracy and economic development might be the
key to long-term stability, but widiout some short-term fix for the political
chaos, Pakistan might be lost to the West. 41 The inability of the Pakistani
political parties to act responsibly and work together to alleviate the economic
crisis and political chaos heightened concerns in Washington. Rather than
increasing stability, the upcoming Pakistani elections loomed as a source of
even greater political instability. 42 Eisenhower and his advisors concluded that
the benefits of a stable, pro-Western Pakistan took precedence over other
considerations, including political democracy.

In early October, President Mirza informed Ambassador Langley that the
Pakistani military had decided to take over the government. Mirza wanted
Langley to give him an idea of the US reaction. Having had more than enough
of Pakistan’s chronic instability, Washington instructed Langley to tell Mirza
that countries had the right to determine their own form of government based
on what was best for the welfare of its peoples. Undoubtedly, given the
intelligence interests related to the Peshawar facility, Washington knew full well
from other sources about the intentions of the military, but there is no
evidence that the Eisenhower administration did more than give Mirza and
Ayub a nod: the Pakistani generals did not need any US support to take
control. In early October 1958, Mirza and the Army Chief of Staff, General
Muhammad Ayub Khan, took over the government and canceled
parliamentary elections. Mirza told Ambassador Langley that the military had
waited until the situation had become severe enough and the politicians had

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101

made big enough ‘asses of themselves’, so that the move would have
widespread support. 43 An audible sigh of relief was heard in Washington
following the Mirza-Ayub 7 October takeover. In private, administration
officials believed that the coup had produced Pakistan’s first ‘stable, strong,
unified government’. The lack of violence, the few arrests, and a crack-down
on corruption boded well for the military regime. 44 In a further political
consolidation, Ayub Khan took complete control on 27 October, and sent
Mirza into retirement. In Washington, the administration believed that this
move would be ‘likely to improve the situation generally in the country’. 45

The apparent contradiction between supporting a military dictatorship under
General Ayub and official support for democracy and representative
government created a real dilemma for the Eisenhower administration. Viewed
in die context of Iraq, no one in Washington wanted to take a chance with
Pakistani instability. Still, officials at the State Department and the White
House had hoped for a better option. In essence, security issues had dictated a
compromise of fundamental principles. In this regard, Fred Bartlett, the South
Asian desk officer wrote:

When the takeover [in Pakistan] took place so soon after the Iraq and
Burmese ‘incidents’, I was very dispirited. It seemed to me that the
takeover meant that in one more country, and a country which was a
good friend of the United States, the light of the democratic ideal had
been snuffed out. What made it worse, in my personal opinion, was that
because of the larger issue of national freedom versus Kremlin
hegemony, we were not in any position to protest.

Because the Indians viewed the Communist threat to Pakistani as a ‘hoax’ to
acquire arms for its confrontation with India, New Delhi saw US support for a
military dictatorship as the height of hypocrisy. The irony was not lost on the
US government. In New Delhi, Ambassador Bunker questioned the efficacy of
new aid to the Pakistani regime shortly after Mirza and Ayub overthrew the
parliamentary system. Bunker argued: ‘The consequences in the long run for
the moral standing and reputation of the US in India, and indeed elsewhere
may be serious.’ Bunker also feared that support for Ayub’s dictatorship might
strengthen the hand of Communists and leftists who were arguing for a non-
democratic solution to India’s political problems. 46 Regardless of its concerns
about the reaction in India, Washington informed Ayub that ‘whenever
appropriate and within its available resources [the] USG desires [to] assist GOP
in future as it has in past.’ 47

The Indian Embassy in Washington reported to New Delhi: ‘The
abrogation of constitutional government in Pakistan and assumption of full
powers by a military junta failed to cause any serious concern in the USA.’ The
Indians viewed US support of a military dictatorship as a continuing trend to
preserve authoritarian regimes that supported containment. They argued that
the ‘assurances’ given by the ‘military dictators of Pakistan of continued

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support for military alliance’ guaranteed continued US support for the
Pakistani regime. The Indian Foreign Ministry took a particularly negative view,
arguing that Karachi’s participation in the Baghdad Pact, coupled with the
increased military aid to Pakistan, was a clear attempt ‘to browbeat India’.
These developments also served to underscore the lack of importance
Washington placed on the ‘hard earned Indo-US good will of recent years’.
The embrace of Ayub and military rule in Pakistan increased Indian
disappointment that improved US-Indian relations lacked a higher priority. In
addition, the fact that Pakistan now had a priority over India in the immediate
aftermath of the Baghdad coup increased Indian frustration with die US. 48

The split between supporters of a pro-Indian and a pro-Pakistani policy
intensified within the US government. This competition had existed from the
moment India and Pakistan emerged as independent nations. Cold War
imperatives and Indian insistence on non-alignment forced trade-offs between
what the Eisenhower administration viewed as its immediate security interests
and its long-term goal of economic development and stable, pro-Western,
democratic governments in die region. In New Delhi, Ambassador Bunker
stressed accommodation and economic development, the cornerstone of
democratic development, a view shared by both Eisenhower and Dulles.
Bunker stated:

In many of the newly independent countries where political freedom has
come before economic freedom, die roots of democracy are shallow and
the plant itself withers quickly when subject to adverse [political or
economic conditions]. ... [W]e must constandy keep the long-term batde
for men’s minds ... in the forefront of our thinking. . . . Massive military
aid to countries with a weak economic base is not in the long run a
genuinely effective course of action, even from a military point of view. It
is building on sand. 49

The tone of the exchanges between the Indian and US governments was that
of political equals. While acknowledging die efforts of President Eisenhower
on behalf of world peace, Nehru made it clear that he believed the US misread
the events in Iraq and Lebanon, and reacted in a manner that threatened the
gains made by Washington since the Suez crisis of 1956. Just as he disagreed
with US actions in Lebanon and the evaluation of Nasser and Iraq, Nehru saw
no linkage between the coup in Iraq and any necessity to arm or support a
Pakastani military dictatorship. 50

Ambassador Bunker clearly viewed Washington’s position on Ayub’s
October 1958 coup as a factor further damaging US credibility. No doubt
disturbed by having to justify the US position to Nehru, he argued:

One of the strengths of the United States throughout the world and also
here in India has been that, while many question our judgment, on the
whole they have not questioned our motives or our basic principles. This

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103

is a priceless asset and it disturbs me greatly to see us getting into a
position where we can be thought to be departing from our fundamental
convictions to serve expediency . 51

Eisenhower viewed support for the military government in Pakistan as an
expediency necessitated by containment. As for India, the administration
pursued its preferred long-term strategy for stability, namely economic
development and support for political democracy as a bulwark against
Communism. To counter die negative propaganda related to supporting the
Ayub coup, the US initiated a campaign to ‘make [the] Indian people conscious
of [the] magnitude [of| US assistance, both absolutely and in relations to the
Soviet effort’. Washington wanted ‘steady progress in India’s economic
development under democratic institution ’. 52 As Ambassador Bunker put it: ‘it
is not in the United States’ interest to see India’s economy collapse,
notwidistanding divergences’ in political policies. ‘India is the key to the
direction things will take in this part of the world .’ 53 There were debates in
Washington over the amount of aid and financial policies for India, but the
focus remained on economic development. This contrasted sharply with the
situation in Pakistan, highlighting the fundamental contradiction between
support for economic development through democratic means in India and
that for the expediency of stability through military rule in Pakistan.

Washington had to make an exception for Pakistan, the ‘cornerstone of US
policy in this part of the world’ and the ‘anchor of the Baghdad Pact and of
SEATO’, particularly when this system was ‘in real danger of being wiped out
if something is not done to arrest the deterioration in many aspects of
Pakistani life’. Pakistan’s ‘Byzantine’ political milieu threatened vital US
interests; therefore, the pragmatic requirement for pro-Western stability took
precedence . 54 Eisenhower and Dulles needed a new policy to rationalize their
support for military-rule in Pakistan. Ambassador Bunker suggested that the
US take ‘practical steps’ to mitigate the contradiction between supporting a
military dictatorship and ‘our proclaimed devotion to democracy’. He called for
the adoption of a policy that ‘emphasized economic aid and play[ed] down
military support’. Washington argued that it focused aid on the ‘people rather
than the military dictatorship’. The administration rationalized that the Ayub
interlude constituted a ‘temporary bridge’ on Pakistan’s road to permanent
representative government, and was consistent with Washington’s ‘ultimate
support’ for democracy . 55 Nehru had always been uneasy with what he
believed to be the US tendency to emphasize the military aspect of its alliances
in order to contain the Soviet Union and China; now, with a military
government in control of Pakistan, these concerns escalated . 56 The Eisenhower
administration was discomfited by the necessity to support Ayub, but it
concluded that the successful containment of die Soviet Union required stable,
pro-Western governments and an atmosphere conducive to economic
development. If it required ‘temporary’ military rule to deliver these pre-
conditions for success, dien so be it.

Part II: Revising Containment,

1959-1960

1959 marked the beginning of a significant shift in emphasis for US foreign
policy in the Greater Middle East. The Eisenhower administration moved
toward more pragmatic policies driven by situational requirements. The goal
was still containment, aimed at undermining Soviet influence and the potential
for Communist gains in the region. US policy continued to utilize military
assistance, economic aid, and support for controlled reform, but the
application became significandy more sophisticated. The change reflected the
Eisenhower administration’s improved apprehension of the regional situation.
The Baghdad coup also served to simplify, and to focus Washington on, its
pragmatic interests in the region. To prevent a repetition of the Iraq disaster,
Eisenhower and his advisors were far more willing to provide military and
security assistance than they had been prior to July 1958. Security aid had now
become a prerequisite for economic development and reform. At the same
time, Washington had become more cautious in advocating reform.

Other factors were in play as well. John Foster Dulles, the implementer of
and lightning rod for Eisenhower’s foreign policy, was increasingly
incapacitated by cancer and would die by early spring. Eisenhower understood
Dulles, as he put it, ‘Until I thought I understood the inside of that man’s mind
as I knew my own.’ 1 With Dulles’ passing, Eisenhower decided to enter the
Cold War fray with his own brand of personal diplomacy. In addition, the
picture in the Middle East had altered radically for the British. With
pretensions of imperial prerogatives now gone, the British, girding to defend
what was left of their influence and economic interests in the region, played
second fiddle to Washington and always sought Washington’s concurrence on
important policy issues. On the fringes of the Middle East, increasing
competition and conflict between China and India placed Nehru on the
diplomatic and ideological defensive. Indian denunciations of Western
defensive alliances and regional policies moderated as New Delhi became more

Revising Containment, 19594960

105

aware not only that it needed Western economic aid, but also that it might
need friends in a potential confrontation with Beijing.

The emergence of an alternate center for Arab revolutionary agitation in
Baghdad, backed by Iraqi Communists, renewed die old courtship between
Washington and Cairo. At the same time, Nasser’s attempts to reassert his
authority as a revolutionary leader created strains between the UAR and much
of tire Arab world. Washington no longer feared monolithic Nasserism because
it had encountered something worse — Communist-backed Iraq. Qasim’s
regime in Baghdad and its dependence on the Communist Party of Iraq (CPI)
for support represented the worst of Washington’s fears for the region. For
Nasser, Qasim’s dependence on the Communists created a different sort of
aggravation. Communist support allowed Qasim to curb pro-Nasserist and
pro-Ba’thist elements and effectively rejected Nasser’s leadership. In a nutshell,
Washington and Cairo now had a common problem, which overshadowed
their chronic conflicts.

The negative reverberations of Washington’s anti-Iraqi, anti-Communist,
and pro-Nasser stance were particularly strong in London and New Delhi.
Lubricated by Iraqi oil, tire British government, with some alacrity, put the
unpleasantness of July 1958 behind it and came to a working agreement with
the Qasim government. Qasim’s Communist connection, although
problematic, was secondary to securing the future of British oil interests in
Iraq. In this regard, the US had become a liability, as growing hostility from
Cairo, with the appearance of American backing, threatened the British
arrangement. The British, with some justification, viewed strengthening ties
between Washington and Cairo as the latest round in the Eisenhower
administration’s aggravating infatuation with Nasser. Just as in 1954 and 1956,
what the British viewed as a misbegotten relationship again reared its ugly head
and threatened important interests in the region. The British argued
vehemently that Qasim was not a Communist and that pro-Nasserist and pro-
Ba’thist pressure merely increased his reliance on CPI support. Again
aggravating, the Americans appeared willing to accept the inevitability of the
collapse of traditionally pro-Western Arab regimes with ones headed by more
radical nationalists or by Nasserists.

The Hashemite collapse in Baghdad made tire survival of the Pahlavi regime
in Iran critical to US interests in the region — a reality not lost on the Shah. The
demands from Tehran escalated, accompanied by the Shah’s comments about
the benefits of neutrality. Although the administration’s push for reform
continued, placating the Shah and enlisting his support became the priority.
The size of the military assistance group (MAG) in Tehran increased
dramatically, as did US support for internal Iranian security organs. At the
same time, the Eisenhower administration intermittendy urged the Shah to give
up direct rule, hoping to broaden his political support. Washington continued
to view the government in Tehran as critically unstable, and began a systematic
program to shore it up. In contrast, the British argued that Iran was simply
unfixable, and that no matter how bad the situation became, there was no

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

alternative to the Shah. To the British, Iran was simply Iran; any change in
government in Tehran would be detrimental to Western interests. The British
consistently warned Washington that attempts to tinker with reforming the
Iranian system had the potential to bring about its collapse.

The post- 1958 situation also had important implications for India. In
Washington, the ‘Communist threat’ made maintenance of the Baghdad Pact,
which became CENTO, a critical priority. India was important, but Pakistan
constituted the eastern anchor of the Western defensive posture in the Middle
East and the western anchor of SEATO. In addition, the United States had to
maintain its intelligence facilities at Peshawar. Thus, Pakistan, with its new
military government under General Ayub Khan, had to be courted, even at the
expense of relations with India. To deal with the aggravation that was sure to
follow in New Delhi, die administration proposed to offer additional economic
aid to encourage an ‘inward focus’ away from the rivalry with Pakistan.
Washington worked widi India in policy areas on which they agreed, but
anticipated areas of sharp disagreement and minimal Indian support for US
diplomatic initiatives. Unable to solve the problems in the region, the
Eisenhower administration now focused on core US interests: containment of
the Soviet Union and its potential allies.

Chapter 6: The Arab Cold War
and US Policy

Rather than ushering in a new age of Arab unity and solidarity, the Iraq
coup signaled the beginning of what Macolm Kerr so aptly described as the
‘Arab Cold War’. This period constitutes one of the most important and least
examined periods of the history of the Arab Middle East. In addition, die
implications of the Arab Cold War for the rest of the Greater Middle East have
also been largely ignored. 1 The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union
found their regional interests and strategic goals subordinated and often
frustrated by the parochial interests of political leaders and states in the region.
They also discovered that the more their policies took regional issues into
account, the greater their potential for some success. During this period, the
Eisenhower administration displayed, comparatively speaking, a great deal of
flexibility in adjusting containment policy to this reality. In terms of pro-
Western allied states, containment policy continued to focus on military
assistance, economic aid, and reform, but in dealing with non-aligned and at
times hostile neutrals, it added a new dimension. US policy took an increasingly
pragmatic view of die regional political situation and then calibrated how to
employ aid or pressure to moderate anti-Western policies. US-UAR relations
were a case in point: Eisenhower and his advisors learned that small amounts
of economic aid, coupled with US political support for Cairo in die Arab Cold
War netted more for US containment strategy and influence in Cairo than all
the direats and boycotts of the past. Nasser could not be bought, but to some
degree he could be temporarily leased or enlisted for tactical political gain. It
was not a strategic solution to US problems in die region, but it was far
superior to what had transpired between 1955 and 1958.

Nasser and the revolution in Iraq

In late 1958, Nasser’s stature in the Greater Middle East and the non-

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Corbis

Iraqi coup leaders Aref and Qasim

Abd-al-Salaam al-Aref and Abd-al- Karim al-Qasim shortly after their successful 14
|uly 1958 coup in Baghdad. Within months, Aref would be in prison, senternced to
death for plotting with Nasser against Qasim. Ironically, his sentence commuted,
Aref would lead the February 1963 coup against Qasim, who was captured, tried
and executed within the first 48 hours.

aligned world symbolized and, to a large extent, defined the dynamic for
change in the Middle East; however, the emergence of an alternate
revolutionary power center in Iraq forced a policy reevaluation in Cairo.
Initially, Nasser worked cautiously and patiently to maintain the facade of Arab
unity and civility as the Qasim regime adjusted to its new responsibilities.
Nasser’s patience stemmed at least in part from the confidence generated by
his phenomenal run of political good fortune. Like the Eisenhower
administration, Nasser really believed that he was ‘the wave of the future’. 2
Undoubtedly, Nasser had jumped to the same conclusion as everyone else,
namely that the strong pro-Nasserist elements in the Qasim regime and broad
support for Nasser in Iraq would translate into an alliance, or perhaps union.
Qasim’s intentions were unclear but nevertheless, the Egyptian leader, his
advisors, and his Syrian allies believed that Qasim would ultimately embrace
the Nasserist formula or succumb to those who did.

This confidence colored Cairo’s initial dealings with Baghdad. It reflected
what would turn out to be a misplaced confidence that the ultimate outcome
was a foregone conclusion. Nasser believed that he could afford to wait, and
thus focused on his more immediate concern with Lebanon. By December
1958, disturbances in Iraq between the Ba’thists and Communists
demonstrated the ability of the Communists to mobilize the masses against any

The Arab Cold War and US Policy

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movement toward union with Egypt. That same month, Qasim claimed that
his security forces had uncovered a conspiracy against the revolutionary
government instigated by Rashid Ali al-Gaytiani. Gaytiani was the former Iraqi
colonel who had led the 1941 coup against the monarchy and British. Gaytiani
was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death. Qasim commuted the sentence to
life in prison. Simultaneously, die pro-Nasserist Abd-al-Salaam Aref, who had
been shipped off to Bonn as Iraqi Ambassador because of his Nasserist
leanings, returned to Baghdad without permission. He was summarily thrown
into prison, and after a brief trial received a deadi sentence as well. Arefs
detention brought widespread arrests of Ba’thist and Nasserists. 3

The reaction in Cairo was predictable. Nasser began to have second
thoughts about his theory that patience with Qasim would pay off. Qasim
clearly had his own ideas about die future of Iraq, and the discipline and
organizational skills of his Communist allies now appeared to be a real threat to
Nasser’s brand of Arab unity. The US Embassy shared Nasser’s concern about
Communist discipline. Decribing the ability of the ICP to take advantage of the
death of one its ‘Popular Militia Force’ in a clash with ‘Ba’thist Arab
Nationalists’, the embassy reported:

Communist Arabs cannot be fit into the molds, which have become the
cliches to describe Arabs. They (the Communists) are not lazy, are not
lacking in ability to cooperate, coordinate, and they obviously are willing
to follow directions. Their performance in action on an increasing
number of newsworthy occasions is timely, doctrinaire and impressive.
Public attention is drawn to their rallies, parades, speeches and petitions
whenever they occur. They demand, and get, the ear and eye of Iraqis. 4

In Washington, officials became increasingly convinced that Qasim, in order to
maintain power, had grown too reliant on the Iraqi Communists and was now
unable to control them. The Communists became the focus of Egyptian ire
and Western concern for two somewhat different reasons. The US had a
straightforward fear of a Communist takeover. Nasser’s hostility stemmed
from the fact that ICP support for Qasim allowed him to pursue a course
independent of die UAR, and encouraged Communist and anti-UAR elements
in Syria.

This clash between Cairo and Baghdad produced another festering issue as
well. Nasser’s neutralism and relations with die Soviet Union had made Egypt
the center of diplomatic and non-aligned activity in Africa and die Arab Middle
East. It had in fact propelled his meteoric rise in world affairs. All roads in the
Arab and non-aligned world seemed to wind their way through Cairo. As one
observer put it: ‘There were hardly enough palaces in Cairo to house all of die
dignitaries who came on visits in January 1959.’ Be that as it may, the situation
between Nasser and Qasim complicated UAR relations with Moscow. As the
Ba’thists and Nasserists struggled with Qasim and his Communist supporters
for control of Iraq, Nasser found himself stuck between his need for Soviet

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military and economic assistance and his profound antipathy toward the
ideological competition from Iraq and the Communists.

Qasim’s refusal to come to terms with Nasser threatened Cairo’s newfound
political and diplomatic prominence, and potentially undermined Nasser’s
position with his Soviet benefactors. The Baghdad press heightened the
acrimony by accusing Nasser of plotting against the new regime in Iraq ‘just as
he previously plotted against the Iraqi monarchy’. Worse still, the Soviet Union
sided with Qasim. 5 The Soviet Union wanted die Iraqi republic to remain
independent of Egypt for two reasons. First, the Kremlin believed that a large,
unified Arab and largely Muslim super-state in the Middle East might excite
similar aspirations among the Soviet Union’s Muslim minorities. Second,
Qasim relied on the ICP for his grip on power, and the ICP had close ties with
Moscow. For the Russians, this situation translated into more potential
influence in Baghdad than in Cairo. In addition, Nasser’s crackdown on
Egyptian and Syrian Communists aggravated Moscow, and their relationship
with Qasim had potential as a counterweight against growing anti-Communist-
based, rapprochement between the US and the UAR. 6

Conflict with the Soviet Union

On 23 December 1958, the simmering disagreements between Nasser and
Qasim developed into an open conflict with die Soviet Union. In a speech at
Port Said, Nasser charged that the Syrian Communists had ‘rejected Arab
nationalism and Arab unity’ and ‘called for separation’ of Syria from Egypt. He
labeled separation as ‘the call of the Zionist . . . and reactionaries’. 7 Nasser also
pointed out that the Arabs had resisted not only the crusaders from the West,
but also the ‘Tartars’ from the East - a comparison not lost on the Soviets. 8 In
January 1959, Nasser sent Khrushchev a letter, via the Soviet Ambassador in
Cairo, Evgeny Kiselev. The letter, something of an ultimatum, stated: ‘We
consider that the fate of Iraq affects us and we are not going to leave it under
the Communists. But we do not want this to be the cause of a quarrel with the
Soviet Union. You must decide whether you want to deal with die Arab people
or only a few isolated Communist parties.’ 9 On 27 January 1959, in the opening
address at the 21st Communist Party Congress in Moscow, Khrushchev
predictably lashed back at die ‘campaign being conducted against progressive
forces in some countries under the spurious slogans of anti-Communism’. To
add insult to injury, he also spoke highly of Qasim. The Soviet leader then
pointedly named the UAR as the principle culprit, stating: ‘The struggle against
Communists and odier progressive parties is a reactionary undertaking’ that
served the interests of ‘imperialist’ forces. 10

The Egyptian leader had made a pointed reference to Egyptian
independence and Soviet support for building the High Dam at Aswan, stating:
‘We are ready for cooperation with the Soviet Union, but we shall no more sell
our freedom for roubles [sic] than for dollars.’ Khrushchev responded: ‘They
say they don’t want to sell their independence for roubles. Let me remind them
that we didn’t impose our aid on them.’ 11 Replying from Damascus, Nasser

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111

accused the Soviet Union of reneging on its official position, that the
suppression of die Communist Party was an internal Egyptian affair, and on its
professed commitment to pancha sheela , the ‘five principles’ of the 1954
Colombo Conference. These included non-interference in the internal affairs
of other nations. 12 In a strongly-worded letter to Khrushchev, Nasser
demanded that Moscow declare its ‘exact intentions toward the U.A.R.’. For
added emphasis, Muhammad Husayn Heikal launched a broadside in Al-Ahram
the next day. Under the ‘large red headline’ of ‘Frankly’, the article explained
that Egypt and the Soviet Union were friendly ‘despite, and not because of, die
local Communists’. 13

Taken on balance, the view that the ‘entire Iraqi affair had the magical
power of spellbinding the Egyptian leader’ may not be far from the truth. 14
Since Bandung, no other leader in the Arab world had come close to Nasser’s
stature. 15 In addition, his credentials in the non-aligned movement and his
relationship with the Soviet Union had further enhanced his clout. Now Qasim
threatened it all. In addition, Qasim had oil, and an economic alliance with his
old enemy, die British; he had the support of the ICP and increasingly of the
Soviet Union. Qasim was positioned to threaten Cairo’s Syrian adventure with
Moscow’s apparent blessing. Nasser also personally disliked Qasim, a man that
he never met. Qasim was a crude affront to Nasser’s image of Arab
nationalism. 16 On 20 February, Moscow, now alarmed with the escalating
rhetoric coming from Cairo, responded to Nasser’s letter with a letter of
flattery and goodwill, blaming the rift on the ‘evil agents of imperialism’. 17
Those evil agents on the Potomac were increasingly pleased widi the
developments.

Iraq and the Syrian connection

In retaliation for UAR propaganda attacks, Qasim encouraged anti-Nasser
agitation in Syria. He provided moral and material support to the Syrian
Communists and fanned anti-UAR sentiment. Baghdad called for Syria to sever
its ties with Cairo and enter into a union with Iraq. This agitation took
advantage of the rising discontent in Syria over Egyptian domination of the
UAR governing apparatus. Nasser became increasingly dependent on the
services of Colonel Sarraj, the head of Syrian internal security, and the most
steadfast of the UAR supporters in Syria. 18 By 1959, disillusionment with the
union was growing as the Syrians found themselves marginalized in a
centralized Egyptian system that had little in common with the traditional
political and economic structure of Syria. Dissatisfied Syrian groups became
progressively more than receptive to anti-Egyptian machinations. The Ba’thists,
disappointed in Nasser’s refusal to adopt their Arab socialist principles, had a
final falling-out with the Egyptian leader, and were eliminated from power. The
fact that Nasser’s quarrel with Qasim had damaged that part of the Syrian
economy associated with Iraqi trade complicated matters for Cairo. 19
Additionally, Egyptian-style bureaucracy and corruption transformed Syria into
a colonial market for Egyptian goods. Finally, Nasser’s attempt to gain support

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through land reform and nationalization backfired. He failed to understand
that a strong, stubborn middle class, tied to every facet of Syrian life, including
the military, existed in Syria. In addition, the Syrian military were discontented
because Egyptians received the key posts and promotions. 20

Like his boss in Cairo, Sarraj had enjoyed a string of good luck, and had
now set his sights on an even bigger prize - the regime in Baghdad. Sarraj,
undoubtedly with Nasser’s strategic if not tactical approval, set about planning
the overthrow of Qasim’s regime. He recruited pro-Nasserist and pro-Ba’thist
elements within the Iraqi military and government. 21 Whether or not Sarraj
exceeded his mandate from Cairo, he certainly had clearance from Nasser for a
destabilization campaign against Qasim. Fearing just such a coup, Qasim spent
February and March removing nationalist and pro-Nasserist ministers and
officers from the government and army. In their place, he elevated personal
supporters and Communists. It was obvious that serious trouble was brewing.
In late February, Allen Dulles reported to the NSC: ‘In Iraq, rumors circulating
of action being organized in die north against Qasim regime, with “cue” to be
given by Nasir.’ The same report expressed concern over die growing influence
of the ICP in the press and government. 22

The trouble came on 6 March 1959. Communists called for a rally in Mosul,
which sparked the premature revolt; fighting broke out between Communists
and local nationalists on 7 March. On 8 March, prominent leftists and pro-
Qasim elements in Mosul were arrested, and the coup was underway. A lack of
coordination with plotters in Baghdad doomed die revolt from the beginning. 23
Sarraj had not only supplied the Mosul coup leadership, headed by Iraqi
Colonel Abd-al-Wahhab al-Shawwaf, with material support, but also with
Syrian and UAR manpower. The Iraqi plotters had radio equipment that still
bore their Syrian markings and some of the infiltrators wore their Syrian
uniforms. UAR complicity in the coup was undeniable. 24 Qasim’s security
forces rounded up the opposition in Baghdad and then counterattacked the
rebels in Mosul. Shawwaf was killed and resistance rapidly collapsed. Upon
recapturing Mosul, troops loyal to Qasim, along with the Communists, many
freed from jail, ran wild: ‘By the time it was suppressed, naked mutilated bodies
hung from lampposts.’ 25 For a week, the wealthy, Ba’thists, nationalists, and
Nasser’s supporters faced the frenzy of semi-judicial tribunals and summary
executions. Already paranoid, Qasim now used special courts to destroy his
internal opposition, while Radio Baghdad and the Iraqi press pilloried die UAR
and thoroughly embarrassed its leader. 26

Nationalists and pan-Arabists were eliminated from the government, while
the confidence of the Iraqi Communists and Soviet hopes surged. 27 The
Communist organizations in Baghdad published a list of eight demands
following the failed coup. These demands called on the government to purge
the army and state of conspiratorial elements; withdraw immediately from the
Baghdad Pact; carry out all death sentences immediately, including those
against Aref and Gaylani; arm the People’s Militias; arrest elements of
‘doubtful’ loyalty; entrust key positions only to those of proven loyalty to the

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‘present democratic republic’; take a clear stand on all elements opposed to the
republic; and finally, demand that the UAR ‘stop encouraging internal and
foreign plots nourished by imperialism against our dear republic, fortress of
Arab nationalism’. 28 Qasim also declared most of the Egyptian embassy staff in
Baghdad personae non gratae, and charged that Nasser had planned the coup
attempt ‘down to the smallest detail’. The Baghdad press blasted Nasser:
‘Abdel Nasser is revealed as the great plotter, enemy, shedder of blood. Those
who proclaim pan-Arabism and raise Abdel Nasser to the rank of prophet have
been exposed. Nasser sent arms to Mosul because he wanted to annex Iraq to
his kingdom.’ 29 Baghdad called Nasser the ‘foster son of American
imperialism’. 30 To forestall UAR propaganda attacks related to Iraq’s continued
membership in die Baghdad Pact, on 24 March Qasim formally withdrew.
Foreign Minister Hashim Jawad told British Ambassador Sir Humphrey
Trevelyan that the move would allow Iraqis to assume a ‘neutralist policy
which membership in the Pact did not allow’. The Iraqis asserted that they
wanted to maintain ‘the most friendly relations’ with the members of the Pact,
but without participation. 31

Privately holding Sarraj responsible for die failed coup, Nasser launched a
violent campaign in the UAR press and radio against Qasim and redoubled his
efforts to overthrow the Iraqi leader. He accused Qasim of delivering Iraq into
the hands of the Communists. The Egyptian leader also saw the hand of the
British at work in Baghdad. By attacking Qasim for his Communist support
and the Russians for providing it, Nasser put the British in the position of
having to maintain its position in Iraq with the IPC without coming into
conflict with the anti-Communist positions of the United States. Cairo partially
succeeded in portraying the British as lukewarm anti-Communists. 32 The
British preferred Qasim to Nasser and made little secret of it. London even
continued to supply the Iraqi army with weaponry and support. 33 Nasser also
saw the British hand in warming relations between Iraq and Jordan. In
response, he lashed out first at the Communists and then at the enemies of
Arab unity, while simultaneously seeking more support from the United
States. 34

Washington’s ‘Red Scare’ over Iraq

Concern in Washington about Iraq had returned to its July 1958 levels. This
was driven to a large degree by the steady flow in intelligence reports about
growing Communist influence. Some government circles, particularly those
around Vice-President Richard Nixon, were openly discussing and advocating
either overt or covert military intervention. On 17 February 1959, a Special
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that Qasim lacked the ‘ability
to stem the movement toward a Communist takeover’. The report cast doubt
on Qasim himself being a Communist, but offered a bleak picture of continued
Communist successes. It noted that, fortunately, the security services and
Ministry of the Interior had remained in the hands of non-Communists. 35 The
aftermath of the failed Mosul revolt further aggravated Washington’s concerns.

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John D. Jernegan, the US Ambassador, reported that: ‘Overt signs point
sharply Left.’ He stated that the ‘Basic question remaining is whether Qassim
and GOI [Government of Iraq] are too along road to Communism to turn
back and whether Iraq consequently is fated to be first Soviet Satellite in Arab
World.’ Seeing a ‘grave danger’ that in ‘the short run’ Iraq would ‘come under
preponderantly Communist control’, Washington searched for a stopgap
solution. 36

The State Department wanted to reduce Communist influence, and queried
the Embassy in Baghdad on a number of options. These included: offering
continued military aid despite Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; a direct
warning about die dangers of Communism; an orchestrated warning about
Communist subversion from Turkey or Pakistan; or the possibility of
providing discreet but ‘direct encouragement or assistance’ for Nasser’s efforts
to ‘reverse [die] tide of events in Iraq’ by direct intervention or by cutting the
oil pipeline dirough Syria. 37 The prospect of working with Nasser also received
a boost in Washington: William Lakeland, the same person who had served as
liaison between Nasser and die British in 1954, had become the head of the
Iraqi desk at the State Department. Lakeland had had a close relationship with
Nasser and Heikal the early 1950s and he strongly believed Nasser to be far
preferable to Qasim. As a result, he was receptive and supportive of policy
based on fears of a Communist takeover in Iraq. 38

In Cairo, Nasser had no intention of putting up with Qasim or die
Communists. He fed US fears of a Communist coup. On 5 March, Allen
Dulles told the NSC: ‘Events seem to moving in the direction of ultimate
Communist control.’ The CIA Director underscored his interpretation of
events by pointing out that Qasim had just appointed his brother-in-law,
Colonel Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi, to the post of Minister of die Interior. The
Director added: ‘This individual is either an out-and-out Communist or very
nearly one.’ Secretary Dulles stated that the situation in Iraq ‘perhaps dictates
some U.S. contact with Nasser’ because ‘we seem to be confronted . . . with a
choice between Communism and Nasserism and the latter seems to be the
lesser of two evils.’ 39 Eisenhower grumbled at one point that making a choice
between Qasim and Nasser was like a ‘choice between A1 Capone and John
Dillinger’. 40

The consistent reports supporting the position that a Communist takeover
was likely sprang, at least in part, from three other issues that had arisen in the
intelligence community. The failure to predict die Iraqi coup in July 1958 and
the subsequent criticism of the intelligence agencies created an impetus at the
CIA not to be wrong again. To report that a Communist coup was possible or
even probable and have it not occur was far more acceptable than to report the
opposite and then witness a Communist takeover. The intelligence community
was taking no chances in its reporting. Also there was a very high degree of
interest in the Iraq situation among policy-makers. This translated into a desire
for as much information as possible on die situation there. As a result, priority
given to reporting on Iraq gave an added, if inadvertent, emphasis to the

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administration’s concerns. Lastly, and this is more difficult to assess, there was
the issue of John Foster Dulles’ illness and the personal and professional effect
that dais had on his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles. As Senate Foreign
Relations Committee testimony and die reaction of the press to the Iraqi coup
showed, Allen Dulles faced considerable criticism for the ‘intelligence failure’.
In early 1959, his brother Foster was dying of cancer and would resign his
position as Secretary of State. In addition to the personal loss, Allen Dulles
faced the professional uncertainty of a world without Foster as Eisenhower’s
principal foreign policy advisor. Reporting on Iraq that emphasized the threat
of a Communist takeover served two purposes. First, it protected the Director
from the charge of an intelligence failure, and second, it made him a useful ally
for those within the administration, particularly Vice-President Nixon, who
advocated a more aggressive response to the Iraqi situation. In short, the
message that key administration officials wanted to hear also offered political
protection to die Director. These influences undoubtedly added urgency to the
growing alarm. Fortunately, an experienced President would choose the
ultimate course of action.

Initially Washington believed that London shared a similar concern about
the situation. In reality, the British were more concerned about US and UAR
actions undermining the British IPC or the interruption of Iraqi oil flowing
through UAR-controlled pipelines. US mutterings about intervention in Iraq
made London very nervous. On 22 March 1959, Macmillan and Eisenhower
met and discussed the Iraqi situation. Eisenhower pushed for the formation of
a joint working-group to study contingencies for Iraq in the event of a civil war
or a Communist takeover. London actually welcomed the working-group
because it provided a window on US plans and an opportunity to influence US
policy. The British believed that they could make US intervention ‘doubtful’
but wanted Washington to come to that conclusion ‘independently’. The
British cabinet concluded: “We should avoid appearing to push them into a
decision one way or the other.’ In the event that Wasington decided to
intervene, London would then decide whether or not to try to dissuade diem.
In a cabinet paper, with die notation that the contents had already been
discussed with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, the British laid out
their position, under die heading ‘The status quo’:

It has always been our appreciation that our interests are best likely to be
served by Qasim’s maintaining himself in a position dependent neither on
the Communists nor on the pro-Nasserites and able to pursue a central
and neutralist line of policy. ... So long as Qasim remains in power and
continues to give evidence of his intention to maintain the independence
of Iraq we should not countenance, still less encourage, any designs
against him from any quarter.

The Eisenhower administration had not categorically endorsed non-

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Courtesy of National Archives

Meeting of British and Americans over Middle East, 1959

British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles meeting in February
1959 on the Middle East situation in general and Iraq in particular. Dulles was to
die of cancer in May.

intervention; however, it now agreed that under the present circumstances
‘non-intervention’ was ‘the right policy’. The cabinet recommended that the
British and US ‘clandestine services’ develop ‘contingency plans’ in the event
of a civil war. The paper directed that Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Jordan be
warned not to act against Iraq or the UAR without consulting the US and
Britain . 41

The British also believed that they had managed to convince the Americans
that doing nothing was the best course: no arms, no warnings, and absolutely
no conniving with Nasser. The British warned Washington that the ‘Iraqi
charge that Nasser [was] acting as [the] cat’s-paw for imperialistfs]’ had gained
wide acceptance in the Arab world. Selwyn Lloyd had already met with the
Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter at the British Embassy in
Washington and requested US pressure on Nasser to restrain his current
attacks on Qasim. Herter demurred, stating that Nasser might misinterpret
such action as siding with Qasim, thus undermining the UAR’s current anti-
Communist campaign. Herter added that there was no indication that US
intervention with Nasser would have the desired effect anyway, and expressed
his reluctance to take any direct action in that regard . 42 Noting that the
situation in Iraq ‘presented a very dark picture’, the State Department cited the

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117

‘rapprochement’ with Nasser and his ‘effective campaign’ against Communists
and the Soviet Union. Herter and Rountree did not want to take any drastic
action in the region that might undermine US gains with tire UAR. They urged
covert encouragement to Nasser’s anti-Communist campaign, stating: ‘We have
already taken steps to make clear to Nasser that we approve of what he is
doing and that we support him in this battle .’ 43 In short, Nasser’s anti-
Communist campaign, with its fall-out for Qasim, was too important to US
policy goals to risk sending the wrong message to Cairo and ‘any assistance to
Iraq would be greeted by both press and congressional hostility .’ 44

The British were apparently having more success at influencing US views in
Baghdad. Ambassador Jernegan supported the ‘cessation of Nasser’s personal
attacks on Qasim’. Desk officers in Washington noted that: ‘In fact, however, it
has been clear for some time that the State Department suspects Jernegan of
sharing to some extent the undue optimism — if one can call it that — about
Qasim’s position and prospects that they, and to an increasing degree the
American press attribute to H.M.G.’ London’s influence was also reflected in
Jernegan’s message to Washington on the pipeline issue:

We think it would be serious error if UAR cut oil pipelines at this time.
Step would immeasurably exacerbate UAR/Iraq feud and would
strengthen rather than weaken Qassim \sic\ regime. West would inevitably
be blamed along with UAR, whereas Soviet bloc would have good
opportunity tighten hold on country by extending increased aid to
cushion shock of ‘imperialist’ squeeze on oil revenues. Iraq would no
doubt demand large loan from IPC to tide it over fiscal emergency, under
threat of nationalization.

Jernegan was getting a reputation for being too much under British influence.
Aware that his recommendations might not sit well, he apologized that his
‘cogitation’ resulted in a ‘generally negative reaction’ to Washington’s queries
about what proactive action could be taken. Aware of the proximity of his
position to that of the British, Jernegan acknowledged London’s ‘deep aversion
to Nasser’, and tried to distance himself from their views by commenting that
the British ‘declare somewhat greater confidence’ in Qasim than was
warranted. Jernegan added: ‘We recognize they [die British] may yet be proven
right. In any case, we see no present alternative to support of Qassim [A ].’ 45

At die same time, the Eisenhower administration sought to maintain a
‘correct but friendly attitude’ toward the Iraqi government, while making
‘energetic efforts to persuade’ allies that they were underestimating the danger
of a Communist takeover. The policy statement concluded that the United
States should coordinate closely with the British and jointly examine the steps
that might be required, if military intervention became unavoidable . 46 There
were those in the administration, including Vice-President Richard Nixon, who
took a more aggressive stance. Nixon believed that the State Department
position was too passive and that Iraq could not be allowed to go Communist.

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He felt that the US had to be prepared to replace the Qasim government
before the Communists could take control. 47 Nixon wanted a ‘Mossadegh type
operation’ to overthrow Qasim and put pro-Western military officers in
power. 48 No doubt Nixon was influenced by the consistent reporting, since the
failed Mosul coup, of Communist gains, and privy to the information that
Director Dulles reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27
April that the Communists had moved from a position of ‘negligible influence’
under the old regime ‘toward a position where they will exercise outright
control, be it from die facade of a “national front”, or as an outright “people’s
democracy”.’ The failure of the Mosul coup and the resulting Communist gains
had markedly increased fears of a Communist takeover. 49

On 17 April, Nixon chaired the NSC meeting. He questioned Assistant
Secretary Rountree at length on the State Department suggestion that the
United States wait and see what would happen in Iraq before taking any
aggressive action of a military nature in that country. At this point, Rountree
argued that the United States would have to wait until the Communists actually
came to power, so that Arab opinion would swing in favor of intervention or
of US incitement of the Iraqi military to overthrow die regime:

The revulsion against any government set up under [US] aegis would be
so great that it would probably be swept away and its replacement would
in all likelihood be a Communist government. Thus for diis reason alone
we cannot advocate this course, apart from the long standing United
States principles which would be violated by what would in effect be
unprovoked United States aggression and apart from the catastrophic
psychological reaction throughout Africa and Asia which would
inevitably portray us as being worse aggressors than the Communists. 50

Fearing a Communist takeover, Nixon was also no doubt also trying to assert
himself and lay claim to a substantive role in foreign policy. The 1960 election
was only 1 6 months away and he was trying to build his image as a substantive
decision maker in the administration. John Foster Dulles was terminally^ ill with
cancer and had just resigned, and Eisenhower was in Georgia playing golf.
Nixon was making a play for a bigger role in die administration by pushing an
aggressive policy. Nixon also made it clear that he believed the traditional
foreign-policy apparatus would never recommend military or covert action, no
matter how grave the situation. As a result, he made it plain to those present
that he wanted to see more aggressive options, both covert and overt, to
potentially deal with the problem in Baghdad. Nixon’s effort to assert himself
no twith standing, the majority of those present at the meeting would only agree
that plans might be necessary but that the situation required no immediate
action. 51 On his return to Washington, Eisenhower sided with Rountree’s
assessment, which reasoned that intervention would undermine other US
relationships in the region and that when US forces departed from Iraq the
government it had put in place would be shortlived. 52

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Coming to terms with Qasim

Concerns about a more aggressive US posture on Iraq did not preclude
encouraging Nasser. In a policy assessment in April 1959, the State
Department acknowledged that: While we have not direcdy linked with
Nasser’s present campaign against communism [and] the steps we have
recendy taken to aid Egypt, there is no doubt that Nasser knows that we have
taken these steps as a sign of approval of his current campaign and that they
have emboldened him in his anti-Communist efforts.’ 53 Washington
approached Nasser ‘to explore parallel measures which the US and the UAR
might take’ with regard to Baghdad, and expressed support for his anti-
Communist campaign. Nasser responded with a predictable request for more
aid to enable his program to continue. While the US and UAR attempted to
undermine Qasim, London pursued an accommodation with him, lubricated
by the flow of Iraqi oil. To justify this policy, London took the position that
‘Iraq will preserve an attitude of independence and neutrality’, and offered to
continue arms shipments to Baghdad. Although agreed to by Eisenhower,
British arms sales raised eyebrows in the US and NATO. At an NSC meeting,
Nixon now groused that apparently ‘the British thought they could make a deal
with the Iraqi Communists [because] they considered Nasser a greater danger
than the Communists to die Near East.’ Eisenhower added that fundamentally
the British felt that ‘Nasser cannot be trusted.’ 54

British Ambassador Sir Humphrey Trevelyan applauded Macmillan’s
decision to provide arms, stating that it would ‘encourage . . . some vestige of
independence’ from the Qasim regime. London explained that arms for Qasim
and the army made both less dependent on the Communists and their Soviet
sponsors. Trevelyan stated: ‘Conversely a refusal would be profoundly
depressing and demoralizing to Qasim’s anti-communist supporters who want
to retain links with the West. It might indeed have the effect of just pushing
Qasim himself over the communist brink. Her Majesty’s government therefore
believes that the action they are taking is in the best interests of the Middle
East as a whole.’ 55 The Ambassador also pressed London for assistance in
reducing the level of UAR attacks on Qasim by having a third party, perhaps
Tito, go to Nasser with the suggestion. The British were absolutely convinced
that the UAR attacks coupled with internal agitation was in fact dangerously
increasing the leverage of the Communists over the regime. 56

Sir Humphrey wanted London to help ‘the Americans find it possible to
take a more positive line with Qasim in spite of the unfavourable features of
the situation’. 57 Trevelyan argued: ‘One of our main problems is how to
improve relations between the Americans and Qasim.’ This obsession with
improving US-Iraqi relations constituted an on-going project for the British in
Baghdad. It spawned all manner of novel ideas. Deciding that the Eisenhower
administration and Qasim regime lacked ‘practical issues to deal with’ together,
Sir Humphrey seized upon dates. He suggested the following to London: ‘I
think that the key may be dates, and have suggested to my American colleague
that by some means or other they should buy a vast quantity of bad Iraqi dates

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and give them away somewhere or sell them at a loss. It might have quite a
considerable effect. He thinks that it will horrify the AID people in
Washington, but has noted it down as a possible idea.’ 58 Sir Humphrey was
either really thinking outside the box, in desperation, or suffering from too
much Iraqi sun.

Soviet problems with their clients

The failed coup in Mosul also reignited UAR-Soviet disagreements. From
Cairo, Nasser continued his attack on the threat that Communism presented to
Arab unity, reopening the row with the Soviet Union. The Cairo press called
Qasim and his followers the ‘Communist agents of a foreign power’ and stated
in print: ‘Iraq is ruled by a Red butcher.’ 59 On 15 March 1959, from Damascus,
Nasser delivered a speech accusing Qasim of handing Iraq over to
Communists. Arguing that Communism threatened Arab nationalism and
Islam, Nasser used a play on Qasim’s name, ‘Kassim’ as opposed to Qasim,
meaning ‘divider’. His allusion to the ‘subservience’ of Qasim to the
Communists in Iraq got a quick reaction from Moscow. 60 On 16 March,
Khrushchev responded, describing himself as ‘chagrined’ by Nasser’s use of
the ‘language of imperialists’ in his attacks on Iraq. Khrushchev stated that the
Soviet Union would not be ‘indifferent’ to the ‘situation emerging’ in Iraq, and
he chided Nasser for having put his personal view of Arab unity and the
interests of the UAR above those of the people. The Egyptian press
responded, referring to the ‘showdown’ between ‘Arab nationalism’ and
‘Communist imperialism’. Then, on 19 March, Khrushchev delivered his most
stinging rebuke yet: he called Nasser ‘a rather hotheaded young man’ and stated
that the Egyptian leader had undertaken ‘more than his stature permitted’. 61

Never one to shrink from an escalating war of words, Nasser responded die
next day: ‘If today the Soviet Premier supports a small group of our
countrymen against the unanimity of our people, in no circumstances can we
accept this.’ 62 He added: ‘Had it not been for this passion and hot-headedness,
our country would have been turned into rocket bases against the Soviet Union
and into Western bases against the Socialist and Communist world.’ Nasser
then declared: ‘If a Communist State is established, the Communists will smite
down all patriotic and nationalist elements - or eliminate them, as we say - by
inventing incidents until they get rid of all these elements and will then
establish a Red terrorist dictatorship in which subservience prevails.’ Nasser
also accused the Communists in Iraq of allying themselves with British
agents. 63 As the exchanges escalated, Nasser denigrated the Soviet contribution
to Egypt in 1956 and credited the United States and the United Nations with
the key roles in stopping the fighting. 64 In April, Nasser gave an interview to a
visiting Indian journalist. He stated: ‘Our quarrel is really with communist
conspiracy against Iraq and the whole Arab World. . . . We are fighting the plot
of a communist minority in Iraq which functions as a tool of Russia and
international communism in the same way as the pre-revolutionary regime
there executed orders of British and American imperialism.’ In the same

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interview, Nasser’s analysis colorfully lumped the British and their policies
toward Iraq in with the Soviets:

British policy is conditioned by two factors. First of all, they still suffer
from Suez sickness. They are like wounded wolves out for revenge
against me for having taken Suez away from them. They will use any
instrument — Kassem, communists, anything that comes their way to
destroy [me]. That is why they are helping Iraq and conducting press and
radio propaganda against me. ... Additionally, [die] British want to
continue flow of their petroleum company in Iraq and influence Kassem
in favor of their vested interests. 65

Nasser’s emphasis may have been slightly off, but he certainly grasped the
basics of Russian and British policy. Thus, the spring of 1959 found Moscow
pressuring its erstwhile client in Cairo to cease and desist from its attacks on
the Qasim regime, and it found London attempting to convince Washington to
do the same thing. Nixon was on the mark when he commented that the
British seemed to prefer working with Iraqi Communists to dealing with
Nasser. 66

Communist eclipse in Iraq

Given Nasser’s problems with Moscow, British attempts to undermine his
influence, and the conflict with Damascus, it was only natural for Nasser to
turn to his former ‘friends’ in Washington. Nasser understood die Eisenhower
administration’s fixation on Communism. The UAR position on Iraq,
Communism, and, at that moment, Soviet influence in the Middle East,
complemented US containment policy. Nasser’s suppression of Communists in
Egypt and Syria resonated positively in Washington. While the administration
did not believe that Nasser had had a total change of heart, the friction
between Cairo, on the one hand, and Baghdad and Moscow on the other was
for the US the first positive news out of the Arab Middle East in years. In a
document entitled “Nasser Steps Up Anti-Communist Drive’, INR at the State
Department commented:

The conclusion is difficult to avoid that Nasser has made a decision to
carry on his fight with Iraq regardless of the consequences for his
relations with the USSR. In the final passages of the speech, reaffirming
the determination of Arabs to resist communist as they did imperialist
control, Nasser recalled the earlier struggle of Arab nationalism in Iraq
‘when Hulagu conquered Baghdad and the Tartars occupied Iraq’ and
expressed confidence in die victory of Arab nationalism just as in the past
when ‘Hulagu was defeated and the Tartars crushed.’ The next important
question is whether Mr. Khrushchev is willing to acknowledge the
challenge implied in Nasser’s recent speeches and if so how he will
respond. 67

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Nasser played his retooled relationship with the Americans to the hilt. It
provided leverage against the Soviet Union, in his dealings with the British and
with various Arab states, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq,
improved US-Egyptian relations made the US a prime target for media attacks
charging Washington ‘with collaborating with Nasser against Iraq’. 68

In the summer and fall of 1960, the situation in Iraq offered some
encouraging signs that Qasim had begun to recognize the potential threat from
the Communists. He probably recognized them all along, leaving control of the
security services and army in the hands of non-Communist nationalists who
were loyal to him. On 1 May 1959, massive Communist rallies in Baghdad
called for the appointment of Communists to the government and for an
elected representative assembly. 69 Qasim responded on 2 May with a speech
that many viewed as a ‘slap in the face of the Communist Party’. He flatly
stated that: ‘groupings, parties and party politics were not at that moment
beneficial to the country.’ Then, he directly attacked die Communists for
demanding positions in the government. Although cautious, London was
hopeful that Qasim’s speech signaled a ‘real determination by Qasim to govern
the country and not be pushed around by the Communists’. 70 When a
Communist rally in Kirkuk, on 14 May 1959, exploded into two days of ethnic
and class violence, Qasim arrested Communists and removed them from key
positions in the peasants’ and trade unions.

Returning from Baghdad, Anthony H. Nutting reported that the situation in
Iraq was ‘very dicey indeed’. 71 Nutting stated that Qasim’s suspension of all
political activity was a real attempt to curb the power of the Communists. He
argued: ‘In this way, they put the Communists in the dilemma of either having
to oppose the government or accept the suspension of their own political
activists.’ Nutting also reported that the Iraqi regime was highly suspicious of
American activity. Ambassador Trevelyan bolstered this view, and had
repeatedly reassured the Iraqi leadership that Washington was not attempting
to create a ‘Moslem front’ to undermine the regime. 72 The British believed that
neither Qasim nor the army would readily relinquish power to the
Communists, but that if Qasim disappeared in a ‘palace revolution’, the next
leader ‘would be more a prisoner of the Communists than Qasim’. Nutting
concluded: ‘The politics of Baghdad, like the traffic, were in a state of
indescribable confusion.’ 73

In June 1959, Qasim and the Communist leadership clashed over a decision
to allow ‘exiles’ to return home to celebrate the Eid and reduce prison
sentences for ‘feudalists and reactionaries’. The Iraqi Communists found their
power curbed in other ways as well. Organizers of Communist demonstrations
found themselves the targets of ‘truncheon-wielding police’. Communist
demands for a purge of the foreign ministry had failed in the face of
determined resistance by Foreign Minister Jawad. Perhaps most significantly
the rumors of a split in the Communist party over tactics and support for
Qasim promised more problems for the leftists. In Washington, the CIA
predicted ‘a real show-down’ between Qasim and the Communists, but stated

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that Qasim’s preference for maneuvering and for a more cautious approach to
his rivals would probably delay the confrontation. Coupled with an expected
new long-term contract between the IPC and the Qasim government, these
modestly encouraging signs effectively precluded any serious thoughts of
intervention in Washington. 74

Just as the situation in Iraq seemed to be calming somewhat, the Ba’thists
who had escaped prison attempted a sudden change in leadership: on 7
October 1959, they attempted to assassinate Qasim. Although wounded, he
survived. 75 The attempt resulted in the usual flurry of rumors in Baghdad about
invasions from Jordan, Syria, and other Nasserist plots. The Communists were
predictably vocal, hoping to recapture their lost political momentum.
Communist influence had been clearly on the decline since its height at the
time of the March coup attempt in Mosul. They also faced a better-organized,
more active anti-Communist movement. Qasim encouraged this development
as a counter-weight to surging Communist power earlier in the year. 76 As
further evidence of slipping Communist fortunes, the Baghdad newspaper Al-
Thawra had called for the establishment of new political party headed by Qasim
himself. At the State Department, Lakeland described the rumors as ‘kite
flying’, but the Communists were concerned enough to come out strongly
against such a move. 77 It smacked too closely of Nasser’s abolition of political
parties.

In late December a military court headed by Colonel Mahdawi began a
series of televised ‘show trials’. Described as ‘one of the most gross perversion
of justice yet witnessed’, the trials became a platform for pro-Qasim
demagoguery with the verdicts ‘a foregone conclusion’. The logic of the trial
was that because some Ba’thists had plotted against the regime, then all
Ba’thists were guilty of plotting against the regime. Disaffection with the trials
and the regime spread, but there was no outspoken opposition. The US
embassy reported: ‘No one dares, however to argue the point publicly lest he
become a guest of Mahdawi and Majid Amin on their popular evening quiz
show.’ 78 Mahdawi, the most notorious of the judges, accused US Ambassador
Jernegan of being in league with Nasser and of paying the Ba’thist plotters to
overthrow the Qasim regime. 79

By early January 1960, the Communist influence and ministers in the Iraqi
government brought open concern. The Shah of Iran stated that he did not
believe that Qasim was a Communist but that Communist influence was
certainly on the rise. He counseled that anti-Communist forces in Iraq were
much stronger than anyone realized, and lamented that no-one seemed to have
a plan to assist them.’ 80 No-one seemed able to adequately analyze the situation
or provide accurate analysis of die future. For example, in January 1960 the
Indian Embassy reported: ‘Qassim \sic\ is a transitional phenomenon
corresponding to the state of Iraq now. . . . Qassim’s failings are the failings of
Iraq. ... If Qassim is a split personality, so is Iraq and it is difficult to decide
which affects the other more in the present circumstances. As was said long
ago, the times produce the leader and every people gets the ruler it deserves.’ 81

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Non-Communist Iraqi parties were increasingly concerned that Qasim
‘underestimated (die) danger (that the) Communists could become’. Qasim’s
pronounced tilt to the left reflected his consuming fear of ‘pro-Nasser
nationalists’. 82 The Indians were obviously operating slightly behind the actual
course of events.

On 1 January 1960, Qasim ended the ban on political parties, giving the
appearance of making good on his promise to allow die resumption of
political-party life in Iraq. 83 In February, unfortunately for the Communists,
Qasim decided diat they had become too powerful and set about redressing the
situation. For months, two rival wings of the Communist party had struggled
for control. Now, both groups applied for licenses to operate as the sole
Communist political part} 7 in Iraq. 84 In early February 1960, the regime
announced its intention to grant a license to the minority, splinter group under
Daoud al-Sayegh as the Communist Party of Iraq. This move diluted the power
of the Communists in Iraq by creating a leadership crisis within its ranks. The
Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawad had presaged this move when he stated that
despite the power of die larger ICP there were ‘ways of clipping its wings’. 85

With no choice but to support Qasim, the mainstream Communists now
lacked a party vehicle. 86 In addition to the political emasculation of the
mainstream group, the conclusion of the conspiracy trials also indicated a loss
of Communist influence. In sentencing 76 of the 78 defendants, the court
showed surprising leniency. Some of the accused were actually acquitted, and
the court only sentenced a handful of the ‘ring leaders’ to be hung. 87 The
Qasim government presented itself as having curbed Communist influence. 88
Economic problems also brought friendlier attitudes toward Washington.
More Iraqi students were attending US universities and technical schools, and
there seemed to an increase in attempts to acquire Western technical assistance.
While the regime, bolstered by oil revenue, looked stable in the short term, the
longer view was an entirely different matter. Many began to question Qasim’s
competence to run die country. 89 Industrial output had fallen sharply from pre-
revolutionary levels. Qasim was increasingly isolated and unable to deal with
Iraq’s mounting economic and political difficulties. His only salvation appeared
to be the weakness of any opposition and the lack of an alternative
leadership. 90 As a result, the Qasim regime found itself, in the words of The
Guardian, ‘losing its grip’ on the political and economic levers of power.
Observers saw the lack of direction and focus of the once infamous Baghdad
mobs as another indication of the malaise in the government. 91 By 14 July
1960, the second anniversary of the revolution, the ‘continuing revolution in
Iraq had come to a halt.’ 92 Now Qasim’s sole goal had become survival.

Nasser’s Syrian labyrinth

Any Schadenfreude Nasser may have felt with regard to Qasim’s predicament
was no doubt tempered by his own problems in Syria. In October 1959, Nasser
sent his old confidant Marshal Amer to Damascus to function as viceroy.
Amer was to use the ‘carrot and not the stick’. Nasser simply failed to grasp

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that the arrival of an Egyptian field marshal in die role of viceroy would only
increase disaffection among Syrian politicians and the military. 93 Salah al-Din
al-Bitar and Akram Hourani, two leading Syrian Ba’thist politicians, made a trip
to Cairo to voice their opposition, but Nasser intimidated diem. In December
1959, after returning to Damascus, they 7 resigned in protest from the
government. Nasser saw the resignation as disloyalty. He concluded that Syrian
politicians could not be trusted and removed them from key positions in the
UAR government, further undermining the UAR administration in Sy 7 ria. 94
Sarraj remained to support what increasingly appeared to be an Egyptian
occupation. There were now only 7 three Sy 7 tians, ‘political nonentities’, in the
higher echelons of the UAR government. 95

At this juncture, Nasser appointed Sarraj, his chosen head of the muhabbarat
(or security 7 service), to head the Syrian executive. Sarraj understood that Syrian
resentment of Egyptian rule had risen to dangerous levels and that the only
way to prevent a revolt in the military was through arrests and interrogations. 96
In his zeal to preserve the union, Sarraj ran afoul of Amer. The very Syrians
who were planning a revolt against the Egyptians began to complain to Amer
about Sarraj and his programs of suppression. Annoyed with Sarraj, Amer
sought to quell die unrest by ordering an end to the arrests and interrogations.
When Sarraj protested, Amer, with Nasser’s blessing, ignored him. Amer, in
effect, blinded the security apparatus and acquiesced to the very Syrian military
officers who would lead a coup against UAR rule. 97 In London and
Washington, most observers doubted, despite the ‘mounting wave of
discontent’, that the Syrians would either significantly 7 assist or rise up to expel
the Egyptians. 98

For the US, patience was paying off. Having resisted the temptation to
intervene in Iraq, the Eisenhower administration had allowed the fractious
nature of Iraqi politics to take its toll on the Qasim regime. Concerns about
Communist influence were mitigated to a significant degree by Qasim’s astute
maneuver that split the party. In addition, Nasser’s problems in Syria now
seemed to portend limitations on UAR expansion. The fundamental
conservatism of the Eisenhower administration’s approach to the region was
netting die same results that Vice-President Nixon and die more radical
advocates of a more aggressive policy had touted as the benefits of
intervention, and Eisenhower had done so without the potential expense in
lives and dollars or the immeasurable damage to the US reputation in the
region. In addition, increased aid to Cairo had temporarily improved US
influence with Nasser and encouraged him to pursue the blatantly anti-
Communist policies long sought by the Eisenhower administration.

Despite the fact that the fear of monolithic Nasserism had subsided,
Washington continued to worry about the survivability of traditional regimes in
the region, but now it appeared that whatever nationalist regime might replace
the Hashemites in Jordan or the Saudis would most likely pursue a course on
the Iraqi mode of independence from Cairo. After the difficult learning curve
of 1955 to 1958, the Eisenhower administration had come up with a set of

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pragmatic policies that worked, albeit with a constant need for adjustments.
Washington had also come to the realization that die United States
government lacked the ability to engineer or impose a ‘strategic’ solution to the
problems in the region or for that matter to implement a ‘strategic plan’ to
protect its own interests there; however, it could, and at times very effectively,
take advantage of die inherent regional conflicts and political dynamics to
further and protect the longer-term interests of the US government.

Chapter 7: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel — the Bystanders

The Arab Cold War held clear benefits for diree relative bystanders in the
Arab Middle East. Nasser’s frustration and obsession with Qasim’s Iraq and
the resulting fall-out in the Syrian UAR and with the Soviet Union diluted the
Egyptian leader’s ability to focus on other revolutionary opportunities. For
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, the Arab Cold War brought a relative respite
from political and subversive pressure that would further serve to ensure their
survival. From 1958 through 1960, the two Arab monarchies, Jordan and Saudi
Arabia, faced increasing political instability and financial problems which,
coupled with focused subversion from the UAR, might have toppled both
regimes. Because of the hostile relations between the UAR and Iraq, Jordan
and Saudi Arabia were able to navigate this critical period of internal crisis and
emerge stronger and more stable than at any time in the past. This did not
mean that anyone in Washington, or for that matter London, would describe
either monarchy as stable, but in a relative sense the regimes in Amman and
Riyadh were clearly less vulnerable and better led than drey had been in a
decade. Even more critical, by die early 1960s the United States was committed
to their survival. For Israelis, the Arab Cold War provided a diversion behind
which they developed what Ben Gurion believed would be the ultimate
assurance of survival - nuclear weapons. Each of the bystanders took
advantage of die conflict between the UAR and Iraq in dieir own way, and in
the end they would find their positions enhanced and those of Nasser and
Qasim significantly diminished.

In terms of vulnerability, in early 1958 most in Washington believed that the
Hashemite regime in Jordan would succumb to the Nasserist ‘wave’. King
Hussein faced Palestinian and pro-Nasserist plots in the government and
military. There was little enthusiasm in the Eisenhower administration for
supporting Jordan, which was not even a part of the US scheme for
containment in the region. Nevertheless, despite objections from key elements

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in the US foreign policy community, Amman found itself the recipient of
significant amounts of US military and economic aid. This aid did in fact
represent an investment in containment, but only an indirect and somewhat
unwilling one. US support for King Hussein was, in large part, a contribution
to relations with London. The Eisenhower administration supported Jordan
because the British viewed the collapse of the Amman regime as potentially
disastrous to their remaining position in the Middle East. Wanting to avoid
further damage to the British position and needing London’s cooperation on a
variety of other issues, Washington supported a regime that it believed would
soon succumb to radical Arab nationalism. How this arrangement matured is
instructive in understanding the British approach to protecting its regional
interests by enlisting US financial and political support. Nasser’s
overconfidence also contributed to Jordan’s survival. He viewed a collapse of
the Hashemites as a foregone conclusion. As the conflict with Qasim
intensified, Nasser’s frustration with King Hussein increased, and Jordan
became a major test of Nasser’s influence and a major affront to his prestige.
Only the loyalty of Bedouin units in the army, British backing, Israeli
preference for the Hashemite monarchy, and lukewarm American support kept
the last Hashemite regime afloat. 1

Jordan’s struggle to survive also highlighted a new level of complexity in
relations between the Atlantic cousins. Eisenhower’s pro-Nasserist tilt and
Macmillan’s continued antipathy toward the Egyptian leader created debate
over Anglo-American policy toward Jordan. Clear disagreements, often
expressed in a most entertaining manner, existed between Britain’s Kipling-
esque Ambassador, Sir Charles Johnston, and the US Embassy in Amman, the
NEA Bureau at the State Department, and the CIA in Washington. 2 Without a
doubt, Johnston was the most colorful participant in this policy tug-of-war.
Fighting to preserve Britain’s commitment to the last Hashemite, Sir Charles
had an unabashed admiration for desert royalty and absolute disdain for Arab
nationalists and their supporters. 3 He derisively dismissed US views of Nasser
and other revolutionaries as the ‘wave of the future’ and engaged in all manner
of chicanery to undermine policies that smelled of accommodation with
revolutionary regimes. Jordan became something of a test case for Anglo-
American cooperation and compromise in the post-1958 Arab world.

The Arab Cold War also benefited the Middle East odd couple - Saudi
Arabia and Israel. Nasser’s feud with Qasim, his problems with the Soviet
Union, his difficulties in Syria, and the war of words with King Hussein
necessitated good relations with other key Arab states in the region. One could
argue that the conflict with Qasim caused Nasser to miss his best opportunity
of undermining the Saudi regime. In the middle of a dynastic crisis, Saudi
Arabia found an anti-Communist alliance with Nasser useful as well. The
alliance reduced the potential for Nasserist agitation and increased the
Kingdom’s influence with Washington. Shrewdly, Crown Prince Feisal used
the respite to improve relations with the UAR, while introducing reforms and
undermining revolutionary groups at home. In addition, Feisal impressed upon

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129

US officials the progress being made in modernizing tire Kingdom, particularly
in tire realm of financial reform. Economic aid was less an issue with the
Saudis, but reform constituted a major issue, if Saudi Arabia were to develop a
stable economy and society.

As for Israel, with Nasser finally involved in an anti-Communist crusade,
Washington avoided actions that might stir up the Arab-Israeli conflict and
damage its anti-Communist campaign. The Eisenhower administration used
economic aid as leverage to prevent Israeli schemes that might derail Nasser’s
anti-Communist campaign, but as a by-product of minimizing potential
disagreements with Israel, the administration failed to confront signs of a
growing nuclear weapons program. As a result, die distractions of the Arab
Cold War and US preoccupation with maintaining UAR pressure on Iraq
allowed the Israelis to divert aid into a nuclear weapons program. Ironically,
the weakest monarchy, Hashemite Jordan, and the two most ideologically
hostile regimes, Zionist Israel and Wahhabist Saudi Arabia, benefited the most
from the ‘Arab Cold War’. These issues and circumstances converged in 1959
and 1960 to form a critical chapter in the Cold War politics of the Greater
Middle East.

Jordan’s premature obituary

Predictably, Nasser’s attempt to bring Jordan to heel involved the
operational skullduggery of the Syrian intelligence service and its chief, Colonel
Sarraj. The collapse of Hashemite Iraq, in July 1958, raised expectations that
King Hussein was next. Although the young King had survived riots, plots,
and assassination attempts, it appeared that his luck had run out. Hussein
seemed to have two choices: toe the UAR line or be overthrown. After the
crisis-ridden 1958, New Year in Jordan began on a shaky note. To bolster King
Hussein’s confidence, the Eisenhower administration approved a February
1959 ‘private visit’ to Washington for informal talks with President
Eisenhower. Still, expecting a Hashemite collapse, the administration was
careful not to classify the trip as an ‘official visit’. The Jordanian government
expected significant new military aid and perhaps even a ‘mutual defense
guarantee’. The Eisenhower administration quickly dashed these hopes. The
White House agreed to increased military aid, but took the position that the
United States had ‘consistently refused to give mutual defense guarantees to
any Middle East country, and [did] not propose to start with Jordan.’ 4 It was a
polite but firm vote of no confidence from Washington.

US officials in both Washington and Amman pointedly pressed the
Jordanians to come to terms with the UAR. 5 In Amman, the Embassy stressed
Washington’s ‘interest in die independence and integrity of Jordan’, but offered
a stern warning: Jordan needed to mend its political fences with its neighbors.
The warning added that US aid should not be interpreted as an endorsement of
a defiant Jordanian policy toward its more powerful neighbors. Under
prodding from the White House, the State Department made it clear that US

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Courtesy of National Archives
Eisenhower and King Hussein

Eisenhower at the White House with Jordan’s King Hussein. Although convinced
that Hussein’s regime would most likely fall, Eisenhower met with the King to
offer his encouragement if not the material support that the King wanted. During
this visit, the Jordanian security service uncovered a plot to overthrow the
Hashemite regime.

aid was to allow ‘Jordan under the King’s wise leadership, ... to expand and
improve her own connections with other Arab States’. Additionally, US
officials pointed out to King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifai’ that they did
not believe that ‘Nasser is at present interested in working for the overthrow of
the regime in Jordan.’ Eisenhower encouraged and offered to assist Jordan in
improving its relations with Cairo. 6

London received American matchmaking between Nasser and King
Hussein badly. Whitehall strongly opposed any suggestion of ‘detente’ between
King Hussein and Nasser. The subject gave Sir Charles Johnston, British
Ambassador in Amman, near apoplectic seizures. Fearing that Washington
might push King Hussein into an alliance with Nasser in a US-sponsored joint
quest ‘to resist Communist encroachment’, the British worked behind the
scenes to undermine US plans. 7 Given what the British viewed as their
interests, London had reason for concern. In an NIE dated 10 March 1959, the
Eisenhower administration made its assessment clear: ‘Over the long run, we
have little confidence in Hussein’s ability to hold his throne or, indeed, in the
viability of Jordan as a state.’ The estimate went on to suggest that it was
impossible for us [the US] to satisfy the desires and ambition of the King and

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Rifai’, and stated that the US should discourage Jordan from further reliance
on Anglo-American largesse for survival. It also called for Jordan to seek at
least a partial accommodation with Arab nationalists and the UAR. 8

On edge about US intentions and the King’s visit to Washington, Sir
Charles Johnston complained to London: ‘We are clearly in for another period
of instability which will last as long as the King’s absence and will be intensified
while Samir is away as well.’ Sir Charles cited die ‘financial and military
disadvantages of [Nasser] adding Jordan to his empire’, but quickly added that
a success in Jordan might offset Nasser’s problems with the Iraqis. Fearing
Sarraj’s entrepreneurial streak, Johnston warned that Nasser’s Jordanian and
Syrian supporters might initiate action without his authority in ‘an attempt to
force his hand’. 9 Johnston worried about the army, stating: ‘In this country,
however, we must always be prepared for the worst.’ 10 The Ambassador also
fretted about what he called Lakeland’s ‘pet scheme’ to induce the former
Jordanian Chief of Staff, Major General Sadiq Shara, to defect while in
Washington, because it ‘would, no doubt, greatly strengthen the forces in the
United States Government which would like to see (its) Jordanian commitment
dropped.’ 11 As events turned out, Shara should have adopted Lakeland’s ‘pet
scheme’. While King Hussein was away, the Jordanian security service
uncovered a plot against him that implicated Shara. Traveling with the King,
Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai’ scoffed at rumors that al-Shara would be
arrested upon his return to Jordan, stating that ‘if General Shara goes die
Jordan Army will cease to exist and only a Bedouin mob will be left.’ 12 In fact,
Shara was arrested on his return and served 12 years in prison for his role in
the plot. The plot in large part had been foiled because of the vigilance and
loyalty of General Habis al-Majali, the Jordanian Chief of Staff and his
intelligence organization. 13

The results of the Washington meetings of 24-26 March 1959 were
predictable. The Jordanians requested more aid and emphasized the Nasserist
threat. At one point, Rifai’ even argued that a Nasserist takeover in Iraq was
more serious than a Communist one. Exhibiting an uncompromising hatred
for Nasser, Rifai’ criticized US aid to the UAR stating: “Nasser should not be
saved at the very moment when he had weakened himself in his battle against
the Soviets.’ 14 These views did little to enhance Washington’s opinion of the
Jordanian regime. Putting the best face on tilings, Washington called the visit a
‘success’. 15 As predicted, upon his return Rifai’ resigned as Prime Minister and
took a parting shot at Nasser, stating that the trip’s purpose had been to ‘show
up Nasser in his true light as a false leader [ot] Arab nationalism who had
single-handedly opened [the] Middle East to Communists.’ When prodded by
questions of Nasser’s anti-Communist utility, Rifai’ exploded, criticizing ‘what
he called the pro-Nasser clique among [US] policy making officials’ and stated
that he had ‘warned everyone he talked to in Washington against giving this
“Egyptian Dog” a third chance, explaining the first one was U.S. support for
Nasser against Naguib, the second our action during the Suez Crisis.’ Rifai’
ranted that if the US government ‘raised one finger to help Nasser it might as

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well pack up and leave Middle East . . . [because] it will earn the hatred of all
Arabs, particularly the Syrians and Saudi Arabians.’ Rifai’ also stated that
Jordan was encouraging elements in Syrian to oppose the UAR. In response to
a question about a united front of Nasser and King Hussein against the
Communists, Rifai’ blundy made no bones about it: ‘I know only too well how
you Americans hate communism, well we hate Nasser even more .’ 16

When word of US encouragement for a UAR-Jordanian rapprochement
reached Amman, Sir Charles erupted in what could only be described as a
vesuvian expression of displeasure. Johnston snarled that the US intended to
offer up ‘any “small potatoes” like Jordan which might stand in the way’ of
Nasser pursuing an anti-Communist campaign . 17 In a cable to London,
Johnston howled that US policy ‘seemed to mean’ that Jordan would keep its
independence for a while but under a ‘Nasserist prime minister’, and then at
some point King Hussein would oversee the transition of Jordan into a
republic. Never shy about expressing his views, Johnston lambasted American
Charge Edwin M. Wright, and blasted anyone in London who might be
thinking about acquiescing to what he viewed as the American scheme. He
stated:

Unlike Mr. Wright, I had seen a pro-Nasserite Prime Minister [Nabulsi] in
operation here. His regime had simply opened the door to chaos and
Communism, and I saw no reason to think that the result would be
different if the experiment was repeated again now. Whatever might be
Nasser’s own attitude towards Communism, his Jordanian supporters
(particularly those now in exile) had played the Communist game for all
they were worth and would no doubt do so again. ... If the American are
in effect, letting Nasser take over Jordan while trying to build him up as
an anti-Communist champion, they will have to pay him a subsidy
comparable to what they pay the present Jordan Government, if they
want to prevent him from being sunk by the Jordanian millstone. That
being so, it seemed far more sensible to pay the subsidy directly to a
regime which, whatever its shortcomings, is at least robusdy pro-western,
rather than to an untrustworthy opportunist like Nasser.

Johnston informed London that after expressing his views to the US Charge,
‘Mr. Wright expressed general agreement.’ ‘Mr. Wright’ was more likely afraid
to disagree. To make absolutely certain that no one in London missed his
point, Sir Charles added: ‘I trust that, if there is any danger of Mr. Hare’s policy
being adopted, its risks as regards Jordan can be pointed out with force to the
State Department .’ 18

After some reflection, the Foreign Office reassured Johnston that they were
certain that Washington would discuss any radical changes in policy prior to
making them. At the same time, the FO made it clear that Whitehall was not
unhappy with the idea of a US-UAR sponsored anti-Communist front, and
believed that Jordan needed to broaden her contacts in the Arab world and

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participate in the Arab community rather than try to exist in isolation. London
also stated that a ‘live and let live’ arrangement with Nasser, if handled
properly, might be both desirable and achievable. 19 This exchange also
indicated a growing difference of opinion between the Foreign Office and old-
line Colonial officers like Johnston; the latter were having difficulty coming to
terms with a changed environment, where American financial resources and
interests were displacing traditional British approaches to the Middle East.
Although still grousing, Johnston was somewhat mollified by this response,
and the fact that his close relations with the new Jordanian Prime Minister,
Hazza al-Majali, guaranteed him the leverage of political access in both Jordan
and London, and vis-a-vis the Americans.

Hussein dangles the Nasser card

In September 1959, Nasser and Saud met in Cairo and announced a decision
to put past differences aside and form a united Arab front against Zionism and
Communism. Saud then suggested another meeting in Riyadh or Jidda, and
wanted to include King Hussein. Relating to Hussein the gist of his recent visit
to Cairo, Saud invited Hussein to participate. Seeing an opportunity for
additional leverage, Hussein approached the British and American
Ambassadors separately with his ‘quandary’. Speaking to Johnston first,
Hussein stated that, given his history with Nasser, he would not consider a trip
to Cairo, but that a meeting in Saudi Arabia was a different matter. Hussein
knew exactly how Sir Charles would react. Johnston made the obligatory
statement that it was a Jordanian matter and then listed the negatives. Johnston
told die King that his attendance would place him in the anti-Qasim camp, and
Jordan should seek neutrality in die Iraqi-UAR dispute. Johnston also cited the
personal risk, stating that ‘Nasser’s need for further successes’ and Jordan’s
‘undue dependence’ on Hussein’s survival raised serious questions. Johnston
pointed out that Nasser had managed to ‘plant a bomb in Saudi’s palace last
year’. He suggested that the King ‘temporize and avoid meeting Nasser for the
time being’. 20 While British concerns about King Hussein’s safety might have
been real, a Jordanian alliance with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with which latter
London lacked diplomatic relations, would have damaged British influence. It
also had the potential to lead to a breach with Iraq, and thus threatened
petroleum revenues. Given these possibilities, London quickly agreed that
Hussein should be discouraged from attending. 21

Then on 18 September, to his chagrin, Johnston learned that King Hussein
had asked the US Ambassador Sheldon T. Mills for advice on the meeting with
Saud and Nasser. Mills told Hussein that he saw no threat of assassination and
that Washington viewed cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and die
UAR as a positive counterbalance to the ‘unfavorable trend in Iraq’. Unhappy
with the US advice, Johnston planned to discreetly discourage Jordanian
participation, emphasizing possible repercussions with Iraq. 22 At dais point, the
State Department approached the Foreign Office directly in the ‘hope’ that
they would encourage the meeting. 23 Concerned about a confrontation with

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Washington, the British formulated a strategy designed to gendy nudge the
Jordanians to forego the meeting with Nasser, without running afoul of the
US. The British approach worked, and Hussein informed Saud that he could
not attend. 24 Johnston wanted to inform the Americans of the King’s decision
in what was a clear game of diplomatic ‘one upmanship’, but London advised
caution: ‘(We) still attach the greatest importance to avoiding any appearance
of stage management on our part.’ 25 Sir Charles’s preference for putting a
sharp stick in the State Department’s eye had the potential for upsetting the
trans-Atlantic relationship.

The Iraqi reaction to the mere rumor of Hussein’s participation in a meeting
with Saud and Nasser underscored the importance that the British attached to
preventing the meeting. The British Embassy in Baghdad pointed out that
Qasim’s Communist supporters were already talking of a ‘Nasser-Hussein-Saud
bloc formed under the guise of combating Communists in the Arab states’. 26
The British were further upset by an article that appeared in the New York
Times on 25 September captioned: ‘Hussein to Meet Nasser and Saud’. The
article cited ‘reports that King Hussein is preparing to renew his claim to the
Baghdad throne and that if he does so Cairo and Riyadh are ready to give him
at least tacit support.’ In the covering letter, the British Embassy in
Washington commented that dais article ‘may not help matters’. The embassy
stated: ‘The implication that Cairo and Riyadh are calling the tune for Hussain
[si(\ will not enhance his prestige, but then the Iraqis are unlikely to be very
worried.’ 27

Domestic perceptions of the political situation in Jordan did not help
matters. Squabbling between key political figures reinforced the impression
that the King could not keep his house in order. In public comments, former
Prime Minister Rifai’ stated that the Jordanian attacks on the UAR were a sign
of weakness. These outbursts from influential Jordanians indicated the
existence of an ongoing power struggle between Rifai’ and Prime Minister
Majali, and they undermined perceptions of the King’s authority. 28 Prime
Minister Majali hoped to smooth over the differences plaguing Jordanian
society and to steer a middle road with Nasser. In January 1960, he convened a
‘secret parliamentary session’ to discuss whether or not Nasser was serious in
his expressed desire to have better relations with Jordan. Majali believed that
conflicts between UAR officials in Syria and the remaining Ba’thist ministers
and politicians there had alienated the Ba’th in Jordan to the point that their
cooperation in a conspiracy against King Hussein was highly unlikely. The
Prime Minister argued that Cairo’s problems in Syria reduced the Nasserist
threat and might open the way to better relations with the UAR. 29

The possibility of better relations with the UAR predictably came to naught.
In the spring of 1960, die frustrated Jordanian regime embarked yet again on
an anti-Nasser propaganda campaign. This time Jordan’s attempt to match
UAR’s vitriolic insults greatly alarmed both the US and the British; London in
particular cringed at Majali’s statement that ‘normal relations’ meant
‘subservience and obedience’ to the UAR. The irrepressible Ambassador

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Johnston in Amman saw little chance for the situation to improve, and noted
that the Egyptians treated the Jordanians like ‘wogs’. 30 As the propaganda
attacks gained in intensity, Radio Amman blasted ‘Nasser and his retinue’ for
their ‘immoral plots, impudent policies and disdain of Arab public opinion’. 31
Fearing that the situation would get out of control, London cautioned: ‘It is
very short sighted of the Jordanians to imagine that they can compete with
Cairo in a propaganda war. They have neither the technical resources nor the
flair.’ 32

Exasperation at the British diplomatic mission in Cairo showed as well.
Charged with normalizing relations with the UAR, Sir Roger Stevens
complained: ‘The Egyptians continue to persuade themselves that the British
run Jordan and have forces stationed there, they will continue to believe that
we are behind Jordan’s anti-U.A.R. propaganda.’ 33 Most likely pleased by the
prospect of trouble in Cairo, and perhaps encouraging it, Sir Charles Johnston
enjoined that he saw little to indicate that the Jordanians were willing ‘even to
tone down their hostile broadcasts and we are therefore unable to suggest a
way out of this difficulty.’ 34 By July 1960, Sir Roger Stevens in Cairo had
become so frustrated that he asked to invoke ‘American advice’. London raised
the issue in Washington, but reported that the US ‘showed no special
enthusiasm’ about getting involved. 35 London wanted US intervention on
Jordan’s behalf with Nasser. Instead, Washington instructed the Amman
Embassy to tell King Hussein: ‘In this connection we continue to hope His
Majesty’s government will resist, as it has on occasions in the past, frequent
temptations to indulge in heated propaganda exchanges or to give
encouragement to untrustworthy adventurers seeking its support for activities
aimed at undermining Jordan’s neighbors.’ 36 Then the Jordanians actively
began to foment trouble in Syria. Willie Morris, at the British Embassy in
Amman, lamented: ‘It is the conceit that the Hashemite Kingdom is a force to
be reckoned with, which is so distressing.’ He concluded that Jordanian
meddling in Syria would only convince Nasser that Hussein had to go. He
urged: ‘This was an occasion on which we should use our influence to restrain
the King and Government from what could be suicidal folly.’ 37

Jordanian-UAR relations reach boiling point

Any hope for restraint collapsed in the whirlwind that followed the
assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majali on 29 August I960. 38 Quite
logically, the Jordanians assumed that Nasser and his Syrian henchman, Sarraj,
were to blame. King Hussein threatened a propaganda war with Nasser that
would reach ‘new heights’. Hussein named Bahjat Talhouni to replace Majali,
paving the way for the security forces and the army to increase their role in
Jordanian political life. The assassination also highlighted the differences in US
and British political preferences for Jordan. Majali had been a British favorite,
while Washington felt far more comfortable with Rifai’. Prime Minister
Talhouni was viewed as being in the Rifai’ camp. In Amman, citing Talhouni’s
lack of popularity with the ‘West Bankers’, Willie Morris stated: ‘British feel

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Majali’s loss deeply and despite his faults he will be “irreplaceable”.’ The British
Embassy interpreted the assassination as the accomplishment of a key UAR
goal, namely ‘weakening local and national government in Jordan for some
time to come’. 39 Considerably less upset, American officials surmised that the
British lament reflected the fact that Talhouni was close to Rifai’, an American
favorite. Talhouni was also more ‘closed mouthed’ and less friendly toward the
British. Thus Talhouni would ‘probably be less satisfactory as source
information’ for the British in Amman. 40

Showing a studied lack of concern, Washington viewed die Jordanian
situation as an expensive aggravation and Majali as London’s man.
Additionally, die Eisenhower administration had tired of King Hussein and his
political entourage contributing to their own troubles by baiting Nasser and
then crying wolf. The cries of distress were so frequent from Hussein that
NEA developed its own inter-office code for dealing with the alarmist requests
from Hussein, also known as the ‘PLK’ or ‘plucky little king’. Senior officials at
State would routinely instruct the Iraq-Jordan Desk to send the ‘PLK’ a
‘BOGHAKYPU [see note] message and calm him down.’ 41 Many believed that
the Jordanians had gotten what they should have expected, if not deserved. To
support this view, they cited Jordan’s anti-UAR campaign, including Radio
Amman’s propaganda calling Nasser ‘a Red agent’ and ‘a small Farouk’, and
issuing threats about the ‘dark fate awaiting all dictators’. In October 1960, to
further goad Nasser, Hussein decided to ignore the elimination of his
Hashemite relatives in Iraq and recognize the Qasim regime in Baghdad. 42

In Washington, there was an additional incentive to downplay any UAR
responsibility for the assassination. Nasser planned to attend the UNGA at the
end of September, and efforts were underway to arrange a meeting between
Nasser and President Eisenhower. Jordan had become a nuisance that
threatened to get in the way of the United States’ real goal, namely using Cairo
as a counterbalance to Communist influence in the region, thereby enhancing
the effectiveness of containment policy. As a result, US officials argued that
Majali’s assassination was a tragic ‘act of terrorism’ with only limited tactical
consequences. 43 The Eisenhower administration expressed concern about
Jordanian stability but coolly concluded that, outside of the government and
Majali’s clan and tribe, no one in Jordan seemed to care very much about the
assassination. In point of fact, Washington was more apprehensive that
increased influence of the military would bring demands for more aid. In that
regard, the Embassy in Amman took a preemptive hardline with Talhouni
about military aid requests. 44

The Americans seemed almost pleased with Majali’s abrupt departure from
the Jordanian political scene, because it held the promise of better American
access to and influence with the Jordanian government. 45 London and
Washington agreed on one thing, namely that the Jordanians could not afford
to overreact. The British feared that Jordanian demands for the extradition
from Syria of the two Jordanians involved in the assassination might spark an
open conflict. London got both the UN and Washington on board for a

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coordinated effort to prevent precipitous action on the part of the Jordanians.
All were ‘strongly urging restraint’, while the Majali family demanded
immediate action against the UAR. 46 Perversely, Jordanian attempts to reassure
the British that they planned no such action only increased British concerns.
King Hussein stated that he had no intention of sending Jordanian forces into
Syria unless the UN failed to ‘obtain any redress’ or if they were invited in by
Syria to ‘support an appropriately constituted new regime’. 47 Since no one
expected the UN to achieve ‘redress’ and the Jordanians had convinced
themselves that ‘Syria [was] ripe for revolt’, die possibility that Bedouin
elements in the Jordanian army might take direct action against Syria presented
a sobering, if not terrifying, prospect to the British. Worse yet, the King
actually seemed convinced that Jordan could win a war with the UAR. The
cousin of the slain Prime Minister was General Habis al-Majali, who happened
to be Commander-in-Chief of the Jordanian armed forces. General Majali had
convinced himself that Jordan could take on the UAR militarily, despite the
deficiencies of the Jordanian air force and the limited capability of the army.
He believed that Jordan would win any war within 24 hours, through surprise
coupled with an ‘imminent revolt’ in Syria. Majali had by-passed key officers
who held more ‘realistic’ views of military operations to push his aggressive
plans with the King. 48

King Hussein would not accept the fact that action against Syria could
destabilize the internal Jordanian security situation, leading to chaos and
collapse. Johnston clearly understood and informed London: “We must, of
course, continue our all-out attempts to prevent die King from taking dais or
any other form of military action.’ 49 Prime Minister Macmillan reacted to
Johnston’s message by sending a message to King Hussein advising caution.
Macmillan made it clear that the British government would not intervene as it
had in 1958, except to provide for the safety of British citizens and to evacuate
the King and his family on ‘humanitarian grounds’. 50 The letter had the proper
effect. Two days later, Johnston reported: ‘Our impression is today that the
temperature has dropped but that die crisis is far from over’, and stated that he
‘would not be happy until [he] saw them [the Jordanian Army on the Syrian
border] beginning to return to their normal quarters.’ 51 The British were
skeptical of the US contention that even if UAR agents had assassinated Majali,
Nasser may not have had any direct knowledge of either the planning or
execution. 52 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office advised that while Washington
was being ‘cautious in asserting direct UAR Government responsibility in
Majali assassination’, Johnston was not being critical enough of the
information coming from die Jordanians. In London, the Foreign Office told
the US Embassy: ‘Reports both from King Hussein and Ambassador Johnston
are . . . being treated with some reserve.’ 53

The fact diat the Cairo press and Sawt al-Arab (“Voice of the Arabs’) radio
continued a ‘violent campaign’ against Jordan did litde to convince anyone that
Nasser was not directly involved in Majali’s demise. In the period immediately

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Courtesy of National Archives
Eisenhower and Nasser at UNGA, 1960

Eisenhower with Nasser at the September 1960 UNGA. Despite pronouncements
about a more open policy toward the non-aligned, and Nasser in particular,
Kennedy refused to meet with Nasser for fear of losing Jewish and pro-Zionist
votes.

following the assassination, Cairo Radio welcomed the death of Majali, calling
him ‘an agent of imperialism’ and advised King Hussein to ‘commit
suicide’.The local Egyptian press ran articles stating that ‘the son of Talal’ was
mad and listed British officers serving in Jordan by name on Cairo Radio and
Sawt al-Arab. Damascus Radio warned Hussein that the people of Jordan
would kill him, and called for an uprising. In Amman, Johnston complained
that the ‘tone of UAR Press and broadcasting ... have reached a peak of
violence never achieved in 1958.’ 54 Although certain that the UAR government
was involved, accusing Nasser of arranging the assassination would only
damage Britain’s efforts at rapprochement with the UAR, further inflame the
Jordanians, and perhaps provoke a border war between Syria and Jordan. At
this point, London just wanted the problem to go away.

Containment policy: Jordan and aid

President Eisenhower’s meetings at the UNGA underscored the fact that
the administration viewed Jordan as adding an unwanted complication to
higher priority objectives in the Middle East. Secretary of State Herter had
recommended that Eisenhower take the opportunity to meet with key Afro-
Asian leaders. Nasser was at the top of the list. On 26 September, Eisenhower
met with Nasser in New York and discussed a wide range of issues, including

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139

the conflict with Israel, the Congo situation, and Communist influence in the
region. 55 On 7 October Eisenhower had a half-hour meeting with King
Hussein at the White House. The President explained that he had raised the
assassination of Majali with Nasser and that Nasser had denied any role. The
President also told Hussein that Nasser had taken the position that if Israel
wanted free passage through Suez, then they would have to recognize the right
of return for all Palestinian refugees. Hussein expressed hope for more UN
involvement and enhanced ‘peace prospects’ in the region and, with that, the
meeting ended. 56 At the UNGA, Hussein publically denounced die UAR as a
‘pro-Communist’ threat to the ‘basic aims of the Arab nation’. In Amman, die
US Embassy viewed die speech as unfortunate: ‘This denunciation is certain to
be considered by UAR as full scale attack on part of Jordan and as such is
likely to lead to UAR reaction which may be far from pleasant to GOJ.’ 57

During the UNGA, British and US diplomats asked India to weigh in to
defuse the situation. The Indians saw nothing to be gained by getting involved
and said as much. At the Ministry of External Affairs, F.S. Dutt commented
that in the interest of ‘keeping Jordan alive’ Washington and London were
probably discouraging ‘any adventures on the part of King Husain \sk\. The
Indians surmised that more pressing problems in other parts of the world,
including the fact that ‘die British government wants to go nearer Nasser’, had
created a strong desire to see ‘detente’ between Amman and Cairo. Officials in
the MEA questioned whether or not London and Washington had really
exercised any ‘restraining influence’ over the Jordanians. The Indians saw no
advantage in getting involved. R.K. Nehru stated: ‘I agree with F.S. [Dutt] that
the British and the Americanfs] would probably like to see a detente between
the U.A.R. and Jordan’, but ‘I agree that it is not desirable for us to meddle in
this matter. We should keep aloof.’ 58 There would be no non-aligned help in
settling dais dispute.

The issue of political support for the Hashemite regime constituted only one
of the Anglo-American difficulties over Jordan: the other was paying for it.
While the British certainly did not want the Jordanian government to collapse,
it simply could not afford the bill associated with maintaining its stability. As
noted, many in Washington viewed aid to Jordan as a waste. The US had
confronted the British on the issue, stating that a fifty-fifty split on Jordan
appeared more realistic to Washington. 59 They saw the regime as unstable, and
the current aid bill, an 85-15 split, had London getting die better bargain. In
addition, the United States provided 70 per cent of die funding for UNRWA
to support the Palestinian refugees. There was a feeling in Washington that, if
the British saw Jordan as strategically important, then they should be willing to
foot more of the bill. American concerns finally came to head in the fall of
1960. In London, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon told Selwyn Lloyd,
now Chancellor of die Exchequer, that the US would only provide budgetary
support for Jordan through March 1961. Dillon then flatly informed the British
that they would have to increase their contribution. Selwyn Lloyd responded
by saying that the ‘UK had not much direct interest in Jordan.’ He added the

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London had been ‘rather relieved when they had been “kicked out’” because
their ‘concerns lay more with the Commonwealth.’ 60 In short, Britain did not
want to see Jordan collapse, and they now believed that Washington was on
the hook to prevent it. London argued that because of commitments in Oman,
parts of Africa, and the sub-continent, no additional money was available for
Jordan. At that point, Dillon stated that as of 1 April 1961 direct budgetary aid
to Jordan would have a shortfall of $6.5 million and that Washington expected
London to pick up the tab or to come up with another source of funding;
whereupon the West Germans became the focus of that alternate source of
funding. 61

As die Eisenhower administration came to a close, the Jordanian situation
remained very much up in the air. Luck had favored King Hussein, and he had
survived. Neither London nor Washington wanted to pay the bill to float the
Hashemite regime. The US favored a Jordanian policy of working with Egypt
and Nasser against Communist inroads in the region. In effect, Nasser had
become the more desirable active partner in Washington’s containment
strategy. Only British allusions to the negative effect of a Jordanian collapse on
their position in the Gulf prevented the Eisenhower administration from
leaving die Hashemites to their own devices. In effect, London had made the
case that further damage to its position in the Middle East would hurt its ability
to support the US in other areas. From London’s point of view, the logic
followed that the US should pay the lion’s share of aid support to Jordan in
order to protect broader Western interests in the region. What Selwyn Lloyd
apparently meant when he referred to Jordan was that the ‘UK had not much
direct interest in Jordan’ as long as the US footed the bill for Hussein’s
survival.’ 62 Under Eisenhower, the US had provided just enough aid to allow
Jordan’s survival; it remained to be seen what would happen after April 1961 .

Saudi Arabia: surviving Nasser’s surge

At the same time that the Hashemites in Jordan were struggling to survive
Nasser’s maschinations, Saudi Arabia faced a critical test as Nasser’s influence
grew in the Kingdom. Nasser viewed Saudi Arabia as the epitomy of a feudal
state, and he was, in fact, not far from the mark. Slavery was still legal there,
and the traditional Saudi institutions could not manage a modern state. King
Saud was at best incompetent and, at worst, dangerously unstable. From
Nasser’s perch in Cairo, the Saudi Kingdom looked like a rotten apple about to
fall. King Saud, who had voiced his support for the Eisenhower Doctrine in
early 1957, brought the full-brunt of UAR propaganda down on the Kingdom
in March 1958 by bungling an attempt to subvert Colonel Sarraj, the Syrian
security chief. Led by Crown Prince Feisal, members of the royal family
pressured Saud to step down as ruler and to embrace a program of
fundamental reforms. Knowing that he needed time, the shrewd Feisal moved
to neutralize Nasser. The Egyptian leader viewed the announcement on 22
March 1958 that Feisal would now head the Saudi government, and Feisal’s
reassertion of the Kingdom’s ‘positive neutrality,’ as a significant political and

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel

141

diplomatic victory. 63 Nasser no doubt believed that this development, at the
least, neutralized Saudi Arabia, and perhaps constituted the first step toward
the end of the monarchy. The Kingdom sat on an ocean of oil but was virtually
bankrupt due to tire mismanagement, corruption, and incompetence of King
Saud. Feisal understood that if die dynasty was to survive, he needed to buy
time by following Nasser’s lead in pan-Arab affairs. Given the ‘street’
popularity of Nasser, the ruling family had little hope of winning a propaganda
campaign or a war of subversion with the UAR. In addition, attempting to
regain power, King Saud waged a dynastic and bureaucratic battle with Feisal,
when tire latter refused to recognize King Saud’s debts. As the struggle
intensified, the almost total lack of visibility into the inner workings of the
royal family, and Feisal’s poor health, created rumors that sent shudders
through the Washington foreign policy establishment. As one observer put it:
‘Faisal \sh\ appears to be the only member of the royal family who understands
modern processes of government. The resumption of power by the King
might be disastrous to Saudi Arabia.’ 64 This murky internal sparring was a
constant source of concern.

Chafing under Feisal’s fiscal restraints, Saud cast about for political allies,
temporarily embracing a discontented group of young princes that had formed
around Tallal ibn Abd-al-Aziz. Tallal was ostensibly the leader of the Nejd al-
Fattah or ‘Young Nejd’. He and his compatriots were disillusioned reformers.
They believed that Feisal’s assumption of power in 1958 would bring
constitutional government to the kingdom. Feisal soon proved that he had no
intention of creating a constitutional monarchy, and Tallal’s group went into
open opposition. Historically, King Saud had opposed Tallal and his reformers,
but now, with Feisal controlling the purse strings, Saud courted the reformist
opposition. 65 In December 1960, the reformers supported Saud’s successful
bid to retake control of the Council of Ministers. Radio Riyadh announced on
25 December 1960 that a new constitution for Saudi Arabia would be written
and accompanied by other liberalizing reforms. Four days later, the King
ordered Radio Riyadh to announce that a constitution would not in fact be
forthcoming. When Saud returned to his old ways, clashes ensued between him
and the reformers. Eventually, the King forced Tallal from office, leaving the
Kingdom more vulnerable and divided than ever before. 66

Between 1958 and 1961, a serious attempt by Nasser to topple the regime
might well have succeeded, but Saudi Arabia’s window of vulnerability, like
that of Jordan’s, coincided with Nasser’s attempts to deal with problems in
Syria and with Qasim in Iraq. Nasser simply lacked the ability to focus on the
Kingdom. In the mean time, more perceptive members of the royal family
recognized that Feisal had to retake control of the government and manage the
relationship with the UAR. In Washington, Feisal gained a reputation as a
proto-Nasserist, not by making pronouncements, but by spreading rumors
about his adherence to the Nasserist line. 67 Feisal’s former alignment with the
Nejd al-Fattah and rumored support for constitutional government enhanced
his image as a progressive Arab nationalist. Feisal also possessed solid anti-

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British credentials, having refused oil supplies for Jordan at the time of the
British intervention in 1958. 68 Saudi Arabia also had no diplomatic relations
with Britain because of the Buraimi Oasis dispute. 69 Serious negotiations about
renewing British-Saudi relations only occurred after the UAR announced in
December 1959 that it would renew relations with London. 70

As the Buraimi dispute simmered on, the Saudis began to make claims vis-a-
vis Oman, which the Egyptians and even the Iraqis supported. The British
were not happy: ‘The Omani nationalist movement is a pure invention of
U.A.R./Saudi and Iraqi propaganda.’ 71 The Saudis followed Nasser’s lead on
the question of the French and Algeria. 72 In September 1959, Feisal engineered
King Saud’s attempt to arrange an anti-Communist summit in Saudi Arabia
with Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan, scoring points in both Cairo and
Washington. 73 Not all Saudi initiatives with Nasser were just to buy time for
reform. The Saudis sincerely sided with Nasser in his anti-Communist
campaigns in Egypt and Syria, and against Iraq. While obviously wary of the
ultimate intentions of Cairo, the Saudis actively opposed the Communists.
Feisal’s pro-Nasser policies, coupled with improved US relations with Cairo,
opened the way to even better relations between Riyadh and Washington. As
one observer put it: ‘With Britain and France away from the field, the USA
entrenches herself in dais country more and more.’ 74

On 19 April 1959, the United States issued an intelligence estimate for Saudi
Arabia. It seemed to confirm at least the partial success of Feisal’s policies:
‘The 1958 Iraqi revolt and its aftermath, including fears of increased
Communist influence, have diverted the interest of Arab Nationalists in
general, and of Nasser in particular, away from the traditional states. ... As a
result, Feisal has been able to devote much of his time and effort to internal
matters.’ The report went on to state that Feisal had stabilized the currency,
established the ‘first real national budget’, and managed modest improvements
in die administration. 75 For the future of the Saudi monarchy, Crown Prince
Feisal’s arrival on the scene in 1958 was an extraordinary stroke of good
fortune, but the simultaneous outbreak of the Cold War between Qasim and
Nasser was a blessing from Allah himself.

Paranoids with real enemies:

Israel and the Arab Cold War

Ironically, the other great beneficiary of the Arab Cold War was Israel. In
1956, Eisenhower’s opposition to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt
had preserved Nasser’s rule and, in 1957, the administration had demanded
and gotten Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula over the strenuous
objections of Israel’s Ben-Gurion and despite pressure from the American
Jewish community. 76 Eisenhower had demonstrated his willingness to put real
pressure on Israel. Recognizing that there would be a political price to pay
because of Zionists groups pressuring a Democratic Congress, the
administration relaxed its pressure on Israel, when it might have forced a
comprehensive peace plan for the region. In addition to domestic political

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143

considerations, the primacy of containment policy placed a premium on
Nasser’s anti-Communist activities. This essentially precluded pressuring Egypt
as well, and diverted Washington’s attention away from the issue of an Arab-
Israeli peace. The Israelis argued: ‘As long as the West cannot consent to its
[Israel’s] complete disappearance from the region, and to cede its positions to
Nasser, there is no basis at all for a common language between the West and
Nasser.’ Admitting that for the ‘time being’, Nasser had left Israel alone and
put the ‘Arab countries at the head of his list’, the Israelis warned that any
attempt to work with Nasser and ‘providing him tire benefit of a truce’ was
folly. Playing on old fears, the Israelis stated: ‘Appeasement in the long run
necessarily means undermining the whole structure of Western interests in the
region and serving [sic] Soviet efforts at penetration.’ 77

While useful at times, there was always a high price associated with relations
with Israel. During the Lebanese and Jordanian crises, overflights of Israel, by
US aircraft moving British troops and supplies to Jordan, had been critical in
maintaining the Hashemites on the throne. In return, the Israelis obtained
something approaching a security guarantee from the Eisenhower
administration. When the press picked up the story, which the Israeli
government may have planted, the Soviets felt that they had to react. 78
Moscow demanded that Israel stop the flights immediately. Ben-Gurion,
feigning fear of a Soviet attack, stopped the overflights. When Dulles charged
that Israel was caving in to Soviet blackmail, the Israelis pointed out that a long
list of countries had received US guarantees in the event of an attack by
Moscow. Abba Eban informed Dulles: ‘We are not defended by an American
guarantee and tire Soviet Union is able to wipe us out in five minutes.’ Dulles
replied that after discussions at the White House, President Eisenhower had
decided that the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East covered Israel as
well. America would come to Israel’s aid if the Soviets were to attack. 79

In early 1959, the British began one of their periodic evaluations of the pros
and cons of good relations between Jordan and Israel. The British Embassies
in Tel Aviv and Amman argued that good relations between Jordan and Israel
served to dampen down problems in the region in general and on their borders
in particular. The Foreign Office predictably concluded that influence and
good relations with Israel were useful, despite Israel being a ‘largely negative
factor’. London decided that the best course was to ‘keep carefully in step with
the Americans; avoid action which will exacerbate Arab opinion; [and] not
allow ourselves to be led by the nose by Israel importunity.’ 80 In an attached
minute, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar scribbled a warning: ‘I think the moral is
that we must go slow with the Israelis . . . with our steady improving Anglo-
Israeli relations, be careful not to give the Israeli’s too much rope.’ 81

US aid and relations with Israel

No matter what London’s position, Israel’s fortunes were tied to the United
States. Almost every Israeli policy decision included a discussion of how the
US would react. Every potential new regional development found its way into

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in die cabinet discussions and often the press. Strangely enough, in the early
months of 1959 John Foster Dulles’ illness, resignation, and death highlighted
the trepidation with which the Israeli government viewed changes in
Washington. The Israeli government and press were reassured by the
appointment of Christian Herter as Secretary of State, but it appeared that
Richard Hare, the US Ambassador in Cairo and the architect of ‘detente’ with
Nasser, would replace Rountree at NEA. This increased the Israeli ‘tendency to
see an Arab behind every desk at the State Department’, or ‘Byroadism’:
Byroade attempted to make Egypt the principal US partner in the region. As
the uproar grew, British Ambassador Francis Rundall wryly commented:

The Israeli press is showing its usual tendency to cry before it is hurt, but
it would be unwise to discount entirely the effect, which recent
developments in tire apparent attitude of the United States towards Israel
have had here. ... The United States is not always popular here, but
whatever happens it remains the rich uncle, and the imagined prospect of
Israel’s worst enemy becoming the new favourite nephew is not, from
any point of view, a welcome one.

This turmoil occurred simultaneously with negotiations to end its grant-in-aid
program for Israel. 82 Washington made it clear that any consequent loss would
be made up in some other way, but the situation had become an internal Israeli
political issue. Golda Meir stood up in the Knesset and criticized the ‘insanity’
of die State Department’s pro-Nasser policies. This speech resulted in a
routine rebuke from Washington and copious amounts of hand-wringing in
Israel. The State Department viewed the commotion as the price for doing
business with Israel. From a State Department perspective, relations with Israel
were proceeding much more smoothly than they had for some time. 83

Israel’s insurance policy: nuclear weapons

Despite the occasional heated exchange over aid or Nasser, Israel benefited
from the fact that, distracted by the Arab Cold War, the Eisenhower
administration missed early signs of Israel’s nuclear weapons program. In 1955,
David Ben-Gurion made the secret acquisition of nuclear weapons an absolute
priority. US intelligence resources focused on France and other industrialized
states, placing Israel in tire ‘Third Category Priority’ list of those countries not
considered a proliferation risk. In 1957, Israel shifted from a pool-type
research reactor to a ‘real’ production reactor. This triggered no alarms, and
Washington approved technology transfers and monetary grants for research.
Hiding behind what seemed to be a sensible move toward nuclear power, die
Israelis quietly proceeded with a baseline weapons program. Israeli shifts in
priorities appeared to reflect inexperience and budgetary concerns more than
an ulterior motive. Additionally, US approval of the construction of a 10-
megawatt reactor at Nachal Soreq by American Machines and Foundry

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Courtesy of National Archives
Eisenhower and Herter, 1959

Eisenhower with Secretary of State Christian Herter in 1959. Herter became
Secretary of State after Dulles’ death on 24 May 1959. Herter’s relationship with
Chester Bowles, both of whom were Connecticut polticians, eased the transition
from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration.

provided the Israeli government with the perfect screen for its weapons
program.

There were other indicators as well. In early 1958, at the time of the Soreq
deal, the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) discovered large-
scale construction in the Negev desert during a routine U-2 flight. The CIA
Program Director, Arthur C. Lundahl, and his deputy, Dino A. Brugioni,
briefed President Eisenhower and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman
Lewis Strauss on the facility. Both believed that it was probably a nuclear
weapons facility. The lack of questions from either Eisenhower or Strauss led
Lundahl and Brugioni to conclude that the administration wanted Israel to
acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, Eisenhower immediately sent a list of specific
questions to the Ambassador in Tel Aviv, who in turn, presented them to
Ernst David Bergmann, the head of Israel’s nuclear program. Somewhat
disconcerted, Bergmann admitted that Israel had decided to build a reactor but
no firm decision had been taken on exactly what kind it would be. Evidence of
French-Israeli cooperation in the nuclear weapons field led to the May 1959
resignation of Dan Tolkovsky as head of the Development Department in
Israeli defense. In June, there were rumored heavy- water agreements with
Norway, indicating that something beyond research and peaceful development
might be going on. 84 In addition, the Israeli embassy in Washington indicated

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that Israel wanted an exemption from the inspection regulations of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Eisenhower administration had shown a particular commitment to die
creation of an international agency dedicated to non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. The IAEA was slated to take over monitoring and safeguarding
functions. The United States wanted to change its nuclear agreements such that
non-compliance with IAEA regulations would be grounds for terminating
cooperation with that nation on nuclear energy. The administration had no
intention of undermining, through making an exception of Israel, the very
agency whose creation it had sponsored. The Israelis began to offer
justifications for the exception. They argued that if the IAEA center were in
Cairo dien the Israelis would not be allowed access. In addition, the IAEA
might give the Egyptians access to the Israeli reactors. Israel provided another
hint about their real objective, stating that they could not comply with the
IAEA strictures because they wanted 90-per-cent enriched uranium-235 as
opposed to the 20-per-cent enriched allowed under IAEA guidelines. Israel
wanted reassurances that the US would not terminate bilateral agreements
based on IAEA findings. 85

The Eisenhower administration refused, but stated that the United States
would not terminate its agreements and cooperation ‘without full prior
consultation and consideration’ with Israel. Washington also insisted that the
agreements be modified to include the termination clause, but offered to study
the matter further. 86 On 27 June 1959, Washington responded that while
Article V, the offending termination clause, would be in the agreements, ‘the
proposed amendment is not intended to mean that the Government of the
United States would feel the need to terminate the Agreement in the event the
Government of Israel is not ready to accept the administration of safeguards
and controls by the International agency at a time when there has not been a
widespread transfer to administration by the International Agency of bilateral
safeguards.’ 87 In other words, the United States for the time being would
continue to monitor Israel’s nuclear program as it had in the past. Tel Aviv had
bought some more time for its efforts. 88

With the nuclear issue buried for the time being, the Israeli government
immediately returned to the pursuit of conventional weapons. Whether
intentional or inadvertent, this resumption of business-as-usual requests for aid
and arms further screened the nuclear program. In a meeting with Secretary
Herter, Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, introduced a new request for
conventional weapons. Citing recent shipments of Soviet arms to Nasser as the
justification, the Israelis argued that they had to keep up, in ‘quality if not in
quantity’, with Cairo. In the same breath, she mentioned to Herter that Israel
was out of money. Officials at the State Department called die new weapons
requests ‘depressing to face’, since another round of Israeli security demands
had been completed only four months before. 89 In London, the Foreign Office
commented: ‘The Israelis’ arguments to us were different. . . . But it is
interesting that after a year of comparative peace (except for an occasional

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147

push for guided weapons) we too have begun to hear that old request again.’
London speculated that the ‘younger and wilder MAPAI men’ were the source
because of ‘genuine alarm caused by reports of the rate of absorption of arms
by die UAR’. 90

During the summer of 1960 another debate erupted over die Dayan Plan,
which called for removal of the Bedouin population from certain sensitive
areas in the Negev. As one journalist close to the MAPAI put it: ‘The transfer
of a certain number of Bedouin to permanent settlement in a more northerly
area will ... [make it] possible to establish on this strip [non-Arab] security
settlements, which are extremely vital for a certain area.’ 91 Why was this area
vital? In June 1960, the US Embassy in Tel Aviv reported rumors that the
French were assisting the Israelis in the construction of a major nuclear facility
near Beersheba in the Negev. In August, French participation was confirmed.
Under renewed pressure, the Israelis called it a metallurgical research facility
and offered no additional information. Then in October 1960, the British
informed Washington that the Beersheba site was indeed a nuclear installation.
Both British and American Military Attaches got pictures of it, and confirmed
that it was a nuclear reactor site. When confronted, the French denied assisting
the Israelis with the reactor or even knowing anything about it. The ultimate
confirmation came from a nuclear scientist from the University of Michigan,
Henry Gomberg, who was visiting Israel. In late November 1960, after talking
with Israeli nuclear engineers, he concluded that Israel had a dual track nuclear
program: the American reactor at Nachal Soreq for research, and the French
reactor at Beersheba for nuclear weapons production.

Two weeks after John Kennedy won the presidential election, the
Eisenhower administration concluded that Israel was building a nuclear reactor
capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Despite Ben-Gurion’s claims
to the contrary, the Atomic Energy Commission and the CIA concluded that
the ‘nuclear complex cannot be solely for peaceful purposes.’ In an effort to
save face, tire outgoing Eisenhower administration told the Congressional Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy: ‘We [the United States] have been assured
categorically at the highest level of the Israeli government that Israel has no
plans for the production of atomic weapons.’ 92 On 21 December 1960, Ben-
Gurion publicly announced that Israel was completing a large nuclear reactor
of 24-megawatts to be used ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ and called
rumors to the contrary ‘deliberate or unwitting untruth’. 93 In Washington,
Israeli Ambassador Avrahm Harman argued that the facility would take three
years to complete and that ‘this allows ample time to discuss any implications
[ot] Israel’s atomic program.’ The State Department reported that Harman
stated that he ‘personally had not understood urgency USG attached to subject
when it first brought to his attention and expressed hope that with assurances
GOI has now RPT now given there would be no QTE nagging doubt
UNQTE.’ US intelligence sources now believed that the site was definitely a
nuclear weapons facility and that it would be operational within a year. 94

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The State Department reminded Harman of the ‘sense of urgency’ that
Washington attached to proliferation issues ‘anywhere’, and particularly in a
volatile region like the Middle East. The US strongly suggested that, in addition
to Ben-Gurion’s promise not to develop nuclear weapons, Israel should open
the facility to IAEA inspection. On 29 December, Washington forwarded a list
of questions to Tel Aviv for presentation to the Israeli government, including:
‘Can Israel state categorically that it has no plans for producing nuclear
weapons?’ 95 On 6 January 1961, Washington issued public affairs guidance to
posts and military installations stating that Washington requested information
from Israel, over and above Israel’s denial that they intended to build nuclear
weapons, but received no response.’ 96

On 12 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a senior level conference to
discuss the Isreali nuclear issue. In an apparent attempt to put the best, if not
the most candid face on the situation, Secretary Herter proposed that tire State
Department issue a statement that the Israeli plutonium production plant at
Dimona was for ‘peaceful purposes’. Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr. countered:
‘Our information is that the plant is not for peaceful uses.’ John A. McCone,
the Deputy Director of the CIA, stated that his analysts believed that a
‘chemical separation plant’ existed at die site and that ‘the Israelis would not
build such a plant just to do part of the job.’ His next statement surely made
everyone in the room uncomfortable: ‘The plant had probably been financed
from U.S. support for Israel.’ The outgoing administration decided to take the
position that the US government did not know the source of the funding for
the facility and to issue a statement calling for complete IAEA inspection and
monitoring of the facility. 97 The Israelis had won the race. It would take the
new administration time to organize itself to deal with the nuclear issue, and
John Kennedy had been heavily dependent on the Jewish votes to get elected.
Israel expected some questioning, but, quite correctly, did not expect any
action from Washington on this issue.

Chapter 8: Iran and Pakistan
Cash in on Iraq

In 1959 and 1960, Iran and Pakistan adjusted to new reality in the Greater
Middle East by first recognizing and then utilizing their new-found leverage
with the United States. The collapse of the Baghdad regime had severely
shaken Washington and London and placed a premium on preventing the fall
of more allied regimes in the region. In fact, as Secretary Dulles pointed out in
the days immediately following the Baghdad coup, Iraq was not even a part of
his original concept of the ‘northern tier’, but Iran and Pakistan were keys. Be
that as it may, the collapse in Baghdad frightened the Eisnehower
administration because a repeat in either Iran or Pakistan would undo its
containment or encirclement of the Soviet Union. Only five years early, a
nationalist leader in Iran, Musaddiq, had forced the Shah to flee the country,
and the US and Britain by the narrowest of margins had overthrown Musaddiq
and placed the Shah back on the throne. In the intervening time, the Shah had
not led Iran’s government, economy, or society to anything that approached
the level of stability that Washington desired. At the beginning of 1959,
Eisenhower feared, and with justification, that the situation in Iran might bring
about a repeat of that in Iraq the year before. Unstable perhaps, but die Shah
recognized the opportunity presented by Washington’s concern, and he
pressed for aid, particularly military aid, arguing that had the US been less
niggardly prior to July 1958, die coup in Baghdad might never have happened.
With regard to Pakistan, the administration believed that instability and
possible collapse had only been averted in October 1958 by the military
takeover led by General Ayub Khan. Because of Ayub’s firm grip on power
and personal aura of no-nonsense competence, Washington was concerned
about Pakistan, but not on edge as it was about Iran.

Always a source of concern, Iran’s stability following the Baghdad coup
emerged as a major preoccupation in Washington. US-Iranian relations now
had a new problematic twist. Between 1959 and 1960, the Shah learned to use

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US concerns, and even perceptions of his own personal stability, as leverage to
demand increased economic and military support. With increasing
sophistication, the Shah employed Washington’s fears of a neutral Iran and an
accommodation with the Soviet Union to transform demands for aid into
tangible results. At the same time, the Shah blunted attempts by the
Eisenhower administration to pressure his regime toward political and
economic reform. The Eisenhower administration consistently pressed for
reform and economic development as the only sure path to Iranian stability,
but after the Baghdad coup, Washington feared that rapid reform could
destabilize the regime. Reform could not be undertaken at tire risk of a Pahlavi
collapse; therefore, it had to be controlled reform. The stability and survival of
a friendly regime in Tehran was the first priority.

Pakistan found itself in a very similar position, and undoubtedly General
Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, and the Shah of Iran frequently
compared notes on the status of aid and support coming from the United
States. The impact of developments in Iraq on Pakistan and India were as
dramatic and, in many ways, more far-reaching than in Iran. 1 Just as Nasser’s
1953 rebuff of MEDO led to US-sponsored defense alliances in the ‘northern
tier’, the Iraqi coup and the prominent Communist influence in Baghdad
brought renewed efforts to ensure the containment of tire Soviet Union. In
Pakistan, this led to US support for military rule, which in turn further strained
ties with India. By early 1959, the Eisenhower administration came to view
Pakistan’s government as the most stable since independence. General Ayub
Khan, now President, had Washington’s confidence and particularly that of
President Eisenhower. Ayub’s government had transformed a chaotic political
and economic situation into something that was reasonably stable and efficient.
Ayub also exuded confidence and a sense of purpose. By curbing corruption
and instilling order, Ayub impressed the White House. This translated into
increased military and economic aid. Pakistan was the lone bright spot in the
Western alliance system in the entire Greater Middle East.

Now, with the United States reeling from Iraq, Ayub renewed his demands
for modern weapons. He argued that they were necessary for Pakistan to fulfill
its obligations to both CENTO and SEATO. To demonstrate his options,
Ayub began to explore the possibility of better relations with Beijing. As in the
case of Iran, apprehension over events in Iraq, coupled with irreplaceable US
strategic intelligence assets in Pakistan that directly affected the continental
security of the United States, made Washington receptive to Ayub’s requests. 2
Nehru could not appear to back down in the face of Pakistani military aid from
the US. With Krishna Menon at the helm in the Ministry of Defense, the
answer was obvious - call Moscow - and so began India’s efforts to establish
an indigenous, modern, weapons program. Menon was convinced that a
military relationship with the Soviet Union was more advantageous than one
with the West in terms of ideology, costs, and creating an indigenous
manufacturing base. 3 While Washington tried to explain the benign nature of
its agreement with Karachi, Nehru pondered the potential threat posed by

Iran and Pakistan Cash in on Iraq

151

Pakistan. Ironically, neutral India pursued the focus on economic development
and reform most advocated by the Eisenhower administration, but US military
aid to Pakistan, in reaction to the Iraqi coup, forced a reappraisal. In the 1959
to 1960 timeframe, Washington viewed Iran as more unstable than Pakistan;
therefore, its role is examined first.

US aid and the Persian bazaar

Appropriately, this new period in US-Iranian relations began with Iranian
requests for more military and security aid to combat growing threats from the
Soviet Union. The annual budgetary cycle for Tehran began in March;
therefore, pleas for additional military and economic aid started appearing in
November and December. These aid requests usually touched off a series of
US national security assessments of Iran and the Shah. The 1959 budget cycle
differed only because of an increased sense of urgency generated by the Iraqi
coup. Intelligence estimates and cable traffic after July 1958 overflowed with
ominous warnings about the ‘precarious’ situation in Iran and the Shah ‘as an
individual of very uncertain quality’. In addition, Iran was the only non-
Communist country in the world which shared a long border with the Soviet
Union but with which die United States had no defensive alliance. 4 The
Eisenhower administration recognized that the problems of corruption,
incompetence, and the personal instability of the Shah contributed to the
instability in Iran, but saw no alternative to continued support for his regime.
Washington would have preferred an alternative to the Shah, but no acceptable
option existed. 5

Eisenhower and his advisors wanted fundamental reforms in Iran to
improve the Shah’s chances of survival, but the instability of the Shah’s
government and the monarch’s idiosyncrasies made the administration
cautious. Washington feared drat under pressure the Shah might lose control of
the ‘precarious’ political situation or stampede into an accommodation with the
Soviet Union. They believed that ‘meaningful political, social, and economic
reforms designed to increase popular support’ were in die best interests of the
Shah and the West, but that possibilities for reform were tied to the Shah’s
personal sense of security. Aware of ‘latent Iranian xenophobia’ toward the US,
the administration also recognized that it needed an effective ‘informational
and cultural program.’ 6 Despite misgivings, Eisenhower concluded that military
aid was required to get the Shah to reform his regime. The Shah assumed, and
probably correctly so, diat he understood Iran better than experts in
Washington. Making this assumption, the progression of events in 1959 and
1960 takes on a significandy different interpretation. From his reinstatement in
1953, the Shah had a set of reasonably clearly-defined goals. He wanted to
transform Iran into the primary strategic partner for the West in the region,
thus attaining regional political, military, and economic preeminence. Turkey
was his model. The Shah believed that with US assistance, he could emulate
Mustafa Kemal — Atatiirk — and transform Iran into a modern, secular society.
None of this seemed remotely possible prior to 1958, until the collapse of Iraq

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thrust Iran to the forefront of Western security concerns. The Shah
immediately understood and acted on his newly-acquired leverage.

On 6 December 1958, Washington got its first real taste of what the future
would hold for Iranian- American relations. Citing the threat to Iran from the
Soviet Union and Soviet-supplied Afghanistan, Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, CPO
Director, appealed for dramatically-expanded military aid. Then on 9
December, displaying amazing cheek, Ebtehaj complained that new military
requirements levied by the United States had resulted in financial difficulties
and that Iran required additional economic aid to compensate. Seeing a
looming financial pit, the administration tried to defer the Iranian requests.
Washington explained that Tehran needed better accounting practices and a
better distribution of oil revenues. The administration also shifted the issue to
the IBRD. 7 Undetered, the Shah continued to press. He had Washington over
the proverbial barrel, and he knew it.

During December 1958 and January 1959, the Shah now began to demand
enough military assistance to bring ‘existing’ military units up to ‘full strength’.
Tehran also attempted to enlist the help of General Nathan F. Twining,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who visited Tehran and then sent a letter
to the Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy on 23 December 1958, strongly
recommending that the US join the Baghdad Pact and shift aid programs to
support Pact members. 8 To emphasize his requests, die Shah, with increasing
frequency, complained that the lack of US support might well oblige him to
seek an accommodation with Moscow. The Shah wanted ‘satisfaction’ on his
budgetary requirements, support for his military-assistance goals, and a bilateral
security agreement with the United States. 9 The Shah argued that Washington
had not lived up to its Baghdad Pact commitments and had shown a decided
insensitivity to Iran’s security situation. Malcolm E. Yapp described the Iranian
alliance with Britain in the early nineteenth century as follows: ‘(L)ike many a
marriage. After a breathless courtship and whirlwind ceremony die groom had
begun to examine his situation.’ The groom ‘complained about the bride -price’
and ‘sickened of the union’, but ‘was alarmed by the appearance of a new
suitor’ and began to ‘discover attractions’ that he had ‘previously despised’. ‘It
was a question of whether die future held a second honeymoon or a divorce.’ 10
This description fit die US-Iranian relationship perfectly. Neither was
particularly happy with the situation, but neither could afford the consequences
of a messy divorce.

The Shah’s December 1958 demands roiled Washington for weeks. On 16
January, the State Department informed the Department of Defense that,
while it supported the military-assistance goals of Iran, military support for the
Baghdad Pact could not undermine aid to other critical nations in the region.
The report also singled out India, stating that die United States could not
refuse aid to ‘our other friends in die Middle East or even to certain sensitive
countries such as India, whose “neutralism” we may deplore but whose loss
through neglect would be an even greater blow to the free world cause.’ 11

Iran and Pakistan Cash in on Iraq

153

Rountree at NEA told US Ambassador Wailes to call on the Shah and remind
him of the following:

It seems evident that in his frustration as to how to strengthen his
position he has grossly underestimated US contribution to Iranian
security and indeed to stability of his own regime. While we realize that
Shah no doubt has taken this line in belief it would precipitate grater US
willingness to accede to his desires, we cannot discount possibility that in
his present apparent frame of mind he might take some action, which he
and we would later deeply regret.

Rountree described the scale of the US commitment to Iran and pointed to the
London Declaration of July 1958 and the US Congress’s Joint Resolution on
the Middle East as examples of security commitments. Playing on die Shah’s
antipathy toward the Soviet Union, Rountree told Wailes to remind the
monarch diat Soviet ‘multi-lateral guarantees’, based on the adoption of a
‘neutralist foreign policy’, had proven unreliable in the past. 12 Wailes met with
the Shah, but came away with the understanding that the Shah felt that he got
‘little out of the (Baghdad) Pact’. 13

Facing the Shah’s spiraling demands, Secretary Dulles told the NSC on 22
January that the Shah’s demand for a bilateral agreement that promised US
intervention against all enemies, including domestic ones, was simply
unacceptable to the administration and certainly to the United States Senate.
The ailing Secretary of State warned drat the Shah, in frustration, might actually
resort to a ‘flirtation’ widi the Soviet Union. George Allen, Director of USIA,
supported Dulles, stating that he was glad that ‘Dulles had decided to hold the
line’, because ‘the Shah was best blackmailer that he knew of. 14

Playing the Soviet card

Predictably, the US Embassy in Tehran reported that the British, Pakistanis,
and Turks reported that the Shah would improve relations with the Soviet
Union in retaliation for the lack of a US ‘blank check’ for joining the Baghdad
Pact. 15 Wailes suggested that a letter from the President might delay any
rapprochement. The Ambassador reiterated that the Shah’s problems were
internal, not external, and that emphasis on military aid merely exacerbated the
domestic situation. In an attempt to further mollify the Shah, President
Eisenhower wrote him on 30 January 1959, reciting the instances of Soviet
perfidy and pointing out that ‘regardless of the actual terms of any new treaty
with the Soviet Union, the impact on your friends would be unhappy.’ The
President then addressed die issue of the bilateral agreement with the US,
pointing out that the United States’ ‘strong determination to support Iran’s
independence and integrity has not in the past depended upon, and need not in
the future depend upon, any particular provision of formal agreements
between us.’ 16

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Despite reassurances, Iranian negotiations with die Soviets in January and
February 1959 left the Western allies holding their collective breaths. The
situation in Iran had begun to affect other sensitive relationships as well. The
British wanted to complete the sale of arms to Qasim’s Iraqi regime in an
effort to strengthen the hand of the Iraqi army against the rising influence of
the Communists. 17 For Iraq, the move made sense. In Iran, the US Embassy
believed that it might push the Shah over die brink in his negotiations widi the
Soviets. Wailes ‘most strongly’ urged that ‘no indication’ of a possible arms sale
to Iraq be given: ‘Even a hint in that direction right now might prove
catastrophic at present, driving die Shah into the arms of the Soviets out of
resentment and exasperation.’ 18 In Tehran for a visit, the British Minister of
Defense, Duncan Sandys, effectively pressured the Shah and his advisors to
wait.

In less than a week, the Soviet negotiations ceased to be an issue. Talks on
the non-aggression pact failed. Despite the failure, the fact that the Shah would
have signed the agreements had the Soviets immediately agreed to his terms
before Western pressure could be brought to bear was of serious concern in
Washington. 19 The collapse of the negotiations was so acrimonious that
warning flags once again surfaced vis-a-vis the possibility of Soviet retaliation
against Iran. Foy D. Kohler, in the European Bureau at State, warned Rountree
in NEA that the Soviets were doubly chagrined because not only did the talks
go badly, but also the Shah almost immediately announced his intention to sign
a bilateral security agreement with the United States. The London Embassy
reported that Moscow’s reaction would be ‘surcharged by their indignation and
resentment of the Iranian conduct of the talks with them. They will consider
that they have been deliberately gulled by the Shah and can be expected to
concentrate their attack on him personally.’ The Soviet experts at the State
Department believed that the Soviets saw the potential for a repeat of the Iraqi
coup, only this time in Iran, as the natural progression following a Communist
consolidation of power in Iraq. They also predicted new personal attacks on
the Shah and trouble in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. 20 In addition, the Soviets
initiated over-flights of the Iranian border areas. 21

Over the next week, concern mounted. A special memorandum for
President Eisenhower apprised him of the situation, and briefly recapitulated
the events surrounding the failure of the Soviet-Iranian negotiations, adding
that it had been a ‘personal affront to Khrushchev’. Because the Soviet Premier
had authorized the negotiations at the personal instigation of the Shah, the
report expressed concern that the Soviet reaction might include a Soviet
occupation of Azerbaijan. It ended by stating that Iran, despite the pressure,
intended to go ahead with the agreement, but that the United States:

must recognize that there are dangerous potentialities in the present
situation. We cannot know the extent to which the Soviet statements are
bluff, and thus cannot be certain that they will not take action vis-a-vis
Iran which would pose a serious dilemma for us. We do know that the

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Soviets are endeavoring by all means at their disposal to prevent the
signature of the bilateral agreements and that their signing, in the light of
the history of the recent Soviet-Iranian negotiations, would be viewed
with great seriousness by the Soviet Union, even though the agreements
in fact do not contain any new commitments on our part.

Herter went to state that despite die dangers, the failure to consummate the
bilateral agreements would constitute a major setback for the United States. He
stated the signing had to proceed but that Washington should be prepared for
any contingency. 22 Fears of the worst proved unfounded, but the incessant
attacks of the Soviet propaganda machine on the Shah had their effect. The
Shah could now point to his sacrifice for the Western alliance and complain
that he had not been properly rewarded.

The Shah had made progress. He now had a bilateral security agreement,
albeit one not totally to his satisfaction. Iranian military and economic aid had
increased, although not to die levels that the Shah desired. Perhaps more
important, the United States continued to be seriously concerned about the
stability of his regime: ‘We remain pessimistic as to the longer term outlook for
the Shah’s regime.’ 23 Reflecting an uneasy intelligence community, Allen Dulles
summed it up: ‘The Shah ... as of now does not seem sure where he is
going.’ 24 In reality, the Shah may not have known exactly how to get where he
was going, but he knew exactly where he wanted to go. Widiin a matter of
months, he would renew, more forcefully dian ever, the battle for dramatically-
increased military and economic aid.

US aid and complications

Despite increases, the Shah’s dissatisfaction with die amount of US aid
mounted over the summer and fall of 1959. Since the collapse of the talks with
the Soviet Union early in the year, the Soviets had brought considerable
propaganda and economic pressure to bear on die regime. By clamping down
on cross-border transit and stopping trade in foodstuffs to border regions in
Iran, the Soviets forced Tehran to make up the difference. 25 The propaganda
campaign was aggressive, and pointedly directed at Pahlavi rule. Soviet radio
stations beamed into Iran more than 70 hours per week of Persian-language
broadcasts. These broadcasts called for the overdirow of the Shah’s rule and an
end to American influence. 26 For example, on 12 April the Shah and his regime
were labeled ‘die betrayers of die Iranian people’. On 5 June, die broadcasts
labeled the Shah’s policies ‘anti-nationalist and treacherous’. On 8 July,
Moscow radio called for ‘power in the hands of a real national government’.
Additional broadcasts alluded to the fate of the ‘tyrant’ and ‘traitor’. 27 From the
Shah’s point of view, he had maintained his relationship with the West despite
the considerable risk that it entailed. He had rejected an opportunity to come
to terms with die Soviets and, in return for his loyalty, the Eisenhower
administration refused to meet Iran’s minimum requirements for military and

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economic aid, while leaving him to face the brnnt of Soviet propaganda and
economic pressure. The Shah believed that Washington was simply ungrateful.

As tire Shah exerted more pressure, Washington received all manner of
advice. Pakistani President Ayub told American Ambassador Langley that the
Shah was ‘a good chap’ but lacked the ability to delegate authority: “Why don’t
you fellows get him to adopt the president set-up so that he will be an
executive with good men about him, and get brings done?’ 28 On the issue of
the Baghdad Pact, Ayub agreed with the Shah. He stated that without a
command structure and more economic aid the Pact would wither on the vine.
In the past Ayub had ridiculed the Shah, but now the collapse of Iraq and the
instability in Iran bolstered Pakistan’s importance to US containment policy,
and he wanted to take full advantage. In reporting the meeting, Ambassador
Langley commented: ‘Ayub obviously thinks he is sitting on top of heap, that
US is in position from which it can not extricate itself and he doesn’t propose
to help it do so.’ In the near term, Ayub was absolutely correct. 29

Always ready with an opinion, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion argued
that the US had let the Shah down following the bilateral accords: ‘[The] US
“appeared” to be doing more for Nasser than for Iran which [was a] clear
friend.’ Ben-Gurion suggested that more military assistance and ‘psychological’
support to Iran might also influence die government of Afghanistan to ‘turn
away more from Russia, more toward the West’. 30 Even Dag Hammerskjold,
UN Secretary General, expressed concern about the situation in Iran. He
informed Washington that Khrushchev and Andrei Gromyko had both made it
clear that propaganda attacks on Iran would not cease unless the Shah
concluded a non-aggression treaty with the Soviets and renounced its bilateral
defense agreement with the United States. Hammserskjold added that the Shah
really felt that both the United States and Britain had let Iran down in the
propaganda war. These gloomy predictions had an effect in Washington. The
State Department concluded: ‘There is the clear danger that the Shah might be
persuaded by the faint-hearted and the neutralists around him that he should
take one of these steps to relieve the immediate pressure.’ 31

To make certain that the Eisenhower administration got the message, the
Shah sent Minister at Court Alaa to meet with the British Charge J.W. Russell
on 23 July. Alaa bombarded Russell with a long list of complaints about
everything from Britain’s ‘pro-Iraqi policies’ to the lack of substantive support
for the Tehran regime. 32 Two days later the Shah summoned Russell to the
palace for a discussion. The Shah exuded confidence and requested that the
British and Americans provide more open-handed support to his regime. 33
With regard to London, the Shah stated that he believed that they ‘not only
were not supporting Iran over the Shatt [al-Arab] dispute, but actively
encouraging the Iraqi in their encroachment on Iranian rights.’ The Shah
pointedly asked: Why are you British always so keen on helping your enemies
at the expense of your friends?’ 34

When British Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Harrison returned to Tehran, he
requested an audience with the Shah. His purpose was to brief him on the

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recent talks with the Soviets in Geneva and to allay what he described as ‘the
pathological fear common to all Iranians’ that in the spirit of compromise the
Great Powers ‘sacrifice the interests of smaller nations’. The Shah thanked the
British Ambassador for the ‘moral and diplomatic support’, but then inquired
direcdy about ‘what practical support’ would be forthcoming. The Shah raised
his concerns about tire lack of a clear statement on the defense of Iran in the
event of a Soviet attack, the lack of a real command structure within the
Baghdad Pact, and the paucity of military assistance to Iran. The Shah
confidently added that he ‘attached not the slightest importance to die Soviet
propaganda campaign’ against him. In die area of reform, he stated that he was
carefully studying the issue of land reform and, despite its unpopularity with
many of his ‘friends’, he intended to pursue it. 35 The Shah obviously intended
land reform as an example of good-faith efforts to modernize Iran, but his
primary concern was military and security assistance.

Political instability and increased Soviet pressure

Facing upcoming Majlis (parliamentary) elections, Iranian politicians
repeated their gloomy views on the political situation. Sardar Fakher Hekmat,
the Speaker of the Majlis, complained about rampant corruption in the
government and army and noted rising dissatisfaction among the population.
Inflation put enormous pressure on the working classes, and the government
had refused to invoke price controls. Inflation also drove corruption, as
government officials, the police, and the military turned to graft to maintain
their standard of living. Hekmat argued that the Shah hesitated to deal with the
problem because of die fear induced by the current Soviet propaganda
campaign. With regard to the army, the speaker stated: ‘The Shah has lost his
nerve. . . . The SHAH ONLY THINKS HE HAS THE CONTROL OF THE
ARMY.’ 36 With Iraq fresh on their minds, Washington feared that the Shah
might lose control of die armed forces. Although not very comforting, the
increased military funding provided new weapons and created an additional
source of graft that tied the key army officers more closely to the regime.

To get some relief, on 2 September 1959 the Iranian Ambassador in
Moscow, Masud Ansari, met with Chairman Khrushchev to discuss the
propaganda campaign. Not in a charitable mood, Khrushchev bluntly stated
that propaganda attacks on the Shah would cease only when Iran embarked on
a neutralist foreign policy and sharply reduced its cooperation with the United
States. The Soviet leader went on to say that, given his personal involvement,
the Shah should not anticipate any changes until these conditions were met.
Khrushchev then pointed out the benefits of neutralism, citing die UAR,
Afghanistan, and India as examples. Khrushchev argued that ‘a weak nation
like Iran cannot rebuff the powerful Soviet Union with impunity’, and he
reminded the Shah that Iran had received little substantive reward from the
West for its loyalty, a point on which both the Shah and Khrushchev could
agree. 37

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Given the aggressive Soviet position, the Shah wanted the Soviet campaign
against his government to be a priority item on President Eisenhower’s agenda
in his talks with Khrushchev, scheduled for Camp David from 25 to 27
September. Although on the agenda, the two leaders never got around to
Iran. 38 Not wanting to insult the Shah, the administration informed him that
several important issues, including Laos and bilateral US-Soviet relations, were
displaced by the Russian preoccupation with Berlin, but that US officials had
made US support of Iran clear to Gromyko. 39 To further assuage the Iranians,
on 9 October President Eisenhower met with Iranian Prime Minister
Manuchehr Eqbal, congratulating him on Iranian courage in withstanding tire
Soviet propaganda campaign. 40 In an interesting twist, Soviet Ambassador
Pegov, with ‘all sweetness and light’, met with the Shah prior to tire Camp
David meeting and expressed his hope that Iran would see that the advantages
of ‘neutralism’, convincing the Shah that the worst had passed. 41 As a result,
the Shah took the lack of a discussion at Camp David with surprising
equanimity.

To further mollify the Shah, President Eisenhower scheduled a December
1959 visit to Tehran on his world peace tour. The visit boosted the Shah’s
morale, but it had a downside. On 14 December, in a meeting with President
Eisenhower, the Shah launched into his plans for a major military buildup. This
included five new air bases, one a medium-bomber base, and a Nike missile
system to defend Iran against a Soviet-inspired invasion from Afghanistan and
Iraq. The President told the Iranian ruler that he would have his people look at
the issue. Eisenhower focused on economic concerns, and suggested that a
better relationship with Afghanistan might be in the offing if a solution to the
Helman River issue could be found. The Shah agreed, and promised to have
the Iranian Foreign Minister look into it. 42 After Eisenhower’s departure, the
Shah tasked the American military assistance group to begin formalizing the
planning for the bases. To head off a real problem, Secretary of State Herter
requested that the President write a letter to the Shah to ‘make clear’ that local
wars, i.e. with Afghanistan and Iraq, were not included under the mutual
defense agreement. Herter also suggested that the letter point out that Iran’s
real problems lay in economic development, not the military field. 43
Eisenhower’s letter emphasized the US commitment in tire event of a Soviet
attack and stressed the need for reform in the finances and the administration.
It pointed out that while the goal of modernizing Iran’s forces was laudable,
excessive spending on the military could be catastrophic for the country’s
economy. 44

The situation improves?

Early 1960 brought some encouraging signs. The Iranian government had
more revenues than expected to meet its budgetary requirements. The US
administration hoped that this would reduce demands from Tehran for
assistance. 45 Despite this bright spot, the overall stability of the regime had not
appreciably improved; and the improved revenue picture was a temporary

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respite, with the long-term trend being downward. 46 In June, the Shah
announced that Iran would hold elections under a two-party, majority-rule
system. If either the government or the parliament failed to carry out its duties,
it would be dismissed and the Shah would resume direct rule. 47 On the surface,
the formation of political parties and elections looked like political reform. The
reality was another matter. The approved parties, Mardom and Melliyun, had
little popular support. While the Mardom party made real attempts to attract
dissatisfied elements in society, neither party really reflected the ‘actual
spectrum of political opinion in Iran’. The parties were designed to function as
safety valves, not political institutions. The actual possibility that the parties
might survive as popular, independent political entities was remote; however,
the Shah now pointed to them as examples of political liberalization and
representative government. 48

Many experienced, reform-oriented politicians argued that no real political
liberalization would occur since all of the candidates were personally approved
by the Shah and vetted by the security apparatus. Dr. Amini, the former
Ambassador to Washington, stated that until the parties, the Majlis, and the
Shah dealt with inflation and corruption, all would lack credibility. He argued
that the population required immediate relief from ‘economic pressure’. 49 In
addition, the Shah’s land reform, in its final form, was meaningless, due to
concessions to the large landowners; its only value was as propaganda. 50
Intelligence reports became increasingly alarmist, expressing fear that any
major disturbances could bring the overthrow of the Shah. The CIA believed
that army and security forces might join an uprising if there were election
irregularities. The agency warned that the security forces might take advantage
of disturbances to depose the Shah and stated: ‘Our purpose ... is to reiterate
our judgment that . . . there is a chance that the present regime may not be able
to survive [the elections] and their repercussions.’ 51

The ‘fiasco’ of the 1960 Majlis elections dealt political liberalization a critical
blow. Corruption and vote-rigging were endemic. The entire exercise
resembled a bad comedy. The situation was so severe that the Shah intervened
and voided the election; this action bought some time to reassess the situation
and come up with an alternate plan, but there was little hope that a real
solution to the situation could be found. 52 In addition, both of the approved
political parties, the Mardom and the Melliyn, had participated in the political
shenanigans and were discredited. 53 The Shah publicly blamed Prime Minister
Manuchehr Eqbal for die election mess, and Eqbal resigned with his cabinet
on 29 August 1960. Jafar Sharif Emami replaced Eqbal and formed a new
cabinet on 31 August. The Shah instructed the new cabinet to conduct new
‘free’ Majlis elections, improve relations with the Soviet Union, and implement
an economic stabilization program. Despite the removal of all of the
recognized pro-American ministers, the Emami government looked much like
that of Eqbal. A weak Foreign Minister, Yadollah Azodi, ensured that the Shah
would maintain personal control of foreign affairs, while Medi Qoli

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Courtesy of National Archives
Eisenhower and Shah of Iran, 1959

Eisenhower with the Shah of Iran in December 1959. Despite increased military
and security aid, Eisenhower continued to press the Shah on the issuse of political,
economic, and social reform. The President was firmly convinced that only real
reform could bring stability to Iran.

Alavi-Moghadam, the new Interior Minister and member of the Shah’s inner
circle, maintained palace control of the police. Timur Bakhtiar stayed as

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Undersecretary for Security and Information, or SAVAK. The Shah made
certain that the security apparatus reported directly to him. 54

In Washington, the chaos associated with the election of the 20th Majlis
accelerated concerns about the stability of the Shah’s regime. On 6 July 1960,
the NSC issued an official statement of policy toward Iran: ‘Since 1953, Iran
has been regarded in the area as a symbol of U.S. influence, and its reversion to
neutralism or its subjection to Soviet control would represent major
psychological setbacks, with repercussions for U.S. prestige throughout the
Middle East and Asia.’ The report cited the vulnerabilities of the Shah’s regime,
and stated that Washington needed to foster an environment in which tire Shah
would eliminate corruption, enact social and economic reforms, and allow
political liberalization. Washington recognized that social and economic reform
attacked the privileges of the principal supporters of the Shah’s regime: ‘Thus
the problem confronting the United States is how best to influence the Shah to
move constructively. A problem confronting the Shah, however, is the extent
to which his regime can move in the direction of satisfying popular demands
without alienating conservative elements on which traditional support of the
regime rests.’ In addition, the NSC report pointed out that the Shah tended to
react badly to criticism. If pressured too strongly, he might seek an
accommodation with the Soviet Union. Washington concluded that if the
regime appeared to face problems of serious instability, the United States
would have to ‘dissociate itself to the extent feasible’. 55

The Shah may have lacked Reza Shah’s forcefulness and perhaps
intelligence, but he certainly understood his situation and Iran better than
Washington. Any precipitous move toward reform would alienate his
supporters and place his rule in jeopardy. In a policy assessment, the US
concluded that most Iranians probably did not aspire to a truly democratic
political system based on a Western model. Instead, they wanted their
economic and social grievances addressed by tire government. Once in power,
the ‘reformers’ themselves would not permit political freedom because in the
fractured cultural and ethnic environment of Iran, true political freedom
constituted a recipe for chaos. The question was ‘if not the Shah, then who?’
No clear alternatives existed, and the Shah’s departure would create a huge
unknown. Political discontent was rising. In addition, the second Seven-Year
Plan (now in its fifth year) projected a deficit of over $130 million by 1962. The
dual problem of an increased deficit, coupled with the balance of payments
problems, raised tire possibility of economic collapse. In Washington, analysts
determined that by delaying IMF loan repayments and providing a $70 million
US loan, both the economic and potential political crisis could ‘probably’ be
averted. 56 The Shah argued that without US support he would have to turn to
the Soviets for aid.

On 19 July, Chairman Khrushchev sent a letter to the Shah, outlining Soviet
attempts to improve relations with Iran and listing examples of US penetration
of the Iranian military and security services. 57 The Soviet move offered the
Shah another opportunity to use Soviet leverage. During the course of the

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summer and early fall 1960, the Shah had annulled the Majlis election, and
Washington had turned down die military build-up that the Shah had discussed
with Eisenhower the year before. In September, the Iranian monarch let it be
known that he was once again reexamining his relations with the Soviet Union,
due to the lack of material support from his allies. 58 To make certain that both
Washington and London were acutely aware of his ‘growing insecurity’, the
Iranian Foreign Ministry requested assistance from both the American and
British Embassies in Tehran in ‘drafting terms’ for an agreement with the
Soviets that would be acceptable to the Western allies. 59

In responding to the Iranian request, the US and British argued: ‘Any
agreement of the kind proposed by Mr. Gromyko would be open to Soviet
exploitation for propaganda purposes in the outside world. It seems
particularly important to avoid giving the Russians an opening of this kind at
this time when they seem bent during the next six months on exploiting of
opportunity of mischief-making and wedge-driving in the free world.’ 60 The
Western allies were so concerned about the Shah’s reaction that they chose not
to present him with assessments of Iran’s military needs that ran counter to his
views. As John W. Bowling on the Iran Desk put it: ‘What president would be
willing to send the Shah into a seething rage by being brutally frank with him re
our military program. . . . He only has to beckon and Pegov will be there. Who
wants to risk being remembered as “die man who lost Iran”?’ 61 No doubt
someone in Washington noticed the correlation between the Shah’s bouts of
insecurity and his pique at not getting what he wanted, but no-one wanted to
challenge him either. Washington restated its support for the regime, and
amended the military arms package with regard to specific requests from
Tehran. 62 To what degree the Shah’s perceived insecurity and instability were
real is impossible to tell, but clearly the perception alone paid off.

By November and December 1960, the situation had changed little. The
Soviets continued to pressure the Shah, and he complained that the United
States had not lived up to its side of the bargain that brought Iran into
CENTO. In fact, the Eisenhower administration had allowed the Shah to
believe that he would receive massive amounts of military aid. A key factor in
his decision to join the Baghdad Pact had been Turkish persuasion that
membership would mean military parity between Turkey and Iran. Washington
knew about the ‘misunderstanding’ and had not bothered to correct it.
Following the Iraqi coup, President Eisenhower himself had offered to bring
95 per cent of the units in the Iranian Army up to full strength, to consider the
activation of additional units, and to compensate for the strain on the economy
with more financial aid. 63 The Shah’s complaints about the gap between
expectations and reality were understandable. This resulted in continued
commitments to the military and security services totaling 55 per cent of
Iranian oil revenues. As a result, the rising educated middle class felt woefully
short-changed. In addition, discontent had spread through the landowning
classes as the Shah toyed with land reform in an effort to placate the US’s calls
for reform; there appeared to be no solution in sight. 64

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The future of Iranian-U S relations

By die end of the Eisenhower administration, the US was moving toward
the view that it needed a new approach to Iran. Several memoranda from the
Iran Desk circulated on the eve of the Kennedy administration taking power.
These revisionist views stated that US policy to date had made it possible for
the Shah to ‘resist Soviet pressures’, but that any relief was temporary. The
United States now faced the challenges of Soviet influence, the Shah’s
resentment over his alleged lack of Western support, and Washington’s
growing identification with the increasingly unpopular Pahlavi regime. 65 There
was also the conflict between the kind of military that the Shah wanted, a large
army like that of Turkey, and the Pentagon’s view of what Iran really needed,
namely mobile light forces, stronger police, and security units. 66 Before
Eisenhower left office, these issues resulted in the bureaucracy preparing to
recommend to the new administration that it invite the Shah to Washington on
a state visit and ‘re-argue the whole tiling’, meaning military assistance. The
proposal stated that if the new administration did not give into to the
‘importuning’ by the Iranians, they could probably get the ‘Shah’s grumbling’
agreement on the fundamental points. These points included a commitment to
the ‘trip line’ defensive approach, increased internal security assistance, and
‘improved morale and reliability’ in the military. The theory was that the
Kennedy administration could then obtain an agreement on the strategies to
improve the political and economic situations. Iran Desk Officer Bowling
articulated one drawback: ‘One would have to take a sizable but still acceptable
risk that the Shah would either turn to the Russians or abdicate.’ 67 Apparently,
Bowling mistakenly believed that Kennedy would be less concerned than
Eisenhower about being remembered as ‘the man who lost Iran’.

Pakistan’s ‘controlled democracy’

In contrast to the continued instability in Tehran, Ayub Khan appeared to
have found an approach that worked so efficiently that the system imposed in
Karachi emerged as Washington’s preferred model for the region. Although
the Eisenhower administration supported democracy in theory, the practical
exigencies of the security situation in Pakistan made strong pro-Western
military rule a very attractive ‘temporary’ option. The White House came to
view a period of authoritarian rule as the only realistic path to stable,
responsible, pro-Western democracy. From independence, Pakistan survived as
a result of economic aid and its important strategic position within the US
concept of containment. Washington believed that Pakistan had become die
‘cornerstone of US policy in [that] part of the world, ... [an] anchor of the
Baghdad Pact and of SEATO’. American Ambassador Langley’s contradictory
description illustrated Washington’s conflicted attitude. He stated that Pakistan
was a ‘bulwark of strength’ which was ‘in real danger of being wiped out if
something is not done to arrest the deterioration in many aspects of Pakistani
life.’ By 1957, chronic political instability and corruption had undermined
confidence in civilian democratic rule. The latest in a long line of failed

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politicians, Prime Minister Noon proved to be a ‘weakling’. Despite significant
economic and military support, political and economic paralysis threatened
total collapse. While Communism was not a real threat (Pakistan was 98 per
cent Muslim), Washington feared non-alignment and an accommodation with
the Soviet Union or China.

US officials characterized the political climate as ‘increasingly Byzantine and
sterile’. Military spending approached 65 per cent of die budget. Key US
officials privately recognized that requests for arms were in fact a ‘hoax’ to
acquire arms to control the Pashtun tribes and to confront India, but the need
for a continued pro-Western political stance in Karachi forced them to look
the other way. To provide additional justification for its ‘wink and nod’ toward
Ayub’s coup, Washington employed some creative logic. 68 The administration
reasoned that because economic improvement and stability required reduced
defense spending, only a military leader could affect the changes necessary to
free up funding for economic development. Through the ascendancy of Ayub,
the military would feel politically secure enough to reduce its budgetary share. 69
Military rule also offered protection against the wrong kind of military coup, as
in Iraq. Ayub was acceptable to Washington - a progressive, pro-Western
leader, committed to paying lip service to ‘controlled democracy’. 70 One
fundamental problem remained, namely squaring a military coup and thinly
veiled dictatorship, albeit benevolent, with traditional US principles of support
for democracy and economic development.

Blending various elements of containment theory, the Eisenhower
administration constructed a model in which stability, rather than a chaotic
democracy, created the conditions for economic development, social progress,
and finally stable democratic political reform. It became a choice between evils.
It was a question of whether Washington wanted to deal with hostile or
friendly authoritarian governments. Stable democratic governments aligned
with the West did not appear to be viable; therefore, if there was a choice
between authoritarian regimes, Washington naturally preferred pro-Western
ones. In the Middle East, the military appeared to have on average less political
and ideological baggage and be a more stable and progressive vehicle for
change. 71 Ayub effectively argued that economic development required
political stability and an end to corruption: ‘History would never have forgiven
us if the . . . chaotic condition were allowed to go on.’ He had supporters: many
in Pakistan agreed. As one Karachi businessman put it: “Now we know where
we stand and can plan ahead.’ Many began to view die Ayub experiment as the
preferred model for economic development. 72 Ayub’s ‘temporary bridge’ on
Pakistan’s road to democracy provided a realistic way to avoid chaos. 73 In
effect, die Eisenhower administration adopted just that posture, and proceeded
to transform Ayub into a champion of stable ‘controlled democracy’ - the key
words being ‘stable’ and ‘controlled’.

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Paying the Pakistani bill

In the 1959-1960 timeframe, the Eisenhower administration hoped,
illogically, to reduce military aid and increase economic development in
Pakistan through military rule. In February 1959 Muhammad Khurshid chaired
a meeting of the Pakistani general staff and senior US military and State
Department officials. Economic assistance, military aid, and budgetary
expenditures were at issue. First, tire Pakistanis wanted new weapons to replace
the ‘old junk’ from World War II, some of which was still in the US inventory.
For example, the Pakistanis wanted ‘395 jet airplanes’, but mentioned that they
would settle for ‘35 high performance fighters’ armed with advanced missiles.
When Ridgeway B. Knight, the US Charge d'Affaires, emphasized the need for
economic aid, Khurshid stated: ‘Pakistan wishes it could devote more of its
resources to economic development and less to defense; however, Pakistan’s
defense requirements must take into account the security and geography of the
nation and its obligations to its allies.’ 74 This was almost die same argument
used by the Iranians. Containment and US intelligence installations provided
Pakistan with a trump card. The balance between civilian economic
development and military spending notwithstanding, the military were in
charge, and they wanted new weapons. 75

The Pakistanis developed a transparent but effective approach. First, they
hit US officials over Kashmir, knowing that Washington wanted to stay out of
the Pakistani-Indian dispute. Eisenhower had hoped that Ayub would be
inclined to let the Kashmir issue with India go ‘dormant’, but Karachi
continued to press at every opportunity. 76 Knowing US officials’ hands were
tied on that issue, the Pakistanis argued that the alliance with the US netted
nothing on the critical issue of Kashmir; therefore, at least, Washington could
provide more aid. The rough symmetry between this approach and that of the
Iranians was no accident: ‘If you cannot help us with India, you have to assist
us in confronting the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.’

Charmed by General Ayub’s personality, Sandhurst education, and manners,
the Eisenhower administration campaigned to make the Pakistani dictator
democratically presentable. The astute Ayub billed the coup as a ‘revolution
away from Communism’ and stated that he would ‘restore workable
constitutional government in Pakistan’ at the earliest possible date. 77
Washington parlayed these statements into a rehabilitation program for Ayub,
which included press and academic coverage of the new regime in Karachi.
Leading experts on South Asia viewed Ayub’s ‘martial law’ as ‘harsh only to
those who have been destroying Pakistan’s moral fiber’. 78 The first intelligence
estimate published after the coup stated that the political and economic
situation in Pakistan had improved and, for the next year or two, no threat to
military rule appeared likely. In addition, it commented that Pakistan would
remain staunchly pro-Western and, other than ‘modest’ trade, there would be
no expansion of ties with either the Soviets or the Chinese. 79 Given this
positive assessment, the administration argued that since military expenditures
resulted largely from ‘our encouraging that country [Pakistan] to join the

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Baghdad Pact’, military aid should be maintained and economic aid increased.
The Embassy cited ‘promising steps in the fields of fiscal, administrative and
agrarian reform, which merit our support and encouragement’. 80

One year after die takeover, the Embassy assessment credited Pakistan with
a ‘strong stable government’ in Karachi, and Ayub with a ‘benevolent
dictatorship’ that professed its intention to ‘return to a more democratic form
as soon as conditions permit’. This assessment bluntly stated that a ‘too-early
and ill-planned return to democracy might not be in Pakistan’s best interest, or
our own.’ 81 Washington continued to push for more economic development
and reduced tensions with India. Ayub could hardly minimize calls for military
hardware since this would undermine the support of die military who put him
in power. 82 To preserve an air of reasonableness, Ayub stated that he only
wanted to modernize the forces currently under arms; he was well aware that
this clever position echoed the very advice being giving to Iran. He also offered
to make these troops available for joint duty with the US in the region.
Knowing what Washington wanted, Ayub accompanied every request for
weapons with an emphasis on the need for Pakistan’s economic
development. 83

Ayub: faithful ally and voice of moderation

Pakistan’s newfound stability and Ayub’s ‘reasonableness’ appeared to offer
an opportunity for improved Indo-Pakistani relations as well. In May 1959,
Ayub proposed that India and Pakistan create a common defensive policy.
Nehru flatly rejected the proposal, calling the Pakistani government a ‘naked
military dictatorship’. 84 In September 1959, Ayub and Nehru met briefly at the
airport in New Delhi, giving the impression that the potential for improved
relations was in the offing. Ayub in particular seemed to believe that some
common ground might be found with Nehru. The Pakistani leader attempted
to enlist the Australians to broach the topic of bilateral talks. Declining the
honor, the Australians felt that: ‘At the present time, Mr. Nehru is extremely
‘touchy’ as to outside suggestions regarding his policies with other countries,
... With respect, ... the relations between India and Pakistan touch upon
interests and emotions altogether too sensitive for there to be room for any
useful Australian intervention, however benign our intentions.’ In part,
Nehru’s sensitivity stemmed from an ‘extraordinarily stupid and apparently
quite incorrect’ article written by Ayub’s personal secretary, Qudratullah
Shahab, concerning the Ayub-Nehru meeting in New Delhi. The article
indicated that Nehru wanted to compromise on Kashmir, and it drew harsh
criticism in Nehru’s speech on 12 September in the Indian Parliament. This
article, coupled with the ‘considerable strain’ resulting from the failure of
Nehru’s goodwill policy toward China, left the Indian Prime Minister in no
mood for compromise with anyone, much less Ayub. 85

Betting that Nehru’s ‘touchy’ state might be used to advantage, Ayub told
Washington that Pakistan was open to any reasonable settlement and actually
wanted an ‘outside party’ to ‘adjudicate’ the Kashmir problem. The Pakistanis

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informed the State Department that Ayub had initiated the meeting with
Nehru in September and was willing to enter comprehensive discussions on
Indus waters, border alignments, and Kashmir. In response, Nehru only
indicated an interest in tire Indus waters issue. 86 By appearing proactive on the
peace front, Ayub hoped to garner US sympathy, additional aid, and even
support on the Kashmir issue. Ayub knew that if he played his cards correctly
military aid, perhaps including advanced fighters, would be forthcoming.

In a sweeping effort at personal diplomacy focused on developing countries,
President Eisenhower embarked on a world ‘peace mission’ in December 1 959.
The trip included a four-day visit to India, the ‘leading non-committed country
of tire world’, and 36 hours in Pakistan, ‘a stalwart ally’ of the US. 87 The trip
also provided an opportunity to stress to both nations the importance of
economic development and the need for a Kashmir settlement. In the face of
aggressive Chinese moves on India’s northern border, the president pledged
his support for Indian democracy and, in Pakistan, he encouraged the building
of ‘representative institutions’ that would not ‘succumb to either external
aggression or internal subversion’. Eisenhower wanted both Pakistan and India
to turn away from their confrontation over Kashmir and focus on economic
development, social reform, and the Communist direat. 88

In meetings widr Eisenhower, Ayub underscored Soviet inroads into
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role as a ‘strong bulwark against Communism’. He
also reiterated that until the Kashmir issue was resolved, relations with India
would continue to fester. Ayub complained about US Congressional support
for India and opposition to military aid to Pakistan, pointedly naming Senator
Kennedy, Senator J. William Fulbright, and Congressman Chester Bowles as
culprits. When Eisenhower pressed Ayub over Indo-Pakistani relations, Ayub
repeatedly redirected the conversation to new military hardware for Pakistan -
F-104 Starfighters, Sidewinder missiles, and Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft
missiles. Eisenhower promised to review the military aid. Ayub relegated
discussions of economic development to Minister of Finance Muhammad
Shoaib in another meeting. Ayub’s anti-Communist stance impressed the
President, and he accepted Ayub’s view that ‘in some decades’ the
improvement in education would allow the Pakistani people to vote for their
leaders. 89 Ayub had made an important friend in Washington.

Upon returning to Washington, Eisenhower summoned Walt Rostow to the
White House to discuss the need for greater US efforts in the developing
world. 90 The trip solidified a policy direction that emphasized the Communist
Chinese threat against India and the need for both India and Pakistan to focus
on economic development, as opposed to their long- simmering territorial
disputes. Ayub obtained much of what he wanted, including an extension of
military aid beyond the levels of the 1954 agreement. The package included
Sidewinder missiles, B-57 aircraft, and an evaluation of an F-104 purchase. 91
On 3 March 1960, Eisenhower’s personal intervention gained approval for the
Starfighter sale. Washington asked the Pakistanis to hold die details ‘tightly’ for
the ‘time being’. 92 The Pakistanis responded by asking Washington not to

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inform the Indians of the fighter-aircraft shipment at all. Washington agreed to
consult with Karachi should it decide to notify New Delhi. 93 Eisenhower had
concluded that no real alternative existed but to provide Ayub with the
weapons he had requested. Pakistan was a key member of CENTO and
SEATO, and hosted critical US intelligence sites. At the Badaber site, Pakistan
monitored Soviet missile tests in Central Asia, while Peshawar supported U-2
operations. 94 Both were considered critical to the strategic defense of the
United States itself. That is all the leverage Ayub really needed.

Ayub had played the situation well. He had new arms for his military. He
had avoided political compromise over Kashmir on Nehru’s terms without
angering Eisenhower. 95 Ayub had increased his value to the US as well, and yet
he continued to support Arab issues, like Algeria and Palestine, in return for
Arab support on Kashmir. In turn, he became something of a roving
ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the UAR, supporting Muslim solidarity against
Communism. 96 At the same time, Ayub’s nationalist and Muslim credentials
also allowed him to maintain strong relations with nationalist elements in Iraq,
providing a useful window on the Qasim regime. 97 Ayub also appeared to be
on the way to a successful implementation of land reform, something long
advocated by Washington. Ayub wanted to move land ownership from the
large land-owning families to mid-sized landowners made up largely of
bureaucrats and army officers, who were the principal support for the regime. 98
These reforms further enhanced the Pakistani leader’s reputation as a model
progressive ruler. The collapse of Iraq, die weaknesses of Iran, and Soviet
influence in Afghanistan had played into his hands, and Washington happily
embraced him. 99

Following die US presidential election in November 1960, the only question
that remained was whether or not a new administration would honor the
Eisenhower commitments. For this reason, Ayub and the Pakistani leadership
preferred the election of Vice-President Nixon. Following Kennedy’s
November victory, Ayub summoned Ambassador Rountree to his office. He
wanted reassurance that the defense arrangements with the United States
would continue under the new administration, and he took the opportunity to
impress upon Washington that his rule had brought stability to Pakistan. He
had been a loyal ally and, in return, he expected preferential treatment if
Pakistan were to continue to meet its alliance and security commitments. 100

Difficulties for India: Pakistan and China

When President Eisenhower arrived in New Delhi on his good-will trip, he
received a hero’s welcome. Beset by chronic domestic political and economic
problems and the nagging dispute over Kashmir, the Indian Prime Minister
now faced a direct military and diplomatic challenge from the Chinese. He
needed friends. None of this was lost on Eisenhower. In his first meeting with
Nehru on 10 December, discussions focused on Pakistan. Nehru was
circumspect in his criticisms of Pakistan, but he wanted US assurances that
they would control Ayub. Nehru used vaguely optimist words like ‘progress’

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and ‘they were essentially the same people’ in describing Pakistan. Nehru
complained that despite progress on refugee compensation and Indus waters,
Pakistan ‘would interject something which tended to impede matters’. Nehru’s
main concern was security. He told Eisenhower that he feared a Pakistani ‘stab
in the back’ while India confronted tire Chinese on the border. On 13
December, after touring India, Eisenhower returned to New Delhi and held
additional meetings with Nehru. In an effort to secure the Pakistani front, the
Prime Minister wanted Eisenhower to pressure Ayub into an agreement
renouncing military force. Nehru argued that it would reduce Indian fears of
Paksitani military modernization. In that situation, Nehru stated: ‘[India] would
simply not take note of it or make an issue of it.’ The President wanted to mute
Indian reaction to the arms program for Ayub, and stated that he thought the
Indian suggestion had merit. 101

Hoping that an agreement might be possible, he instructed the US Embassy
in Karachi to explore the possibility with Ayub. The President told
Ambassador Rountree to inform the Pakistanis that: ‘Our purpose would be to
make sure that President Ayub understands the great opportunity this could
give him in modernization of his army.’ 102 Rountree warned that Nehru had
proposed this approach in the past, beginning with Pakistani Prime Minister
Liaquat Ali Khan in New Delhi on 22 December 1949, and gave little chance
for it to succeed. Predictably, when presented with the suggestion, Ayub stated
that this was an old Indian ploy that would commit New Delhi to nothing and
allow them to consolidate their position in Kashmir. Ayub stated that Pakistan
could only agree to such a proposition if the process for a Kashmir agreement
were firmly established and adhered to by both parties. He argued that such an
initiative would be fatal to his regime and the US position in Pakistan unless
the Indian made a significant compromise. 103 Nehru had no intention of
compromising; thus Eisenhower would have to settle for die satisfaction that
concern in New Delhi was mounting with regard to Chinese intentions. 104

Through early 1959, India pursued a non-aligned foreign policy as it had in
the past. New Delhi believed that the US would continue to be India’s
principal economic partner, and treated aid as a virtual entitlement. The
Indians saw it as an obligation of a rich country like the United States, and thus
the aid failed to garner much pro-US sentiment in India. Washington was
reluctant to pressure India by using aid, out of concern that any decease might
send Nehru to Moscow for assistance or create instability and political
extremism. 105 Despite some optimism that internal Communist political gains
and the border issue with China might result in a harder Indian line toward
Communism, the nature of the relationship remained unchanged. 106
Surprisingly, Washington did not want an Asian competition between India
and China; Eisenhower himself argued against using India as a ‘counterweight’
in ‘competition’ with China. The President stated: ‘It was best not to take a
black and white position on the counterweight issue. On the other hand, it was
very important to give India a chance to grow as a free and democratic
country.’ He added that at some point in the future India might well become a

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‘counterweight’, but at dais point it was premature and dangerous. Indian
democracy and independence were vitally important to die West, and should
not be risked in an escalating competition with China. 107

China had become the flaw in Nehru’s policy of non-alignment. The lack of
a clearly-agreed-upon border between China and India had been a potential
problem for some time. The area was so remote that the Indians ignored it,
and neither the Chinese nor Indians pushed their conflicting claims. 108 Then, in
1956, reports of Chinese road-building prompted Indian patrolling on the
border. These patrols found Chinese survey parties penetrating deep into the
disputed areas. Additional patrols in 1957 confirmed a Chinese presence as
much as 70 miles inside the disputed zone. In March 1958, an intelligence
report from Bhola Nath Mullik to Nehru recommended a formal ‘protest’ to
the Chinese. 109

In addition, the border issue coincided with growing Indo-Chinese
difficulties over Tibet. From November 1956 to February 1957, the Dalai
Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, visited India. Apparently encouraged by the visit, Dalai
Lama ‘showed some independence’ vis-a-vis the Chinese on his return. Tibet
reached a flashpoint, and the angry Chinese cancelled a visit Nehru had
planned to make there. Beijing feared that Nehru would encourage calls for
greater independence. In March 1959, Tibet broke into open revolt against the
Chinese. 110 The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa, seeking sanctuary in India,
where public opinion and the press strongly condemned the Chinese actions.
The Hindustani Times remarked: “We may go on saying that we want to be
friends with China. The Chinese don’t seem to value our friendship much and
this must in the end compel us away from what has seemed for a long time to
be an unnatural orientation of our foreign policy.’ 111 Nehru was in a ‘no win’
situation. 112 Nehru wanted good relations with China, but he could not ignore
the popularity of the Dalai Lama’s cause among the Indian electorate. The
Chinese saw India as a haven for fleeing rebels and the spiritual leader of the
rebellion, and in trying to straddle the issue, Nehru ‘pleased no one’. 113

At this point, Nehru decided to act. Additional patrols in 1959 resulted in a
border skirmish and several Indian border police were killed or captured by the
Chinese. 114 In October 1959, just as the situation in Tibet reached boiling
point, Nehru pressed the Chinese for recognition of the McMahon Line. On
10 November, Chou En-lai replied with a courteous but solid rebuff. The
British Foreign Office described it as a ‘very clever move’ that would be
unacceptable to New Delhi but make Beijing ‘appear conciliatory and
reasonable’. 115 Chou replied that the Sino-Indian border had never been
delineated, that no agreement or treaty existed between China and India in that
regard, and that China could hardly accept a ‘product of the British policy of
aggression’ as a legal demarcation. 116 The Chinese were negotiating, but the
Indians had painted themselves into a psychological and political corner. Given
its territorial insecurity and paranoia, India saw territorial issues in terms of
Pakistan and Kashmir. 117 In a statement in the Tok Sabha (Indian Parliament),
Nehru said, ‘The McMahon Line is the firm frontier, firm by treaty, firm by

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right, firm by usage and firm by geography.’ 118 This rigidity would ultimately
prove cosdy, as would Nehru’s loyalty to his friend, Krishna Menon, the
Minister of Defense. 119

Despite rising tensions, Nehru could not believe that armed conflict with
China was possible. Why fight over a sparsely populated, largely worthless
piece of land? A conflict with China also ran counter to the spirit of his
commitment to bring China into the world community. Finally, acceptance of
the possibility of war with China stood juxtaposed to the ‘intellectual and
ideological’ framework on which Nehru had based Indian foreign policy. 120
The idea that the two most prominent members of the Asian brotherhood of
nations would actually come to blows would undermine the entire concept of
pancha sheela, and die spirit of the Bogor and Bandung conferences. Worse, it
would prove the Americans right and justify the Pakistani adherence to
defensive military pacts. Nehru ignored growing warnings from the West and
rejected Ayub’s call for a joint India-Pakistan approach to defense in facing the
Chinese. Nehru would cling to non-alignment, while seeking new support. 121

Developing the Soviet option

Following die meetings with Eisenhower, Nehru began to cultivate a Soviet
relationship. In February 1960, Khrushchev stopped in New Delhi twice on his
trip to Indonesia. Although the Soviet leader did not specifically mention the
dispute with China, he assured India of support. Perhaps encouraged by
Khrushchev’s presence, Nehru gave a speech in the Lok Sabha flady rejecting
any compromise with China. The Chinese had been busy. Under pressure,
Burma agreed to a new border demarcation with China, and a Nepalese
delegation in Beijing had taken positions ‘manifesdy aimed at India’. In April,
Chou and Nehru met to discuss the issues. There was no compromise on
either side. At this point, the Indians decided to establish permanent military
posts in the border region to prevent furdier Chinese encroachments. Nehru
simply could not bring himself to believe that China would fight, given the
unforeseen consequences of such an eventuality. 122

As the situation with China grew more intractable, New Delhi learned that
the United States had indeed included advanced supersonic aircraft in its
modernization of the Pakistani armed forces. Nehru had believed that the
shipment of supersonic aircraft to Pakistan would not materialize. As a result,
the actual announcement of the agreement came as more of a shock than it
should have. The Indians responded with an immediate request for US
transport aircraft, which was approved. 123 They quickly followed dais with a
request to purchase Sidewinders and F-104 aircraft. Washington dodged the
request and referred die Indians to die British for a ‘similar’ weapon. Fulfilling
the Indian request would cause a major breach with Pakistan. 124 Krishna
Menon had been the source of both requests. 125 Menon believed that only
Pakistan constituted a real potential military threat to India. 126 His argument
that the aircraft and missiles were to counter the Chinese threat represented a
ploy to expose the pro-Pakistani tilt in US foreign policy. Menon used the

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situation to discredit the United States and create an opening for military
cooperation with the Soviet Union. The predictable US rejection gave Menon
what he wanted: Nehru’s blessing to initiate arms talks with Moscow. In
August 1960, India began to negotiate not only for the purchase of transport
aircraft and helicopters from the Soviet Union, but also for a manufacturing
agreement. This development alarmed Eisenhower. The Pentagon told the
White House: ‘Once the Soviets establish themselves in the eyes of die Indians
as a dependable and economical source of aircraft, their opportunity to
conclude other deals for military equipment would be enhanced, thereby
increasing Indian dependence on the Soviet Union.’ 127 In a 26 September 1960
meeting with Eisenhower at die UNGA, Nehru stated that he saw little hope
for resolution of the border issue widi China. Soviet arms for India never came
up. 128 The new administration would have to deal widi Pakistan, India, and the
future.

The non-Arab Middle East and the end of the Eisenhower era

By the end of die Eisenhower administration, US foreign policy in Iran and
Pakistan retained a decided preference for economic development as die basis
for creating stable pro-Western states and potentially lasting democratic
institutions, but the realities of the security situation dictated support for
authoritarian or military regimes and the aid programs necessary to support
them. Washington feared that a failure to act in this way or too much pressure
to reform would result in the adoption of neutralist policies that would
undermine the strategic interests of the United States. Those interests included
intelligence assets in Iran and Pakistan that were of increasing importance to
the strategic defense of the United States. In the case of Pakistan, these sites
had to be maintained, at the risk of alienating India. Fundamentally, military aid
programs ran counter to Eisenhower’s own best judgment about how best to
serve the long-term interests of their allies, but immediate strategic security
interests took precedence. In the case of Iran, the administraton saw little
option but to placate the Shah with military assistance while pressing for
economic and political reform. At the end of the Eisenhower administration,
containment strategy and Iran’s role in it resembled the situation of December
1954. The Pahlavi regime faced serious economic problems and social unrest.
The Shah was still obsessed with acquiring military hardware at the expense of
economic development and modernization. Washington continued to fear the
Shah’s moods and his vacillating leadership. In addition, opposition to his rule
appeared to be mounting. Eisenhower was convinced that only economic
development and social and political reform could ultimately save Iran for the
West, but he and his advisors feared that pressure to reform and almost
certainly rapid reform might very well set in motion events that would mirror
Baghdad in 1958. Eisenhower wanted a stable alternative to the Shah’s regime,
but one simply did not exist. In Pakistan, the situation looked brighter. Ayub
Khan had stabilized the regime and appeared to be making headway in
pursuing controlled reform. The decision to provide Pakistan with modern

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arms intensified a fierce debate within the United States government between
those who believed that India, not Pakistan, should be the focus of US policy.
The fact remained that India had refused to commit to Western defense
arrangements and was pursuing a new military-assistance relationship with the
Soviet Union. Ayub gave every appearance of being a stable, solid ally, and as
such had to be valued. The Eisenhower administration, quite simply, saw no
real alternative to supporting the Shah and Ayub and their demands. The
experience of Iraq and tire fragility and instability of democratic and pro-
Western regimes in the region dictated a decided preference for authoritarian
control, and if necessary iron-fisted stability. The Kennedy administration now
had to decide if it would follow Eisenhower’s lead. Chester Bowles, former
Ambassador to India and a critic of both the Shah and Ayub, was a Kennedy
advisor. He was also a realist who told Kennedy ‘that on foreign policy there
was not much difference between the democratic and republican parties’ - a
harbinger of tilings to come . 129 Kennedy could now tty his hand.

Chapter 9: 1960 — JFK vs. Nixon,
and the Greater Middle East

Predictably, the events in the Middle East and South Asia found their way
into domestic US politics. The candidates in the 1960 presidential election used
the turmoil in the region in an attempt to gain political advantage, in what
would turn out to be a very close election. The Democrats pointed to the gains
that the Soviet Union had made in the region, and the Republicans argued that
because of their experience they had been able to manage a complex, difficult
situation, and the country could not risk the inexperienced leadership of the
junior senator from Massachusetts. These events were invariably cast in terms
of the Cold War and the effectiveness of the containment policy under
Eisenhower. The Kennedy campaign played on the uncertainty and chaos of
the 1955-1958 period, and attempted to define Eisenhower foreign policy in
those terms. The Democratic challenger made Dulles’ foreign policy a major
negative campaign issue. The idea that Communist influence was growing in
Africa and Asia became a part of the same campaign tactic that created the
non-existent ‘missile gap’. 1 The Suez crisis, problems with Nasser, strained ties
with India, the coup in Iraq, and Soviet regional influence contributed to the
view that the Eisenhower administration represented the moribund policies of
the past. It added to a growing sense that the US had fallen behind the
Communist bloc in the contest for world influence. It also provided a rallying
point for much of the intellectual and academic community. The Democrats
gained valuable and articulate allies among those with whom Dulles had had a
long and prickly relationship. Kennedy tapped into both die hostility toward
policies and the personal animosity of those who had viewed Eisenhower’s
policy under Dulles as simplistic and moralizing. 2 There was plenty of both.

Additionally, the election appeared to have the potential to become a
political watershed. The consensus view assumed that the election of Vice-
President Nixon would see the continuation of conservative, anti-Communist
policies that favored traditional Western allies in the Middle East. Nixon’s

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175

statements during the campaign were clear enough: on 23 April 1960, he told
the American Society of Newspaper Editors: “We can and will make clear that
the moral difference between our system and the Soviet system is fundamental
and cannot be narrowed in any way by the dialogue of peaceful competition.’ 3
In June, he stated: ‘We will maintain the military strength we need to defend
freedom. We will use our economic resources, public and private, to assist
others in their quest for progress with freedom and for national self-
determination, free of all outside domination. And we put tire enemies of
freedom on warning, world-wide, that we will tolerate neither subversion nor
overt aggression against the integrity of free nations.’ 4 Nixon steadfastly
believed that nations like Iran, Pakistan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and
other conservative states should continue to be the backbone of US policy and
receive the lion’s share of economic and military aid. The Vice-President’s
advisors, like Attorney General William P. Rogers, reinforced the conservative,
anti-Communist bent of his campaign. Rogers advised Nixon to take a hard
line on his visit to the Soviet Union ‘and not to let Russian lies about the U.S.
go unanswered’. 5

In contrast, it appeared that a Kennedy administration might offer
something new. Countries like India and Egypt saw signs that fundamental
change might result from a Democratic administration. The 1960 presidential
campaign began in earnest for the Kennedy camp in 1958. Kennedy and his
advisors focused on the series of setbacks associated with Soviet gains in the
developing and non-aligned world, and systematically created ‘facts’ to
differentiate his party from the Republicans. 6 Influenced by die economic
evangelism of advisors like Walt Rostow, the Senator borrowed the 1953 views
of Eisenhower and turned them against Nixon. He argued that in the
developing world the United States could ‘join with our allies in channeling
enough aid to close the ever-widening gap between our living standards and
theirs [and] encourage their economies to grow faster than their population and
stabilize their infant government against the chaos on which Communism
feasts.’ 7 Kennedy and his advisors insisted that the Republicans had allowed
Communist inroads in the developing world through their unsophisticated
approach to emerging nationalisms. They accused the Eisenhower
administration of ignoring the necessity of economic development, despite the
fact that Eisenhower had repeatedly tried to pursue modernization policies
recommended by advisors like Walt Rostow. This nuance was totally lost on
the American public. 8 Wanting to set himself apart from the Eisenhower
administration and Nixon’s campaign, the Senator argued that the State
Department policies of the Eisenhower administration were staid and out-of-
date. 9 In fact, the campaign rhetoric created a false sense of optimism in the
Kennedy organization that economic development would result in developing
countries sharing the same values and priorities as the West. 10

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Campaign rhetoric and South Asia

Kennedy focused on India, not Pakistan. He charged that die Eisenhower
administration ‘in a changing time, [had] not changed; in a time that required
foresight and innovation, they have relied on the old policies, some of which
are long outdated.’ 11 Kennedy argued that: ‘die fundamental task of our foreign
aid program in the 1960s is not negatively to fight communism: its
fundamental task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the
twentieth century, as in the nineteenth — in the southern half of the globe as in
the north — economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in
hand.’ 12 The Senator accused the Republicans of blocking economic aid to
India, calling it ‘the most critical area [of] the so-called undeveloped world’. He
linked the survival of democracy in India to economic competition with the
Communist Chinese: ‘If India fails and China succeeds, then of course the
balance of power moves against us. This in die 1960’s will be the great area of
competition.’ 13 The Democrats took every opportunity to emphasize the
forward-looking nature of their programs and Moscow’s successes. They stated
that while the US did nothing, the Russians were training their students in
languages and foreign cultures in order to effectively spread Communism
throughout ‘Africa and India’. 14

In accusing Eisenhower of being ‘indifferent’ to international ideological
and economic competition, Kennedy compared India and China repeatedly:
‘Ten years ago China and India started from the same economic base, with the
same economic problems, and yet China, by methods repugnant to us has
begun to move its industrial growth forward at a faster rate than that of India
through freedom.’ 15

Kennedy hammered the Republicans for failing to address the need for
massive Western support for the Indian government’s Third Five-Year Plan.
He argued that with 35 per cent of the underdeveloped world’s population, the
failure of their economy and democratic system would shift the balance of
power decidedly against die United States: ‘I believe that four years of Mr.
Nixon would be a government frozen in the ice of its own indifference, and I
don’t think the world can afford it.’ 16 India became the focal point for dire
predictions about the battle with Communism. Kennedy stated: “We face ... a
difficult situation in India, as India attempts to finance its third five-year plan.
If India fails, Asia will fall. If India fails, Africa will fall. . . . Has this
Administration spoken at all about what we and the Western Powers are going
to do about India...?’ 17 In effect, the Kennedy campaign transformed the
Eisenhower administration’s own focus on Communism into a political
opportunity. Wedded to anti-Communist rhetoric, Kennedy found himself
using the domino theory to attack Republican policy.

Kennedy’s pronouncements, particularly those in the fall of 1 960, reflected a
growing sense of urgency in the campaign. His polling numbers were sliding,
and the opposition attacked his lack of experience in foreign affairs. He was
doing everything possible to distance himself from Eisenhower policies and
present his candidacy as something fresh and with new ideas. Kennedy and his

1960 JFK vs. Nixon, and the Greater Middle East

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advisors worked to hide the direct relationship that existed between his ideas
and tire policies already pursued by the Eisenhower administration in India and
Pakistan. First, almost all the issues and ideas concerning aid and economic
development focused on the competition between the US and the Communist
bloc. Kennedy exaggerated the level of neglect on the part of Eisenhower, and
ignored the fact that the Democrats’ arguments had been die basis for
Eisenhower’s policies in India since 1953. Pakistan received litde or no
attention from Kennedy during the campaign. He ignored the coup in
Pakistan, and did not criticize Eisenhower over Ayub because he, like
Eisenhower and Dulles, saw no alternative to supporting the Pakistani regime.
Lasdy, the presence of Rostow, Bowles, and John K. Galbraith on the
Kennedy foreign policy team made economic development the focus of
Kennedy campaign rhetoric. The press and others viewed this as new policy
when, in reality, the Eisenhower administration had consistently pursued this
type of effort, not only in India and Pakistan but also in Iran and Egypt, since
1953.

The Kennedy team also had another subde advantage in playing the India
card. Prior tol958, maintaining economic funding for India had been a difficult
task because of India’s non-aligned stance. The right wing of die Republican
Party viewed Nehru’s non-alignment as something between outright
Communism and political naivete that, in either case, contributed to
Communist expansion. Then Nehru appointed Krishna Menon as his deputy,
over the Indian delegation at the UN. This left US-Indian relations in a lurch. 18
Menon was Nehru’s friend; nevertheless, powerful factions in the Indian
political structure roundly detested him. He also preferred the lifestyle of
London and New York to that of New Delhi. Nehru found it politically more
useful to assign Menon abroad rather than have him create political problems
for the Prime Minister in New Delhi. Unfortunately, Menon went out of his
way to antagonize the United States and to praise the Soviet Union and
Communist bloc. In addition, he insisted on high-profile, often inexplicable,
votes or abstentions in the United Nations. 19 Moscow could not have hoped
for more consistent support had Menon been an agent of influence. His
attacks on the West and his obvious pro-Soviet leanings, coupled with a love of
the limelight, made Krishna Menon ‘Mr. India’ in the eyes of the media and
conservative political groups in the US. 20 His close and well-publicized
relationship with Nehru tainted the India Prime Minister. As a result, every aid
bill for India between 1956 and 1958 brought a pitched political battle between
the administration and the Republican right wing in Congress. 21

With respect to US domestic politics, this process had two salient effects on
the Eisenhower administration, both of which made their way into the
presidential campaign. First, die Eisenhower administration found it difficult to
maintain the current level of aid to India, let alone to increase it. Menon and
non-alignment effectively poisoned die well. Second, the considerable aid that
was forthcoming served as a lightning rod for right-wing criticism of ‘foreign
aid’ in general, and of India in particular. As a result, the administration tried to

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keep its support of India out of the newspapers and political sight as much as
possible; thus the Kennedy campaign could use the perception that
Washington was doing nothing to support democratic India.

Belatedly Nehru recognized the liability that Krishna Menon posed at the
UN and, in 1957, brought him home as Defense Minister. 22 Menon himself
had apparently asked to resign, telling Nehru: ‘I am the wrong kind and create
more conflicts and difficulties — so it is best for me to “go”.’ The New York
Times agreed, stating that Menon had a ‘talent’ for making ‘a few devoted
friends and many devoted enemies’. 23 Nehru rejected Menon’s resignation, but
realized that his usefulness in New York had ended. By bringing Menon back
to India, Nehru might as well have sent him to die moon; Menon had no
understanding of or real backing within die Indian political structure. As an
adult, he had never lived in India; however, his departure did create slighdy
improved political prospects for India in the US. 24 Menon’s presence in New
York might have precluded the use of aid to India as a campaign issue, but
circumstances had changed. With Menon gone and aid to India understated,
the Kennedy campaign pounced on the political opportunity.

Kennedy’s apparent campaign preferences had a downside. Pakistan was
more important than ever to US interests in the Middle East and to
containment. Ayub had scored a major victory in obtaining new advanced
weapons from the Eisenhower administration. Basking in his new-found
importance in Washington, President Ayub had serious misgivings about the
possibility of a Kennedy victory. Judging from campaign rhetoric, the
Pakistanis concluded that a Kennedy win might reverse their gains and
jeopardize both their economic and military-aid packages. Prestige and
legitimacy were also issues. Pakistani politics, both foreign and domestic, had
always reflected the insecurity of being viewed as an Indian Muslim ‘rump
state’. Eisenhower had reversed much of that. Pakistan was a key US ally, and
perhaps with Ayub in control, the most stable in die region. Membership of
CENTO and SEATO aside, it was Pakistan, and not non-aligned India, that
supported Washington diplomatically in international forums like the UN.
Averell Harriman, a key Kennedy advisor, exacerbated concerns when he told
The Times of India : ‘Unhappily U.S. policies have aggravated rather than eased
the situation, and contributed to an arms race detrimental to both countries. In
emphasizing the military, the Eisenhower Administration has failed to
appreciate die urgency of economic progress as democracy’s best defense
against communist subversion in this area.’ 25 Ayub saw Kennedy’s campaign
attacks on Eisenhower’s India policies as a clear threat to Pakistan. As a
military man, he understood Pakistan’s importance to the United States’
strategic position, and he made it clear that a Kennedy victory could endanger
US-Pakistani relations and certain critical security and intelligence agreements
between the two countries. 26

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179

Concerns about JFK in Tehran

By 1960, Iran had received over $1 billion in US economic and foreign aid,
with a major surge following the Iraqi coup of 1958. The Shah watched the
presidential campaign with great interest. He, like Ayub, secretly supported the
candidacy of Nixon over Kennedy. The coup in Iraq and rising Communist
influence had shifted the nature of Iranian-US relations, and placed Tehran in a
much stronger position. Fear of a coup in Tehran or a declaration of neutrality
from the Shah had their desired effect on Washington. The growing US
association with the Shah and his authoritarian regime was unfortunate but, at
least for now, unavoidable. Containment took precedence. With the loss of
Iraq, stabilizing and strengthening the Shah’s regime had become a priority.
Reduced pressure from Washington for political and economic reform in turn
reduced internal pressure on the Shah’s regime. Risky substantive changes were
now unacceptable. The Eisenhower administration shared those same fears.
The Iraqi regime had fallen during a period when reform and economic
development appeared to be transforming Iraq into a more open, pluralistic
society. As for tire Shah, he enjoyed more leverage in Washington than at any
previous time. Understandably, the Shah supported the status quo in the form
of a Nixon victory.

Iran never emerged as an election issue for the Kennedy campaign. The
fundamental reasons for this were two-fold. The situation in Iran was
considered so volatile that, like the Arab-Israeli dispute, both campaigns
adopted a virtual hands-off policy. Iran was not a topic for public debate. Such
a debate could well have encouraged the Shah’s opponents and further
threatened the regime. It might also have pushed the Shah toward an
arrangement with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Eisenhower
administration and the foreign-policy experts of tire Kennedy campaign were
united in their desire to see a program of controlled reform from above,
backed by a strong, loyal military and security apparatus. The Shah need not
have worried. Only by splitting hairs could any observer discern a real
difference between the policies of the Eisenhower administration and those
proposed by Kennedy toward Iran. High-value intelligence sites overlooking
Soviet missile development centers and silos in Central Asia made support for
the Shah a necessity. 27

1953 reborn: JFK and peace in the Arab Middle East

With regard to the Arab Middle East, Kennedy also developed a campaign
to differentiate himself from the Eisenhower administration, by employing a
thoroughly jaundiced interpretation of the events of 1956-1960. Between 1955
and 1958, President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
faced a series of foreign-policy crises in the Middle East unlike anything
experienced before by an American administration. Even die Iranian crisis of
1953 paled in comparison with the turbulence and fluidity of the Arab world
during those years, whose ups and downs gave the impression that the West
had completely lost the initiative in the region. Democrats in Congress quickly

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seized the opportunity to make political mileage in the 1958 and 1960 elections.
Eisenhower’s demand that the British and French withdraw from Suez caused
a serious rift with America’s closest allies, just as forcing the Israelis to
withdraw from the Sinai infuriated Israel and the Zionist lobby. Arguably, the
Eisenhower administration performed decently in dealing with this series of
changes, but political reality and perception diverged more significantly than
usual. As a result, the Aswan imbroglio, the Suez crisis, the Iraqi coup,
problems in Syria, and the intervention in Lebanon gave the appearance of a
rudderless policy, benefiting the Soviet Union and radical Arab regimes. 28 To
further complicate Eisenhower’s woes, the serious illnesses faced by both the
President and the Secretary of State, a major heart attack and cancer
respectively, reinforced die popular view of a tired, old, and moribund
administration tied to ineffectual, outmoded policies.

The ensuing cacophony of criticism from the Democrats, the Zionist
community, Israel, and allies reinforced the notion that US policy was badly
mismanaged. Political and media criticism further reinforced this image by
portraying the Soviets as controlling the initiative through their radical Arab
clients. In a ‘what went wrong’ environment, the Arab Middle East became a
campaign issue in which Kennedy’s style triumphed over both substance and
reality. Kennedy’s confident manner served him well, as he depicted himself as
having the ability to control Middle East events through a new policy. This
begs the question - did the Kennedy administration really believe its own
rhetoric? The evidence suggests that Kennedy and his advisors actually
managed to convince themselves that they could control and influence events
by applying hardheaded policy-planning and by focusing on economic
development and personal presidential diplomatic approaches.

The Arab Cold War of 1959-1960 also assisted Kennedy by ushering in a lull
in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Ironically, Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ initiatives to
improve relations with Nasser allowed Kennedy to advocate economic aid
without fear of political backlash. The manner in which the Kennedy campaign
employed the situation in the Arab Middle East is a lesson in style and
communication skills. Before 1959, the Democrats, including Senator
Kennedy, basically followed the administration lead on policy toward the UAR.
Reassessments now criticized Eisenhower for having a simplistic view of
Communism and Arab nationalism. Kennedy had begun to build this cause in
closed sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1957, when he
grilled Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on
the issue of Nasser. In countering Radford’s view of Nasser’s Communist
leanings, Kennedy pointed out that it was likely that Egypt’s relationship was
simply a ‘matter of convenience’ ‘when he could not receive arms from us [the
US]’ after the Gaza raid of 1955. In the debate over the Eisenhower Doctrine,
Kennedy stated: ‘My only concern has been that this guarantee is liable to
influence the Syrians and the Egyptians to even closer ties with the Russians
and that it will break the Arab unity, which has been one of the sources of at
least Nasser’s strength, if it is at least our policy to break this unity, making the

1960 JFK vs. Nixon, and the Greater Middle East

181

Egyptian s and Syrian more isolated from the West, and cause them to develop
even closer ties with the Communists.’ After Admiral Radford’s statement that
the Russians were ‘much more apt to take Iraq by internal coup than by . . .
overt military action,’ Kennedy raised questions about Iraq, stating that in fact
the guarantee proposed by the President had the potential to make Iraq more
vulnerable. While asserting that the guarantee was a positive move, in a preview
of things to come, die admiral admitted the small amounts of military aid to
Iraq might cause junior officers to ‘think [about the Soviets] maybe that is the
side we should be on’. 29 Of course, by the following year, the Eisenhower
administration had come to this conclusion about Nasser and Communism,
and had understood the risks and vulnerabilities in Iraq, but the Kennedy
campaign ignored these aggravating details. Kennedy claimed that the
unenlightened policies of the Eisenhower administration had driven the non-
aligned world, including Nasser, toward the Soviet Union. In a deft political
maneuver, Kennedy and a handful of Democrats supported the Eisenhower
Doctrine, not because they thought it was a good idea, but because, as Senator
Humphrey put it, President Eisenhower’s unilateral announcement had put the
Senate in ‘sort of a box’. A vote against it would have undermined the US
position abroad. Kennedy got credit for supporting the President, and put
himself in a position to criticize the administration if things did not go well. 30

With Rostow, an early Eisenhower advisor on his foreign-policy team,
Kennedy bought into the idea of economic development as the answer to
problems in the Middle East. Thus Kennedy’s policies reflected the same
optimism as Eisenhower’s had in the 1953-1955 period, and ignored the hard-
learned lessons of 1955-1958. Kennedy’s ideas were a reversion to the
economically-driven policies in which Eisenhower and Dulles originally had so
much faith and of which Rostow had been a part. These views hardened into a
tailor-made approach for the economic and social engineering popular with die
‘best and brightest.’ It also cleared the way for the application of the
developmental principles espoused by the Charles River school of economists,
who believed that the timely application of strategic economic aid would bring
developing countries to a self-sustaining stage, or ‘take-off point.’ At this
juncture, economic development would replace militarism and confrontation,
reducing Soviet influence and enhancing that of the West. 31 The fact that this
policy substantially mirrored the early policies of Eisenhower, Dulles, and
Herter was ignored.

In addition, Chester Bowles, Averell Harriman, and Rostow believed that
under Dulles foreign policy in respect of non-alignment had been seriously
mishandled. In the case of Nasser, they argued that the Egyptian government
turned to die Soviet Union only after being rebuffed by the West - Nasser’s
favorite refrain. 32 They managed to conveniently overlook the fact that Israel
and the American Zionists, Kennedy’s steadfast supporters, had more than a
litde to do with the Egyptian request for arms and with the subsequent US
rebuff. By 1960, as a result of improved relations engineered by Eisenhower,
Egypt appeared to be the perfect laboratory in which to reverse the Soviet tide

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and reestablish Western influence. These ideas also meshed well with
Kennedy’s view of himself and of what kind of an administration he would
head. He wanted modern, progressive ideas and policies. He wanted to shake
up the foreign-policy community with new blood and ideas. 33 Kennedy also
wanted better relations with progressive regimes. Nasser cut a much more
progressive and impressive figure than the Jordanian or Saudi monarchies. The
message of secular nationalism and social and economic development roughly
paralleled Kennedy’s view of himself. Finally, and most importantly, Kennedy
believed that these elements, combined with the ideas of economic
development, offered the promise of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute.

On the one hand, the Kennedy campaign attacked the Eisenhower
administration for its poor handling of the situation with Egypt; on the other,
it assiduously sought and received support from Jewish and pro-Zionist
groups. During the 1960 presidential campaign, these policy elements appeared
repeatedly in Kennedy speeches, particularly those addressed to Jewish
groups. 34 Kennedy focused on the Israeli and Zionist unhappiness with
Eisenhower over his even-handed policy in the Middle East. Myer Feldman, a
Washington lawyer, became Kennedy’s ‘de facto ambassador to American
Jewry’, a position that did not exist in Eisenhower’s White House. 35 One can
only guess at the substance of the private discussions with Jewish leaders, but
the pronouncements paid off in overwhelming Jewish support for Kennedy in
the election. Despite a tacit agreement with the Nixon campaign to avoid the
Arab-Israeli dispute as a campaign issue, Kennedy pressed die boundaries by
focusing on the Cold War and the issue of Soviet influence. 36

The Kennedy campaign also attacked Eisenhower policy on two general
issues that had Middle East implications - ‘flexible response’ to nationalist
movements, and increasing Soviet influence. Concerning the issue of flexible
response, Kennedy argued that Dulles’s vaunted ‘brinksmanship’ had placed
the United States in a position where it had to choose between ‘world
devastation and submission’. 37 Kennedy attacked the ‘so-called Eisenhower
Doctrine’ for allowing Soviet influence to become ‘immeasurably greater’, and
wisecracked that countries in the Middle East believed that ‘the shortest route
to Washington was through Moscow’. 38 Ironically, in March 1957 Senator
Kennedy had led seven defecting Democratic senator in support of the
administration on this very issue. This vote not only funded the Eisenhower
plan, but also allowed significant discretion to the administration on how the
money would be used. At that time, Kennedy had stated: ‘An administration
defeat on the Middle East resolution’ would mean ‘repudiation of our
Government on a major foreign policy issue before the eyes of the world.’ 39 In
Alexandria, Virginia, Kennedy stated that: ‘never before have the tentacles of
communism sunk so deeply into a previously friendly area — in Iraq and the
Middle East ...’, and further that: ‘Eisenhower Middle East Doctrine was a
farce and the Baghdad Pact was a failure.’ 40 Obviously, these were campaign

1960 JFK vs. Nixon, and the Greater Middle East

183

Courtesy of National Archives
Kennedy with Myer Feldman

Kennedy with Myer Feldman who was Special Conselor to President Kennedy for
issues on domestic Zionist issues and Israel. Feldman was disliked by some senior
administration officials who felt that advocacy of Israeli interests and warnings
about electoral consequences of pursuing pro-Arab policies prevented a balanced
Middle East policy.

speeches, but they gave the impression that Kennedy had a new policy for the
region. He outlined a plan that called for the United States to reaffirm its
friendship to nations in the region regardless of race, religion, or politics . 41

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Kennedy carefully cultivated Zionist organizations. On 10 August 1960, in a
letter to Rabbi Israel Goldstein of New York, the candidate stated that he
would urge ‘continued economic assistance to Israel and the Arab peoples to
help them raise their living standards’ and ‘direct Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations and the resettlement of Arab refugees’. He then stated his
personal belief that: ‘the central and overriding problem in the Middle East is
the problem of achieving peace in the area.’ He went on to say that his
administration would focus American diplomacy on ending the ‘state of war’
between Israel and the Arab states. In his letter to Goldstein, Kennedy
suggested a conference of the ‘contending states’ to settle the issue, and ended
by saying that: ‘this will be our firm objective.’ 42 On 26 August, he spelled out
his administration’s planned Middle East policy in a speech to the Zionists of
America Convention in New York, based on US friendship for all peoples and
religious groups in the Middle East, willingness to ‘halt any aggression by any
nation’, and finally his promise that:

All the authority and prestige of the White House be used to call into
conference the leaders of Israel and the Arab States to consider privately
their common problems, assuring them that we support in full their
aspirations for peace, unity, independence, and a better life - and that we
are prepared to back up this moral support with economic and technical
assistance. He went on to say that the region needed ‘water, not war;
tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs’.

The speech presented an overview of his goal for his administration — a
comprehensive peace and the use of economic development to achieve it. 43

JFK’s campaign rhetoric: a fundamental difference?

What differentiated tire Kennedy administration policy from the late Dulles-
Herter-Eisenhower administration with respect to die Middle East? The only
substantial difference existed in attitudes about the potential for what Kennedy
termed a ‘comprehensive peace’. He believed it was possible. 44 Given that his
policy tools were identical to those of Eisenhower, what drove diis conclusion?
Both the British and Americans had failed since 1918 to achieve an Arab-
Israeli settlement, and now Kennedy not only believed drat he could make it
happen but also made this aspiration the centerpiece of his policies for the
region. Despite all the similarities, including the advisors in some cases, the
Kennedy foreign-policy team believed that their approach was different from
that of Eisenhower.

In the Arab Middle East, Kennedy believed that personal diplomacy, in
effect his charm and style, would allay Nasser’s concerns about US intentions
and remove the personal animosities that had poisoned Egyptian-American
relations. As NSC staffer Robert Komer, also known as ‘Blowtorch Bob’,
stated: ‘The President was his own Secretary of State in dealing widr . . . Middle
East affairs.’ Phillips Talbot, head of the NEA Bureau, shared this view to

1960 JFK vs. Nixon, and the Greater Middle East

185

some degree. In effect, the primacy of Nasser and the ultimate goal of a
comprehensive peace created a policy troika, with Komer, Talbot, and
Ambassador Badeau working together, coordinating information for the
President. Kennedy did this to control and carry out the policies that he had in
mind. 45 He believed that by focusing on Nasser’s self esteem, he could improve
the chances for US-UAR cooperation, undermine the Soviets, and advance the
cause of a peace settlement with Israel. 46 This was a tall order. Second, like the
previous administration, Kennedy intended to use economic aid as a lever to
influence Egyptian policy. He believed that the technocrats in his
administration were more sophisticated than those in Eisenhower’s, and would
be able to place aid more precisely in order to bring Egypt to the ‘take-off
point. Interestingly enough, there was relatively little additional funding, and
yet the new administration believed that it would succeed where Eisenhower
had failed. Finally, Kennedy brought specialists from outside the government
into the policy-making tent. This gave the White House the option of
excluding all but a few professional Foreign Service officers from the process
when desired.

These two appointments go a long way towards explaining Kennedy’s
thought processes in relation to the Greater Middle East in general and to the
UAR and the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular. Talbot had been the executive
director of the American Universities Field Staff for ten years. AUFS consisted
of a loose collection of academics who were expected to spend about half their
time in a particular region and half in the US, teaching or lecturing. Although
Talbot’s field had been India and Pakistan, under his direction AUFS had
produced a number of studies of Arab nationalism and the non-aligned
movement. He understood the issues, but was not tainted by either the pro-
Zionist or the Arabist label. Given the state of relations between India and
Pakistan, and Nasser’s connections with the non-aligned movement and with
India, Talbot possessed solid academic-type expertise in the region. In
addition, many of the opinions expressed in die various AUFS reports agreed
with notions that Kennedy held about the situation in the Middle East. For
example, statements like ‘the theme [since 1956] is a tragic one of the decline
of the West in the Middle East and the rise of the Soviet Union’, or the
contention that Nasser was not a ‘power mad dictator’ but ‘a prisoner as well
as the leader of the nationalist upsurge’, resonated with views held by
Kennedy. 47

With regard to the US embassy in Cairo, administration officials thought
that John Badeau’s appointment would send a message of sensitivity to Nasser.
Badeau was a bona fide Arabist. In addition, he was well known to the AUFS
primarily as the former President of die American University in Cairo. Chester
Bowles, who helped set up the Kennedy foreign-policy team, would later
complain that the Middle East team was ‘terribly closed, very closed’. 48 The
fact that Badeau had no diplomatic experience, lacked stature as a political
player in the US, had only briefly met Nasser, and had never met President
Kennedy before his appointment did not alarm anyone in the administration. 49

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

By sending Badeau, Kennedy solidified his ability to conduct personal
diplomacy. It represented another manifestation of this idea that US-UAR
difficulties were rooted in an unfortunate misunderstanding and that once it
had been rectified, partially through personal contacts between Kennedy and
Nasser, there would follow numerous possibilities, including an Arab-Israeli
peace. The President had stated his policy priorities, the economic experts were
in place, and he had taken control of the diplomatic process by placing
appointees like Talbot and Badeau, who depended on his patronage, in key
positions.

Viewed through the Middle Eastern prism, Kennedy’s plan to engage the
UAR appeared ill-conceived at best. The idea that Nasser and the UAR
leadership were merely expressing nationalist sentiments in terms of
revolutionary ideology constituted a basic tenet of the Kennedy Middle East
plan, whose proponents believed that Nasser’s commitment to revolutionary
ideals was largely rhetorical, and that his actions rarely matched his words. In
reality, Nasser had for decades been a revolutionary driven by ideas of class
struggle and anti-colonialism in any form. It was not a theoretically structured,
clearly articulated approach; instead, he believed in a loose collection of ideas
and theories. Viewed in terms of a longer chronological frame of reference,
Nasser’s early attempts to express dais ideological bent would have alerted
Kennedy to die more revolutionary aspects of his thought and to the Egyptian
leader’s tendency to pursue less than well conceived policies, which made him
somewhat unpredictable. In 1953 Nasser published Philosophy of Revolution. A
vague, metaphysical rambling about the ‘permanent revolutionary struggle’, it
nevertheless gives an insight into Nasser’s attempt to express an ideological
basis for his views and actions. 50 Nasser, the military officer turned politician,
acquired ideas and coupled them with his own. The result was an eclectic
Egyptian political, social, and economic ideology. 51 He consistently expressed
three ideological themes: ‘elimination of imperialism’, ‘eradication of
feudalism’, and ‘eradication of monopoly and the domination of capital’. 52
Even Nasser’s insistence that all political parties disband at the time of the
Syrian-Egyptian unification in 1958 constituted an ideological motivation to
create a society with one creed and no organized political parties.

Nasser’s ideas were crude and lacked clear articulation, but they were real.
The Kennedy administration missed die significance of this component in the
situation, for two basic reasons. First, the new administration understood
ideological motivations largely in terms of materialist economic factors.
Kennedy’s view of economic development followed virtually the same
paradigm as that of Eisenhower and Dulles when they arrived in office in 1953.
Second, key Kennedy advisors who were dealing with Nasser, particularly
Badeau, believed that apparent ideological differences expressed frustration
with the West and nationalist rhetoric, and not differences of substance. The
idea that Nasser held some fundamental revolutionary views was foreign to the
Kennedy establishment. 53 Third, pragmatically, Nasser intended to benefit no
matter which party won the election. He maintained his non-aligned, Arab-

1960 JFK vs. Nixon, and the Greater Middle East

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nationalist credentials, and his absolute opposition to Arab Communism.
Nixon would identify with these policies. 54

Nasser was anti-Communist and a nationalist, but he was a revolutionary
nationalist whose more radical tendencies periodically ran afoul of US policies
and interests in the region. The Eisenhower administration understood and
applauded Nasser’s consistent anti-Communist stand, but they also understood
that he was a revolutionary with his own vision for the Middle East. 55 Despite
these warning signs, Kennedy downplayed the ideological content of
Nasserism. The degree of revolutionary and ideological motivations within die
Egyptian regime would only become undeniably apparent well after the new
administration had taken office.’ 56 The Eisenhower State Department had
learned to limit their ambitions and hedge their policy bets with the UAR;
caution was the guiding principle. Kennedy equated caution with a lack of
imagination. He had a superficial grasp of the dynamics at work in the region.
Kennedy and his advisors believed that the region had stabilized and that the
Arab-Israeli situation had improved. They failed to understand that the union
with Syria and the conflict with Iraq had monopolized Nasser’s attention. He
was simply too busy to take on other revolutionary adventures. The basic
revolutionary nature of the Egyptian regime, with its hostility toward Israel,
had not changed, to say nothing of Israeli hostility toward the UAR. It was a
complete misunderstanding of the Arab-Israeli context.

From Nasser’s point of view, die misunderstanding served an important
purpose. Closer ties with die United States proved useful; he projected himself
as a nationalist and anti-Communist by suppressing die Communist parties in
the UAR and by working with die US on Iraq. His efforts paid off in the form
of PL 480 grain and discussions of more aid. Also, his improved relationship
with the US gave him added respectability with the conservative Arab states.
The messages coning out of the US presidential election sounded positive on
the subject of ‘North-South’ divisions and the efficacy of non-alignment. 57
Improved relations in his efforts to deal with regional problems did not
represent a basic policy or ideological shift. When considering the chase for
Arab-Israeli peace, Kennedy failed to consider the broader context.

The leverage of economic aid constituted anodier area in which the
Kennedy administration appeared threadbare. This is perhaps the most
amazing element in Kennedy policy, because it is difficult to understand how
the administration could offer anything to Egypt on a scale that would modify
its behavior or have a realistic chance of bringing Egypt to the ‘take-off point’.
The United States had attempted to use economic leverage to influence Nasser
from as early as 1954. With a little more reflection, the Kennedy advisors
would have realized that funding for the Aswan Dam, a huge sum, did not
deflect Nasser from arms deals with the Soviets or attacks on those Western
policies with which he disagreed. PL 480 wheat or other aid anticipated in the
1960s paled in comparison with Aswan, so it is almost incomprehensible that
anyone would conclude that US aid could buy influence. As a serious
component of any effort to get Nasser to the bargaining table with Israel or to

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obtain a significant compromise on almost any important issue, economic aid
was a non-starter.

Finally, the prospects for an Arab-Israeli peace as laid out in the campaign
appeared to lack any basis in reality. Had Nasser been personally predisposed
to such a possibility, and in 1 960 he was not, he would not have survived the
preliminary discussions. US aid, political support, and goodwill counted for
very litde in the internecine wars for leadership in die Arab world. The single
issue that the Arabs agreed upon was Israel. Nasser understood that he had
come to power at least in part because of the preceding regime’s total
impotence during the 1948 war. More fundamentally, Nasser had become the
embodiment of Arab nationalism and unity for most of the Arab world — he
believed that Israel represented the last physical vestige of colonialism in the
region. Any economic aid and political accommodation was better than none,
but to actually participate in a peace discussion was not possible. At die highest
levels, the administration failed to view the issue from Nasser’s perspective,
and, more importantly, failed to draw on the experience and caution of the
Eisenhower State Department.

Changing the guard with new — old ideas

Issues related to the Middle East perhaps played an important role in the
outcome of a very close election contest. In a way, it was Eisenhower’s success
in weathering the events of the mid-1950s that enabled Kennedy to selectively
use those issues to advantage. It contributed to the view that the Eisenhower
administration had unnecessarily alienated die leaders of the non-aligned world,
Nehru and Nasser. 58 Kennedy was assured of the Jewish and Zionist vote
because Eisenhower had forced the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai
in 1957. 59 With India, Menon’s departure from New York in 1957 removed a
major irritant. At the same time, Indian complaints about arms for Pakistan,
coupled with the lack of publicity for pre-1958 economic aid to New Delhi,
served to lend credibility to Democratic assertions that Eisenhower had done
nothing in India’s capitalist competition with its Communist neighbors. These
issues allowed Kennedy to ‘muddy die water’ with regard to Eisenhower
foreign policy. They also united change-oriented elements in the American
foreign-policy community on the side of the Democratic challenger. They
brought the support of key media elements, many of which had long criticized
the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign-policy goals and tactics.

This combination contributed to the perception that something was
fundamentally wrong with the direction in which the United States was headed.
Perception is the key in politics. By focusing on the trials and tribulations of
1955-1958, Kennedy managed to get the public to overlook the overwhelming
consistencies between his proposed policies and those of Eisenhower. As one
astute observer reported: ‘Senator Kennedy has given no indication that he
sees the necessity for a fundamental rethinking on international approaches.
His assessment of problems has been, in most instances, moderate; his
criticisms have concerned American methods and diplomatic inadequacies

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189

rather than basic aims and objectives.’ 60 As the new Kennedy administration
relearned the lessons taught to Eisenhower and Dulles during the early and
mid-1950s, we will see just how accurate this observation was.

Part III: Lessons from the Past
the Middle East 1961-1962

As 1961 began, one interpretation of the situation in the Middle East
appeared to bode well for the non-aligned states; however, another perspective
indicated that traditional and authoritarian regimes were holding their own, or
in some cases learning to manage the revolutionary climate of the region. In
particular, conservative military elements were taking an increasing proactive
role in the political life of die Greater Middle East. Turkey underwent a coup
in 1960, and although the military stated that they had no desire for a
permanent governing role, the generals made it clear that they intended to be
the guardians of political stability. Iran seemed to be headed for another of its
periodic convulsions, with unforeseeable results. Whatever stability existed in
Pakistan was due to a military dictatorship. India refused to deal with Pakistan
on Kashmir, and faced a growing Chinese threat in die north. In the Arab
Middle East, Jordan and Saudi Arabia had survived the deluge of 1958, and,
while their respective situations had improved, the prognosis for both regimes
remained uncertain. Sudan and Yemen had maintained their independence but
charted courses decidedly accommodating to Nasser. Israel appeared unwilling
to make any real compromises with the Arabs, even in return for security
guarantees and sophisticated arms. Then there was the problem of Tel Aviv’s
‘peaceful’ nuclear program, which the CIA believed was a weapons facility.
Despite all of this, Kennedy and his advisors sincerely believed that they were
poised to make great diplomatic gains where Eisenhower, Dulles, and Herter
had failed.

Given the fact that leaders like Nasser, Nehru, and Qasim, with more to
lose, had problems assessing future developments, it is litde wonder that the
incoming Kennedy administration had difficulty in calibrating the political
climate and coming up with a more progressive strategy for US foreign policy.
In Washington, several contradictory views existed concerning the potential for
US and Western gains in die Middle East. The widespread view among the

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191

more politicized of Kennedy’s advisors was that the Eisenhower administration
had badly bungled US relations in the Middle East and had alienated the
progressive non-aligned regimes, particularly the UAR and India. This group
focused on the events of 1954 to 1957 - the Czech arms deal, Suez, and
hostility toward die Eisenhower Doctrine. They argued that by treating
emerging nationalist regimes with respect and by providing non-military aid,
revolutionary fervor would continue to diminish as they increasingly focused
on economic development. They failed to grasp, or ignored, the simple fact
that their proposed solution reflected not only tire spirit but also the exact
wording of the policy pronouncements of the incoming Eisenhower
administration in 1953. It was precisely the policy that Eisenhower and Dulles
had pursued from 1953 to 1954 in their quest to correct what they viewed as
the bungling of the Truman administration. The Kennedy policy goals made it
appear that the election of 1960 had erased the institutional memory of the
government 1

The policy myopia that afflicted Kennedy and his advisors when it came to
the Greater Middle East resulted from the fact that these more proactive policy
advisors, who wanted to see dramatic change, initially held tire upper hand in
the administration. Because of this, the Kennedy administration would take a
somewhat contradictory position on the legacy of the Eisenhower
administration. On the one hand, they would argue that Eisenhower and his
team had bungled policy from 1954 through 1957, and on the other, they
viewed administration policy as having ‘improved situation’ in the region since
1958. They also used their often skewed perceptions of Eisenhower, to heavily
influence their projections of what new policy initiatives might work in the
future. Strikingly, they believed that US-UAR cooperation heralded tire end of
the UAR’s revolutionary phase and portended progress toward better relations
in the future. The UAR, as it had in the Eisenhower administration, remained
the centerpiece of US policy, including renewed optimism with respect to a
possible settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In South Asia, increasing
problems between India and China appeared to promise progress on multiple
fronts. Kennedy believed that the Chinese threat could mutate into Indian
support for US policies in Southeast Asia, and held out hope of a major pro-
Western reorientation of Indian foreign policy. Washington hoped that India
would reconsider its neutralist stance and move into a pro-Western and anti-
Communist alignment. The new administration believed that friction with
China would shift the focus of Indian foreign policy concerns away from
Pakistan and allow a compromise settlement on Kashmir.

In parallel, Kennedy and his more proactive advisors hoped to push
traditional regimes toward more liberal, if not democratic, policies. They
believed that the gradual introduction of reforms would result in a pro-Western
political stance. These reforms were intended to co-opt dissident elements and
broaden the base of popular support for the regimes. In theory, this process
would allow traditional regimes to develop more representative political
institutions. The idea was to prevent revolutionary explosions and the potential

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for the ascendance of anti-Western regimes. An important part of encouraging
and providing an atmosphere conducive to reform was to reinforce the
progressive but non-revolutionary model in those regimes that had already
dispatched, in one way or another, traditional rule. By incentivizing moderate
policies in states like the UAR and solving key regional conflicts over Palestine
and Kashmir, Kennedy and his advisors believed that they could reduce the
threat posed to the traditional regimes, making political reform a significantly
less risky proposition. A move to the political center would also increase the
influence of the West and lessen the opportunity for Soviet meddling in the
region. The new President concluded that the only way to achieve these goals
was through aggressive activism and his own personal involvement in
diplomacy. During 1961 and 1962, a series of situations unfolded that
completely undermined these plans. Nasser’s Damascene adventure suffered
an unambiguous collapse. What emerged in 1961 and 1962 was the education
of the Kennedy administration about the limitations of US power and
influence in the Greater Middle East.

Chapter 10: Courting Nasser, 1961
N e w B eginnings ?

In January 1961, the new administration made improving relations with
Nasser an immediate priority. Like Eisenhower before him, Kennedy and his
advisors believed that the UAR lay at the heart of almost every issue in the
Arab Middle East. It threatened the traditional and pro-Western regimes across
the region, played an increasingly important role in Africa, was a ranking
member of the non-aligned movement, and confronted Israel. There was also
the belief that Nasser had entered a post-revolutionary stage and was
progressing toward a more conservative stance on several key issues.
Unfortunately, the new US administration could not have been more mistaken.
Nasser was still the revolutionary who believed in the principles of the
Egyptian revolution: the destruction of imperialism and its ‘stooges’; the
ending of feudalism; and the ending of monopoly and capitalist domination. 1
These views were more than rhetoric. He still believed in the ‘permanent
revolutionary struggle’ described in Philosophy of Revolution. 2 Nasser still thought
that Egypt belonged to, and had an obligation to bring revolutionary progress
to, ‘three circles’ - the Arab, tire African and the Islamic. 3 As stated at
Bandung, he continued to oppose ‘imperialism’, ‘feudalism’, and ‘capital
monopoly’. 4 By 1955, the Eisenhower administration had become very familiar
with the troubling ideological element in Nasserist thought and actions and
recognized that the US could only successfully work with Nasser on a case-by-
case basis. 5

The incoming Kennedy administration failed to comprehend that a
fundamental ideological change had not in fact occurred in Cairo. In reality,
Nasser was simply busy, consumed by problems with Iraq and in Syria, as well
as the continuing confrontation with Israel and disputes with traditional Arab
regimes. Initially, for Nasser, Kennedy’s misunderstanding served a useful
purpose. He could use closer ties with the United States to his advantage. By
projecting himself as a nationalist and an anti-Communist, he gained US

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support, muted his opposition, and managed to keep the Israelis somewhat in
line. The UAR also received PL 480 grain and the promise of more aid. His
stature in Washington made him respectable in the view of some conservative
Arab states, mainly Saudi Arabia, and provided leverage against others.

By 1961, political, economic, and regional problems brought new pressures
to bear on Nasser’s regime. As one observer put it: ‘For nearly two years there
have been no revolutionary “victories” in the Arab World, and it has begun to
look as though President Nasser is stuck.’ 6 This situation directly affected
domestic Egyptian politics. Nasser relied on the lower middle classes for
support. The army officers who formed the backbone of the regime were
largely from those classes, and their continued support of his nationalist
ideology was critical. 7 The successes of 1954-1959 had focused these groups on
the great Arab revolutionary cause: ‘They kept their eyes fixed on distant
horizons and paid little attention to what was going on at home.’ The failure to
subdue Iraq, Habib Bourgiba’s defiance in Tunisia, and King Hussein’s survival
in Jordan had tarnished Nasser’s revolutionary vision for die Arab world. Many
believed that Nasser’s focus on Africa and the Congo conflict reflected the
failure of his Arab policies, an attempt to maintain Egypt’s revolutionary
impetus. 8 In addition, the thinly veiled nuclear-weapons program in Israel and
other forms of Western military support raised serious doubts about the utility
of a pro-Western stance, domestically or in foreign policy. Perceptive observers
concluded that the UAR was about to enter into ‘a new period of revolutionary
thrust, [in which] die future lies in a forward movement of anti-Western
extremism’. The stage appeared set for a radicalization of UAR foreign policy
and greater cooperation widi die Soviet Union.

Simultaneously, the Egyptian lower middle classes began to examine the
benefits of Nasser’s revolution, creating additional pressure for internal change.
Nasser’s program to reduce the dependence of the UAR economy on foreign
investment fit well widi his political program based on the Arab nationalist
ideal of ‘Arabia for die Arabs’. This trend was particularly pronounced in
economic areas long dominated by the minorities. The Egyptian government
nationalized the National Bank of Egypt and the pharmaceutical industry; both
moves were a blow to foreign and traditional Egyptian commercial interests.
With their foreign commercial ties, minorities felt more economic pressure,
backed up by the ever-present security services. In addition, the UAR
government used the Congo situation as a pretext for the expropriation of
Belgian property and commercial interests. Nasser made it clear that he
expected to transform the UAR into a ‘socialist cooperative’. Nationalization
provided some short-term political gains and relief from acute economic
problems, but it created long-term problems. Capital flight further constricted
the availability of foreign exchange. UAR foreign exchange, already low, faced
further depletion from the economic situation in Syria. Three years of drought
and crop failure had drained the coffers in Damascus and left Syria unable to
feed itself. This necessitated a shift of a significant amount of Egyptian foreign
exchange to prop up the Syrian half of the UAR. 9 The combined effect of

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195

Egypt’ s foreign, political, and economic policies placed political stress on the
revolutionary credentials of the regime, setting the stage for a radicalization of
policies.

Nasser: the Kennedy view

The technocratic bent of the Kennedy administration approached problems
from die standpoint that they could be properly managed through a
combination of sensitivity to nationalist ideals, high-level personal diplomacy,
and economic aid; the White House believed that Nasser would then abandon
revolutionary agitation and opt for a closer working relationship with the West.
This, in turn, would open the door to a peace treaty with Israel, closer US
economic ties, the further development of an anti-Communist front, and
perhaps an end to Soviet influence. In the State Department, the Middle East
experts took note of Kennedy’s ideas. On 9 February 1961, G. Lewis Jones,
Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, circulated a memo entitled, ‘President
Kennedy on the Middle East’. He used excerpts from A Strategy for Peace, in
which Kennedy had written: ‘American (and Western) Middle East policy over
the past eight years has been a failure’, advocating ‘a solution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute as a whole, not on a piecemeal basis’. Jones underlined that
Kennedy intended to focus on ‘helping people instead of regimes’ in the
region. Kennedy emphasized ‘revitalizing the Development Loan Fund’ and
developing a ‘Middle East Nuclear Center’ in Israel: something that actually
happened, but not as Kennedy had conceived it. 10 The memo put the State
Department on notice that the new administration had its own ideas about
what was possible. Whether those ideas were realistic or not remained to be
seen.

The memo also signaled the beginning of the traditional dance between a
new administration, with its own foreign-policy agenda, and the professionals
in the foreign-policy establishment. The latter almost always had a better grasp
of the feasible. This accounted for the note of skepticism in Jone’s memo. On
11 May 1961, Kennedy addressed a series of letters to Arab leaders. To a
significant degree, this bulk mailing was a screen for sending a very focused
letter to Nasser. After commenting on die ‘rich contributions’ of the Middle
East and invoking die ‘concepts’ of independence and non-interference
expressed by Americans from George Washington to Franklin Roosevelt,
Kennedy listed American contributions to Egypt. Ironically, all were
attributable to the Eisenhower administration, including support during the
Suez crisis of 1956, die Food for Peace Program, and other forms of
assistance. He promised more aid for ‘Middle East states that are determined
to control their own destiny, to enhance the prosperity of their people, and to
allow their neighbors to pursue the same fundamental aims’. The message
talked of a settlement to the Palestinian refugee problem dirough ‘repatriation
or compensation’ and offered US assistance in brokering a solution. 11 The
Kennedy message evoked memories of 1953 and 1954 and of Eisenhower and
Dulles; ‘cooperate with Washington and we will reward you’.

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The messenger had changed, but the message remained the same - with one
large problematic difference. Kennedy needed pro-Zionist votes to stay in
power. 12 Muhammad Heikal, Nasser’s confidant and the editor of Al-Ahram,
stated that Nasser’s early ‘admiration’ for Kennedy changed to ‘doubts’ and
‘hesitation’ on reports of Israeli and Zionist influence in the administration.
According to Heikal, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told Nasser that West
Germany had come under pressure from the Kennedy administration to sell
arms to Israel, so that the US could avoid the stigma of doing so. Whether it
was the Adenauer visit or rumors of secret arms deals, concern existed in Cairo
that Kennedy might not follow Eisenhower’s practice of refusing to supply
sophisticated weapons to Israel. 13 Fluent in English, Nasser was a voracious
reader of newspapers and political commentary. Without a doubt, he knew
more about Kennedy than Kennedy knew about him. Nasser believed that
Eisenhower had a stature and political independence that Kennedy did not,
and his cautious response reflected that belief. Nasser reviewed the history of
US-UAR relations and pointed to the improvement since 1958. But the
Egyptian President also made his position plain on die Palestinian issue. He
cited chapter and verse on all the Israelis’ transgressions and on their
unwillingness to compromise on a just solution for the Palestinians. Nasser
made it apparent that his options in dealing with the Palestinian issue were
limited, and that only real Israeli concessions could break die deadlock. 14

Nasser had also launched a domestic radicalization program. The Kennedy
administration missed the significance of this trend for two basic reasons. First,
administration experts believed that Nasser had become more nationalistic in
outlook and would focus on UAR economic matters instead of revolutionary
activity. 15 Second, Kennedy and his Middle East team of Komer, Talbot, and
Badeau believed that apparent ideological differences with Nasser were
expressions of frustration with Western hostility toward regional nationalisms.
Badeau, for example, recognized the ‘schizophrenic fears of neocolonialism’,
but he thought that this was manageable. He correctly argued that Israel
pursued policies that ‘served Israel’s ends, but not American interests’. 16 Talbot
believed that problems with Nasser were rooted in Dulles’ insensitivity and
fundamental ideological differences. What differentiated Kennedy from
Eisenhower in the Arab Middle East? Both wanted improved relations and
cooperation on issues of mutual agreement. The only substantial difference
related to the potential for what Kennedy termed a ‘comprehensive peace’. He
had learned nothing from Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ failures. 17

Talbot, Komer, and Badeau worked to control and coordinate information
that would place much of the tactical decision-making in President Kennedy’s
hands. Kennedy believed that his own personal touch would significantly
contribute to a settlement. 18 In effect, focusing on Nasser’s self-esteem would
improve the chances for his cooperation vis-a-vis relations with the Soviets and
for a peace settlement with Israel. 19 Next, just as the Eisenhower
administration had, Kennedy believed that economic development aid would
bring Egypt to an economic ‘take-off point and thus spawn pro-Western

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197

policies and potentially more liberal institutions. With relatively little additional
funding, the new administration believed that it would succeed where
Eisenhower had failed. Last, Kennedy believed that the traditional Foreign
Service was an obstacle to progress, and that he could avoid the bureaucracy by
bringing specialists and technocrats from outside the government into the
policy-making tent.

Nasser fails in Jordan

Just as Kennedy began the process of courting Nasser, the situation became
more complicated. Ironically, because of his anti-Communist campaign and
Iraqi propaganda, Nasser found himself being closely identified with the US; as
a result, he found his revolutionary credentials coming into question. Jordan
provided a case in point. In April 1961, the US and Britain had to make some
critical decisions about the extent to which they would continue to prop up the
Hashemite monarchy. Reduced aid and support would weaken King Hussein
and likely lead to collapse. The majority of any aid for Jordan would have to
come from Washington. The Kennedy administration would therefore make
the decision that determined whether or not Jordan could continue its current
anti-Nasserist course or come to an accommodation with the UAR.
Washington had either to support King Hussein or to allow events to take their
course. Both courses of actions had supporters, but the pro-Hussein element
had gained an edge. Even the financially-strapped British, came up with
additional funding. 20 After some debate, die Kennedy administration decided
that the ‘continued integrity, stability and pro-West orientation of Jordan’ was
in US interests. 21 In effect, Washington had dealt a serious blow to Nasserist
ambitions in Jordan. From this point on, every spring the British and American
would negotiate a new aid arrangement for Jordan. The British now had
Washington firmly on the hook to support Hussein. With Jordan more or less
secure, British interests in Jordan had waned as London focused on the Gulf.
The British assessment of the situation was confirmed when Washington
proposed to cut budget support in early 1962. 22 Wafsi al-Tal formed a new
government on 28 January 1962, replacing the Talhouni government. 23 As a
result, on 3 February, King Hussein and the new Prime Minister called US
Ambassador Macomber to the palace to make an ‘urgent appeal for full
restoration’ of US budget support. 24 King Hussein hinted that die combined
Anglo-American subsidy cuts would put him under great pressure from ‘many
elements in Jordan’ to accept aid from places other than his “Western friends’.
Threatening relations with the Soviet Union, he argued that he could hardly
‘deny’ the Jordanian people die ‘benefits’ that might accrue ‘from taking aid
from both sides in the cold war’. 25

On 6 March, Macomber learned that the British would not reverse dieir
decision about support for Jordan. Alarmed, he wrote to Washington:

Soon after my arrival, I concluded that Jordan was, internally, on a
descending spiral which, if not arrested, would in time almost inevitably

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lead (to) die reemergence of conditions here comparable to those of 1958
and 1956. If one considers what happened in Baghdad in 1958 as a 12th-
hour situation and what is going on in Iran at this time as an 1 1th- hour
effort to stave off such a situation, I have felt we were roughly at the 8th
or 9 th hour of a similar trend in Jordan.

Jordan’s supporters in die administration argued that King Hussein had
responded to calls for reform by installing Prime Minister Tal, and now his
reward appeared to be a reduction in aid. 26 Tal’s selection as Prime Minister
had been an attempt by Hussein to shore up his sagging popularity among
Palestinians and some East Bank Jordanians, but his lack of political experience
and ‘alleged association with die British’ made him vulnerable. 27 Reforms in the
various ministries and the civil service reduced corruption but seriously
alienated many of his supporters, including to some degree the army. 28 Tal
wanted to include the army, led by Lt. General Habis Majali, the Jordanian
Chief of Staff and brother of slain Prime Minister Hazza Majali, in die
‘cleansing’ program. This brought strong opposition, not only from Majali, but
also from members of the royal family who believed that Majali and the army
were too important to the regime to risk alienation. 29 Ultimately, King Hussein
had little choice but to support Majali, underscoring the limitations facing
reformist politicians.

In Cairo, Nasser understood that the lack of an appropriate accommodation
from Hussein was linked directly to US policy. 30 Hiding behind a British skirt
paid for with American dollars, an emboldened Hussein let Nasser know that
he wanted improved relations with Cairo, but on his own terms. In
correspondence with the Egyptian leader, Hussein stated that improved
relations were his goal, but Hussein dismissed ‘real unity’ with the UAR as ‘not
practical’. 31 Thus the UAR propaganda campaign against Jordan continued
unabated, and Amman retaliated in a way that undermined Kennedy’s
initiatives with Nasser. Amman radio called Nasser’s cooperation with the UN
peacekeeping force, among other things, a ‘liquidation of the Palestinian
cause’. 32 This placed Nasser in a position where accommodation on any peace
plan was impossible.

Siding with feudalism and colonialism

Also, in 1961 the UAR feud with Iraq took an unusual turn. Facing
escalating political and economic difficulties, Qasim revived Nuri Sa’id’s claim
to Kuwait. Iraq’s IPC negotiations with die British had become increasingly
difficult. The British used their oil interests in Kuwait to leverage new
concessions from Baghdad. Qasim had made periodic threats that he would
launch an anti-imperialist campaign over Oman, Palestine, and Arab oil. In
fact, on 1 May 1961, Humphrey Trevelyan, British Ambassador in Baghdad,
reported: ‘we would not read anything immediately sinister’ into Qasim’s
comments about ‘blood ties’ and ‘no frontier’ between Iraq and Kuwait, but as

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199

Courtesy of National Archives

JFK and Prime Minister Macmillan

Kennedy at Key West, Florida, in his first meeting as President with British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan. From left to right, Charles Bohlen, Kennedy,
McGeorge Bundy, Harold Caccia, British Ambassador, and Macmillan.

May and June progressed, die war of words escalated. 33 By using the crisis to
distract Iraqis from the problems at home, Qasim managed to back himself
into a corner. Although the exact decision-making process remains a mystery,
in late June Qasim began moving troops and tanks to the Kuwaiti border. 34
Whether this was an attempt to intimidate Kuwait into concessions or a serious
move to occupy its oil-rich neighbor, the outcome proved disastrous for
Qasim. Following a request for support from the Kuwaiti ruling family, the
British immediately dispatched marines and air units from Bahrain. 35

Prior to doing so, Prime Minister Macmillan made sure that the Americans
were on board ‘on this occasion’ and then asked the ‘Old Dominions’ for their
diplomatic support. 36 In March 1961, Macmillan had met with Kennedy to
solidify the relationship with the new administration in order to make certain
that there would be minimal policy disconnects. From Baghdad, Ambassador
Trevelyan warned that the Iraqis might use the situation ‘to convert an inter-
Arab quarrel into a first-class anti-British issue’. 37 The British further insisted
that the Kuwaiti ruler, Sheikh Jabir al-Alimad al-Sabah, make a public request
for assistance and ‘send a telegram through commercial channels’ to the UN
Security Council. 38 The British also quietly contacted the UAR government to
explain its position and to express its intention of immediately withdrawing its
troops after the crisis had passed. Once again, Qasim’s unpredictability placed
Nasser in a very difficult position.

As the self-appointed leader of Arab nationalism and unity, Nasser could
either support the ‘feudal’ Kuwaiti regime, or stand by and allow the colonial
British to do it. On 27 June, the UAR government perfunctorily stated: ‘Arab
problems should be settled by Arabs.’ He also acknowledged that Iraq was

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clearly in the wrong. 39 Nasser simply could not countenance his Iraqi nemesis
taking control of Kuwait, be it through occupation or intimidation. Rather than
see that happen, Cairo made a major policy shift. The UAR had systematically
opposed the admission of Kuwait to the Arab League, arguing that it was a
British colonial possession. Now, not only had Qasim threatened Kuwait, but
the British, followed closely by Saudi Arabia, had also moved troops to the
Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. If the Egyptian leader wanted to have any pretense of
leadership in die Arab world, a quick response was in order.

Cairo now feared that ‘feudal’ Saudi Arabia might actually grab part of die
mantel of Arab leadership. On 2 July, Muhammad Heikal published an article
in Al-Ahram entitled ‘A Bad Day for All Arabs.’ He stated that the motives
behind Qasim’s direat against Kuwait constituted one of ‘the great enigmas of
the Middle East’. He labeled it: ‘Suez in reverse’. In what can only be regarded
as an officially approved policy statement, Heikal argued: ‘The original Suez
symbolized the victorious struggle for Arab rights but Qasim had, by
threatening a small Arab country which had just become independent,
produced the incredible situation wherein Saudi and Kuwaiti troops were
standing shoulder to shoulder with British Imperialists who had returned with
no bloodshed and no shots fired facing an Arab army.’ 40 Attacking Qasim for
returning tire British imperialists to Kuwait proved too much of a temptation
for Nasser. 41 Nasser cast his lot with ‘feudalism’ and ‘colonialism’ to protect
another ‘feudal’ Arab state against revolutionary Iraq. As a by-product, on 20
July Cairo found itself diplomatically cornered, and agreed to Kuwait’s
admission into the Arab League. 42 The irony was complete. Nasser, of course,
made every effort to give the appearance of having a key role in the defense of
Kuwait and of making the defense an Arab affair. To this end, Cairo blustered
and made threats about UAR moves from Syria against Qasim. Nasser also
improved the UAR relationship with Saudi Arabia and even acquired Riyadh’s
contingency approval to base fighter aircraft at Dhahran in the event of
another Iraqi move toward Kuwait. 43 The Iraqi feint toward Kuwait did
uncomplicated damage to US-British relations with Iraq: now, British support
for Kuwait effectively removed British economic interests in Iraq and
London’s stake in the survival of Qasim; 44 this in turn removed London’s
economic incentive to moderate US policies toward Baghdad. The British
predicted the long-term reliance of the Kuwaiti ruling family on British arms, a
dependency that protected British oil interests in Kuwait and counterbalanced
IPC problems in Iraq. 45

As for Nasser, Kuwait did nothing for his declining revolutionary Arab-
nationalist prestige. He now needed a distraction and new successes. In no
small measure, this explains Cairo’s shift in focus from the Middle East to
Africa. Nasser believed that Africa, the last bastion of colonialism, presented
an alternative to the stalemate on die Arab front. Nasser supported the
Algerian liberation movement, but in places like Guinea, Mali, Somalia, and the
Congo, die Egyptian leader saw the potential for political and economic gain in
supporting anti-Western nationalist elements. Israel had made steady

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201

commercial gains, with the clear intent of compensating for the Arab boycott
in Africa; therefore, Nasser argued that he was challenging Zionism. The UAR
also needed markets for the manufactured goods of its developing industry. 46
With the support of revolutionary African rulers like President Nkrumah of
Ghana, Nasser began to push policies that clashed with Western interests.
Then, in the Congo, the assassination of leftist Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba by pro-Western elements became a specific rallying point. Nasser’s
interests and those of the Soviet Union coincided once again. 47 Nasser’s
African thrust may have been ideologically consistent, but it carried little
domestic weight, increasing his need for an Arab success. At die same time, the
Kennedy administration was becoming more aware that its obligation to pro-
Zionist voting blocs made improved relations with die UAR problematic. 48

The Syrians call it quits

The creation of the United Arab Republic had been the catalyst behind
Eisenhower’s rapproachment with Nasser. The new potential political reality
that it represented was part of the Eisenhower legacy, and formed a key
element in Kennedy’s perception of and policy toward die region. It drove the
President’s personal focus on the relationship with Nasser. The UAR meant
that Nasser controlled two of the three confrontation states, and the third,
Jordan, was expected to fall under UAR direct or indirect control. Viewed
from the prospective of 1956-1960, Nasser appeared to have transformed Arab
unity and nationalism into ‘the wave of the future’. Then, on 28 September
1961, the Syrian military mounted a coup, arrested Egyptian Field Marshal
Amer, Nasser’s viceroy in Damascus, and announced withdrawal from the
UAR. Nasser’s reaction was swift and emotional. He attacked the Syrian
‘reactionaries’ for restoring the power of ‘feudalism and capitalism’. He
reserved special attention for the Ba’th Party, stating: “We would not allow
them to divide the Syrian people through discrimination similar to racial
discrimination with Ba’thists getting all the privileges and other Syrians being
deprived of everything.’ He accused the Ba’th command structure of plotting
secession for personal gain. 49 Given the competition with Qasim in Iraq and
his uneasy relationships with the more conservative Arab states, die Syrian
coup was a bitter disappointment. The Syrians and Ba’thists countered, stating
Nasser had caused the split by threatening Arab unity, nationalism, and
socialism. 50 These bitter exchanges, added to those with Iraq and Jordan,
further radicalized Nasserist policy.

Nasser correctly identified the principal opposition to his socialization of
Syria as the entrenched middle class and the wealthy. He believed that they had
organized and financed the coup, and that he should have dealt harshly with
them from the beginning. He concluded that the only way to preserve the
revolution in Egypt was to follow a policy of ‘no appeasement’ in dealing with
reactionary elements. He ordered the ‘socialist measures’ passed during the
previous summer to be put into full effect. On the night of 16 October 1961,
police and security units arrested scores of wealthy individuals with links to the

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old regime. The various newspapers began printing lists of wealthy individuals,
along with editorials describing die impact that these ‘parasitic’ elements had
on society. On 22 October, Zakariya Mohieddin, Vice-President and Minister
of the Interior, made additional arrests and initiated the sequestration of
property and assets belonging to the wealthy. The attacks on the wealthy
served to deflect popular attention from the failure in Syria. 51 In a statement
issued on 4 November, Nasser argued that the arrests and confiscations were
to ‘clear the way’ for the ‘people’ to take control of the ‘social revolution’. The
people would realize this control through three new popular government
organs: the National Congress of Popular Forces; the Constituent Councils for
the National Union; and the General Congress of tire National Union. In Al-
Ahram , Heikal wrote: ‘the revolution now requires genuine representatives of
the people and their aspirations’ but ‘these representatives must share a “unity
of thought”.’ 52 While the internal radicalization had no doubt been long
considered by Nasser, the Syrian situation made it serve the dual purposes of
neutralizing die rich and diverting die attention of the masses.

The British took some delight in Nasser’s Syrian come-uppance but could
not fully savor the moment. London fretted that any attempt by the Egyptians
to recoup their position in Syria might involve Jordanian intervention. Such a
move would create great risks for King Hussein, and would necessitate the
removal of Jordanian troops from Kuwait, where they were serving as a
deterrent to possible Iraqi adventures. 53 In Washington, diis Arab eruption
came as a surprise, and presented the Kennedy administration with a
problem. 54 Kennedy hoped that by refraining from taking advantage of
Nasser’s situation, the resulting goodwill might result in Cairo making some
accommodations. The administration faced the delicate problem of preserving
the ‘personal relationship’ with Nasser while dealing with the new government
of Syria. Komer quoted Kennedy as saying: ‘Look, I’m going to have to tell this
guy we’re going to have to recognize the new government because it is the
government that’s in power, but let’s explain our policy.’ To soften the blow,
Badeau met with Nasser, prior to US recognition of Syria, to deliver a personal
message from the President and to explain the US position. 55

In Cairo, Ambassador Badeau feared that Syrian attacks on Egypt for
conspiring with die US against the Arab cause would compel Cairo to
demonstrate its anti-imperialist credentials. Badeau prepared Washington for
Egyptian ‘attacks on the US’. 56 Nasser would have to demonstrate that he was
not tire US’ ‘chosen instrument in the Middle East’. 57 The US Embassy in
Amman refuted rumors that they were ‘working with opposition elements’ in
Jordan in an effort to replace die current regime and instal another with ‘pro-
UAR policies’. 58 On 16 October 1961, McGeorge Bundy queried Secretary of
State Rusk on behalf of the President: ‘The President is greatly interested in
what policy we should pursue, in the post-coup situation, toward both Egypt
and the new Syrian regime. Is the at least temporary loss Nasser has sustained
likely to lead him to turn his energies more inward and to create opportunities
for bettering US-Egyptian relations via US development assistance?’ 59 The

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President still lacked a firm handle on the situation. In response, INR at State
warned that Nasser would continue ‘building up his own position’ vis-a-vis
East and West and providing litde or no quid pro quo. 60

On 16 November, in a formal NSAM, Kennedy’s foreign-policy advisors
recommended: While we are not enchanted by what Nasser appears to have in
mind with regard to both internal and external affairs, the current psychological
setting would appear to be more favorable than at any time since Suez for
sympathetic attention to tire UAR’s aid requirements.’ NEA cited the fact that
the US ‘did not kick him when he was down’ and that a ‘promising personal
relationship between President Kennedy and Nasser had been developed
through exchanges of letters.’ 61 Meetings in October with Senator Hubert
Humphrey offered some encouragement to dais view. Nasser told Humphrey:
‘I am not a Communist, I am a leftist’ and ‘I am not a Marxist in the true
sense.’ He also strongly defended African socialist leaders whom the US had
branded as Communist. 62 In reporting, die US Embassy in Cairo emphasized
Nasser’s views on Communism, repeating his statement describing ‘Arab
Communists as traitors’. Nasser commented that he was aware that
Communists directed and backed by Moscow were ‘reviving popular front
technique in Near East and Africa’. 63

Nasser’s ‘declaration of independence from advice’

A follow-up memorandum signed by Dean Rusk on 10 January 1962 further
illustrated Washington’s optimism. Borrowed almost in its entirety from
Talbot’s memorandum of 3 January, it argued that systematic aid to the UAR
should continue in order to ‘encourage orderly economic development’ and to
‘provide [Egypt with] significant Western alternatives’ to prevent the UAR’s
economic and political dependence on the Soviet bloc. This memorandum
recommended an official visit by Nasser to Washington. It pointed out that
UAR representatives had played a ‘restraining influence’ during the Palestinian
refugee debate in the UNGA. 64 Referring to the Rusk memo, George Ball
attempted to advance a potential Nasser visit from November to April 1962.
Among other points, Ball believed that the visit would modify Nasser’s ‘radical
domestic policies directed toward “social justice’” and his belief that the
Zionist lobby directed US policy. It would also advance ‘the personal
relationship between you and President Nasser for future exploitation’. 65
Komer added: ‘It is the Arab/Israeli issue which makes a visit difficult;
paradoxical as it may seem, however, better relations with Nasser might give us
more leverage toward promoting an ultimate Arab/Israeli settlement than any
other course.’ 66

Almost simultaneously, the Kennedy administration received another
warning that it had misjudged the fundamentally revolutionary nature of
Nasserist politics. Following a five-day visit to Egypt, Chester Bowles, an
advocate of better relations with Nasser, wrote an assessment of the UAR. On
21 February 1962, after meeting with Nasser and key members of the UAR
government, Bowles described the leadership as functioning with the backdrop

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of a ‘colonial past, scarred by deep-seated suspicions, frustrations, and plagued
by a sense of weakness and inferiority’. Bowles added: ‘All this leads me to
believe that the current US view of Nasser and his colleagues is oversimplified
and defective. We have underestimated the basically revolutionary character of
the regime.’ 67 The White House was not yet ready to acknowledge the
ideological warning implicit in Bowles’ telegram. 68

Events soon validated Bowles’ warning. On 22 February, the day after the
cable was sent, Nasser delivered a speech accusing the US of ‘improper
activities in Syria and attacking Jordan over the Johnson Plan’. 69 Surprised, the
administration placed Nasser’s visit on hold. 70 In explaining the decision,
Talbot revealed that the administration was catching on: ‘Following so closely
on Nasser’s talk with you, his speech makes it apparent that he has present
priorities higher than that of creating an atmosphere that will permit him to
deal normally with us and with more limited repercussions.’ Referring to
Nasser’s outburst as ‘a declaration of independence from advice’, Talbot hoped
that the visit could be rescheduled for December. 71 The trip ultimately fell
through, as a result of political concerns that it could do Kennedy domestic
political damage with the Zionist lobby and Jewish voters, and cause problems
with Congress. 72 At a conference in June 1962, Talbot stated that it was
‘important to remember that the White House was staffed by people who do
not as yet have full perspective’ on the problems in the region. 73 He supported
the Nasser visit and agreed with the chiefs of missions from around tire Arab
world, but as a political appointee, he discreedy put the best face on an
embarrassing situation.

Nasser was also weighing the pros and cons of the situation. The Algerians
had just succeeded in winning their independence from France; thus US
support for a setdement was no longer of value, and perceptions of
cooperation were hurting die Egyptian leader’s revolutionary credentials. 74 The
US had undermined his plans in the Congo. Seeing little to be lost, Nasser
decided to use President Kennedy’s correspondence to counter Arab criticism
over his cooperation with Washington. On 10 September 1962, Muhammad
Heikal informed Ambassador Badeau that Nasser had decided to publish
portions of his letters to President Kennedy in die newspaper the following
day. Heikal explained that this resulted from attempts by Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Syria to undermine Egypt by claiming that Nasser had sold out the
Palestinians in return for US aid. 75 The abuse heaped upon Kennedy in late
September made what Talbot had earlier called “Nasser’s declaration of
independence from advice’ look tame. On 22 September ‘The Voice of the
Arab Nation’, a clandestine UAR radio station, used parts of the Kennedy
correspondence, not previously published in Al-Ahram, to criticize Kennedy
personally. The broadcast specifically called US economic aid a ‘method of
enticement’ and a ‘foolish’ attempt by President Kennedy to ‘find a basic
solution to Middle East problems’. The article and the broadcast created a
major stir. The White House reacted by telling Talbot and Badeau to call it to
the attention of their UAR counterparts, but not to make a formal protest. 76

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The public rejection of Kennedy overtures and use of die correspondence
revealed for the first time the real value that Nasser placed on his personal
relationship with President Kennedy. It was not reassuring. Nasser would
shortly make the independence of his policies even more apparent.

Israeli complications

Nasser’s frustrations with the Kennedy administration increased in other
areas. During the later years of the Eisenhower administration, Israel had
attempted to obtain Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. Tel Aviv always received the
standard answer that the US government did not want to contribute to an arms
race in the region by supplying advanced weapons to anyone. In the spring of
1962, Kennedy offered, via Shimon Peres, to provide the Hawks to Israel. In
this case, Kennedy’s offer was to demonstrate support for Israel with one eye
on the upcoming presidential campaign in 1964. In the election of 1960, the
Jewish vote had made the difference, and Kennedy knew it. 77 George Ball
stated that the Hawk decision was a ‘gesture toward Israel’, pure and simple,
and it was hailed by Israeli propaganda as a ‘first step toward a tacit US alliance
with Israel’. 78 In commenting on Kennedy, Golda Meir stated that the US was
‘in effect, Israel’s “ally”’, and the Hawk sale confirmed it. 79

The meandering path of the Hawk sale provides additional illumination. On
9 July 1962 Talbot, in NEA, specifically recommended that the sale should not
take place, citing the lack of a credible threat from the UAR. In addition,
Secretary Rusk argued that the US should not be the first to introduce such
sophisticated weaponry into the region. Rusk also made it clear that the State
Department did not feel that Israel’s recalcitrance with regard to die Johnson
Mission and its retaliatory raids into Arab territory should be rewarded. 80 A
week later, Bill Bundy at Defense undermined State by taking the position that
the Hawk would not ‘shift the balance of military power’ in the region. 81 In
August, Secretary of State Rusk changed his position and recommended that
the Hawks be sold to Israel after getting Nasser’s reaction, with the intention
of increasing Israel’s security and thus its flexibility in its current policies. That
same day Rusk submitted the Johnson Plan for an Arab-Israeli peace to
Kennedy. The Hawks were to provide a quid pro quo for acceptance of the
Johnson initiative. 82 On 9 August, writing to Myer Feldman, Kennedy’s
counselor for Israeli and Jewish affairs, Talbot argued that the Hawk offer
should only be made with the proviso that Ben-Gurion made progress on
disarmament issues with Nasser and supported the Johnson Plan. 83

Fearing a ‘most violent opposition’ reaction from Ben-Gurion, Feldman
suggested that he deliver the letter to the Israeli Prime Minister. 84 Kennedy
agreed. 85 Given the marked distrust and insinuations from other Kennedy
administration officials concerning Feldman’s relations with the Israelis, it is
not inconceivable that Feldman warned Ben-Gurion not to react to the
Johnson initiative but to wait for an Arab rejection. Ben-Gurion undoubtedly
knew the specifics of the Feldman mission well before the latter arrived in Tel
Aviv, given Feldman’s contacts at the Israeli Embassy. 86 Ben-Gurion

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immediately began to put conditions on Israeli acceptance of the Johnson Plan.
Rusk saw the power-play coming and on 20 August he cabled Feldman: ‘I
hardly need stress that it would be most unfortunate if Israelis were to end up
with the Hawks and strengthened security assurances while being responsible
for derailing the Johnson Plan before it could even be given a good try.’ 87
Nasser pointed out that his acceptance of the Hawk transfer and the Johnson
plan would open the UAR up to the charge that he had sold out the Arab
cause for US aid. Citing the propaganda war against the UAR over Israel, he
argued that a departure from Eisenhower’s negative position on modern
weapons would create an arms race. 88 From Nasser’s perspective, the US
decision to supply Hawks showed growing Israeli influence with Kennedy and
served to remove yet another inhibition on the part of the UAR leadership to
resume its export of revolutionary Arab nationalism.

Revolutionary Arab nationalism reborn

Egyptian ties to Yemen dated from the 19th century and Muhammad Ali’s
campaign. By the mid-20th century, various Yemeni Imams had made some
half-hearted attempts to modernize their country. One of these efforts was to
introduce new educational opportunities, and most of the teachers were
Egyptian. The Egyptians were providing military advisors and training, and the
Soviet Union had also begun to supply arms and some advisors. 89 In April
1961, the Egyptian Consul in Ta’iz reported an assassination attempt on Imam
Ahmad: ‘more Yemenis wish Imam Ahmad dead than wish him to remain
alive.’ He described Yemen as disorganized and so ‘steeped in corruption and
treachery’ that everything could collapse, leaving the Soviet bloc ‘with its
fingers deep in the Yemeni pie’. 90 Soviet aid programs had ‘earned much
greater good will’ in the Imamate than American aid, and Nasserist support for
Yemeni claims to Aden and the Protectorate was popular. Nervous about
Aden, London believed that: ‘If [Yemen] cannot be induced to be actively
friendly, every effort should be made to keep it neutral.’ 91 Geopolitically, close
ties to Egypt made sense to the Imam. At odds with Saudi Arabia and die
British in Aden, the Mutawakkalites needed friends. Recognizing the tie, the
Eisenhower administration even changed representational responsibility for
Yemen from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to that in Cairo. 92

The Kennedy administration believed that Nasser and Egypt represented a
progressive, anti-Communist middle way between the ‘feudal’ despotism of the
Imam and Communist penetration. Kennedy’s policies closely followed those
of Eisenhower. Both administrations came down squarely on the side of
reform and change. Neither wanted significant commitments in southern
Arabia, nor direct involvement. Badeau summed up this policy, stating that US
policy support for monarchies has ‘played into the Russian hands as they ...
depict [the US] to the Middle East as the supporters of the vanishing order’
while they support revolution. He then added that he believed ‘that the
traditional order is doomed’ and that ‘radical change’ was probably the ‘wave of
the future’. 93 In December 1961, while doing his ideological house-cleaning,

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Nasser renewed his commitment to revolutionary nationalism, and added his
former ally the Imam of Yemen to the list of obstacles to Arab unity and social
reform. 94

When Nasser talked about feudalist states supported by Western
imperialism, the Saudis undoubtedly ranked highest on the list. Komer stated
that Kennedy ‘got pretty bored with his correspondence with Faisal . . . one of
those conservative Arabs of the old puritanical Wahhabi sect’. Most
correspondence with Feisal was left to the White House staff, while JFK
handled Nasser’s personally. 95 Badeau’s view of Saudi Arabia typified the
administration’s evaluation: ‘Faisal, coming to power, will seize eleventh hour
chance to introduce needed reforms and thus assist in securing Saudi stability
for at least immediate future.’ 96 By 1961, the power struggle between King
Saud, who was supported by his sons; Crown Prince Feisal, who was
supported by his half brothers, also known as the ‘Sudayri Seven’; and a group
of young reformers aligned with Prince Tallal ibn Abd-al-Aziz al-Saud was
nearing its conclusion. 97 During an official visit by King Saud to Washington,
on 13 February 1962, President Kennedy discussed a list of issues with the
King, including internal reform and support for Kuwait against Iraqi claims. 98
King Saud predictably raised the issue of US support for Nasser. He also stated
that the US needed to force the implementation of various UN resolutions on
the Palestinian problem and to oppose more openly British and French
colonialism in Aden and Algeria. 99 In contrast, Talbot and Ambassador Hart
met with Crown Prince Feisal in Riyadh on 17 February and discussed in detail
the relationship between Nasser’s destabilizing effect and the need for reform
in the Kingdom. Feisal understood and focused on the critical issues. 100

During this period, US unhappiness with King Saud grew. Saud complained
constantly about die status of US military assistance to the Kingdom. 101 He
also pushed for attacks on Nasser, accusing the Egyptian President of selling
out to Israel in return for US aid. Then he complained bitterly about the US
failure to provide radio transmitters to counteract Cairo Radio’s attacks on the
Kingdom. 102 This served to underscore the US position vis-a-vis the inter-Arab
struggles. The US gave aid to Nasser to leverage a peace setdement with Israel.
Nasser attempted to undermine the Saudis, who complained to the US about
aid to Nasser. The US reassured the Saudis, who attacked Nasser for trading
the interests of Palestine and the Palestinians to the US for aid. This made it
impossible for Nasser to seriously consider a settlement with Israel even if he
had been inclined to do so. The new administration was slowly beginning to
appreciate the lack of any real desire on the part of the Arab states to find a
solution to their differences with Israel or, for that matter, each other.

The Israeli half of the peace equation

Israel’s nuclear program, coupled with its intransigence on regional issues
like the role of the United Nations, Jordan water, and Palestinian refugees,
undermined any attempts by the White House to find solutions to the

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Courtesy of National Archives

Kennedy with King Saud

Kennedy with Saudi Arabian King Saud ibn Abd-al-Aziz at Palm Beach, Florida
during the King’s 1961 official visit to the US. At the time, Saud was in a power
struggle with Crown Prince Feisal for control, and Kennedy, uncertain of the
outcome, was attempting to maintain good relations with both.

problems in the Middle East. Politically, the Kennedy administration could not
push for concessions from Israel. The British view was blunt: ‘In any event
Israel will remain the albatross of western policy in this region.’ 103 Political and
economic instability also contributed to Israeli intransigence. A political crisis
developed over the 1954 Lavon Affair. 104 In the winter of 1960-1961, the
Israeli economy experienced a sharp downturn, with price rises and inflation
not being matched by increased ‘receipts’. Concern over its growing isolation
fostered more intensive efforts to apply political pressure on the White House
for support. Myer Feldman arranged regular meetings between the President,
senior administration officials, and the leadership of various pro-Zionist
organizations. 105

On 4 January 1961, Ben-Gurion promised the Eisenhower administration
that the US would be allowed access to Dimona. On 30 March, President
Kennedy inquired about the status of the visit to Dimona and was told that the
Lavon Affair crisis had delayed the visit. After discussions with the Israeli
ambassador, the State Department concluded: ‘Having given his word, [Ben-
Gurion] does not like being pushed by the United States’ and that given his
political difficulties, he could not afford to add a ‘Dimona Affair’ to the list. 106
On 30 May 1961, both the Palestinian refugee problem and the Dimona
reactor came up in a meeting between Ben-Gurion and President Kennedy in
New York, during the UNGA. The two leaders agreed that American nuclear

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experts would be allowed a cursory ‘inspection’ of the Dimona facility. The US
could then confidentially reassure the Arab states of the peaceful nature of the
facility. When informed of die arrangement, the British were less than
impressed, stating: ‘We doubt whether reassurances from the Americans will in
practice reassure the Arab states that Israel is not preparing for nuclear
weapons development; publicly, at least, it will be difficult for the UAR to
accept on this question die word of a country consistendy represented as a
main prop of Israel. We dierefore regard some form of international or failing
that, neutral inspection as essential.’ When provided with a summary of the US
‘inspection’ of the Dimona facility, the British concluded: ‘The U.S. scientists
were not as persistent and thorough in their enquiries as they might have been.’
The Foreign Office pointed out that the US had ‘no evidence’ that would
convince the Arabs that the facility was anything other than a nuclear weapons
center. London’s suspicions were further aroused when they learned from the
Canadian government that Israel was attempting to find alternate sources of
uranium. 107 Taking heed of British and Arab skepticism, the US pressed Israel
to allow ‘tree-world’ access to the Dimona reactor. Having ‘accepted at face
value Israel’s assurances that its development was peaceful’, the White House
actively sought to convince the rest of the much more skeptical world that it
was not being duped. 108

On the refugee issue, the Israeli government clearly understood that the
Eisenhower administration had supported the repatriation of or compensation
to the Palestinians who had lost property in 1948-1949. Support in the new
administration for the Johnson Plan created serious concern in Israel. Ben-
Gurion had vehemently stated his opposition to any repatriation in June 1948 -
‘no Arab refugee should be admitted back’ - and his position had not
changed. 109 Naively, Kennedy appeared to believe that the Israelis sincerely
wanted a reasonable settlement with the Arabs, and would compromise. The
White House failed to understand that Israeli opposition to Arab repatriation
was absolute. At their May meeting, Ben-Gurion told Kennedy that the UN
Palestinian Conciliation Commission would fail because the Arab states merely
wanted to use the Palestinian refugees to destroy Israel. The President
nevertheless pressed ahead, asking Ben-Gurion to consider options for a
solution. Washington was mildly encouraged by signs that the Israelis were
actively considering the issue, when in reality die American focus on the
refugee problem had set off alarms in Tel Aviv. 110 The Israelis viewed any
compromise on the refugee issue as ‘the slippery slope’. 111 Even when offered
the sweetener of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, long denied to Israel by
Washington, Ben-Gurion greeted repatriation with ‘a severely skeptical
response’. Ben-Gurion then proposed preconditions to the Johnson Plan that
he knew were unrealistic and that Nasser would reject. 112 Just to make certain
that all involved understood die official Israeli position on refugees, on 6
November 1961 the Knesset passed a resolution against repatriation of
refugees, while making vague promises about compensation. 113

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Ben-Gurion and other Israeli officials had not given the Kennedy
administration any consideration on a single key issue, not the nuclear
program, nor Jordan water, nor the Johnson refugee plan. In contrast,
Kennedy had significantly compromised Washington’s position. US
government contacts with the Israelis would bring a predictable list of military
and economic aid requests, accompanied by a litany of complaints about
American aid to Nasser. During much of 1961, the Israelis complained of
‘cooling’ relations with the US. It was a ‘deliberate’ pattern of behavior. To
support their argument, die Israelis would then list the military items that the
US had refused to provide. US officials would then bring up Israel’s lack of
support for plans to rectify the Palestinian refugee situation and die need for
additional substantiation of the peaceful purposes of Israel’s nuclear
development program. 114

Repeating the past: the end of Kennedy’s Middle East peace

In 1962, the Kennedy administration again focused on the Johnson Plan for
refugees, and resurrected the Johnston Plan for the Jordan river valley. The
Arabs were showing a decided reluctance to agree to the refugee plan, and Dr.
Johnson himself believed that only an extraordinary level of involvement on
the part of the President had any hope of bringing results. He was also
concerned that the Kennedy had lost interest in the effort. 115 This was a repeat
of the Eisenhower plans that had failed in 1953-1955; nevertheless, the
Kennedy administration, looking for some means of fostering Israeli-Arab
cooperation, issued a policy directive on 26 February 1962, calling for US
support for water projects ‘consonant with die Johnston Plan’. 116 Johnson’s
own apprehension about the potential for the success of the refugee plan and
the Administration’s attempt to unofficially revive the Johnston plan clearly
indicated that Kennedy policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute had
returned to its Eisenhower roots. Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, could not point
to a single concrete issue where he had supported an Arab cause vis-a-vis
Israel. The Israelis had successfully blunted all efforts to wring concessions
from them, and now they focused on making certain that Nasser did not gain
additional influence in Washington. 117

Between January 1961 and September 1962, the Kennedy administration
relearned die lessons taught to Eisenhower between 1955 and 1958. Neither
the Arabs nor the Israelis were interested in realistic compromise. The Israelis
had newfound political leverage in Washington, via a narrowly-elected
Democratic president who needed Jewish votes. They had no reason to
compromise, because ultimately the resident at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue was
in no position to keep them honest. The Arabs still saw little to be gained from
an administration that desperately needed domestic Jewish political support.
Nasser saw less reason to pursue strengthening his ties with Washington. The
US and Britain were also moving more into line on policy issues. The
imbroglio over Kuwait eliminated disagreements with the US over how to deal
with Iraq. In addition, the Kuwaiti crisis served to underscore the fact that

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Britain refused to act unilaterally without specific US agreement. Now largely
out of Iraq, tied by treaty to an independent Kuwait, lacking substantial
relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, British influence clearly rode US coat-
tails in the Arab world.

For the Arabs, the Syrian secession increased Jordan’s chances of survival.
The two most powerful Arab states and their respective revolutionary regimes
were struggling. From the US perspective, the situation in Iraq had improved
with the decline in influence of the Communist Party, but the Kennedy
administration’s hopes for its relationship with Nasser seemed to be in trouble
as Egypt spiraled toward potentially more aggressive internal and external
policies. In Saudi Arabia, the struggle for power between Crown Prince Feisal
and King Saud continued, but there were indications that Feisal might be
gaining the upper hand. In addition, Washington had once again been
sensitized to the US interests in Saudi oil. As the fall of 1962 approached, most
of die tendencies pointed to the return of the Kennedy administration to the
fundamentals of past policies, but a catalyst for making them coalesce was
lacking. That catalyst would shortly appear.

Chapter 1 1 : Iran at ‘the Eleventh Hour’

The situation in Iran best illustrated the degree to which Kennedy’s White
House inherited the policies of Eisenhower, and conversely how subsequent
historical interpretations have focused on minor differences in order to build a
case that Kennedy policy was more progressive and reform-minded. For both
administrations, Iran was a critical, if problematic, part of their commitment to
confront and contain die Soviet Union through defense alliances. Both wanted
to eliminate the sources of instability through economic development and
social and political reform. While the short-term results of these policies were
almost identical, Kennedy’s divergence from Eisenhower on the key issue of
support for the Pahlavi dynasty had significant long-term repercussions. The
Kennedy administration, in seeking to free itself from the Shah and find an
alternative to his rule, miscalculated and ultimately bound itself and the United
States even more tightly to the fortunes of the Pahlavi dynasty. In a series of
decisions driven by a combination of ‘hyper-activism’, inexperience, hubris,
and distrust, Kennedy and his closest advisors temporarily succeeded in
excluding the traditional foreign-policy apparatus from the decision-making
process. 1 This temporary situation resulted in a misunderstanding of the nature
of Iranian political instability in May 1961, which ultimately led to the situation
where US fortunes and those of die Shah were one and the same. After a brief
flirtation with an alternative political power center, Kennedy would find, as had
Eisenhower’s administration before him, that no real alternative to the Shah
existed. 2

Kennedy’s direct support for and endorsement of Prime Minister Ali Amini,
followed by a belated realization that Amini had no real political backing, left
Kennedy no option but to offer die same level of support to the Shah. By
overestimating the potential of the National Front opposition, by
misunderstanding the political crisis in Iran, and by underestimating the ability
of the Shah to manipulate the situation to his advantage, the Kennedy
administration tied the United States to personal support of the Shah that only

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213

ended in 1979. The fear of an Iranian collapse drove this well-intentioned but
ultimately ill-conceived policy. 3 Ambassador Macomber in Amman expressed
the administration’s view most clearly when he described Iran as being at the
‘11th hour’. 4 Just as Eisenhower had worked assiduously not to become ‘the
man who lost Iran’, Kennedy was, if anything, even more determined to avoid
that distinction. 5 The new administration believed that it faced an imminent
crisis requiring special focus. To that end, Kennedy ordered Phillips Talbot to
set up and chair an ‘Iranian Task Force’. In die administration’s view, the Shah
was ‘weak’, ‘insecure’, and driven by ‘a huge megalomania’, making him ‘very
difficult to deal with’. 6 Because of the Shah’s apparent instability, Kennedy and
his advisors concluded that the Pahlavi rule and a pro-Western Iran were on
the verge of collapse.

Soviet threats and Iran

Was the situation in Iran drat serious? Probably not, but in defense of
Kennedy’s foreign policy team, the situation was frightening. In a 10 April
1961 meeting on the Black Sea, Khrushchev told Walter Lippmann that despite
weaknesses in the Communist Party, Iran was a ripe for revolution. The Soviet
Premier stated: ‘You will assert that the Shah has been overthrown by the
Communists, and we shall be very glad to have it thought in the world that all
the progressive people in Iran recognize that we are the leaders of die progress
of mankind.’ 7 Taking an alarmist view, the Kennedy administration believed
that only immediate and extensive reform could save the regime. Instead of
viewing the latest Kremlin pronouncement in the context of Khrushchev’s
1959 diplomatic embarrassment in Iran, the White House took the Soviet
leader’s statement as a direct challenge to its ‘pay any price, bear any burden’
pronouncements. Kennedy also believed that Iran could become the model for
the growth of democracy and Western economic ideals in the Middle East and
the Islamic world, a case study in economic development and reform. 8
However, in January 1961, Iran appeared to be the next Iraq, and the new
administration was convinced that only ‘reform’ could save it. 9 With regard to
reform, Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s tactics were similar, as was the Shah’s
reaction. Kennedy should have been in a stronger bargaining position. Three
years had passed since tire turmoil of 1958, and yet the ability to influence the
Shah’s rule proved as elusive for Kennedy as it had for Eisenhower. Like the
previous administration, Kennedy and his advisors recognized that the US
needed Iranian telemetry sites and an anti-Communist Iran. The question
centered on what was the best Iranian political vehicle to support US interests.

The Shah’s perspective on US-Iranian relations

Immediately after the inauguration, the Shah sent Kennedy a letter
addressing Iran’s potentially ‘bright future’ and citing its natural resources and
lack of overpopulation. The Shah argued that his rule had replaced one of
‘martial law’, ‘tenure of power’, ‘intimidation’, ‘blackmail’, ‘mob rule’, and
‘surrender to the domination of communism’. He stated: Tran is the one

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country that enjoys a democratic regime with all the freedoms except the
freedom to commit treason and to betray the interests of the Fatherland.’ He
then pointed out diat this ‘bright future’, to which Iran was ‘entided’, required
military assistance that ‘only America can furnish’. Playing the neutralist card,
the Shah stated: ‘These times are fraught with danger and the question is not
whether any one country is to remain more or less within the committed group
of nations.’ The Shah pointedly declared that Iran was ‘the key to the region’,
and thus the ‘key to Asia’. The Iranian monarch then offered a rhetorical
question: ‘Would it be too much to hope that you will bear dais in mind when
you decide upon the assistance which you are willing to extend to Iran for her
economic development as well as for her military support?’ 10 The Shah
requested that Kennedy meet the Deputy Iranian Prime Minister on the latter’s
upcoming trip to Washington, and suggested topics for discussion: the
Communist danger; the insufficiency of US military aid; the necessity for more
economic aid; and an increase in Iranian oil production. The attachment then
stated: “Without these actions, doubt may arise in public opinion about the
utility of the present policy of Iran.’ 11 The Shah wanted more military
assistance in return for his support of containment.

The Kennedy administration faced the same conundrum that Eisenhower
confronted for eight years; if not the Shah, then whom? The Iran Desk Officer
John Bowling produced a pessimistic white paper on the potential for
democratic government in Iran, stating: ‘The term “political compromise”
cannot be translated into everyday Persian without a connotation of “sell-out”’;
‘The urban middle class has historically had no interest in or knowledge of
financial realities’; and ‘Democracy in the Western sense means nothing to the
urban middle class’. He pointed out that die emergence of urban middle class
leadership with political power might bring class war and retribution against
the wealthy. Bowling concluded that the threat could only be halted by
‘stopping the process of culture clash, and that is impossible in the world
today’. The report also saw no ‘competent’ leadership emerging from the urban
middle class, the military, or the traditional leaders, including the clergy,
landlords, and very large merchants. It concluded: ‘There is one potential
leader who has die necessary ability, personality, and talent, and whose political
capital is not yet quite exhausted. That is the Shah himself.’ 12 Riots in January
and February 1961 left the Shah increasingly dependent on the security forces,
‘which are not, in our view, very dependable’. Washington feared an alliance
between civilian and military dissidents to overthrow the Shah. 13 The Soviets
also increased pressure for a neutral Iran. Fearing a Soviet-Iranian
rapprochement, the NSC called for a reaffirmation of US support for Iran,
saying: ‘Given the psychological make-up of the man, it is always possible that
he may move a considerable distance toward neutralism.’ 14 The Iranian
monarch had convinced Washington that non-alignment was a real option.

Just to make certain that the message was clear, the Shah sent General
Teymour Bakhtiar, chief of SAVAK, to Washington to emphasize that die
Shah was concerned about the sincerity of the United States. Bakhtiar and

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

215

Iranian Ambassador Ardeshi Zahedi contended that Soviet pressure might
force the Shah to come to terms with Moscow. Just to make his point, in late
February 1961 the Shah announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to accept
a high-level Iranian delegation headed by the Prime Minister to explore
avenues for lessening tensions between the two countries. In the Kennedy
White House, concern mounted: ‘The Shah believes that he has been
grievously mistreated by the United States and that he has not received the aid,
which he considers to be the rightful price of his adherence to CENTO. He
may break up CENTO, out of pique or out of a calculated desire to go
neutralist for its political, military, and economic benefits.’ The report added:
‘He sees no other substantive benefits in CENTO; he does not really trust his
regional allies.’ 15 Washington’s perception of the Shah’s ‘troubled and confused
mind’ played again to the monarch’s advantage. 16 A neutral Iran would have
been a disaster for the US.

Doing something about Iran

Thoroughly alarmed, the President dispatched Special Presidential Envoy
Averell Harriman to Iran in March 1961. Harriman explained to the Shah the
budgetary constraints facing the new administration. The Ambassador’s
conclusions vis-a-vis the situation in Iran decisively affected the new
administration and reflected Eisenhower’s views. Harriman wrote the President
saying that he was impressed with the improved standards of housing, the
‘appearance of the people’, the level of education, and ‘substantially’ reduced
unemployment. Harriman also remarked that the professionalism of the army
and bureaucracy were much improved, and offered the following analysis: ‘On
the one hand, Mullahs and large landowners oppose progress, and on the
other, national front (Mossadequists) are rabble-rousers and give little promise
of stable government, and are probably infiltrated by Tudeh influence. Shah is
at die moment our only hope of stability with pro-West policy. Neutrality in
Iran would today mean Communist takeover.’ Harriman went on to say: ‘I
believe Shah should be supported, dealt with frankly, and not treated as an
unwanted stepchild.’ He concluded that the Shah wanted social, economic, and
political reform including the ‘development of democratic institutions’. Citing
natural resources, under-population, and a ‘close association with the West’,
Harriman stated: Tran is a good bet if social advance and political stability can
be achieved.’ 17 The Ambassador’s message mirrored the Shah’s own arguments
in the 26 January letter to Kennedy and the views of the previous
administration.

At the NSC, Komer reacted to the Harriman report by fuming at George
McGhee about the ‘old refrain’ from the State Department. In a memorandum
entitled ‘Do-Nothingism in Iran’, Komer ranted to McGeorge Bundy and Walt
Rostow: ‘Sure, says State, the real threat to Iran is internal rather than external.
Sure the Shah is a vacillating weakling who cannot be pressed too hard. Sure
we must still rely on him as our chosen instrument until we get something
better. But are we still debarred from anything more than further “delicate

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inferences” by our ambassador, plus giving him some more Baksheesh?’
Komer went on to say that all die State Department had to offer was a view of
‘what we should have been doing for the last five years’. Wanting the US to act,
Komer argued: ‘One of the key reasons why the Shah diinks as he does is that
we have not made enough of high level effort to educate him. For my money,
Harriman did more in a few hours than Wailes in diree years.’ Pontificating,
Komer stated: ‘Hence, with authority of “New Frontier” behind us is not now
the time for frank re-orientation of our efforts and greater pressure if
necessary?’ He concluded that the Shah needed to be told that it was in his
‘own best interest’ to face up to the ‘stark realities of life’. 18 It remained to be
seen who would ‘educate’ whom on these stark realities.

Citing Iranian ‘determination to carry out the necessary stabilization
measures’, Kennedy advisors concluded that ‘crucial elements’, including timely
US aid and rapid steps toward a Third Development Plan, would determine
Iran’s success or failure. 19 On 27 March, Thomas E. Morgan, Vice-Chairman
of die Policy Planning Council, concluded: ‘It would appear preferable that the
United States would be best advised to continue its present policy of
reassurance to the Shah of United States sympathy and support, along with
persistent but delicate inferences by our Ambassador to the effect that the
Shah should devote his attention to his internal political problems.’ Morgan
added that the United States needed to monitor the Shah’s dealings with the
Soviet Union closely. 20 Morgan’s memo contributed to the cumulative
frustration and concern in the White House and provoked an explosion of
sorts on the part of Walt Rostow.

Scoffing at ‘delicate inferences’, Rostow irascibly asked: ‘Can’t we get more
specific in the matter of “Inducing” tire Shah to win the confidence of the
urban middle class?’ Exasperation rising, Rostow bombarded McGhee at State
with questions:

Should we not back, for example the notion of tire Senior Development
Corps, which, I understand, is incorporated in the Third Iranian Five-
Year Plan? ... Should we not support the proposal in the Third Iranian
Five-Year Plan, which would allocate increased resources to the private
sector where a new class of acquisitive businessmen of some competence
is emerging? ... Is it really out of the question to establish contact with,
and perhaps - in appropriate ways - to induce the Shah to bring into his
administration a limited number of able and reasonably reliable new men
rising in Iranian society? . . . Should we not strain the capacity of our staff
work resources in Washington to clarify the direction we should like his
[US Ambassador to Iran Julius C. Holmes] ‘delicate inferences’ to take?

. . . Should we not make a fresh try to come to a more solid understanding
with the Shah on the nature of our security commitment to him and
concerning the purposes his military establishment should fulfill? If
joining CENTO is impossible, is there not some way to increase his sense
of security about American support? 21

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

217

Rostow saw the looming impasses that faced the Eisenhower administration,
and he could not accept drat they were insurmountable. Worse, he feared that
the inability of die Shah to control the situation might result in another 1953,
something the new administration wanted to avoid at all costs. For Rostow and
the administration, the notion that a solution to social and economic problems
could not be engineered in a pro-Western country with ample natural resources
was simply unacceptable. The possibility flew in the face of everydiing that
Rostow believed about economics and nation-building. Rising to the challenge,
Rostow went to Professor T. Cuyler Young at Princeton University with a
series of questions. How does the United States get the Shah to deal effectively
with die unrest in the urban middle class without creating in him an ‘intolerable
sense of personal insecurity’? Rostow wanted a formula to reconcile the
irreconcilable. He wanted the Shah to liberalize and give the urban middle
class, who hated him, a stake in the government. He wanted the urban middle
class co-opted into the Pahlavi state, and he wanted to alleviate Iranian
xenophobia toward outside help and influence. 22

Professor Young told Rostow that the Shah based his support on the army,
security services, and upper classes, and that any step taken that detracted from
their power and wealth would probably bring his downfall. The professor also
questioned whether or not the Shah had any real intention of political
liberalization: ‘The difficulty was that the Shah was sold on the idea of creating
a political situation, where there was no real political alternative to himself’
Young stated that the only way to get the Shah to seriously look at reform
might be through some sort of ‘shock treatment’. 23 In addition to his
suggestion of ‘shock treatment’, two weeks later Young suggested an approach
vaguely akin to nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, reduction of die
army, and, the clincher, Iranian acceptance of Soviet aid and ‘pro-Western
neutralism’. The professor called this list his ‘top ten suggestions’ for change in
Iran, Soviet aid and neutralism being the tenth. 24 Sound or not, the professor’s
ideas did not make the ‘top ten’ list at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Iranian
control of the oil industry and pro-Western neutrality were unacceptable.
Rostow wanted to believe drat the Iranian cloud had a silver lining but, like it
or not, he and the president faced the same policy impasse that had plagued
Eisenhower. Doing somediing about Iran might alienate or unseat the Shah,
for whom they had no alternative.

The eleventh hour arrives?

May 1961 brought a conclusive demonstration drat the Shah responded only
to Iranian necessity, and not to pressure from the United States. On 4 May,
Washington learned that a teachers’ strike in Tehran involving more than
50,000 demonstrators had ended in a violent confrontation with security
forces, with perhaps hundreds of casualties. The following day, Iranian Prime
Minister Jafar Sharif Emami and his cabinet resigned. On 6 May, the Shah
appointed the former Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Ali Amini, as Prime

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Courtesy of National Archives

Chester Bowles and Philip Talbot

Chester Bowles and newly-sworn-in Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, Philip Talbot. Talbot’s realistic support for Pakistan caused
Bowles, a former and future Ambassador to India, regret Talbot’s appointment.
Bowles had wanted to be Secretary of State but lost a power struggle with Dean
Rusk and became Under Secretary.

Minister. Amini was a favorite of those in Washington advocating reform.
Amini accepted the position on the condition that the Shah dissolve the Majlis,
not exactly a democratic move, create a special court to try cases of corruption,
and give him the right to name the cabinet, with the exception of Minister of
Defense. The Shah agreed, and on 9 May Amini presented his new government
to the Shah. The new Prime Minister, not particularly politically liberal himself,
quickly banned demonstrations and began a series of meetings with the striking
teachers to discuss their problems. 25

Within the US administration, the turmoil in Tehran brought the arguments
about Iranian policy to a head. At the 5 May NSC meeting President Kennedy
expressed concern that he was not closely enough informed on the situation in
Iran. 26 An intelligence report entitled ‘Tehran Situation Critical’ contributed to

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

219

the sense of urgency. The report stated that the teachers’ strike incited by the
National Front ‘may start a chain reaction with undetermined results.’ The
report added: ‘The court is very much alarmed, particularly so as it is the
feeling that none of the troops in Tehran would fire against striking teachers.
. . . Tomorrow is a critical day for die regime should major demonstrations
reoccur and should security forces refuse to fire in the event of need, the
outcome may gravely direaten the Shah’s regime.’ 27 Concerned, Kennedy
instructed Secretary Rusk to set up a crisis task force on Iran. Rusk tasked
Talbot with putting a task-force plan together. 28 The manner in which the
Iranian Task Force came into being provides some insight into the power
struggle over Iranian policy in Washington. Rostow and Komer, among others
in the White House, wanted to take the policy formulation portfolio for Iran
out of the State Department. It was Rusk’s rice bowl, and he was an
experienced Washington bureaucrat. To head off the power play, Rusk
appointed Talbot to head the Task Force. Talbot and Rusk had a history that
went back to World War II and India. 29 Rusk could not be certain how the
Talbot move would work, but the risk with Talbot was preferable to the certain
knowledge of trouble if someone like Komer took over. By appointing Talbot,
Rusk appeased the White House staff with an ‘outsider’, while maintaining
control through a State Department official that he knew.

On 7 May, Talbot responded with a lengthy document that included the
plan for a task force and a series of options and recommendations for dealing
with Iran. The options ran the gamut from ‘Full Support of the Shah’ to
‘Support of the Mosadeqists \sh\ ’, to ‘Replacing the Shah by Military
Leadership’, and finally to ‘Limited Support of the Shah’. The position paper
argued that ‘Full Support of the Shah’ was the weakest option for the long
term and predicted that an ‘eventual explosion, when it came, would be
directed as much or more against the United States as against the Shah.’ In
addition, the report argued that the ‘successor regime would be virulently anti-
Western and proportionally open to communist penetration.’ This prediction
was a vision truly through a ‘dark glass dimly’: Talbot, in effect, saw what
would happen 18 years later, minus the Communist takeover he had envisaged.
The Task Force’s ‘second extreme alternative’ was to support a Musaddiqist
takeover by peaceful means or coup, and allow ‘the United States to roll with
the punch of history’. Talbot described the immediate cost as ‘immense’,
including Soviet aid for Iran, abandonment of CENTO, heavy pressure on
American oil interests, and anti-Western agitation by ‘communist demagogues’.
Talbot added: ‘The prospects for Communist penetration of the nation would,
for the short run, be greatly enhanced.’ This option was a non-starter. Talbot
and the Task Force dismissed military leadership as a dead-end, arguing that no
military leader had sufficient stature to replace the Shah. The more extreme
solutions were out.

This left only one option. Talbot and his group recommended ‘Limited
Support for the Shah’, the same position taken over eight years by the
Eisenhower administration. This support included die economic and financial

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aid to prevent a collapse, ‘a reasonable minimum of military assistance’, and
‘advice to die Shah’ about placating or winning over his ‘Mosadeqist
opposition’. The report went on to state that while the ‘Middle ground
between the regime and the Mosadeqists is narrow and shaky’, the Task Force
believed that Amini’s emergence as Prime Minister improved the chances of a
successful compromise. In the end, Talbot concluded that the Shah’s view of
US support was so closely tied to military aid that it had to continue. The hope
existed that as only a potential goal, the other forms of aid might eventually
lessen the Shah’s focus on the military. Talbot stated that the US should
‘continue to adhere to the basic policy of Eisenhower’s July 1958 letter to the
Shah which focused attention on improving the operational proficiency of
existing forces.’ The key foreign-policy makers in the Kennedy administration
concluded that die Shah was a temporary alternative for American interests in
Iran and that his collapse would be viewed as an US failure. 30 This
interpretation of the US predicament in Iran was almost identical to that of the
Eisenhower administration, with one exception: the Kennedy administration
intended to use the Amini government as a new ‘alternative’.

Support for Amini

The tenure of the Amini government would be inextricably tied to the
White House’s hopes and support for reform in Iran. As Komer, underlining
for emphasis, stated on 18 May: ‘ The gut issue was how far we should really go
in supporting Amini .’ He added: ‘All Task Force members agree that Amini’s
moderate reformist program offers the only good alternative to an unpopular
military dictatorship or a Mosadeqist revolution.’ 31 The program’s survival
would be a litmus test for liberalization within a pro-Western framework. The
US Embassy in Tehran had a different take on the Amini government.
Ambassador Wailes wrote to Washington, arguing that the United States
should not ‘publicly’ support or oppose Amini because his appointment
reflected the Shah’s ‘perturbation over deterioration political and economic
situation’. Wailes went on to say that, while Amini might have initial powers
greater than those of previous Prime Ministers: ‘it remains to be seen how
much authority Amini can retain’ if the ‘Shah as expected’ could refrain from
interfering in government operations. The Embassy argued that it did not see
Musaddiqists as an immediate threat and believed that the United States should
refrain from offering ‘advice’ where there was no chance that the advice would
be taken. Ambassador Wailes absolutely opposed support for local
government, arguing that it would cause political chaos. 32

Washington ignored the advice from Tehran. At the NSC meeting on 19
May 1961, Kennedy, acting on recommendations from the Iran Task Force,
decided to ‘make a major effort’ to back the Amini government. 33 The
recommendation read: ‘Amini appears to be the best, and maybe the last, hope
of averting political chaos and the possible loss of Iran to the West. The U.S.
should take vigorous action to assist him in stabilizing the situation and in
building a new political synthesis through a broad program of moderate

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

221

reform.’ 34 While the Task Force feverishly worked to quell the crisis and avert
the imminent collapse of the Pahlavi regime, the Shah was vacationing in
Norway. He obviously had a different take on the gravity of the situation at
home. The Shah also had a different take on Amini. On 13 May, the Shah
stated that Amini was only popular due to the fact that he had been out of the
public eye. The Shah knew that Amini’s popularity would fade as soon as his
followers understood that he could not meet their ‘demands’. As for
neutralism, die Shah stated that he would rather abdicate than countenance a
neutralist policy on the part of the new government. ‘Such a policy would lead
to (an) eventual Communist takeover, and was totally contrary to his personal
convictions.’ 35 On 23 May, an SNIE concluded: ‘Should Amini be able to
stabilize the situation sufficiendy to enable the Shah to recover from his
present fright, the latter will move to resume the dominant position.’ 36 The
prognosis squarely hit the mark.

Amini: ‘the last hope’

The appointment of Ali Amini as Prime Minister was a shrewd move on the
part of the Shah. Amini was an American favorite with the image of a
pragmatic reformer, but the Shah knew his man. Quasi-liberal reformist
sentiments were one tiring; ruling in Tehran was quite another. Amini had an
authoritarian streak that would emerge. By saddling him with die problems of
government, the Shah undermined him as an alternative power center. No
head of government in Tehran could please the competing factions; Amini
would prove no different. The new Prime Minister would have to pursue a
balancing act that would isolate him politically and make him increasingly
dependent on the Shah for support. Amini’s appointment offered another
advantage. The Shah saw Amini as a potential lever on the United States. The
Shah could claim to be supporting a reform candidate, and Amini could take
the lead in demanding more military and economic aid. As things would
develop, Amini’s appointment gave die Shah even more leverage than he could
have hoped for. Against the advice of Ambassador Wailes and the Iran experts
in the State Department, the Kennedy administration, urged on by Komer and
others, moved to directly support die Amini government. Komer and others in
the administration simply could not get it through their collective heads that
the National Front was not the primary threat to die Shah and that Amini was
not the key to controlling the National Front. They could not grasp, or perhaps
admit, that the Shah, not Amini, was the ultimate arbiter of tilings Persian, and
that Amini was merely the Shah’s latest creature. Ambassador Julius Holmes,
Kennedy’s appointment to replace Wailes and his unwelcome advice,
understood this almost immediately and focused his attention on the Shah, but
the White House staff continued attempting to solve the problem of Iran by
using a flawed set of assumptions.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Amini takes the reins

From May until late July 1961, the Amini regime doggedly tried to drive
reform. Amini’s anti-corruption campaign even included die arrest of a handful
of generals. 37 Amini managed to negotiate a settlement of the teachers’ strike
by giving in to the strikers’ demands, which eventually put additional stress on
the government budget. 38 In addition, he appointed Muhammad Derakhshesh,
the rabble-rousing leader of the Jame’eh-ye Mo’alleman-e Iran (‘Iran Teachers
Association’), as Minister of Education. 39 As the financial crisis continued, the
US provided a series of grants and loans to alleviate the immediate fiscal
pressure. 40 By June, Amini had garnered some additional political support from
the Shah and there was hope that the Shah might acquiesce in a ‘more
ceremonial role’. 41 US support for Amini created a ‘breathing space’, and the
Shah’s support for the time being appeared genuine. The situation on the
financial front improved as well. The immediate budgetary crisis passed, and
the long-discussed land-reform programs got underway. 42 Along with
improvement came signs that the Shah might reassert himself. Commenting to
the diplomatic community, the monarch stated: ‘If Amini’s objectives were not
[mine], Amini would not be Prime Minister.’ 43 Washington hoped that Amini
could avoid a direct confrontation with the Shah over reform measures and
security issues. 44

Optimism was short-lived. In August 1961, frustration in the White House
once again approached boiling point. Washington had made an unprecedented
commitment to Amini’s success, and there was nothing dramatic to show for
it. The Iranian Task Force bombarded Amini with a plethora of well-meaning
but often confusing or useless advice. Land reform was a case in point. The
administration became concerned that it was proceeding too quickly and that
the focus should be on ‘land tenure ’, not ‘land distribution ’. Other suggestions
included: ‘Any approach to land reform should be in the context of the Third
Development Plan’, or ‘attention should be paid to the prerequisite measures
which are called for in the so-called ‘Consolidation Program’. 45 Fearing chaos,
the British worried, as related by the Indian Ambassador, that Amini and
Minister of Agriculture Hassan Arsanjani ‘had burned their boats’ by pushing
too far, too fast. 46 Arsanjani had been an outspoken advocate of land reform in
Iran since the early 1950s. 47 When Arsanjani’s ideas found their way into law,
the British argued that it was basically ‘illegal’ and only succeeded in alienating
most of the landowning class. 48 The British cautioned that US support for
reform would actually undermine the regime.

In a contradictory approach, Washington overtly pushed for land reform,
and simultaneously counseled Ambassador Holmes to talk to Amini about
putting die brakes on his program. Arsanjani made no secret that he wanted a
sweeping land-reform program that would start a genuine revolution by
‘lighting land reform fires in the countryside . . . which would eventually
become a conflagration’. The Shah was experimenting as well. Land reform
extended the control of the central government into rural areas at the expense
of the landowning classes, and could serve to bolster his popularity by creating

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

223

a new base of support among the peasant classes. 49 The fact that Amini and
Arsanjani were leading the effort also provided an opportunity for the Shah to
shift the blame, if things did not go well.

Despite all the initial concern and trepidation about the instability in Iran, by
August 1961, the Kennedy administration realized that a lack of progress on
reform had not brought a collapse. It had become apparent that Kennedy and
his advisors had underestimated the resiliency of the Shah and his ability to
deal with the situation. Just as former Ambassador Wailes had predicted,
instead of Amini pushing the Shah toward the National Front and political
reform, the Shah actually pulled Amini into his camp. To maintain power,
Amini now had to accommodate the Shah and suppress the National Front,
the very group whose support Washington had believed Amini would attract.
In short, the Shah had subverted the ‘American’ Prime Minister and engineered
his isolation from alternate power bases, simply by making Amini the
instrument of the regime’s escalating attacks on the National Front. This
transformed Amini into just another political creature of the palace dependent
on the Shah for support. 50 This outcome was exactly the opposite of what the
Iranian Task Force had had in mind when it decided to support ‘last chance’
Amini die previous May. 51

Amini, reform, and the reaction in Washington

The reaction in Washington to the lack of progress by Amini was as
entertaining as it was instructive. At the NSC, ‘Blowtorch’ Bob Komer, in a 4
March memorandum to the President, pointed out that since the
administration’s anointment on 19 May of the Amini government ‘ as the best,
and perhaps last chance of averting political chaos and possible loss of Iran to
the West . . . the situation has gotten worse instead of better.’ 52 Obviously
frustrated, Komer stated that while Amini had announced a ‘vigorous reform
program’, execution was difficult, ‘especially in a gimcrack country like Iran’. A
thoroughly alarmed, and alarmist, Komer stated that Iran was ‘treading on the
thin edge of potential disaster’. ‘Desperate times call for desperate measures’,
he intoned. He argued for: ‘Treat[ing| Iran as a real crisis situation by using
Iran Task Force (on Vietnam model) as an operating mechanism, largely as a
means of keeping pressure on State.’ Asserting that ‘This is no time for too
much haggling’, he also believed that the US had to keep Iran financially
‘afloat’. Amazingly, Komer concluded that should Amini fail, the United States
should prepare a contingency plan for a military or National Front
government. 53 It seemed not to occur to the President’s principal NSC advisor
that the Shah would just name a new government.

Komer’s memo did raise President Kennedy’s level of aggravation. On 5
August, Bundy requested an update on the situation in Iran. The Iranian Task
Force forwarded a memo with the analysis from its 2 August meeting.
Eisenhower’s NSC could have written it. Amini and Shah were ‘firmly resisting
neutralist pressures from right and left’. Amini ‘has not been able to capture
the imagination of large sectors of the population while at same time adjusting

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to the political and legal realities of the situation.’ Komer went on to state: ‘It
appears inevitable that the Iranian Government will soon request a
considerable budget grant from the United States in order to avoid breaching
its economic stabilization agreement with the IMF and losing drawing rights
under that agreement.’ The report also pointed out that the threat of mass
unemployment loomed larger, and the Shah continued to press for more
military assistance and support. 54 Under Amini, nothing had changed.

Reacting to the discouraging news, Kennedy pressed the bureaucracy for
action. Through Bundy, Kennedy expressed his concern that the Amini regime
had ‘lost much of its initial momentum’ and lacked a political base. The
President was also concerned about the additional costs associated with
propping up the Amini government. He asked: ‘If the situation seems to be
deteriorating rather than improving, are there any further steps which the US
could profitably undertake?’ The memo included the usual questions about
whether or not the Iran situation was a crisis that should be given the same
‘treatment’ as South Vietnam. The President queried: ‘Can we . . . glamorize the
new “Third Plan” and get the Iranian population to enthusiastically support it?’
He wanted to know how the US could help Amini ‘generate a political base’,
‘get a more competent cabinet’, ‘split the National Front’, or get more support
from the Shah. 55 A note of desperation had begun to creep into the
administration’s internal dialogue. It appeared that the President had signed up
to support Amini’s sinking ship.

Kennedy wanted additional options from the State Department. Komer,
who viewed the reply as too pessimistic and non-activist, sent it back for them
to ‘completely redo’. Given the ‘can-do’ atmosphere of the White House,
Komer wanted action. The option paper went back for a more palatable
version, namely one that agreed with Komer’s preconceived notions.
Describing the attitude among the ‘Old Persian hands’, including Peyton Kerr
and John Bowling, as ‘fatal resignation’, Komer concluded that the US ‘would
have to live sooner or later with a chaotic Mosadeqist regime.’ Komer stated
that he had reassured State that the White House was not going to ‘push the
panic button’ and potentially make tilings worse. 56 As a consequence of the
White House attention, Armin Meyer in NEA asked Ambassador Holmes in
Tehran for his opinion. The letter discussed ‘anxiety at the highest levels’ and
requested an assessment and prognosis of the political situation. In short, they
wanted Holmes’ view on Amini’s survivability and their theory about creating a
‘bridge’ between the Shah and his National Front opposition. Nervous, Meyer
also wanted some confirmation that he had been correct to argue that Iran did
not face die danger of immediate revolution. 57

Ambassador Holmes responded on 27 August 1961. Holmes argued in
effect for institutionalizing the primacy of the Shah in US foreign policy. He
hammered home the point that there were no current or foreseeable
alternatives to the Shah and that he deserved the full support of the United
States. Holmes made it clear that Amini had the critical support of the Shah,
the military, and conservative elements of Iranian society, but the Ambassador

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

225

pointedly added that without the Shah’s support, the Amini government would
not survive. Holmes sought to educate the administration to die fact that no
government survived without the blessing of the Shah. Second, he predicted
that if tire Shah’s support continued, the Amini government would survive for
‘some time’. Holmes also chided Washington for expecting too much too
soon.

I do not now fully share the apparent deep concern reflected in your
letter. For one reason, I do not see how anybody, and particularly a
Persian dealing with Persians, could have begun to make significant
progress towards this goal in the chaotic situation in which the Amini
regime came into office and in the short time it has been in power. ... I
strongly believe that it is unreasonable to expect notable progress towards
so difficult a future.

Holmes also stated that he saw no real threat of ‘immediate or crucial political
crises’. 58 The Ambassador saw problems, but not a crisis. Lewis Jones in the
NEA Bureau concurred: ‘The situation in Iran could never really be called
good. Iran was somewhat like an individual . . . consistently subject to a low-
grade fever. ... There was no clear evidence of crisis but sometimes the
temperature was down a little . . . and sometimes it was up a little.’ Jones added
matter of factly that ‘sometimes the fever went up and the patient died.’ 59 NEA
had a far better grasp of the situation than the Kennedy brains trust.

Holmes also debunked the perceived threat posed by the National Front,
stating that they ‘possess no unity’ and ‘cannot agree on a political program.’
Holmes argued that for this reason the National Front, or ‘neo-Mosadeqist
elements’ as he termed them, should not be included in the government. The
Ambassador asserted that the National Front would merely form a disruptive
element and ‘have a profoundly negative effect on the stability of Iran and on
our interests here.’ Aware of the activist bent of the administration and their
rejection of Wailes’ appeal not to take a more direct role in supporting Amini,
Holmes admitted that he risked being labeled as supporting the status quo , but
he believed that change would occur at an Iranian pace and ‘not by dramatic or
violent action’. 60 Holmes’ analysis poured cold water on Komer and the NSC.
He minimized anti-American agitation, stating that it fluctuated wildly and
could not be used as a barometer of US relations. He dismissed fear of Iranian
neutralist sentiment, believing that it was overstated. Like Wailes before him,
he counseled patience.

Talbot chooses sides

During this period, in one of the most important internal developments,
Talbot began to support Holmes. Talbot visited Iran in August 1961. On 7
September 1961, he reported Amini to be a competent administrator, but one
who did not ‘seem to possess the characteristics of a charismatic popular
leader.’ He found the Shah ‘ebullient and articulate’, but almost entirely

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focused on military issues as opposed to the economy. Talbot noted that the
National Front opposition was disorganized and unable to mount an effective
challenge to the Shah or the Amini government. The evaluation of the
economy was dismal, with ‘no panaceas’ or ‘grand slam solutions’ to Iran’s
‘deeply rooted problems’ in sight. He told the Iran Task Force that there could
be ‘no sudden quick solution’. Talbot also stated that he saw no immediate
threat to either the Shah or to Amini’s government as long as Amini
maintained good relations with the monarch. 61 The Talbot trip and report
squelched talk of an immediate emergency and reoriented Washington’s focus
to the coming financial crisis. Ambassador Holmes also emerged as the least
pessimistic US senior official on the future of Shah and as his greatest
supporter. 62

Tied to a policy of direct support for Amini, but believing that the Shah was
the real power in Iran, Holmes gradually transitioned US policy toward direct
support of the Shah. The catalyst for this transition would be die failure of the
Amini government. Having publicly supported Amini, the US government
could hardly revert to an Eisenhower-like distancing vis-a-vis the Shah.
Kennedy had let the ‘genie’ out of the proverbial botde. It was now abundandy
clear that the only means of reform that included a pro-Western government
lay through the Shah’s rule. Playing a key role, Holmes increasingly took the
Shah’s side on military assistance, in part to maintain his own relationship with
the monarch and to some degree in hopes of furthering reform. Thus the
Kennedy administration would not only fail to establish an alternative to the
Shah or to improve his relationship with die National Front, but it would, in
fact, permanently establish the personal rule of the Shah as the only real option
for US policy.

The outcome of the August ‘mini-crisis’ in Washington enhanced Holmes’
influence. Quick to take advantage, he forwarded a request for military
assistance to Rusk who had asked for a ‘Check List for Iran’. On 13
September, Holmes responded widi what would become his standard position.
Holmes stated that while a reduction in military expenditures was desirable and
would free up financial resources for economic development, the adverse
effects would ‘outweigh [the] benefits’. The Ambassador argued that the
internal social and economic weaknesses and the requirement for reform made
military assistance a critical element, stating: ‘At the moment, and I venture to
say for the next five years anyway, the Shah and the armed forces hold the key
to the stability of this country.’ He argued that without modernization, a
disgruntled military might be tempted to stage a coup, bringing any benefits
accruing from Amini’s reform programs to naught. Holmes then laid out his
military-assistance plan for Iran; this called for a reduction in Iranian standing
forces, but a significant upgrade in equipment and training for the remaining
units. Holmes estimated the cost saving at $50 million, and he believed that the
modernization would bring the Shah around to Washington’s views on
reducing military manpower. 63 When the Pentagon balked at supplying modern

Iran at “The Eleventh Hour”

227

arms, Holmes countered that the United States ‘must back the Shah to the hilt
as our ‘chosen instrument’” in Iran.

The Ambassador also managed to wrest some control of Iranian affairs
away from the Task Force and the NSC. Komer and Bundy, of course,
opposed this move, but their recent, somewhat unfounded alarms about Iran
had undermined their credibility. The White House had begun to wonder
whether the Task Force was worth the effort, and whether it should just be
reconstituted for the next crisis. Even Komer had some doubts: ‘Changing
situations may periodically alter the value of task forces. They are more useful
in a clear crisis situation than in an episodic one - during hiatus between action
problems they’re often a nuisance .’ 64 Circumventing the foreign-policy
apparatus had its complications.

Amini on the slippery slope

While this jockeying occurred within the US bureaucracy, in Iran tire Shah
was under growing pressure from some of Iris closest supporters to get rid of

Courtesy of National Archives

Chester Bowles and Julius Holmes

Chester Bowles and the new Ambassador to Iran, Julius Holmes. Bowles had saved
Holmes’ State Department career by securing him this post, but later regretted it
because of Holmes’ stalwart support of the Shah’s ambitions over reform in Iran.

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Amini. 65 It was not a coincidence that the pressure and threats aimed at Amini
paralleled discussions in Washington about the new military-assistance package
(MAP) for Iran. The Shah knew that Holmes and the MAP officers in Iran
supported a program that reduced die Iranian military from 200,000 to 150,000
men over three— five years, while substantially increasing the number of
modern weapons and amount of training. The Defense Department opposed
the plan, and wanted a more severe reduction. The Shah let Holmes know that
he would not agree to reductions without significant modernization. 66

At the Shah’s insistence, Holmes raised die issue of an official visit to
Washington. Talbot rejected the request, arguing that Iran was ‘now near the
bottom of the trough into which it has slid’. The White House was concerned
about the reception that the Shah might receive and about the potential
political fallout from a visit in which the Iranian monarch made exorbitant
demands for military aid. In a stinging letter to Talbot on 7 December, Holmes
countered: ‘I should be less than frank if I did not convey to you my deep
sense of disappointment on receiving your letter.’ Holmes pointed out to
Talbot that a visit to Washington was not a ‘reward for good conduct’ but
rather an ‘instrumentality for ensuring good conduct’. Holmes argued diat the
Shah had committed himself to reform and to the support of die Amini
government, and to let the opportunity pass for President Kennedy to
reinforce that progress would be a mistake. ‘We should leave no stone
unturned to make sure that the momentum toward these goals does not falter.’
Holmes then asked why no one questioned a visit by Nehru or Sukarno, and
yet a visit by a ‘proven friend’ came under scrutiny. “We have only to
contemplate die damage to our prestige and our position in the Middle East
which would result from Iran’s defection from the Free World to realize how
great a return we are getting for out money.’ Holmes then attacked the
assumptions made by the Iran Task Force with regard to the potential of the
National Front and ‘rising urban middle class’. He concluded his blistering
retort by saying: ‘Your letter surprises me. To my mind we should not seek to
offer the Shah courtesies that may give him satisfaction . . . but rather to take
action to cause him to do die things we want him to do in die interest of the
United States, and Iran too for that matter.’ 67

Chapter 12: The Shah Ascendant

1962 introduced a new phase in US-Iranian relations. In 1961, although
supporting the Shah, tire Kennedy administration introduced the new element
of American ‘personal support’ for an Iranian politician, Prime Minister Amini.
During that same period, the Shah concluded that to preserve his position
against Iranian and foreign detractors, including those in Washington, he
needed to cultivate advocates to further his goals. The US Ambassador in
Tehran, Julius C. Holmes, became one of these advocates. By January 1962, the
Shah had become more sophisticated about getting his message through to
Washington. Because Prime Minister Amini had become the Kennedy
administration’s ‘chosen instrument’ for reform, the Shah steadily increased
Amini’s dependence on the palace for support, thoroughly co-opting the Prime
Minister. By December 1961, the Shah had enough control over Amini to use
the Prime Minister to advocate both his military and his economic priorities
with Washington.

On 3 January 1962, in a meeting with Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart W.
Rockwell, Amini raised the Shah’s unhappiness with the levels of military aid.
Amini stated that his ‘deep concern’ matched that of the Shah. He explained
that his government and the Shah were coming under increased pressure from
‘old fashioned, neutralist politicians’. These politicians wanted Iran to move
toward a neutralist stance as quickly as possible to avoid being diplomatically
abandoned. Because of US overtures to the Soviet Union, Amini argued that
Washington sought improved relations with Moscow and that inadequate
funding of economic and military aid to Iran had been the price. According to
Amini, these neutralists supported a pre-emptive Iranian move to neutrality
before the US could totally abandon the regime in a new arrangement with the
Soviets based on ‘sphere(s) of influence’. Rockwell defended the US position,
pointing to past aid and to the military aid currently under consideration. To
this, Amini replied that the Shah had a ‘legitimate concern about military
assistance’. Amini added that the Shah would undoubtedly feel better about the

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entire situation, including a reduction of forces, if ‘the quality and quantity of
his military equipment substantially improved’. 1 Now Amini, the Kennedy
administration’s chosen instrument for creating an alternate political power
center to tire Shah and for driving a program of social and economic reform,
was lobbying for the Shah’s agenda.

The Shah, military assistance, and Julius Holmes

The developing alliance between the palace and the US Embassy in Tehran
became more apparent in a letter from Holmes to Secretary Rusk on 22
January 1962 about proposed defense aid for Iran. Rusk liked the newfound
leverage drat Holmes’ aggressive advocacy of the Shah’s position gave the State
Department: it kept Komer and the White House staff on the defensive.
Holmes argued that the recommendations of the ‘Defense Steering Group’ in
the Iran Annex had given inadequate weight to four factors:

(1) Although the key to drastic reduction in military aid without serious
political repercussion is to persuade tire Shah that U.S. forces will help
him in Iran if he gets into difficulties, we know he knows, and tire report
likewise asserts, that this is not possible.

(2) It is the judgment of all of us here [in Tehran] that the Shah will not
cut his forces from 205,000 to 150,000 if offered no more modernization
than envisaged in the Steering Group’s recommended level of aid.

(3) A further probability is that such a level of aid will impel the Shah to
draw more heavily on Iran’s oil revenues for his armed forces — to the
detriment of the country’s development programs.

(4) There is a further problem involved in talking to the Shah about
additional economic aid accompanying reduced military aid in that our
own procedures make advance commitments of greater economic aid
extremely difficult.

Holmes stated that since the Steering Group admitted that ‘it has not been able
to obtain a clear cut picture of what the long tern shape of economic programs
is likely to be’, it would be less than ‘realistic’ to expect tire Iranian to put much
faith in it.

Using a litany of arguments, the Ambassador stated: ‘The concept held in
some quarters that the Shah has no place to turn but to the United States is
erroneous’; the Steering Group ‘seems totally to disregard’ the impact of US
military assistance to Iran on the Middle East; no commitment to defend Iran
in lieu of a robust Iranian military force is ‘believable’; and finally, the talk of
‘glamour’ equipment instead of real force modernization reflects a complete
lack of understanding of the Shah’s position. Holmes passionately argued that
military assistance was not a ‘ quid pro quo ’ for ‘preserving the current direction
of Iranian foreign policy’. Holmes underlined ‘quid pro quo’ and went to say: ‘I
would hate to see Iran, by turning to neutralism and accommodation with the
USSR, demonstrate to us drat there are points beyond which the needs and

The Shah Ascendant

231

desires of an ally cannot be ignored. The catastrophic nature in that event of
the consequences to U.S. interests need not be elaborated.’ Labeling the
Steering Group report ‘a retrograde course’, Holmes contended that ‘the risks
entailed by such a course would be too great’, and he implored Washington to
adopt his recommendations on military aid to Iran for the fiscal years 1962-
1 967. 2 The administration’s plan to ‘personally’ support Amini and reform had
now dissolved into Holmes’ all-out support for the Shah.

Holmes: the Shah’s ambassador

The Shah’s tactics and Ambassador Holmes’ outspoken support benefited
the Iranian ruler in another way: it brought a steady stream of high-level
dignitaries to Tehran. These visits stroked, or stoked as the case may have
been, the Shah’s ego and subjected key policy-makers to the pomp and arm-
twisting of the palace and tire Embassy. The Shah still faced skeptics
concerning his official visit. Komer, still disgruntled over the ‘optimism’ of
Holmes and still insisting that things were ‘going to hell in a hack in Iran’,
complained that the two immediate questions were ‘how much military
baksheesh to give the Shah and whether to have him here for a visit’. Komer
was fixated on an ‘NF government’, as he called it. Komer, once hostile to
State, was now gratified that the reports of John Bowling, the Iran Desk officer
‘reeked with pessimism’. The White House also resurrected Professor Young,
who advocated pushing tire Shah harder and justified his support of a tougher
policy on the basis that the US was ‘damned if we do and damned if we don’t.’ 3
Tehran became a popular place for US officials to visit, so that drey could see
the situation at first hand and weigh in on what needed to be done.

In the meantime, much to Komer’s frustration, Holmes won his argument
for the Shah’s official visit. On 10 February, Chester Bowles, the Under
Secretary of State, arrived in Tehran for a four-day visit to evaluate the
situation in Iran and to invite the Shah to Washington on a visit to be arranged
for September. In tire past, Bowles had supported economic versus military
aid. As a result, Ambassador Holmes sent an evaluation of the visit to
Washington on 13 February, before the Under Secretary had even departed
Tehran. Holmes’ report was to preempt any criticism of the Shah that might
emanate from Bowles’ report. The next day, from Cairo, Bowles sent his own
evaluation. Bowles stated: ‘The Shah’s prestige and presence is essential in
holding the country together.’ He also stated that he subscribed to the
Ambassador’s ‘urgent plea’ that a sound aid package would be put in place as
soon as possible: ‘Speed is of the essence.’ At the same time, Bowles argued
that the MAP package for military modernization should follow the
recommendations of the ‘MAP Steering Group’ and not that of the
Ambassador. 4

On 18 February, Holmes read the Bowles’ airgram, and sent a response
directly to President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, stating: ‘I do not believe that
the MAP Steering group recommendations for military aid to Iran are sound.’
Holmes also raised Washington’s intention to ask the Shah for ‘two more

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special facilities’ for monitoring Soviet missile development, and pointed out
that tire enhanced military-assistance program was a small price to insure a
positive answer. 5 In connection with the Shah’s visit, Holmes wrote to Talbot
on 4 March. He thanked Talbot, whom Holmes had castigated and bulldozed
as a result of the first rejection of the Shah’s visit, for ‘describing the
complications of Iranian Affairs in Washington’. He then quickly added that
while pleased with the decision to invite the Shah, the late September date was
disappointing. Holmes wanted the visit moved up to April.

The Ambassador used the 4 March letter to Talbot to lobby again for his
version of the military-assistance plan: ‘Perhaps I should not say anything more
about my proposal for a Military Program because I have been pretty insistent
about it and I don’t want to get shrill.’ Then came the ‘however’, and a long
argument that the Embassy program was the minimum that the Shah would
accept in order for him to seriously contemplate a reduction in his armed
forces. 6 Holmes’ letter to Talbot brought in a fresh round of meetings and
memoranda. Lucius Battle, Executive Secretary to Dean Rusk, wrote Bundy at
the White House, restating the contents of Holmes’ letter. The memorandum
began with the well-established preamble: ‘the Shah of Iran is depressed and
resentful over allegedly inadequate United States military assistance. ... The
Shah may be considering abdication.’ Then came the traditional punch line:
‘His abdication would result in political chaos in Iran which could only benefit
the Soviet Union.’ 7 Since the decision had been made to offer only the lower
amount of assistance, approved by the MAP Steering Group, State sought ways
to soften the blow.

Battle strongly suggested to the White House that the date of die Shah’s
official visit be moved forward in an attempt to limit his ‘brooding’ over the
military aid. They reasoned that prompt notification would allow the Shah to
‘absorb’ the blow before arriving in Washington. Under no circumstances did
the State Department want to give die Shah the bad news about military aid
when he arrived in Washington. 8 The ‘final decision’ to stick with the MAP
Steering Group resulted in the dispatch of General Maxwell Taylor to Tehran
to break the news to the Shah. 9 On 9 March 1961, Talbot informed Holmes
that the decision on military aid was ‘final’. He mentioned ‘the tendency in
some quarters to regard the Shah’s tactics as sheer blackmail’. Talbot told
Holmes that $290 million was all the Shah would get, and that he was lucky to
get that. The President also wanted the Shah to implement a force reduction
plan as well, or face ‘a flat nagative [r/rj’on assistance in die coming year. The
letter went on to say diat Holmes could expect instructions to break this news
to the Shah as quickly as possible, in light of plans to advance the Shah’s
official visit to April or June. In an effort to prevent further telegrams to the
President, Talbot asserted that ‘Presidential interest’ in a resolution ‘made it
impossible’ to consider additional arguments from Tehran for the larger
program. 10

While Talbot probably enjoyed being the bearer of bad tidings, the setback
for the ever- tenacious Holmes was only temporary. On 13 March, Secretary of

The Shah Ascendant

233

State Rusk met with Iranian Prime Minister Amini in Geneva. Amini told Rusk
that the Shah would only agree to reduce the size of the armed forces if they
were substantially modernized. Amini stated that he could not finish the
planning for the development and economic programs until he knew the
answer to the military-aid situation. The Prime Minister also warned that in
order to support the military die Shah had in the past transferred civilian funds.
Rusk, hoping to preview the bad news to come, stated that Congress had cut
back military-aid programs and that Holmes would soon brief Amini and the
Shah on the implications for Iran. 11

The Shah comes to Washington

The complaints from die Pahlavi palace and Ambassador Holmes not only
secured the Shah’s visit, but also advanced it to 10-16 April 1961. The
administration viewed die Shah’s visit as an opportunity to secure a ‘double-
barreled objective’. Facing the ‘annual budget blackmail exercise’ widi Iran,
Komer described the Shah as ‘volatile’, having an ‘unstable temperament’,
‘fearing for his throne’, ‘jealous of competitors for power’, and given to
‘periodic moods of depression’. Komer also pointed out that the Shah felt that
bodi Pakistan and Turkey received better treatment than Iran through
CENTO. Thus, the first objective was to ‘calm the Shah’s concerns’.
Uncontrolled, Washington believed that these ‘concerns’ might lead to the
Shah’s sacking of Ali Amini. At the same time, the White House feared, as
bizarre as this may seem, diat the Shah might, in a fit of pique, resign. The
Kennedy administration, even the ardent Shah-bashers like Komer, now
realized that the Shah was the essential element of stability in Iran, and that an
alternate power center around Amini had simply not materialized. Komer
grudgingly admitted: ‘Hence, we regard [the Shah’s] continued presence and
support of the Amini [or like] government as indispensable to Iranian stability
over the next several years. There is no feasible alternative, which would serve
US interests as well.’ 12 The second point was to convince the Shah that
economic development should be the Iranian priority over military aid. Like
Eisenhower, Kennedy wanted to ‘convince the Shah that accelerated reform
and development is the best guarantee of Iranian security and of his own
future.’ 13

Single-handedly, Holmes had put Iranian policy back in traditional channels.
This was no mean feat. He had successfully wrested control of Iranian policy
from Talbot’s Iran Task Force and limited the NSC’s options to grousing. The
Ambassador had made a cogent argument that the National Front was a
grossly overstated threat and, thereby, had laid the foundation for discrediting
the NSC view of impending doom. He had managed to co-opt several major
administration figures to his view that the Shah was indispensable to the pro-
Western future of Iran. The fact that Chester Bowles, an official with a
typically jaundiced view of the Shah, announced that the Shah was the key to
Iranian stability was just one of the conversions for which Holmes could take
credit. Holmes’ success laid the groundwork for the Shah’s future maneuvering

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that in turn would seal the fate, of the Pahlavi dynasty and the United States in
Iran.

In Washington, fear of the Shah’s instability drove much of the planning for
the visit. In daily Embassy reports, the fluctuating mood of the monarch had
become the major policy issue. It resembled a weather forecast as Holmes
contrived to make the royal humor a critical issue for decision-making. On
good days, Holmes reported: ‘The Shah appears to be in good spirits’, and the
Shah expressed his ‘gratitude at the President’s “assurances” with regard to
military and economic aid for Iran’. 14 On bad days, the Shah would be
depressed if he could not address Congress. Ambassador Holmes, like any
good advance man, suggested that not only should Congress invite the Shah to
speak, but also that Congressional leaders should ‘persuade, by whatever
means, members to attend’. Just to make his point crystal clear, the
Ambassador stated: ‘I recognize problem this presents for executive branch
but there is no repeat no doubt in my mind about adverse effects on our
interests if dais part of program is eliminated.’ 15 Again, Secretary Rusk called
the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to secure the Congressional address
and attendance. 16

In order to further demonstrate that persistence pays, neither the Shah nor
Holmes allowed the MAP issue to die. The Shah took the position that the
MAP appropriation was still open for the discussion. Fearing that Kennedy
would be caught flat-footed by one of the Shah’s recitations of shabby
treatment, administration officials subjected the President to a barrage of
advice and briefing papers. Komer advised the President to let Secretary of
Defense McNamara give the Shah the bad news about the reduced military
assistance. 17 The White House staff wanted to avoid the potential for a
personal confrontation between Kennedy and the Shah. The concern over the
Shah’s reaction to the MAP figure of $300 million became so acute that the
administration ‘found’ another $30 million to bring the total to $330 million,
just to placate the Shah. 18 Indications were that this might not be sufficient. On
9 April, die day before the visit was to begin, Komer wrote President Kennedy
warning that Ambassador Holmes ‘still holds out for about $424 million
package, despite his talks in State, AID, and Defense.’ Fearing Holmes might
persuade Kennedy to add funding, Komer ‘urged’ the president to hold firm at
$330 million. 19 On 10 April, Kenneth Hansen furnished a paper comparing
and justifying US MAP and economic assistance to Pakistan and Turkey in
relation to that of Iran. 20 Also on 10 April, Bowles weighed in with a
memorandum about Shah’s fixation on military aid. Arguing for the $330-
million cap, Bowles urged the President to ‘resist pressures to increase’ military
assistance. 21 Given the similarities in language and views, Komer and Bowles
undoubtedly coordinated their appeals.

During the actual visit, the discussions went reasonably well. In meetings
with President Kennedy, the Shah made his arguments for increased military
aid to Iran. In response, President Kennedy presented the US case for reduced
Iranian military expenditures and increased focus on economic development.

The Shah Ascendant

235

Kennedy congratulated the Shah on his excellent choice for Prime Minister
and committed tire US to ‘help within our resources’. He also assured tire Shah
that the administration believed Iran would collapse without his leadership:
‘The President wanted the Shah to know that he had the support of the
President.’ As expected, the Shah presented Kennedy with an extensive
shopping list. In addition to the military assistance, the Iranian ruler raised the
possibility of ‘Civic Action’ programs for the military, increased shipments of
surplus grains, and additional aid to assist in reorganizing the Iranian military.

The Iranian monarch also took tire opportunity to raise the issue of
Nasserist agitation against his regime. Stymied in one area, the Shah merely
shifted to another, resembling a day in an Iranian bazaar. He made one point
clear: he believed that ‘a first-class, honest Army, with decent living standards,
was a pre-requisite for time and security, the two things most needed to allow
Iran’s economic development.’ The Shah refused to commit himself to cutting
the size of the Iranian armed forces until their ‘mobility and mechanization’
had been addressed. 22 The Shah also raised the issue of two frigates that had
been deleted from tire assistance plan, and insisted that those be reinstated. 23
The mobility, mechanization, and frigate requests were the difference between
the $330 million budget and the $424 million supported by himself and
Ambassador Holmes. During the visit, the Shah showed a reasonable amount
of interest in economic development and reform, no doubt to offset his focus
on the military. On 13 April, he told Averell Harriman that he was most
unhappy with the outcome of his talks at the Pentagon. 24 It was a clear
indication drat Kennedy had not heard the end of the MAP issue.

The end of the Amini era

The official visit to Washington and the commitments made during that
visit effectively started the clock ticking on the Amini government. Amini had
served his purpose; the Shah had wrung every possible advantage from his
tenure. Amini had delivered on emergency economic aid in 1961, and his
appointment had cleared the way for the Shah’s visit to Washington. American
support for Amini had also exceeded historical boundaries in that the Kennedy
administration had thrown its weight openly behind his government. In the
Shah’s eyes, Amini had failed in two respects: he had failed to maintain direct
budgetary support for the Iranian government, and he had failed to gain the
military modernization-program funds advocated by Ambassador Holmes and
the Shah. As long as Washington was willing to contribute materially to
Amini’s survival, then the Shah supported the Prime Minister; and the benefits
of material support determined die length of Amini’s tenure. Both these
factors were nearing an end. 25

Following his talks with President Kennedy, the Shah hoped that the
additional aid requested might yet materialize. Amini had one more
opportunity to deliver. As noted, the Shah had never agreed to reduce the
military budget. This constituted, in effect, his trump card in dealing with
Washington over military assistance, budgetary support, and development aid.

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The Shah had a modernization program for the Iranian army that more or less
conformed to the higher total of $424 million over five years. The US refusal
to fund above $330 million, plus the possibility of two patrol frigates,
disappointed die Iranian monarch. The Shah’s solution was simple: at his
direction, Amini informed die US government that the ‘military budget could
not be cut and in fact might have to be increased in view of the requirements
of modernization to be undertaken with U.S. assistance.’ Necessary or not, the
Shah was determined to have his modernized military, even at the cost of
starving development programs and reform. The Shah could also divert more
financial resources from increasing oil revenues. Amini understood that this
would be the outcome if the Shah did not get the larger MAP amount. 26

In Washington, the Kennedy administration reacted with consternation: ‘In
discussion dais question between Shah and highest U.S. official ... it was made
clear that . . . new overall military budget could in fact be decreased.’ 27 Kennedy
and other administration officials mistakenly assumed that the Shah, with his
ego massaged, having been wined and dined at the White House and charmed
by the President, would accept the US view of the military aid package. They
could not have been more mistaken. The Iranian budget that finally emerged
astonished Washington. The Shah acted as if the larger MAP amount, or
something approximating it, had been agreed upon. In addition, the civilian
side of the budget was so large that it would require either a postponement of
many of its provisions or a ‘big US loan’. The White House and Komer in
particular, along with die State Department, expressed concern and concluded:
‘We may be heading for another crisis in Iran.’ Komer added: ‘State is trying to
find out if situation as bad as feared. And I’ve been arguing we should run
scared nonetheless. A stitch in time, you know.’ True to form, Holmes
expressed his doubts that the situation was really that serious. The President’s
personal diplomacy also had a downside. The Shah took advantage of the
exchanges to argue that Kennedy had promised to ‘underwrite a 2,000-man
commando brigade for Tehran riot control’. The Shah also believed he was
promised a 500-watt transmitter for the propaganda campaign against Nasser.
These claims sent official Washington scurrying to determine what exactly had
been promised. Exasperated with trying to track down die alleged
‘commitments’, Komer complained: ‘Shah will just queer himself with
everybody here if he keeps translating small talk into firm commitments.’

In Tehran, Amini was worn out, the Prime Minister finding himself unable
to exert any control over the situation, a reality not lost on Washington. 28
Upon taking office, Amini had promised that Iran would have a balanced
budget in fiscal year 1962 (April to April). It was now clear that the deficit
would total between $100 and $200 million. In addition, die Director and
Deputy Director of the CPO resigned in protest, partly from ‘annoyance’ over
corruption investigations and partly from concern that allocations for
development would be severely cut. 29 No matter the cause, the situation
‘threatened seriously the structure of confidence’ on which Iran and the US
were hoping to build an ‘international effort to help Iran’s Third Plan’. The

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237

odds had always been against Amini’s bold promise to end the deficit. In fact,
the reform programs contributed significantly to the renewed financial crisis.
The series of contributing factors included problems in tax collection,
resumption of building programs, an economic depression that lowered die tax
base, the military budget, salary-rises for teachers, land reform, large allocations
to the Plan Organization, and finally, unpaid bills from the previous budget
year. In effect, the pressures of modernization and reform, bad luck, and
reduced direct financial support in both die military and civilian areas caused a
chain reaction that ballooned the budget, and Amini was left holding the bag.

As government revenues fell, Amini himself admitted that he had been
‘remiss in the business of eliminating waste and duplication’. The high
expectations for increased administrative efficiency and improving tax
collection had gone unrealized. The zealous supporters of reform in the
Kennedy administration had failed to reckon widi the problems associated with
the arcane Iranian tax system and with Persian creativity in avoiding the
government collectors. In addition, the IMF, with die blessing of both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, had imposed a stabilization
program on Iran to fight inflation. It succeeded too well and caused a ‘first-
class’ depression. As a result, the tax base degenerated, further reducing
government revenues. Increasing taxes or implementing ‘quick-return new
taxation measures’ was not an option. Neither the Shah nor Amini could face
the political fallout associated with raising taxes in the middle of a depression.
The possibility of floating bonds offered litde promise of raising any significant
amount of revenue. It was unlikely that the IMF would have approved a credit
expansion with the necessary scope to offset the deficit and, even in the event
of approval, Washington speculated that it ‘would start a wild inflationary
spiral’ with totally unpredictable political and economic consequences.

In reality, the military budget, the usual culprit cited by the Shah’s
detractors, constituted only a part of the problem. Other factors were cited as
the principal contributors. Amini had managed to shoot himself in the foot as
well. The pay increases that Amini had given to teachers in order to end the
riots of May 1961 had contributed significantly to budget growth. To delay,
reduce, or renege on them would alienate ‘Amini’s last beachhead among the
intellectuals’ and cause the Minister of Education, Mohammad Derakhshesh,
to resign. 30 The Prime Minister could ill-afford to alienate Darakhshesh, a key
strike-leader, or his followers. 31 Amini had also approved the completion of all
construction projects that were 80 per cent finished. This created critical jobs
during a depression, but it also added to the government deficit. Land reform
also created a drain on die budget. Simply put, it cost money to cancel or alter
it, and would have brought the resignation of the Minister of Agriculture,
Hasan Arsanjani; it would also have damaged relations with the US. The
Kennedy administration had declared land reform, ‘the regime’s brightest long-
range prospect for political strength’. Amini had the option of cutting funding
for die CPO, but dais in turn would bring ‘an irretrievable loss of

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Courtesy of National Archives

Shah of Iran Publicizing Land Reform

The Shah presents land to a farmer. Land reform became the Holy Grail of
modernization programs in Iran. Strongly supported by both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations, it reduced tax revenues, damaged agricultural production,
and undermined traditional support for the regime. The Shah supported it because
he saw land reform as a means to reduce his reliance on the traditional elites, who
often opposed modernization.

momentum for long-range and comprehensive economic planning’. Because
this would not have an immediate ‘catastrophic political’ effect, Washington
viewed it as the best option for Amini: ‘A delayed or truncated Plan would be
better than no Plan at all, and a neglect of political factors could easily mean no
Plan at all.’

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239

The military budget, separate from tire MAP, continued to be an issue.
Because of US reductions in direct budgetary support, just to maintain the
military budget at the previous year’s level required an additional expenditure
of $15 million. While Komer and others had argued that the US had intended
for the Iranians to reduce die military budget, such a move was unlikely even
had the Shah been predisposed to do it. The Embassy in Tehran, the Iranian
Desk at State, and the CIA recognized that rising discontent and serious
‘grumblings’ in the army over housing, facilities, and pay posed a threat not
only to reform but also to the regime itself. The US and Prime Minister Amini
feared drat holding the line on military spending might bring not just a political
parting of the ways with the Shah but possibly ‘military subversion’.
Washington recognized the Iranian military represented the ‘key to the security
situation’. Cutting the military was not an option.

The situation really had only one possible solution, namely, grants in
emergency aid from the United States. Emergency grants and budgetary
support were simply no longer available. Washington faced its own budgetary
problem. Kennedy gave everything that he could to the Shah, but the fact was
that US commitments were outstripping the ability to pay, and cuts had to be
made somewhere. Promises to ‘bear any burden’ had their limitations. The
administration had made it clear drat additional budgetary support for Iran
would not be forthcoming. Contrary to other interpretations drat argue that the
Kennedy administration used cuts in the military-assistance program to push
the Shah toward reform, the cuts were across the board and included civilian
subsidies. The reductions in support of the civilian government and its related
reform efforts were in fact much more severe. Military support lost $15
million, while civilian lost $30 million. The cumulative effect of cuts in civilian
and military budget support created a situation in which Amini could not
achieve his promised goals. Washington cajoled, prodded, and pushed the Shah
and Amini regime toward reform, but balked at the bill. The very reform
efforts that were to transform Iran into a modern, progressive state had created
a financial drain that threatened Iran’s political stability. Bowling saw it clearly:
‘Something will have to give.’ 32

On 24 June 1962, Amini appealed to Ambassador Holmes for additional
aid. The Prime Minister listed the measures that he had taken to increase
revenues and reduce expenditures. The government had tried to cut the
ministry budget by at least 15 per cent, but Amini explained that the military
budget would not be cut given the regional political and security issues. He
followed with a special plea to restore the $15 million cut from the military
assistance. Holmes stated: ‘He [Amini] was making a desperate try in a belief,
possibly shared by the Shah, that if we could be convinced of the critical
character of the existing situation, that it was worth a try to get us to do one
more rescue mission.’ Holmes reminded Amini that both he and the Shah had
received notification months before that they could depend on continued
support. The Ambassador then restated that ‘there were no funds available for
this purpose.’ Disappointed, Amini stated that he would ask the Shah to make

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a public statement of support endorsing the direction that the government had
chosen for the coming five years. Amini did not appear to be contemplating
resignation, and although tired and harassed, he believed that the Shah would
support him. According to Holmes: ‘It may be that events will prove that he is
a “spent force” but it is very evident that he does not think so.’ 33 Within weeks,
Holmes had his answer.

On 17 July 1962, Amini presented his resignation to the Shah. According to
intelligence reports, after 14 months in office Amini’s resignation was
‘welcomed by nearly all political elements in Iran’. Amini’s efforts, aimed at
gradual change in Iranian social and economic processes, had created more
resentment than results. Land reform, anti-corruption campaigns, and the
economic stabilization-program had managed to alienate large segments of the
most influential political groups in Iran. Reform had garnered little support
from more radical nationalists in die National Front. The landlord-merchant
classes saw his reforms as a political and economic threat to their position of
influence. His refusal to hold parliamentary elections and his ‘gradual’
approach to reform undermined any potential support from the radical
nationalists. Amini’s controls over credit and the money supply, while
temporarily stabilizing Iran’s finances and foreign-exchange crisis, brought on
an economic depression. 34

The aftermath of Amini

Amini, the Kennedy administration’s ‘last hope’, blamed Washington’s
reductions in economic and military-budget assistance for the ongoing financial
crisis and record budget deficits. The Prime Minister told all who would listen
that the United States ‘let him down’. 35 In attempting to reduce the deficit, the
15 per cent program had met stiff opposition from the ministers of education
and defense. 36 Rumors circulated in Tehran that Derakhshesh, whose
education ministry had the largest civilian budget in the government, had
threatened strikes if the education budget were cut. 37 The Shah refused to
intervene in this deadlock, and for good reason. He obviously supported the
military budget and, like Washington, feared growing unhappiness in the army.
At the same time, cuts in education threatened a renewal of the teachers’
strikes and student rioting that had originally brought Amini to power. The
Shah wanted to avoid a repetition of May 1961. Both he and Amini believed
that Washington’s personal commitment to the Amini government would
translate into a belated reversal of the US decision not to supply the required
budgetary aid. 38 The realization that the aid would not be forthcoming proved
a bitter disappointment for both, but particularly for Amini. The Prime
Minister believed that he had Kennedy’s support and had tried diligently to
follow Washington’s ‘advice’. To Amini, Kennedy and his advisors were
heaving his regime overboard to lighten Washington’s financial and political
load. Kennedy had done this despite the fact that tire very programs advocated
by Washington had significantly contributed to the problems Iran now faced.

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241

In a last ditch effort, Komer urged Kennedy to save Amini ‘despite his wild
charges about lack of US aid’. When the rumor first circulated that Amini
would resign, a thoroughly alarmed Komer told President Kennedy: We’ve got
to back Amini’s hand.’ 39 After the resignation, Komer argued: ‘Our aim should
be to get Amini back in, with such backing from the Shah. Instead of Holmes’
policy of standing back and letting Iranians come to us, we ought to go tell
them.’ 40 Realizing that the Amini effort had run its course, the President
ignored Komer. Holmes and the traditional foreign-policy establishment had
wrested control of Iranian policy from the activism of the New Frontier.
Anticipating the questions from Washington on tire course of action that the
US should pursue in wake of the Amini resignation, Holmes wrote: ‘I see no
useful initiative which could be taken by US. In essence only thing Shah, Amini
or anyone else who might assume responsibility for affairs here wants to hear
from US government is that we will provide enough money to ease budgetary
situation which clearly has not yet been squarely met by Iranians.’ Believing
that the Shah and Amini might yet attempt to get the United States to make up
the difference, estimated by one Iranian official at $80 million for the civilian
government and $20 million for the military, Holmes suggested that
Washington wait for the dust to settle before contemplating any action.
Squarely in the Shah’s camp, Holmes also warned against attempting to find
either another Amini to support or a ‘Shah-equal’. 41 In reporting that the
current head of the Pahlavi Foundation, Asadollah Alam, would become Prime
Minister, the Ambassador pointed out that under Alam that there would be ‘no
question of independence’: ‘Alam will be a graceful scapegoat for any matters
which do not go well.’ 42 The Ambassador informed Washington that the
reform programs of Amini would go forward, but that progress would depend
on the Shah 43 Holmes had now passed Amini’s reformist mantel to the Shah,
making him not only the undisputed Iranian political focal point, but also the
only vehicle through which the Kennedy administration might hope to see
reform.

The appointment of Alam left little doubt that the Shah would actively run
the government and Iranians would hold him directly responsible for the
outcome. 44 On 21 July, the Shah reinforced this view of personal control by
offering ‘faint praise’ of Alam for being ‘young, loyal, and energetic’. In
speaking to Holmes, the Shah insisted that the program of reforms and the
anti-corruption campaign would continue, as would the pro-Western
orientation of Iran. The Shah then took occasion to raise the issue of ‘loans’ to
help the Iranian budget crisis in lieu of the grant program that had ended. 45 He
made it clear that some form of financial assistance remained on his agenda
with the Kennedy administration. The CIA reported: ‘Some means must be
devised to permit urgent economic aid of a type that will stimulate economic
life and create the means for combating die serious unemployment which now
exists and which poses a grave political threat.’ There was also a realization that
the ‘stabilization program’ had done more damage than good and that ‘less
conservative economic policies’ might be required. Former opponents of the

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Amini regime were now praising the ex-Prime Minister and the policies that
they had assisted in toppling. From Washington, it appeared that Alam, and
thus the Shah, would not aggressively pursue reform, leaving them vulnerable
to National Front elements. 46

In his final assessment of the Amini tenure, Flolmes pointed out that most
of the ‘organized groups’ opposed him and that his only real support had come
from the Shah himself. Flolmes argued that Amini became a prisoner of men
like Derakshesh, and did not insist on putting the best available men in his
cabinet. In addition, the Shah had believed that, contrary to what he was
repeatedly told, Washington would ultimately bail him out of his predicament.
For that reason ‘he kept putting off die day of reckoning.’ Amini’s resignation
had political fallout in Washington. Talbot wrote to Flolmes relating a lunch
with Senator Stuart Symington of Washington in which the Senator accused
the administration of ‘wasting money on those who oppose us while letting our
friends go down the drain for lack of even small sums of the support that they
deserve.’ Talbot counseled that, despite the problems, the US government
needed to see the current course through. Fie argued: “We have already
accepted major costs [Amini’s fall] to carry forward the difficult process of
weaning a client away from budget support.’ Talbot compared it to ‘die
weaning of a baby in spite of fretting and crying’ but commented: ‘Proper
weaning does not mean the inducement of starvation.’ 47

Kennedy and the Iranian reality

The Kennedy administration now had an epiphany on Iran. At the White
Flouse, Brubeck wrote to Bundy stating that Amini, ‘on whom we had pinned
great hopes for economic and social reform in Iran’, resigned because of
problems with the Iranian budget. Fie went on to state: ‘The termination of
U.S. budgetary support contributed to his difficulties.’ Brubeck reaffirmed the
administration’s position on refusing budgetary support, and then added a
caveat: ‘Should it appear that alignment with the Free World is seriously and
immediately jeopardized, we would reconsider this policy. ... With Prime
Minister Amini out of the picture, the Shah is the principal bastion of pro-
Western strength and even of political stability in Iran.’ As a result, Washington
had to retain the Shah’s ‘confidence and goodwill’ 48 In an intelligence estimate
on 17 August 1962, the CIA reported no apparent immediate threats to the
Shah’s rule. The agency stated that his return to the position of ‘single focal
point’ in Iranian politics meant that future unrest would be directed at him.
The fact that the Shah would have to face the mounting problems alone
created the possibility that instability might lead to his overthrow or
abdication. 49 The Shah seemed to know exactly what Washington was thinking.
Playing on tried and proven methods of getting Washington’s attention, the
Shah made certain that the Kennedy administration heard that if the Alam
government failed and there was little chance of a similar government
succeeding, he would abdicate and leave Iran. 50 The CIA evaluation expressed

The Shah Ascendant

243

Washington’s view of die situation best: ‘Once again then, storm warnings
appear to be in order.’ 51

These warnings gave added importance to Vice-President Lyndon Johnson’s
upcoming visit to Tehran. 52 Johnson was first to ‘reassure the Shah of United
States support, understanding, and encourage him toward responsible and
progressive leadership’; second, to assure the Iranian people drat the United
States would ‘protect them from aggression’, help them ‘modernize
themselves’, and respect and appreciate their ‘achievements and culture’; and
third, to encourage Iranian officials, including the Prime Minister, to use ‘self-
help measures’ toward ‘national unity and progress’. The paper went on to
warn that the Shah believed that military assistance lacked the necessary ‘quality
and quantity’. It warned against getting into any discussion with the Shah on
specifics issues of budgetary support or military aid, pointing out that the
conversation would undoubtedly be ‘misinterpreted’ as commitments. This was
obviously an oblique reference to the President’s ‘personal diplomacy’ during
the Shah’s official visit to Washington and the claims that the Shah made with
regard to promised military aid. Given the end of US budgetary support, it was
suggested that the Vice-President ‘persuade die Iranians to face up to their
own problems and to take die responsibility for the failure and success of their
own actions.’ 53

Johnson followed his instructions to the letter. He pressed the Shah on
reforms, the economy, and reductions in the military. The Vice-President made
it clear to the Shah exacdy where the administration stood. ‘We realize the
extent to which our views and those of your farsighted leaders are parallel. We
all agree on the necessity for programs of responsible change. We have seen
that the status quo alone provides no safeguard for freedom.’ 54 He reported to
Kennedy that the Shah had accepted the reduction in his defense support and
the termination of his budgetary support, as well as the admonition not to
make new demands for any resumption. Johnson concluded that despite his
‘shortcomings’, the Shah was a ‘valuable asset’, and ‘since we have no
acceptable alternative’, the United States must ‘cooperate’ and ‘influence’ him
‘as best we can’. 55

By mid-September 1962, after over a year of debate and controversy,
Ambassador Holmes and Major General John C. Hayden prepared to present
the final five-year military assistance plan to the Shah. Almost on the eve of the
presentation, Holmes cabled Washington and asked to be allowed to include
the two frigates eliminated from in the plan. He argued that aside from
whatever military benefits might accrue, it would reassure the Shah of US good
intentions and support. 56 When Komer saw the request, he immediately fired
off a memorandum to Bundy stating: ‘I am just firmly opposed to our giving
Holmes and Shah their way on frigates.’ For Komer, the struggle with the State
Department had now become as important as the issues with the Shah.
Discredited but still ranting, Komer argued: ‘I wish we could convince
Ambassador of this too, and get him to spend half the energy on pressing Shah
domestically that he does on military problems. In fact, Holmes is beefing

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before he even tries out on Shah. . . . Admittedly, this is only a $5 million item
but where do we draw the line ? I’d like to tell Bill and Phil that President
personally says “hell no”.’ 57 Komer lost again. The Secretaries of Defense and
State obtained permission to include the two frigates, as a personal gesture
from the President, with the understanding that Washington had nothing else
to give. 58 On 19 September 1962, Holmes and General Hayden presented the
MAP package to the Shah. After some discussion, the Shah accepted, leaving
the door open for more military assistance. The Shah had three conditions:
first, that his request for more tank units was noted, and that consideration of
their supply would be given if resources allowed; second, that two early-
warning radar stations would be better than one; and third, that if the security
situation changed and unforeseen threats arose, discussions would be
reopened. 59 Komer concluded from the Shah’s conditions that Holmes had not
been explicit enough with the Shah about additional aid requests. Komer
stated: “We can expect more pleas from Pahlevi [sic\ all too soon.’ 60

Crisis over — almost

Despite unhappiness at the NSC, the collapse of Amini, and rumors of
continued instability, Tehran’s ‘acceptance’ of the MAP ended hopes that an
alternative to the Shah might exist. It also constituted the Kennedy
administration’s categorical return to Eisenhower’s policies — with one
exception: the Kennedy administration had tied itself absolutely to the Shah’s
dynastic fortunes. NEA and CIA representatives on the Iran Task Force
recommended that Iran be removed from die ‘Critical Country List’, and the
other Task Force members agreed. Iran continued to be unstable, and the
situation ‘could change completely tomorrow’; however, the overall situation
had improved. 61 Iran would continue to have problems and crises, but the
Kennedy administration’s experiment with the Task Force had added little to
the situation, while inviting considerable interference from the White House
and NSC. Those charged with policy in NEA now wanted these outside
irritants removed; they wanted to manage relations with the Shah and Iran in a
traditional manner, as they had been managed under Eisenhower.

The subsiding crisis mentality also allowed die State Department to focus on
more mundane issues that had languished during the tumultuous Amini period.
One of those issues, the ‘status of forces’ agreement, would evolve into
something far more serious than anyone anticipated. Congress wanted an
agreement on US jurisdiction over US military personnel in Iran. 62 On 26
September, John Armitage, First Secretary at the US Embassy in Tehran, wrote
to Jack Miklos, the new Iranian Affairs officer: “Now that die ambassador has
so neady dispatched die MAP negotiations, I will turn my attention to your
favorite problem, jurisdiction and immunities.’ 63 In July 1962, the Chief of the
American Affairs Section in the Political Division of the Iranian Foreign
Ministry, Ali Fouthi, warned that an agreement on immunity would be
impossible to get and that the US and the Iranian governments would ‘regret it
one day’. Fouthi explained that sooner or later there would be a new Majlis and

The Shah Ascendant

245

the agreement would come under strong attack by nationalists; he urged the US
Embassy to drop consideration of a formal agreement. 64

The Embassy was attempting to explore some reciprocal agreement with the
Iranians that would keep US servicemen out of Iranian courts, while allowing
the Iranians to save face. On 12 October 1962, Washington responded: ‘It is
our view here that we should not seek to solve the jurisdictional problems in
Iran through negotiating a treaty with Iran, but we much prefer the less
complicated process of an executive agreement.’ 65 On 5 November, the
Deputy Chief of Mission, Stuart Rockwell, raised the issue with Foreign
Minister Abbas Aram. Aram gave some indication of sympathy for the US
concern and added that Amini had ‘forbidden him to give sympathetic
consideration’ to die US position. 66 Rockwell put brackets around the
statement about the Amini government as if to indicate concern over possible
Iranian resistance to the American position. Fouthi’s warning foreshadowed
the controversy that would grow into a hurricane over immunity for US
servicemen in Iran. This issue would ultimately become the principal catalyst
around which opposition to die Shah and the US role in Iran would coalesce,
but that lay in the future. By die end of 1962, despite all the effort and die
creation of a special task force, Kennedy and his advisors found themselves
tethered to Eisenhower’s approach and enduring the carping about military
assistance not only from the Shah but also from their own Ambassador in
Tehran.

Chapter 13: Pakistan, India,
and Priorities

The outcome of the US presidential election of 1960 raised several questions
about the future direction of US policy toward Pakistan and India. It appeared
that Kennedy’s election might shift US containment policy toward an
economic posture as opposed to military aid. This had serious implications for
Pakistan. Kennedy, as a candidate, took the position that the US’s commitment
to ‘northern tier’ defense — Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan — had undermined the
possibility of a more balanced policy across the Greater Middle East. The
Indians and the Pakistanis concluded that a Kennedy administration might in
fact be serious about reducing military aid and pressing forward with a greater
focus on economic aid and development aid in die region. It also appeared that
a new emphasis on democratic government and reform might emerge, and
favor democratic India over authoritarian Pakistan. Also troubling for Karachi
were indications of a more positive and tolerant US approach to non-
alignment. As if to emphasize the point, Kennedy appointed Chester Bowles,
the former US Ambassador to India during die Truman administration, as one
of his principle foreign-policy advisors. The fact that Bowles had once written
‘Jawaharlal Nehru is the politics of Asia’ was not lost on Ayub Khan. Bowles
believed that die US should emphasize economic development and political
reform, and viewed Eisenhower’s pro-Pakistani tilt as counter-productive for
US interests. 1 Bowles made no secret of his desire to see a major US policy
reorientation and a more pro-Indian stance. Ayub saw Bowles as an old
adversary. His presence as a Kennedy advisor, coupled with the Senator’s
statements, was disquieting. Ayub, like the Shah, had discreetly supported
Nixon’s candidacy and looked with foreboding on Kennedy’s election.

In New Delhi, a cautiously optimistic Nehru viewed with interest the arrival
of die Kennedy administration. Kennedy had argued that India was the key to
Western policy in Asia and that its ‘economic and political leadership of the
East’ had to be a primary US goal. 2 If other statements during the campaign

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

247

were taken at face value, India might receive more economic and development
assistance, as well as the possibility of a shift in US relations with Pakistan.
Kennedy’s intention to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union might also bring
a commensurate reduction in the value of the US relationship with Karachi. In
addition, Kennedy had fought for ‘massive economic aid’ for India and gone
out of his way to flatter Nehru. In his inaugural address, Kennedy referred to
the ‘soaring idealism’ of Nehru. The administration named well-known
economist John Kenneth Galbraith as Ambassador to India. 3 Nehru probably
hoped that Washington would renege on its arms commitments to Ayub.
Shrewd, well-educated, and perceptive, Ayub also took note of how candidate
Kennedy’s ideas on foreign policy might affect US-Pakistan relations and
specifically arms shipments to Pakistan. He was sensitive to arguments that
arms for Pakistan forced India to divert much-needed funds for economic
development into arms purchases. 4 Ayub feared that die new American
administration might not be as enamored of ‘controlled democracy’ as the old
had been. 5

In addition, Ayub believed drat increased US economic aid to India would
merely allow Nehru to divert other funds to a military build-up. 6 Ayub found
himself in much the same position as his CENTO partner, the Shah of Iran.
Ayub feared that Kennedy might not value its relationship with Pakistan. 7
Ayub concluded that just in case the new administration actually contemplated
serious shifts, he needed to reeducate Kennedy and his advisors about the
realities of US defense needs and containment policy in die Greater Middle
East and Asia. Pakistan was the lynch-pin in both CENTO and SEATO,
making it imperative that a pro-Western and pro-US regime maintained control
in Karachi. 8 Given the coup in Iraq and the perceived instability of Iran,
Pakistan under Ayub had become the most stable of the critical ‘northern tier’
states. Bodi Turkey and Pakistan had military governments. In Turkey, the
army had intervened on 27 May 1960 and overdirown the government of
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. 9 In Pakistan, Ayub appeared to have
stabilized both the political and die economic situation. Ayub’s call for a joint
Indo-Pakistani defense policy had gained him a sizeable political following in
the US Congress, while Nehru’s rebuff damaged India’s image with
conservatives. 10 How the Kennedy administration would handle this situation
remained die only outstanding question.

Nothing new under the sun

In 1961, Kennedy and his advisors found that Eisenhower’s last foreign-aid
budget represented a ‘huge increase’ over what had gone before, and required
no additional funding. 11 The plan allotted India approximately $1 billion over
the first two years of the Third Five-Year Plan, excluding shipments of PL 480
grain. Washington slated $250 million for Pakistan, widi the same exclusion. 12
The administration also sent out a series of fact-finding missions, not only to
obtain an independent view of the situation between India and Pakistan, but
also to assess rumors of Ayub’s discontent. 13 Karachi opened a two-front

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campaign designed to get Kennedy’s attention. Pakistani Foreign Minister
Bhutto advocated conclusion of an oil- and gas-exploration agreement with the
Soviet Union. Arguing that the agreement was not a change in policy, Bhutto
believed that Western oil companies ‘left to themselves, will not allow
themselves to find oil in Pakistan . . . because of the world glut in that
commodity’ and that the Soviets lacked ‘inhibitions’ in that regard. Any
Pakistani agreement with Moscow was cause for alarm in Washington.
Simultaneously, editorials appeared in several Pakistani newspapers comparing
the merits of alignment and non-alignment. One editorial stated that Pakistan
was ‘putting the new American Administration “on notice’” over the direction
of any new policies. 14 For good measure, Ayub told the US Ambassador in
Karachi that he had serious concerns about US attitudes toward die Kashmir
issue. 15

On 21 February 1961, the Indian Ambassador in Washington, Braj Kumar
(B.K.) Nehru, met with Averell Harriman. Harriman told him that he had been
asked to go to Europe, Iran, Pakistan, and New Delhi to consult with the
various leaders. Harriman stated:

The foreign policy of the new administration would . . . present a sharp
break from that of its predecessors. The President’s position in Congress,
however, was a difficult one. Due to the narrowness of [Kennedy’s]
electoral victory and lack of support by the Southern Democrats, the
President could not afford to offend the Republican vote in Congress by
announcing in words a drastic change in foreign policy. His [Kennedy’s]
deeds would gradually show in which direction he was going and they
had to date been clear.

Harriman stated: ‘India, in spite of its being an uncommitted nation, was the
greatest ally the United States had - much more so than its vaunted military
allies of SEATO [because] ... under the leadership of Mr. Nehru, the values of
India were the same as the values of the United States.’ Harriman asked the
Ambassador if, based on this common foundation, Prime Minister Nehru
would participate in regular ‘consultations’ with President Kennedy on foreign
policy. 16

The Harriman mission

In March 1961, Averell Harriman went to the region to assess the situation.
He visited Karachi in hopes of putting Ayub’s concerns about Kennedy to rest.
Harriman reaffirmed US commitments to Pakistan and delivered personal
letters from the President. He also reconfirmed Ayub’s state visit to
Washington scheduled for November 1963. In a cordial but straightforward
manner, Ayub stated that he knew that the ‘US needed Pakistan as Pakistan
needed the US’ because the only way to combat Communism was for the ‘free
world’ to remain united. Ayub expressed concern over Soviet adventures in
Afghanistan, and discussed Pakistan’s defense requirements to combat this

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

249

threat. He then brought up the issue of Kashmir and the need for the US to
put its weight behind a UN plebiscite. 17 Ayub took a positive stance with
Hardman, but delegated others to make certain that the Special Envoy
understood what was at stake in Pakistan. On 22 March, Harriman faced a
grueling news conference in which he was bombarded with questions on
foreign aid, Kashmir, and non-alignment. One reporter bluntly asked: ‘What is
the approach of die new American Government towards implementing the
UN resolution about holding a plebiscite in Kashmir?’ Another wanted to
know: ‘Is the new administration to pay more attention to neutral countries
than to America’s allies?’ 18 The questions would never have been asked had
Ayub not approved them. Harriman got die message.

In London, Harriman’s trip raised questions. The British took exception to
Harriman telling Ayub that the Kennedy administration did not ‘regard
neutrality as necessarily immoral’. The Foreign Office wondered: ‘May not
remarks such as these also encourage the tendency in Pakistan to ask what
tangible benefits are to be derived from membership of CENTO and
SEATO?’ 19 Harriman tried to explain that he had emphasized the importance
of CENTO and SEATO, but justified Western support for neutrals, stating
that the US needed to assist them in maintaining their independence. He
asserted that there was a distinction between committed ‘allies’ and the
uncommitted, and he included Afghanistan and India among the latter. 20
Unimpressed, London concluded: ‘Pakistan-U.S. relations may remain in rather
a delicate state until the Kennedy Administration has settled down.’ 21

In India, Nehru lectured Harriman on the aggressive designs of the Chinese
and the unreasonable Pakistani position on Kashmir, insisting ‘on the
boundaries as they now are’. 22 In the background, the Indian Defense Minister,
Krishna Menon, called Pakistan a ‘remnant of imperialism ... an imperialist
stooge, tied to the United States through SEATO, CENTO, and large-scale
military aid’. 23 The Indians also emphasized that since the signing of the Indus
Waters agreement Ayub had exhibited a ‘hostile’ attitude. Apparently, during a
recent Asian tour, Ayub had on several occasions referred to India as
‘Pakistan’s real enemy’. The Indians pointed out that Ayub and Dawn had
blamed India for the Jabalpur communal riots and for making numerous
‘provocative statements’. In addition, Pakistan now seemed intent on
negotiating its northern border with China, an area occupied by Pakistan but
claimed by India. 24 The Harriman visit produced a clear picture of what
Eisenhower had dealt with from 1953 onwards.

Many in Washington believed that the resolution of the Indus dispute would
be a first step toward the settlement of other outstanding issues, including the
impasse over Kashmir. Of course, everything depended on the willingness of
India and Nehru to compromise. To show sensitivity to the India position,
Kennedy appointed officials with well-known Indian sympathies to key
positions. In Chester Bowles, the Under Secretary of State, and John Kenneth
Galbraith, the new US Ambassador to New Delhi, die administration had two
staunch advocates of a pro-India point of view. Galbraith viewed military aid

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to Pakistan as an ‘evil’, if an understandable one. 25 More to the point, Bowles
fumed that the intelligence installations at Peshawar were simply not worth the
resulting loss of US ‘influence’ in India. 26

The possibility of Pakistani-Chinese collusion with regard to India created
another problem for the Kennedy administration’s relationship with New
Delhi, because, at Menon’s urging, Nehru sought additional insurance by
increasingly viewing the Soviets as a counterbalance to China, to Pakistan, and
to pressure from the United States. In Pakistan, the Soviet influence in
Afghanistan, Indian intransigence over Kashmir, and presumed Indo-Afghan
agitation in Pushtunistan constituted an ongoing threat. 27 For Karachi, China
offered additional leverage. Kennedy found himself forced to wink at the
dictatorship in Pakistan and the ‘hoax’ of a Communist threat to justify military
aid clearly aimed at India. Following Eisenhower’s example, Kennedy tried to
divert attention away from the confrontation with India toward economic
development. In India, economic-development aid continued, while New
Delhi’s non-alignment, and congressional perceptions that New Delhi had
ignored warnings about Soviet influence in India, prevented meaningful
military aid. 28

The Johnson mission to South Asia

In May 1961, on his Asia trip, Vice-President Lyndon Johnson visited India
and, in meetings with Nehru, pushed for economic development. Having just
visited Southeast Asia, Johnson raised die issue of Communist aggression in
Laos and South Vietnam. 29 Johnson asked Nehru to speak out ‘in stirring and
ringing tones against the Communist tactics’ in Southeast Asia, and pointed to
Laos as an example of the ‘moral force’ that India could exert. Nehru stated
that he understood the US desire for him to take a position, but refused to do
so. 30 In a pointed reference to Southeast Asia and Pakistan, Nehru told
Johnson that he agreed that economic development was the principal
guarantee against totalitarianism, not arms. 31 Johnson came away from these
meetings optimistic that Nehru would consider taking a more pro-American
stance on the situation in Soudieast Asia. 32 Johnson’s group then traveled to
Karachi. Ayub pressed Johnson about economic aid to India. He stated:
‘Nehru would not listen if he did not feel compelled to.’ 33 Ayub made it clear
that he believed that US economic aid, the refusal of Washington to put real
pressure on Nehru, and the pro-Indian sentiments emanating from the
administration were the primary impediments to a settlement on Kashmir.
Contrary to Washington’s protestations, Ayub insisted that Washington ‘did
have the power to influence him [Nehru].’ Ayub argued that tire dangerous
situation with China left Nehru with no choice but to listen. 34

In contrast to Nehru’s cautionary advice on Southeast Asia, Ayub
wholeheartedly supported the US position and offered Pakistani troops to
confront the Laotian Communists and their North Vietnamese masters. 35
Reporting to the President, Johnson described an ‘intellectual affinity’ and an
‘affinity of spirit’ with the Indians. With regard to Pakistan, Johnson stated:

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

251

‘President Ayub of Pakistan is the singularly most impressive and, in his way,
responsible head of state encountered on this trip.’ The Vice-President argued
that while it was ‘impossible’ and ‘probably unnecessary’ to convince India to
drop its non-aligned status, Pakistan’s strategic position deserved full
consideration for military and economic modernization. Ayub’s views that
‘open representative’ government would invite chaos and ‘Communist
infiltration’ making it impossible to ‘eradicate poverty, ignorance, and disease’
resonated with the administration. Fundamentally, Kennedy and his advisors
shared the same conviction with Eisenhower that only in a controlled political
environment could Pakistan and Iran safely modernize. 36 Kennedy did not
want to be remembered as the ‘man who lost Pakistan’.

Nehru apparently hoped that improved US-Soviet relations would help
India. As Krishna Menon stated, Nehru wanted the ‘Kennedy regime’ to
respond favorably to Russia’s new ‘liberalized’ outlook. 37 It appears that Nehru
viewed rapprochement between the Soviet Union and die United States as an
additional guarantee against aggressive Chinese moves in the north. 38 As Nehru
observed that it was in ‘the strange twist of destiny’ during this lifting of the
‘clouds of cold war’, that India and China moved closer to open hostilities. 39
The Indian Prime Minister may also have viewed the meetings between
Khrushchev and Kennedy as something of test for the new American
administration. In a follow-up report on the meetings and the Soviet reaction
to them, Arthur Lall borrowed a Russian saying from the Soviet Ambassador:
‘A credulous fool is more dangerous than an open enemy.’ Lall concluded:
‘The Russians would therefore rather have Dulles than Kennedy.’ 40 Nehru saw
the situation with regard to Berlin as the ‘real crisis’, because of Moscow’s fears
of a resurgent Germany. 41 The fact that Kennedy reaffirmed Eisenehower’s
and Truman’s position on access to West Berlin served notice on Nehru that
the new administration would be much like the old in its approach to the
Soviet Union and Communism.

Mending fences with Ayub

As Ayub increased his complaints about US policy, fears grew in
Washington that relations with Pakistan were slipping dangerously. In reaction,
Washington advanced President Ayub’s official visit to July 1961 from its
original date in November 1963. 42 To counter the impression of being
‘enamored with non-alignment’, the White House added an ‘unrivalled
occasion’, a dinner at Mount Vernon. 43 The change in dates moved Ayub’s visit
ahead of one planned for Nehru in November. On his way to Washington,
Ayub gave Kennedy a preview of what was to come. He stopped in London
and told British Prime Minister Macmillan that die inability of the US to bring
stability to the subcontinent called into question Pakistan’s decision to join the
Western alliance system. Ayub pointed out that the proposed new constitution
of 1962 might force a neutralist course. Ayub knew that Macmillan would pass
the substance of the conversation to Kennedy. He calculated that having just

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muddled through the Bay of Pigs crisis and a failed Vienna summit with the
Soviets, Kennedy would appease Pakistan . 44 He was right.

Like Eisenhower, Kennedy wanted to avoid the Kashmir issue and to
discourage Pakistani action in the UN Security Council. The administration
believed that: ‘Given the present Indian and Pakistan positions, there is no
immediate possibility for a formal solution to the Kashmir problem.’ The
official US position argued that only bilateral contacts could resolve the issue
and that Pakistan should cultivate broad relations with India as a starting-point
in settling the dispute . 45 The administration anticipated a ‘major effort to
demonstrate Pakistan’s loyalty and to win increased US aid ’. 46 Fundamentally,
nothing had changed: Washington needed Pakistan for its collective security
alliances, CENTO and SEATO; and the relationship required arms. These

Corbis

Ayub, Eisenhower, and Kennedy

Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, Eisenhower, and Kennedy at a state dinner
during Ayub’s official visit to Washington in July 1961. This picture symbolizes the
close relationship between Eisenhower and Kennedy policy. Pro-Indian
pronouncements raised fears of Pakistan’s defection to the neutral camp,
prompting Kennedy to advance the date of Ayub’s visit by more than two years
and resulting in an outpouring of reassurances to Pakistan.

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

253

same arms threatened good relations with India.

During the July 1961 visit, despite efforts to the contrary, discussions with
Ayub always found their way back to Kashmir. Ayub used Soviet involvement
in Afghanistan to highlight Pakistan’s lack of military capability to defend itself.
Ayub disagreed with US aid to India, stating that the purpose of US aid to
India was ‘not with the expectation that India would support US policies’ but
to prevent an Indian economic collapse. Ayub maintained that this approach
only made India more difficult to deal with on Kashmir, and freed other funds
for military use. Ayub asked for American help with Nehru and told Kennedy
that the Kashmir situation had reached a point where the ‘Pakistani people’
had to see some sort of progress, which contributed to demands for a closer
relationship between Beijing and Karachi. Kennedy asked Ayub to wait until
after Nehru’s visit that fall to contemplate additional action at the UN. Ayub
made it clear that if Kennedy failed to make progress with Nehru, Pakistan
would have no alternative but to raise the Kashmir issue again in the UN
Security Council. 47

Ayub believed that he and President Kennedy saw eye-to-eye on most
issues. 48 Ayub had obtained Kennedy’s promise to support the Pakistani
position on UN resolutions on Kashmir, should it come to that. Kennedy also
promised a ‘major effort’ with Nehru during his US visit, stating: ‘It was in the
vital interest of the United States that this issue [Kashmir] be solved.’ 49 The
comments made during Ayub’s visit were also noted in New Delhi. Nehru
called them ‘aggressive and even offensive’ with regard to Kashmir. Terming it
‘India baiting’ and a ‘revelation,’ Nehru stated: ‘The kind of language he used
even on State occasions was the essence of bitterness against India.’ 50 The
prospect of any pro-Pakistan shift in US policy, coupled with the Chinese
threat, had increased Indian insecurities.

The trip also had significant long-term ramifications for US-Pakistani
relations. Pressed on Kashmir, President Kennedy made some injudiciously
vague statements. Kennedy reassured Ayub that the US had ‘no intention now’
of giving military aid to India and, in the event of some important change in
the situation like a war with China: ‘President Kennedy would talk with Ayub
first.’ 51 A ‘vigorous, frank military man’, Ayub took the statement at face
value. 52 At the conclusion of the meeting, Kennedy reaffirmed that the United
States would continue economic aid to India to stave off economic collapse
and die resulting political chaos, but that Pakistan was the principal US ally in
the region. Kennedy also agreed to talk to Ayub prior to any change in that
policy. US officials knew that they had misled Ayub about the nature of the
‘talk’ that would occur between Pakistan and die United States. Should it come
to that, Kennedy would inform, not consult with Ayub. Talbot saw the
problem coming and commented that the conversation left an ‘uncertain taste
in the mouth’. 53 Personal diplomacy tended to leave a trail of
misunderstandings, and President Kennedy certainly left Ayub with die wrong
impression.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Following Ayub’s visit, Kennedy sent Bowles ostensibly on a tour of South
Asia, but with the expressed purpose of reassuring Prime Minister Nehru.
During the meetings, to everyone’s surprise, the issue of India-Pakistan
relations never came up. 54 This was unusual given the recent aggravations in
US-India relations. For example, Galbraith in New Delhi requested that
Washington allow him to notify Nehru of tire type and number of F-104s to be
delivered to Pakistan. Karachi objected, and Washington ordered the New
Delhi Embassy not to inform the Indians. 55 In a letter to President Kennedy in
August 1961, Ambassador Galbraith opined:

If the State Department drives you crazy you might calm y^ourself by 7
contemplating its effect on me. The other night I woke with a blissful
feeling and discovered I had been dreaming that the whole Goddamn
place had burned down. I dozed off again hoping for a headline saying no
survivors. . . . The touchiest issue here is the shipment of military
hardware to Pakistan - arming the present rival and foe and the ancient
enemy and rulers of the Hindus. A few weeks ago one of our aircraft
carriers brought twelve supersonic jets (F-104s) to Karachi where they
were unloaded in all the secrecy that would attend mass sodomy on the
B.M.T. at rush hour.

Galbraith complained that in placating the Pakistanis, the United States allowed
the Indian intelligence service to report the unloading of between 50 and 75
aircraft. The Ambassador ‘threatened physical violence’ to get permission to
explain the transfer to the Indians, causing Pakistan to complain that the US
had not kept it a secret. Galbraith was beginning to understand what he viewed
as the unpleasant realities of Kennedy policy. 56 Pakistan provided key support
to US strategic interests, and was a member of various alliances qualifying it for
military aid. Non-aligned India was not.

Problems with India

Between Ayub’s visit in July and Nehru’s in November, events placed
additional strain on USTndian relations. From 1 to 6 September 1961, a Non-
Aligned Conference met in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, with Nehru in attendance. 57
The Conference communique condemned both the Soviet Union and tire US
equalfy for the resumption of nuclear testing. 58 The Soviets had actually 7 broken
the moratorium, not Washington. As a result of a meeting on 26 August with
Galbraith, Desai suggested to Nehru that ‘there is a lot of justification for the
attitude taken by the United States’ on nuclear testing and promised to
recommend a modification. 59 At the end of the conference, tire non-aligned
states produced a statement that ‘put the US and the USSR on the same level
and blamed both for the crisis.’ 60 Galbraith, who thought that he had an
understanding with the Indians, was perturbed. 61 The Ambassador accused
Desai and Nehru of undermining the ability of the ‘Kennedy 7 administration to

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

255

push through their liberal policies’ by providing ammunition to the US
domestic opponents of closer ties with India. 62

With regard to Soudieast Asia, the Indian position was also problematic.
Averell Harriman, who was responsible for the Geneva negotiations over Laos,
detested Arthur Lall, who headed the India contingent. 63 Lall was a long-time
protege of Krishna Menon, or, as Lall described the relationship, Menon’s
‘closest aide’. 64 Galbraith complained to Desai that the Indian delegation led
by Lall, and undoubtedly influenced by Menon, supported the most radical
views of the Chinese and North Vietnamese in the negotiations, even when the
United States and Soviet Union agreed. In commenting on the Indian role as
Chair of tire ICC on Indochina, Chester Cooper, a member of the US
delegation, described Krishna Menon as the ‘wordy, windy, and exasperatingly
oratorical’ ‘Super Star of the Geneva Follies’. Cooper stated that while the
Indians ‘provided an occasional oasis of amusement in a desert of dull
speeches . . . more often than not they sent most of the long-suffering delegates
into spasms of frustration and irritation.’ In the US view, the Indians were
‘more interested in discussing broad international profundities’ than in making
the ICC work effectively. 65 Desai, an opponent of Krishna Menon and
therefore a Lall detractor, reported to Nehru: ‘I do not see why we should
come in the way of their coming together and support the Chinese and North
Vietnamese who always take an extremist line at Geneva.’ 66 In a minute on 28
August, Nehru concurred: ‘I agree with you. ... We need not be more royalist
than the King.’ 67 Despite Nehru’s views, nothing changed in Geneva.

On 8 September, Galbraith informed Desai that Lall continued to be an
impediment. According to Galbraith: ‘Harriman maintains that Arthur Lall is
never helpful in any way and continues to damage the American position even
when the Americans are able to get the agreement of the Russians on some
issues.’ 68 Even though the Indians had supported a move to take the
neutralization issue and that of the infiltration of Laos by North Vietnam
directly to the ICC, India refused to condemn the North Vietnamese. 69 At
every opportunity, Galbraith harped on tire need for a solution in Laos in
which neither rightist or leftist extremist elements took over. 70 He implored the
Indians to assist in a solution that would preserve the credibility of the
Kennedy administration by preventing a ‘communist takeover of Laos under
the guise of neutrality’. 74 Useful Indian diplomatic assistance, however, never
materialized. 72

Nehru: ‘the worst official visit’

These issues formed the backdrop for Prime Minister Nehru’s November
1961 Washington visit. Disappointingly, Nehru either lectured Kennedy or
gave him the renowned ‘silent treatment’. 73 For Nehru’s part, Kennedy’s
narrow election victory, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and official American concerns
that the liberal policies proclaimed during the election were not in fact being
implemented raised doubts about whether or not ‘the untroubled certainty of

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Courtesy of National Archives

Nehru and Kennedy

Kennedy and Nehru during Nehru’s 1961 official visit to Washington. Kennedy
remarked that it was the ‘worst official visit’ of his presidency. Unimpressed by the
new President, Nehru gave Kennedy his famed silent treatment.

judgments at the White House’ were reliable. 74 Second, the visit demonstrated
the lengths to which the Kennedy administration was willing to go to get India
to counterbalance China in Asia, a competition Eisenhower had pointedly
avoided. Washington gave all the appearance of preferring that India be
embroiled in a conflict with China. Third, Krishna Menon would not go away.
The US suggestion that Lall be removed certainly did not sit well; Nehru
reacted negatively to any hint of external coercion. Finally, there was the issue
of Galbraith’s use of the American right-wing bogey man in an attempt to
apply leverage to India policy. It raised doubts about the administration’s
ability to conduct pro-India policies championed by Galbraith and Bowles.
From the Indian perspective, either the administration was too weak to change
Eisenhower’s policies, or too duplicitous to be trusted.

On 7 November, Nehru arrived at the White House. At the beginning of
the meeting, Kennedy asked for Indian support ‘on those occasions when [the
United States] might be right’. Nehru responded that he attached weight not
only to the merits of an issue, but to the ‘manner of approach as well’. 75 It
could not have helped that Kennedy told Nehru directly that Krishna Menon

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

257

was an impediment to any American administration that wanted closer
cooperation with India. 76 Kennedy offered an interesting explanation of US
support for non-democratic regimes: ‘The foreign policy of the United States
[is] to support countries with democratic systems, but even more basically to
support national sovereignty.’ Nehru countered that weak regimes propped up
by outside military forces merely resulted in ‘weaker’ dependent regimes and
invited outside subversion. In a pointed reference, Nehru then opined that that
if the countries involved had abided by the terms of the 1954 agreements on
Indochina, there would be no problem of infiltration in Laos, nor would there
be any need for intervention in South Vietnam. 77 The exchanges were friendly,
but the Kennedy charm was getting nowhere.

At this point, as he had promised Ayub, Kennedy brought up the issue of
Kashmir. Kennedy observed that this flashpoint issue hindered the ability of
bo tlr Pakistan and India to focus resources on economic development. Nehru
pointedly countered that India could only consider a settlement based on the
status quo. He went on to say that neither he nor the Congress Party could
accept Pakistan’s argument for a plebiscite in Kashmir because Muslim
communalism formed the basis of and motivation for that effort. Nehru stated
that a plebiscite recognized the efficacy of communalism, something that he
had long rejected, and thus the possibility of partition threatened the
fundamental basis of tire Indian secular state. To recognize the Pakistani claim
and their communal argument would invite a never-ending cycle of agitation
among minorities and threaten the existence of the state itself. Nehru pointed
out that general elections in India, something that Pakistan did not have, would
occur in three months’ time, and to raise this issue would cause ‘huge troubles’.
The President’s probing indicated that no room for compromise existed on the
Indian side. 78 The meetings were not productive for several reasons. As Talbot
commented: “Nehru’s style was not of a sort calculated to stir or fully engage
the President’s interest.’ 79

Kennedy’s problem in dealing with Nehru was more fundamental. Nehru’s
attitude was that of a senior statesman advising a young, inexperienced
American President. As one observer commented: ‘He was like a tremendous
nanny, talking to Khrushchev and Kennedy as if they were naughty nephews,
hoping they wouldn’t get into war.’ Nehru saw Kennedy as ‘brash, aggressive,
and inexperienced’. Nehru had gotten along well with Eisenhower, in part
because he viewed him as an equal. 80 The much-anticipated visit had also left
Washington unimpressed. For an administration obsessed with youth, vigor,
and action, Nehru’s demeanor in the meetings caused Kennedy and his
advisors to conclude that: ‘Nehru had aged and was a tired old man who had
stayed around too long.’ 81 Kennedy later described Nehru’s visit, ‘as the worst
head of state visit I have had’. 82

Menon and Goa

Before returning home, Nehru added insult to injury. He asked Kennedy to
meet with the Indian Defense Minister. 83 The purpose of this meeting was a

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

mystery. Menon was broadly despised, and his irascibility and rudeness were
legendary. 84 Yet Nehru prevailed upon Kennedy to discuss the situation in
Vietnam and Laos with Menon. On 21 November, the President met with
Menon, who, while staying on what was for him his very best behavior, still
managed to disagree with Kennedy on every point of substance in the
conversation. Menon was blind to North Vietnamese infiltration and violations
of Laotian neutrality. He lectured Kennedy on Washington’s need to get along
with the Soviets. 85 It was neither a productive nor a pleasant meeting, and
given what was about to transpire it was embarrassing.

Three weeks later, on 17 December 1961, Nehru gave Menon the green
light to occupy the Portuguese enclave of Goa. Founded in 1510, it was die last
vestige of colonial presence in India. The occupation was over in 26 hours and
almost bloodless. Nevertheless, it brought a stinging condemnation from
Britain, France, and the United States. Embarrassed, Kennedy admonished
Nehru stating: ‘All countries including, of course, the United States, have a
great capacity for convincing themselves of the full righteousness of their
particular cause. No country ever uses force for reasons it considers unjust.’ 86
UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson accused India of having ‘killed the UN’ and
termed the attack a ‘stab in the back’, referring to US attempts to improve
relations with India. 87 US officials accused Nehru of taking action on Goa to
improve the sagging position of die Congress Party and his friend Krishna
Menon, and to distract public opinion from dieir inaction in confronting die
Chinese in the north. Nehru virtually admitted as much to Galbraidi: ‘Failure
to react to the Portuguese would I feel sure, be disastrous bodi for the people
of Goa, who would have to suffer terribly, and our own people round about
the border, die position of India generally in regard to other problems that we
face, including other borders.’ 88 The move was wildly popular in India. It not
only bolstered the political standing of Nehru’s Congress Party, but also
appeared to assure a solid political future for his protege, Krishna Menon.
Menon, Kennedy’s guest just weeks before, dismissed US opposition as a
‘vestige of Western imperialism’ and ‘British influence’. 89 Nehru also hoped
that it would serve as a warning to both Pakistan and China and demonstrate
independence from the West. 90

Pakistan reacts to Goa

Reacting to die Indian occupation of Goa, Ayub Khan demanded UN
action on Kashmir, something Washington and London wanted to avoid.
Galbraith hurriedly met with Nehru and argued that a ‘slugging match between
Zafrullah Khan and Krishna Menon’ at the UN would revive the Goa issue
and have a negative impact on India’s position in the US. Nehru agreed to
consider inviting Pakistani General Burki for preliminary talks leading to a
potential meeting between himself and Ayub. 91 Galbraith reported diis to
Washington, only to have Nehru undermine the effort by stating: ‘Our view
has been that we should start with the acceptance of tilings as they are.’ 92 The
proposed talks collapsed into the usual finger-pointing between New Delhi and

Pakistan, India, and Priorities

259

Karachi. 93 The British Foreign Office summed up the situation: “We hope that
it will be possible for Minister to avoid being drawn on Kashmir issue in both
India and Pakistan, particularly if matter is currendy under discussion in
Security Council.’ 94 Ayub insisted that Kennedy stand by his commitment to
support Pakistan at the UN. Just as in 1957, the US attempted to ‘avoid a
brawl’. 95 Then Ayub made it clear that a failure by the West to support
Pakistan would lead to ‘a reappraisal of Pakistan’s present friendships’.
Kennedy understood this to mean that US intelligence sites might be in
jeopardy as well as the possibility of improved Pakistani-Chinese relations. 96

Fearing that an embarrassing debate at die UN would harden India’s stance,
the US tried to prevent the confrontation: ‘Our (US) efforts should be directed
at forestalling bitter and highly emotional public debate and at behind-the-
scenes encouragement of both parties to refrain from taking positions from
which there can be no withdrawal or no compromise.’ 97 The White House
decided to engage in another round of ‘personal diplomacy’. 98 Kennedy wrote
letters to Prime Minister Nehru and General Ayub arguing for bilateral talks.
After reading the letter, B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador in Washington,
offered his view of personal diplomacy and observed: ‘If I may say so, this was
not a wise tiring to do. However, it is an interesting demarche.’ 99 Kennedy’s
letter made acceptance of the US proposal for bilateral talks contingent upon
the suspension of the Pakistani action in the United Nations.

Pakistan accepted Kennedy’s proposal but refused to delay its UN effort,
for three reasons: first, the press in Pakistan had already blamed US pressure
for the delays in utilizing the Security Council; second, the Indians would delay
on bilateral talks unless the ‘heat [was] kept on them’ at the UN; and third, the
Kashmir situation was heating up as a result of major Indian military
deployments in Kashmir. 100 Kennedy appealed directly to Ayub to forego tire
Security Council debate and pressured Nehru to accept bilateral ministerial
discussions. When Galbraith interpreted a non-committal Nehru response as a
commitment to talks, Kennedy was encouraged. Instead, the Indians
responded with a vague invitation that did not meet the Pakistani criteria for
real talks on Kashmir. India would not allow ‘mediation’ over her sovereign
territory. 101 Ambassador Rountree in Karachi commented: ‘We are, of course,
greatly discouraged by report of meeting. . . . What we had assumed would be
important Indian initiative to bring about discussions of Kashmir seems to
have ended.’ 102 Rountree was ‘discouraged’ but not surprised.

More concerned than ever, Kennedy proposed that Eugene Black, President
of the World Bank, act as a mediator in discussions between India and
Pakistan. 103 Ayub accepted, but as one Pakistani official put it: ‘The Indians
would not negotiate except under strong and continued pressure from some
outside source.’ He added that Nehru would ‘wriggle’ and ‘wheedle’ in an
attempt to escape his tight situation. Ayub and his advisors were convinced
that the Americans did not ‘understand the Hindu mentality and the Indians
were taking full advantage of this.’ 104 In New Delhi, Desai was also pessimistic
because tire ‘Kashmir dispute was one of sovereignty’, and he drought Black a

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poor choice. The British commented: ‘It will need all Galbraith’s skill and
persuasion to bring Indians to accept this.’ 105 On 23 January, Galbraith met
with Nehru, who stated that he would discuss die matter with Desai. 106 Ayub
took the position that the entire episode was a test of die American
government and ‘whether die USG insists on a definite, repeat definite, answer
from the Indian Government this week’. The root of Ayub’s position was his
fundamental distrust of the Nehru-Menon axis and his fear that Menon might
actually manage to succeed the ailing Nehru. The British were concerned that if
the Indians offered an indefinite answer and Washington accepted it, ‘diere
may be an explosion.’ 107

In an attempt to forestall that explosion, Kennedy accellerated aid programs
for Pakistan: ‘A failure to provide what competent analysts have determined to
be Pakistan’s needs would seriously weaken the image of the United States and
the West as determined to advance the development of our staunchest
partners.’ 108 The Pakistanis dusted off the SEATO agreements and reminded
Washington that ‘die United States would promptly and effectively come to the
assistance of Pakistan if it were subjected to armed aggression.’ The State
Department concluded that under the Note of 15 April 1959 ‘the assurances
undertaken by die United States ... pertained to a case of armed aggression
“against Pakistan” widiout any limitation as to the place of attack.’ The
provision in the treaty could be interpreted to include an attack on Pakistani
forces in Kashmir. Kennedy reaffirmed in writing to Ayub that ‘my
government most certainly stands by diese assurances.’ The United States had
made similar guarantees to India in the event of an attack by Pakistan. 109

Nehru’s ‘doubts and misgivings’

On 29 January, Nehru replied in writing to Kennedy on the Black proposal.
He stated that he had no confidence in ‘third party’ approaches and that ‘direct
talks between the two countries [was the] ‘only possible way.’ Nehru pointed
his finger at Washington, stating: “We have had the feeling that a certain
measure of support that Pakistan got from other countries made it much more
rigid in this matter.’ Just to make sure that Kennedy understood, Nehru added
sharply: ‘There is no lack of confidence in Mr. Black, but we have certain
doubts and misgivings about your proposal.’ 110 The Indian government clearly
lacked confidence in the White House. In Washington, Ambassador Nehru
told Phillips Talbot that: ‘President to Prime Minister correspondence of this
nature because of the consequences if India were forced to say “No” to the
President was undesirable.’ 111 Within the administration, the pro-India
optimists, Komer, Bowles, and Galbraith, believed that improved relations
with India coupled with Chinese pressure had created an opportunity to
reassess US policy on the subcontinent. In addition, the Pakistani demarches of
January 1962 had ruffled feathers. Questions arose about whether the US
should be ‘more interested in a Western-oriented weak ally or a strong
neutralist India able to defend its own national interests (which happen to
broadly coincide with ours).’ 112 The pro-India elements wanted to eliminate

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Pakistan as the US’s ‘chosen instrument on the subcontinent with a veto on
our Indian policy’. 113

Often led by Talbot, traditionalists successfully countered that, no matter
how frustrating, the US needed both relationships. India carried more weight
in international affairs, but the relationship with Pakistan directly affected US
security. Pakistan’s position in the alliance system contributed to containment
and supplied ‘certain special facilities’ to the US. Pakistan also supported US
initiatives at the UN. India and Pakistan were too important for the US to
choose between them. 114 Putting the best face on a difficult situation, Talbot
argued that India and Pakistan had negotiated an end to the Indus water
dispute. Furthermore, there were indications that influential people on both
sides were ‘fed up’ with die dispute: ‘There is reason to believe that to get a
settlement some of the top Pakistani leadership too would be prepared to make
very substantial compromises of existing demands.’ 115 They argued that after
the Indian elections, a window of opportunity for negotiations would open.

During early 1962, the Kennedy administration attempted to produce
alternatives to Pakistani efforts to bring the Kashmir dispute to the UN
Security Council. The US continued to hope that the parties might yet be
amenable to ‘bilateral talks’ or a mediation effort. Ayub had a better grasp of
the situation, however, and made it abundantly clear that he expected little or
no progress with Nehru. 116 In March, Under Secretary of State Ball informed
Pakistani Ambassador Ahmad that the Security Council effort was premature
and damaging to the potential for ‘direct negotiations’, and that Pakistan
should not ‘overestimate potential support’ in the Security Council. Ball then
pointed out that any resolution would face a Soviet veto, leaving Pakistan only
the option of going to a less sympathetic UNGA. 117 Concern about an impasse
was well founded. Despite the Congress Party’s gains, Nehru understood that,
even were he so inclined, any move toward a compromise with Pakistan would
jeopardize its hold on power. In addition, Menon, the hero of Goa, had gained
considerable stature. ‘He now emerges as one of the very few Congress Party
figures who can be considered national in character.’ 118 Menon’s increased
influence fed Nehru’s natural inclination to maintain an uncompromising
stance on Kashmir.

There were problems in Pakistan as well. Pakistan’s 1959 land-reform
program attempted to reduce the influence of the ‘landed gentry’ while
increasing the support of the mid-sized landowners for the government. It had
run into difficulties. 119 In addition, Pakistan was about to inaugurate a new
constitution, which had been in the works since 27 October 1959. Despite the
ultimate authority residing in the presidency, die new constitution would give
political voice to elements of Pakistani society that would react negatively to
any reduction of pressure on India over Kashmir. 120 Introduced on 1 March
1962, some Indians described the ‘Ayub Constitution’ as ‘a government of the
President, by the President, and for the President’. 121 Nevertheless, Ayub
wanted the new constitution to be at least a propaganda success, and the
Kashmir campaign partially served to insure this outcome. 122 Washington’s

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reluctance to press the Kashmir issue at the UN convinced Ayub that he had
been misled. On 12 April, Talbot met with Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani
UN Representative, and Aziz Ahmad, Karachi’s Ambassador in Washington.
They accused the Kennedy administration of dragging its feet on pressing India
for negotiations, the Black mission, Kashmir, and Goa. Pakistan intended to
bring the issue of Kashmir to the Security Council on 27 April, a move for
which they expected US support. 123

To reinforce this message, Ayub Khan wrote to President Kennedy,
explaining Pakistan’s 14 years of patience and Kennedy’s promise to support
the Pakistanis. 124 Ayub stated that he understood that current US policy would
not bring any positive results for Pakistan with regard to Kashmir, but he
wanted the US to take a public stand. The White House concluded that it had
no alternative but to support the resolution calling for bilateral talks between
Pakistan and India over Kashmir. 125 In the end, the ‘fierce diplomatic
onslaught’ led by Krishna Menon left only the United States and Ireland co-
sponsoring the resolution, which the Soviet Union killed with a veto on 22
June 1962. 126 Kennedy had fulfilled his commitment to Ayub but had nothing
to show for it. Ayub became more disenchanted with Kennedy, and India now
decided to pursue closer ties with Moscow.

Nehru explores the Soviet option

In May 1962, the Indians concluded that they needed modern arms for
protection against the Pakistanis and Chinese. The Soviets were happy to
accommodate them. In Washington, the moment of truth had arrived. Rumors
of the arms deal rumbled around the bureaucracy for months, but most of the
pro-India faction dismissed the possibility. 127 Then the Indians announced the
purchase of MIG-21 aircraft. The US Senate reacted sharply, with a drastic
reduction in aid. 128 New Delhi balked and delayed the agreement. A quick
analysis at the White House concluded that if the price of stopping the Soviet
arms purchase was the supply of F-104 Starfighters like those provided to
Pakistan, then it was simply not worth it. 129 The administration concluded that
the best approach would be to argue that die arms purchase would severely
damage India’s economic development, not only by diverting funding but also
because of aid that India would lose. 130

Both the State Department and the NSC concluded that the cost in political
and financial terms of supplanting the Soviets was just too high, and little
would be gained. Krishna Menon, the architect of the Soviet deal, would get
credit for having forced Washington’s hand. The Pakistanis would be enraged,
and CENTO and SEATO would be damaged, undermining US influence in
the region. 131 ‘The value of our special relationship with Pakistan, particularly
in the military field, is such that we cannot contemplate withdrawal. Also, the
U.S. cannot yet accept the dissolution of CENTO and SEATO, which might
follow if Pakistan withdrew. ... [Ejqual treatment for India would be
interpreted in Pakistan as a U.S. decision to change fundamentally the relative
role of Pakistan and could adversely affect our interests in Pakistan.’ The US

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263

policy statement went on to say that it was imperative to strengthen ties with
Pakistan ‘in order to obtain the additional freedom of action to take the steps
necessary to deal with India in the light of our national interests. An
improvement in Pak-Indian relations is an essential element in gaining this
additional flexibility.’ 132 The decisive issue appeared in a CIA memorandum for
the national intelligence board: ‘US provision of F-104 fighter aircraft to India
would draw a sharply adverse reaction from Pakistan. ... Pakistan would
almost certainly not permit expansion of the special US facilities and would
probably seek to impose new restriction on them.’ 133 Those intelligence
facilities were simply too important.

Simultaneously, Ambassador Galbraith confronted Krishna Menon about
the possibility of US aid subsidizing Soviet arms; Menon denied this, and
claimed that India was paying cash for them. Galbraith, who detested Menon,
retorted that given tire state of the rupee, it was military aid pure and simple.
Having temporarily delayed significant Soviet military assistance, Galbraith,
Bowles, and to a lesser degree, Komer argued that the lack of meaningful US
military assistance for India had opened the door to the Soviets and
undermined pro-Western elements in the Indian military. Galbraith further
pointed out Nehru’s poor health and the fact that the Soviet arms deal
enhanced die reputation and influence of Krishna Menon, the pro-Soviet and
anti-American Minister of Defense. At a minimum, Galbraith wanted to offer
India C-130 transports to stave off die MIG transaction. He failed, and in
bitterness commented: ‘Yesterday an incredible telegram came from the
Department washing out the C-130 offer. ... And, likewise any suggestion of
military aid. All in craven reaction to Congress and, I fear, to the President’s
displeasure with India.’ 134 In frustration, Galbraith decided to resign. 135

On 24 September 1962, Ayub stopped in the US on his way to a
Commonwealth Conference in Canada. He visited Hammersmith Farm,
Jacqueline Kennedy’s family farm at Newport, Rhode Island. There he met
with President Kennedy for several hours. He argued doggedly that large-scale
US economic aid allowed India to divert resources into the purchase of
increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. Ayub made it clear that he viewed
the US reluctance to use economic aid to pressure India as the principal
obstruction to progress on Kashmir. Frustrations were growing. 136

In the final analysis, despite campaign rhetoric and hopes for closer ties, US
policy continued along the same track established by the Eisenhower
administration. The attempt to improve the situation with India had
complicated the relationship with Pakistan. 137 Military and economic aid to
Pakistan continued at the same levels as those during the Eisenhower
administration. Ayub remained popular at DOD, in the CIA, and on Capitol
Hill. When it came to the fundamental US policy of containment, Pakistan, not
India, was more important. In this environment of distrust and dissatisfaction,
the Chinese provided a catalyst that permanently altered the dynamic of US
relations with both New Delhi and Karachi.

Part IV: Frustrations of the Fall
JFK and 1963

In die fall of 1962, die Cuban missile crisis and its potential for
Armageddon with die Soviet Union consumed die Kennedy administration.
Nevertheless, two smaller crises, the beginning of the Yemen civil war and the
Sino-Indian border war, significandy altered the direction of the
administration’s policy in the Greater Middle East. These two events
complicated US relations widi pro-Western states and Britain, and chilled
relations with die UAR and India. The Kennedy administration brought to
Washington an intellectual acceptance of the principle of non-alignment.
Implicit in this acceptance was a belief that the Eisenhower administration had
mismanaged relations with die developing world and that a more sophisticated
application of ‘personal diplomacy’ and economic aid could bring the non-
aligned countries to a more pro-Western orientation. As widi Eisenhower, the
Kennedy administration viewed Nasser’s Egypt as the key to the Arab world
and to any Arab-Israeli peace. By the late 1950s, Nehru’s India had become a
potential counterbalance to growing Chinese power. While Eisenhower had
shied away from encouraging this competition, many in the new administation,
including President Kennedy, believed that if the dispute with Pakistan over
Kashmir could be solved, non-aligned India would move into a more pro-
Western posture and potentially counterbalance Chinese influence in Asia. Like
Eisenhower, Kennedy’s ultimate goal was the containment of Soviet and
Chinese Communism, and, if anydiing, Kennedy was even more aggressive and
less risk-averse in pursuing that goal.

During 1961 and 1962, cooperation and building a working relationship
with Nasser and Nehru had not gone well, and the attempt to cultivate better
relations with these non-aligned states, to one degree or another, had
antagonized US allies in the region. In the fall of 1962, a series of shocks began
the process of exorcising Kennedy’s intellectual flirtation with non-alignment
and of placing US policy goals back on the pragmatic footing developed by

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265

Eisenhower between 1958 and 1960. To grasp the complexity of events during
the fall of 1962, one need only examine a single page in the Melbourne,
Australia, newspaper The Age. The 28 October edition provided a snapshot of
the chaotic fall of 1962. Column one discussed a ‘new ray of hope’ in the
Cuban missile crisis. The next column described fresh Indian troops moving
up to stem the Chinese attack along the northern border. Yet another
announced the arrival of Jordanian and Saudi Arabian forces along the
northern border of Yemen to support royalist elements battling tire UAR-
sponsored republican government in Sanaa. 1 In retrospect, Cuba was the
beginning of the end for Khrushchev’s regime, and in the same vein, the
Yemen civil war and the Sino-Indian border conflict would crush Kennedy’s
hopes for improved relations with the two key non-aligned states in the
Greater Middle East. The crises also undermined the efficacy of White Flouse
‘personal diplomacy’. Given the pressures of the Cuban situation, of necessity
the handling of Yemen and India devolved to more traditional channels within
the foreign-policy establishment, but Kennedy still played an active role in
policy formulation. 2 Fie wanted personal credit for any breakthroughs on the
non-aligned diplomatic front. Unfortunately, by December 1962 events forced
President Kennedy to conclude that his ‘personal diplomacy’ had done little to
alter the situation. In fact, the inability of the President to affect substantive
changes in the Arab-Israeli dispute or the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir
placed the onus of failure squarely on the White Flouse. In terms of diplomacy,
presidential correspondence, personal statements, and initiatives often
diminished Kennedy’s stature, while at the same time compromising his goals.

As 1963 began, the Kennedy administration faced a growing number of
frustrations and disappointments in the Middle East. The White Flouse had
attempted to juggle traditional US security interests and simultaneously
broaden relations with key non-aligned states. Kennedy found that he faced the
same constraints confronted almost a decade earlier by the Eisenhower
administration. Kennedy also learned that these constraints were less a matter
of choice and more a matter of necessity dictated by the requirements of
containment. Kennedy, like Eisenhower, had no choice but to support US
regional allies. Also like Eisenhower, the Kennedy administration believed that
economic development and reform were the best long-term guarantors of
containment, but reality often made security and stability for the traditional
allies the more immediate priority. As a result, Kennedy, the erstwhile
progressive, drove the UAR and India into closer cooperation with the Soviet
Union, the absolute opposite of what he had originally intended. Fie also
alienated Pakistan, and left the United States unambiguously dependent on the
fortunes of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran, a goal diametrically opposed to what
the administration had planned in 1961. The United States found itself tied to
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and other traditional or conservative authoritarian
states. Labeled as imperialist, the White House found itself alienated from most
secular revolutionary states. In addition, policy toward Israel set Washington
on a path toward massive arms and economic subsidies to the Jewish state.

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Sensing the lack of progress in relations with the UAR and India, Kennedy
returned to the more conservative, less activist foreign policy established by
Eisenhower and Dulles between 1958 and 1960. Ultimately, Kennedy bet the
future of the United States in die Greater Middle East on Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and Israel.

Chapter 14: The Best Laid Plans

The spring and summer of 1962 had not gone well for ‘personal diplomacy’.
Nehru stoudy refused to consider the ‘Black mediation plan’ for Kashmir,
pointedly citing ‘confidence’ in Black but a lack thereof in President Kennedy’s
proposal. Nasser publicly rebuffed Kennedy over the Johnson Plan, much to
the relief of the Israelis, who were only too happy to lay the onus for failure on
Cairo. Kennedy and his advisors had adopted Eisenhower’s view that Nasser
was the key to the Arab Middle East and to a solution of the Arab-Israeli
dispute, yet they had no more progress to show for their efforts than Dulles
had had. Kennedy also believed, using a phrase borrowed from Eisenhower,
that the new revolutionary nationalist leaders were the ‘wave of the future’, but
the White House found itself increasingly committed to the traditional ‘feudal
regimes’. John Badeau, Kennedy’s Ambassador in Cairo, could have been
speaking for the Eisenhower administration when he stated that US support
for traditional monarchies ‘played into the Russian hands as they . . . depict [the
US] to the Middle East as the supporters of the vanishing order’, ‘that the
traditional order is doomed’, and that ‘radical change’ was the ‘wave of the
future’. 1 As Komer stated, it was ‘hard to imagine any alternative to Egypt and
Cairo as the center of this movement’. 2 The difference was that Kennedy
believed that he could succeed on the Nile where Eisenhower and Dulles had
failed. Kennedy believed that he was different because initially he had failed to
understand the complexity of die situation; it was lack of experience, pure and
simple.

On the whole, the Kennedy administration had a faulty understanding of
what had occurred between 1953 and 1956. Eisenhower and his advisors had
five brutal years of policy experience that tempered their views. Kennedy and
his advisors really believed that the situation in the Middle East was due to
ineptitude on the part of Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. In addition, they
believed their own high-minded rhetoric about managing change. They would
overcome the mismanagement and insensitivity to regional aspirations that had

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alienated key regional leaders, and their superior management would enable
them to succeed where Eisenhower had failed. In addition, Kennedy’s advisors
were process-oriented technocrats. They tended to see developmental stages in
economics and politics, and they believed that Nasser had already passed
through his revolutionary stage. The administration believed that with the
proper incentives and handling ‘radical change’ would occur in terms of
economic development and cooperation in the region. This change would
relegate political differences to history’s dustbin, as economic development
drove the dynamic in the region.

September surprise: Egypt and the Yemen coup

Policy differences had always existed between Washington and Cairo, but
the Syrian coup and dissolution of tire union with Egypt further complicated
the relationship. Now Nasser faced the combined verbal abuse of Damascus
and Baghdad, and rather then helping, Washington’s attempt to move closer to
Nasser merely added to the voices assailing him. Simply put, the relationship
with Washington was increasingly becoming a liability: Nasser could not afford
to act in concert with the US for fear of further damaging his revolutionary
Arab nationalist credentials. To the contrary, the Egyptians needed to openly
challenge the US on some key issues to demonstrate their independence. Cairo
decided that accusations from various Arab capitals, particularly Baghdad and
Damascus, suggesting that the UAR would sell out to Israel over Palestine in
return for US economic aid needed to be demonstrably discredited. Kennedy’s
personal correspondence with Nasser proved too tempting to pass up.
Kennedy had proposed a settlement with Israel in return for increased
economic aid and development assistance. Referring to Kennedy’s proposals as
‘foolish’, the Egyptian government published the contents of the President’s
correspondence with Nasser. The public rebuke caused considerable
embarrassment in Washington, and also created a major problem for
Ambassador Badeau and those advocating more understanding in dealing with
Nasser. 3 The flare-up in US-UAR relations occurred in early September 1962.

On 18 September 1962 in Sanaa, Imam Ahmad died and Crown Prince Badr
declared himself Imam. The Crown Prince had supported close ties with Cairo
and had long been viewed as pro-Nasserist and pro-Soviet. Badr had no sooner
taken the reins than Egyptian-trained army officers staged a coup. The coup
began in the early hours of 26 September 1962, led by a group of Yemeni army
officers headed by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal. Using Soviet-supplied tanks, the
rebels surrounded key government installations, and after a pitched battle in
Sanaa’s ‘Old City’ around the Imam’s palace, the coup leaders announced the
death of the Imam and the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic.
Unfortunately for the plotters and the UAR, to paraphrase Samuel Clemens,
rumors of the Imam’s demise had been greatly exaggerated. 4 The Yemen coup
contrasted sharply with that of Iraq 1 958. In Iraq, despite early suspicions to
the contrary, homegrown revolutionaries overthrew the Hashemite
government. The coup in Yemen had Nasser’s fingerprints all over it. Despite

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269

alliances with the Mutawakkals, Cairo had supported and harbored in Cairo the
anti-monarchist Yemeni Union led by Ahmad Muhammad Numan and
Muhammad Mahmud Zubayri. In December 1961, Nasser asserted control
over the opposition movement by replacing both Numan and Zubayri with a
new leader, Abd-al-Rahman Baydani. Apparently Numan and Zubayri had
displeased Nasser by conferring too closely with Ba’thist party elements and by
refusing to work with Baydani. 5 Nasser and Baydani set about plotting a coup
against Imam Ahmad. As fate would have it, before the coup could be
mounted, Imam Ahmad conveniently died, more or less of natural causes. The
coup actually succeeded against his successor, Badr.

Cairo, along with several Arab states and die Eastern bloc, immediately
recognized the YAR. 6 Egyptian paratroopers were airlifted to the Yemeni
capital to support the new government. 7 Initially, the Kennedy administration
was positively predisposed to the plotters. Working with the Imam and Crown
Prince had always been difficult, and Yemen was one of the most backward
places on the planet. It was difficult to understand how the coup could have a
negative impact on US interests and, as Komer colorfully pointed out: ‘it could
be a head-hunter tight in the depdis of New Guinea. As long as it didn’t
impinge on our interests, no problem.’ 8 Against this backdrop, Ambassador
Badeau, in Cairo, received a friendly ‘word of advice’ from Anwar Sadat.
Sadat’s influence had grown in the Nasser entourage. He was now the
‘presidential watch-dog’ for political organizations. He bluntly told Badeau: ‘90
per cent of [Yemen’s] intelligentsia support die coup and republic’ and warned
the US not to succumb to the expected Saudi pressure and support the
royalists. Sadat also informed Badeau that Free Yemeni officials wanted to
meet with him in Cairo, and asked Badeau to oblige them. The Egyptians
obviously had a vested interest in the new Yemeni regime. With regard to
support for the royalists, Badeau dutifully responded that unless the situation
in Yemen endangered ‘vital US interests’, Washington would not intervene. 9

Naturally, Nasser feigned surprise at the coup, and in the next breath
announced his pleasure at the triumph of anti-feudalist and anti-imperialist
forces. 10 Yemen hardly compensated for the loss of Syria, but it was better than
nothing — perhaps. Given the vagaries of Yemeni planning, Nasser might not
have known the coup’s exact timing, but his involvement was clear. By 9
October, journalists reported that Sanaa was ‘crawling’ with Egyptian troops. 11
Be that as it may, the US carefully avoided pointing the finger at Nasser while
attempting to understand what was going on and what position the US should
take. Predictably, Badeau strongly favored US recognition. He advised
Washington: ‘Our evaluation of UAR intentions and capabilities persuades us
that the time has come for US recognition of the new Yemen regime.’ Badeau
argued that the Imamate was a ‘paragon of anachronism’ and that the US
needed to identify with progressive forces. Rejecting Saudi and British
arguments against recognition, Badeau maintained that UAR-US cooperation
in Yemen against future Soviet influence could result from early US
recognition of die Sallal regime. 12 Badeau accepted YAR Foreign Minister Al-

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Ayni’s and Anwar Sadat’s assurances that neither the YAR nor the UAR had
designs on destabilizing Saudi Arabia; he also emphasized the problems
associated with delayed recognition . 13 To increase the pressure, the YAR
government threatened to bring in Soviet assistance and advisors if US
recognition were not forthcoming. In an effort to spur recognition, Badeau
suggested from Cairo that the US trade YAR recognition for an UAR
agreement to guarantee Saudi stability . 14

Kennedy and other key administration officials were not yet ready to give up
on their attempt to co-opt the Egyptian leader. The Cuban missile crisis also
reduced the role of the White House in the early stages of the Yemen affair.
Preoccupation with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the possibility of nuclear war
allowed the handling of the Yemen coup to revert to Talbot, Badeau, and the
foreign-policy apparatus. All were inclined to follow through with rapid
recognition. Kennedy wanted to avoid a confrontation with Nasser by
minimizing the conflict and putting recognition for the new regime on the fast
track . 15

The allies react

Reporting from Yemen indicated that the Republican government had
broad support and, in Washington, recognition appeared to be only a formality.
In Cairo, the Egyptians arranged multiple Yemeni testimonials to further the
republic’s claim to legitimacy . 16 As Komer explained it, recognition appeared to
be readily forthcoming had not ‘this little crisis, of no importance in itself,
[become] a sort of vortex’ for other regional issues . 17 Saudi Arabia’s security lay
at the heart of that vortex. When the coup occurred, Crown Prince Feisal
happened to be in Washington. Feisal told Phillips Talbot that US aid to
Nasser did not moderate the UAR’s activities, but rather freed other funds for
propaganda and subversion. Arguing against recognition, Feisal stated that the
new regime in Yemen would not only be bad for Yemen, but also would
threaten other governments in the region . 18 Jordan and Britain also argued
strongly against US recognition. Washington was now in a real quandary. If its
UAR policies were to be salvaged then recognition was unavoidable, but such a
course now appeared to have repercussions for US relations with the British
and other traditional US allies in the region.

In Jidda, Amman, and London, concern grew. While the White House
viewed the coup as a minor event in an insignificant place, die British in Aden,
the Jordanians, and the Saudis saw the coup as evidence of resurgent aggressive
revolutionary nationalism. In Damascus, events in Yemen revived fears of
additional attempts by Nasser to reclaim Syria as a part of the UAR. In
Amman, King Hussein and his advisors predicted a renewal of Egyptian
subversion . 19 Then, just to add chaos to confusion, rumors spread that the
Imam was very much alive and organizing the northern tribes of the Bakil
confederation to retake the capital and destroy the YAR government. The
Jordanians, dedicated Nasser-bashers and distant relatives of the Mutawakkals,

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271

began to send military advisors to Saudi Arabia and offered a Jordanian brigade
to support Riyadh. Both monarchies began to support the Royalists. 20

Despite the long list of outstanding problems between the Saudi regime and
the Imamate, the destruction of a fellow monarchy that inconveniently, left
Nasser and an Egyptian army ensconced immediately next door, was
unnerving. To calm Saudi fears, Kennedy offered Feisal a series of ‘small scale’
proposals and the president’s assurances of US support for the Kingdom. The
White House was attempting to avoid upsetting Nasser. 21 That particular horse
had already departed the barn. Komer put it this way: ‘Unfortunately, the
Yemen revolt has brought to a boil all Saudi fears of Nasserism (the house of
Saud well knows it might be next).’ The fact that Radio Cairo said the same
thing did not help the situation. Trying to avoid openly taking sides, the US
position remained that ‘deliberate, controlled internal reform is the best
antidote to Nasserism.’ 22 On 5 October, Feisal asked Kennedy to use his
influence with Nasser to prevent subversive Egyptian activities. The President
responded by saying that the US, despite its aid programs, lacked that kind of
influence with the Egyptian leader. 23 The Saudis believed that the US had a
close enough relationship with Nasser to control his activities, therefore
unfortunately making the US responsible for something over which it in fact
had no control. The Crown Prince then criticized what he viewed as the
shortsighted ‘belief that Nasser is the natural and inevitable leader’ and
complained that Nasser appeared to be the ‘chosen US instrument’ in the
region. Feisal warned Kennedy that he was making a serious mistake. 24

During the 5 October 1962 meeting, Feisal informed Kennedy that King
Saud had not been well and was no longer participating in the details of
government. 25 This was the first solid indication that the power struggle in
Riyadh between the Crown Prince and King Saud had concluded. The Yemen
coup had initially stunned Riy r adh. In response to an appeal from Yemeni
Prince Hassan, Saudi Arabia pledged covert support for the royalist cause.
When the King ordered the Saudi Air Force to begin ferrying supplies to
advanced bases on the Yemen border, three aircrews defected and took their
planes and cargo to Egypt - so much for covert support. The Saudis
immediately grounded the air force, fearing more defections. 26 The coup, the
air-force defections, pro-Feisal elements in the royal family, and pro-Nasserist
elements in the government brought King Saud to the point of physical and
mental collapse. On 17 October, Saud gave Crown Prince Feisal unfettered
authority. 27 Although not immediately apparent, the Yemen coup and Egyptian
intervention did as much to stabilize the situation in Saudi Arabia as any other
single event. It permanently removed King Saud from power and brought the
decline of Prince Talal’s ‘Free Princes’ or “Young Nejd’ movement with its pro-
Nasserist sentiments. 28 It also placed a competent leader at die head of the
Saudi state. Radio Mecca announced the change on 18 October 1962.
Predictably, Radio Cairo called it a desperate move to shore up a collapsing
regime. 29 An immediate change in die level and sophistication of SAG activity
occurred, Feisal announcing plans to accelerate reform, while pressuring the

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US about the threat posed by Nasser. 311 While Feisal’s presence in Washington
had, in some ways, been fortuitous, the confusion at the top of die government
in Riyadh created an opportunity for the new YAR government to steal a
march on its opponents.

YAR-UAR diplomatic offensive

Fearing the combination of British, Saudi Arabian, and Jordanian influence
in Washington, the UAR orchestrated a diplomatic campaign to gain US
recognition of the YAR. On 19 October, the YAR government invited the US
Consul General in Ta’iz to Sanaa. The Consul met with Sallal and several
influential, well-known pro-Western and pro-American Yemenis. Ahmad
Muhammad Numan and his US-educated son Abd-al-Rahman Numan were
present, along with Abdul Ghani Nagi. The elder Numan was purported to be
an ‘influential political advisor’ to Sallal. In convincing terms, Numan insisted
that Sallal wanted ‘cordial relations’ with the US. As a result of the meeting, the
Consul reported favorably that the YAR met the dual criteria for US
recognition, i.e. popular support and effective control of the country. 31

In Jidda, Ambassador Flart reacted positively as well. Mentioning Saudi
confusion in Riyadh, Hart recommended immediate recognition of the YAR
regime. Hart also asked permission to inform his contacts in the Saudi
government that the Yemen revolution was ‘succeeding and counter-revolution
[could not] succeed’ because the ‘Imamate had acquired too evil and backward
reputation’ which it had ‘richly earned’ that attempts at a ‘restoration’ would
‘drain SA’s resources and injure its position’ in die Arab world. The
Ambassador believed that Yemen intended to steer a ‘neutralist’ course and
had no intention of becoming a ‘tool of die UAR, USSR or anyone else’. He
argued that given the fact that ‘several Cabinet members [were] pro-Western’,
the Yemeni leadership ‘could be much worse’. Hart concluded: ‘An
independent YAR no longer under pressure to accept UAR military help for
survival can be no threat to SA’, and interjected that the revolution might offer
an opportunity to reverse the ‘unacknowledged but universally known’ Saudi
interference in Yemen. In Hart’s view, Feisal, a ‘progressive reformer’, would
‘welcome’ just such a policy because it removed ‘die threat from die north’ and
acted to inhibit Soviet inroads in Sanaa. 32 Of course, Hart was very wrong
indeed about Feisal’s support, but the position of the US Embassy in Jidda,
supported by the reports from Ta’iz, resonated with Badeau in Cairo and the
desk in Washington. By the time the Saudis had reorganized and lodged a
dissenting view, senior US officials in the region had spoken out in favor of
YAR recognition.

On 6 November, aware of planned UAR air raids against tribal resistance in
northern Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia, the YAR government summoned
the American Consul General in Ta’iz once again to Sanaa. Claiming a ‘Saudi
invasion’, Baydani stated that the YAR would be justified in retaking Najran
and Asir, lost to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in 1933. Invoking the 1956 defense
pact with Egypt, which had ironically been signed by the Imam, Baydani stated

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that die YAR, with UAR assistance, would attack airfields at Jidda, Riyadh, and
Jizan. Baydani also accused the US of supplying arms and pilots for the Saudi
and Yemeni royalist efforts. 33 Wasting no time, the Egyptians began to bomb
villages in southern Saudi Arabia. Alarmed, Washington instructed the
Consulate in Ta’iz to make it clear to the YAR government that the ‘USG is
morally committed to support maintenance of integrity of reformist Feisal
regime and cannot stand idly by in the face of such attacks.’ The administration
offered assurances that Saudi forces were not active in Yemen - a reassurance
of questionable value in Sanaa and Cairo. The attacks delayed US recognition
of the YAR and brought a threat to forego it altogether. 34 Riyadh demanded
additional US military assistance, and broke diplomatic relations with Cairo. 35
Like it or not, the Kennedy administration found itself involved in the Yemen
conflict.

The advice of friends

In die middle of this confusion, the State Department concluded that
recognition of the YAR government would prevent a further escalation of the
conflict, limit UAR influence, and undermine Soviet influence. Washington
also feared that Saudi Arabia and Jordan might face a rebellion by internal
dissidents as a result of their participation in die Yemen conflict. On 12
November, despite the UAR air raids on Saudi border areas, Secretary Rusk
recommended to Kennedy that the United States recognize the new republican
government in Sanaa. The administration felt that the delayed recognition,
coupled with assurances to Feisal in the form of ‘Operation Hard Surface’, the
dispatch of US combat aircraft to Dhahran, would soften the blow and make
both the Saudis and Egyptians more agreeable to a compromise. The Secretary
also pointed out that the United States would seek assurances from the
Egyptians that no further attacks on Saudi Arabia would occur and that neither
they nor the Yemenis had any territorial designs on Saudi Arabia or Aden. 36

News of the US intentions presented the British with a problem. On the
one hand, they had no desire to be left out of the recognition cavalcade, but on
the other, London had real concerns about the ‘Federal Rulers in the Aden
Protectorate’. The federation was a British creation designed to support the
British presence in Aden. London believed that recognition of the Yemen
republic would undermine Adeni confidence and, ultimately, their position
there. 37 Anti-UAR and anti-YAR elements had an irrepressible British
champion, none other than the Nasser-hating, American-baiting Sir Charles
Johnston, former Ambassador to Jordan and now the Governor-General in
Aden. Sir Charles wasted little time in expressing himself: “We had a difficult
enough time combating Yemeni subversion in the 1950s when there was not a
vestige of Yemeni irredentism toward Aden or the Protectorate. The task
might well prove impossible if a strong Egyptian type republic now emerges in
the Yemen.’ 38 Warming to his task, Sir Charles lobbed another well-placed shot
at London on 8 November:

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We do not wish to challenge HM.G.’s view. We would, however, remind
you that in this matter H.M.G. is handling the Federation’s foreign affairs
in terms of the treaty and that H.M.G. therefore has an obligation to
consider the question of recognition from the point of view of the
Federation’s interests. In these circumstances, if H.M.G. intends to
recognize the Yemeni Republican regime in its conduct of the
Federation’s foreign affairs, we must ask that I should only do so after
the Yemeni Republican regime has first given a formal public undertaking
to recognize the existence of the Federation as an Arab Government
under the United Kingdom’s protection and to respect its integrity.
Clearly, it would be unreasonable for H.M.G. to oblige die Federation to
acquiesce in the recognition of a regime within a neighbouring state,
which has refused to give such an undertaking. 39

Johnston’s barrage had the desired affect. Whitehall concluded: ‘British
recognition is unlikely in the very near future, even if Royalist make no
Progress.’ Fearing that they would be the odd man out, die CRO sent a circular
telegram aimed primarily at the governments in Ottawa, Canberra, and
Wellington: ‘we therefore still hope that there will be no rush to recognize,
especially by members of the Commonwealth.’ 40

On 14 November, Macmillan wrote to Kennedy explaining the British
position and the potentially ‘disastrous effect’ that the loss of Aden would have
on ‘the Anglo-American position in the Gulf. He suggested that Kennedy
needed to withhold recognition in order to make sure that he got something
concrete in return from Nasser. Macmillan stated: ‘I therefore feel that you
should get something more than words before you give recognition and
money. I quite recognize that the loyalists will probably not win in Yemen in
the end but it would not suit us too badly if the new Yemeni regime were
occupied with their own internal affairs during the next few years.’ The Prime
Minister pointed out that Sallal’s public call for a revolt against the British in
Aden made recognition impossible. On 15 November, Macmillan reiterated
opposition to recognition and suggested that die US should use economic aid
as leverage against Nasser and the Egyptians. The Prime Minister warned that
recognition ‘would spread consternation among our friends throughout
Arabia.’ Macmillan concluded by stating: ‘I very much hope that you will
accept this view for I am sure that it would have great dangers for our position
in Arabia if recognition was accorded without a precise plan for Egyptian
withdrawal and evidence that they were carrying it out.’ 41 The issue was
apparendy not cut and dried in London. The British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir
Harold Beeley, supported recognition and believed that Sir Charles and the
Colonial Office had not yet recognized that Pax Britannia was a thing of the
past.

By early November, Feisal was officially in charge in Saudi Arabia. He
informed Ambassador Hart that he was moving forward with social reforms,
infrastructure improvements, the abolition of slavery, and improved financial

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controls. Using these reforms and the ever-present issue of oil as leverage, Dr.
Rashal Fir’awn, Feisal’s chief advisor, pressed die US for support against
Nasser in Yemen and a delay in recognizing the YAR government. 42 In an
unsettling note, the royal family faced more defections to Cairo by ministers
whom Feisal had removed. 43 These events heightened concerns in Washington
about the viability of die new government under Feisal. 44 Fearing revolutionary
instability in the Kingdom, the Kennedy administration continued to hedge in
its support for Feisal, expecting a renewed power struggle with the reformist
princes or widi King Saud at any time with an unforeseeable outcome.

Recognition of the YAR

US hedging did not go unnoticed in Riyadh. As Feisal became more secure,
he flexed his diplomatic and economic muscle. Feisal told Ambassador Hart:
‘The US considered relations with its sincere friends, like SAG, as less
important than helping Nasser.’ He instructed Hart to inform Washington to
stay out of SAG policy vis-a-vis Yemen. At die same time, Feisal became
increasingly aggressive in his demands for US support against the UAR
bombing campaigns. He believed that the war had become a grinding stalemate
and that he could economically crush Egypt. Feisal had no intention of backing
down in the face of UAR attempts to intimidate him. He calculated that a UAR
invasion of Saudi Arabia would bring US intervention and that, short of an
invasion, the Kingdom had the resources to undermine the UAR in Yemen
and at home. 45 Washington could not ignore Saudi oil. The White House
authorized Feisal’s publication of an October letter from President Kennedy
that promised ‘full United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia’s
integrity’. The letter got Cairo’s attention. 46 When the Egyptians raised this
letter with Badeau, he downplayed the warning, calling it only a pledge of
support for Saudi internal reforms. Despite Badeau’s rationalization, Nasser
correctly saw the letter as full US support for Feisal ‘come what may.’ 47
Increasing problems in US-UAR relations spurred Badeau to redouble his
efforts for YAR recognition.

As US recognition of tire YAR became more likely, opposition intensified.
The British cited Royalists’ gains and the potential impact of their defeat on the
regime in Saudi Arabia. In response, the US attempted to reassure the British
that it had extracted non-interference pledges from the UAR regarding Saudi
Arabia and Aden. 48 On 27 November, the Jordanians urged a further delay in
US recognition for the YAR, stating that most of the people of Yemen did not
support the YAR government. Amman also pointed out that the Royalists were
gaining ground and would be disheartened. The Jordanian government
requested that the US await the report of a British parliamentary delegation
currently visiting Yemen. The Jordanians questioned US reliability, stating that
Washington would recognize any splinter group, including ones in Saudi
Arabia or Jordan that might gain temporary power. With three key US allies,
Britain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in opposition, Badeau had his work cut out
for him. At Badeau’s prodding, the White House finally concluded: ‘US

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recognition will be the necessary catalyst which will bring about a gradual
disengagement.’ 49

Having made the decision to recognize the YAR, the administration began a
damage- control effort, addressing letters to both Feisal and King Hussein.
Washington informed both Riyadh and Amman that US recognition was in tire
interest of both Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In a personal letter to King Hussein,
Kennedy wrote: ‘I believe that my proposal [withdrawal of all foreign forces] is
the one most likely in the long run to assure the independence of Yemen, to
abate the conflict now raging in the country, and to offer the Yemeni people
the opportunity to determine their future.’ It also warned against Jordanian
‘diversions’ that might undermine domestic development goals. 50 Jordan had
already dispatched aircraft to Saudi Arabia and advisors to the border regions
of Yemen, and shipped large amounts of rifles and ammunition to the Royalist
forces. While these moves caused internal dissatisfaction, including tire
defection of the commander of the Jordanian air force and two other pilots
with their aircraft to Egypt, the embarrassed monarch was not dissuaded from
supporting the Royalist cause. 51

The pro-Western states and Britain lectured the Kennedy administration on
the folly of trusting Nasser and on YAR instability. 52 At the eleventh hour,
Feisal warned the US that formal relations with the YAR would ‘backfire
against (the US) in the region’. 53 Ratcheting up the pressure, Wasfi Tal, the
Jordanian Prime Minister, castigated Kennedy, stating: ‘The sole purpose of the
US recognition action was to save UAR President Gamal ABDUL-NASSER
[sic\ from the consequences of tire difficulties into which he had gotten himself
in Yemen.’ King Hussein added: Why is Cuba considered a matter different
from Yemen?’ 54 Recognizing that withdrawal in the short term was unlikely, in
early November Badeau began to argue that the UAR could not withdraw
from Yemen in the ‘absence of something resembling victory’. He stated
further: ‘In sum, success in Yemen of major importance to UAR regime in its
aspirations towards Arab world.’ The Yemen desk in Washington highlighted
that passage in tire margin: they had gotten the message. 55 In early December,
Badeau traveled to Washington to personally argue for recognition. Relaying
messages through the Charge in Cairo, the administration attempted through
Nasser to get agreements out of the Sanaa government.

The US wanted the YAR to acknowledge the Sanaa Treaty of 1934, to
recognize British rights in Aden, and to recognize the rights and status of the
US Agency for International Development mission in Ta’iz. 56 The YAR
government flatly refused. Undeterred, Badeau and Talbot recommended: “We
believe it is imperative that we recognize the Yemen Arab Republic as soon as
possible in order to (a) avert an escalation of the conflict endangering the
stability of the whole Arabian Peninsula; [and] (b) prevent die termination of
an American presence in Yemen which would likely lead to a considerable
increase in Soviet influence.’ 57 On 20 December 1962, the United States
recognized Yemen. US recognition received a mixed review. In Cairo, Al-
Juhuriya attributed it to Ambassador Badeau’s consultations in Washington. Al-

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Ahram sarcastically described it as ‘Recognition Number 39’, and stated the US
had been ‘forced to face up to reality’. 58 The Egyptian Gazette heralded it as ‘a
significant development [which] wouldn’t have made much difference.’ The
same article also described die US as the ‘main prop’ for reactionaries. 59

In Jordan, Prime Minister Wafsi Tal called the recognition of the YAR a ‘sell
out’ and ‘totally immoral’, stating that Jordan would reconsider its dealings with
the US. King Hussein also expressed indignation from London, where he was
meeting with his ‘British allies’. 60 These allies viewed US recognition as a
mistake, because Yemen would become another base from which Nasser
would stir up trouble. There was one exception: British Ambassador Beeley, in
Cairo, saw the Yemeni chaos as an opportunity for Britain to get its South
Arabian Federation organized. 61 Nevertheless, the increasingly violent tone of
Nasser’s pronouncements on the ‘forthcoming liberation’ of Aden left
Whitehall more convinced than ever that US recognition had been a mistake. 62
Kennedy had once criticized the Eisenhower administration for demonstrating
to the developing world that ‘the shortest route to Washington was through
Moscow.’ 63 To Arab observers, a new route lay through Cairo. Yemen
provided a final context for Nasser’s evaluation of Kennedy. The Egyptian
President concluded that die US had litde positive to offer. Komer tried to put
the best face on it, stating: ‘I would say that U.S.-U.A.R. relations did not slide
backward during the Yemen episode up to October 1963.’ In the same
conversation, he took a different angle: ‘The significant tiring is that our
relations did not slide backward despite the existence of this highly disruptive
peanut crisis in which we played quite a significant role.’ 64 In fact, the Yemen
civil war was the beginning of the end of any real attempt to seek a real
accommodation with Nasser. Kennedy found himself relearning the lessons of
1954-1955. A fundamental shift in attitude took shape within the Kennedy
administration. The Yemen coup and civil war demonstrated to tire White
House that economic development usually took a back seat to political
considerations in the Middle East.

Chapter 15: India, Pakistan, and China
Eastern Opportunities?

The looming confrontation between China and India had long been a topic
of speculation in Washington, but familiarity had bred complacency. In
addition, the problem with Yemen and the UAR, not to mention the mounting
concerns about Soviet missiles in Cuba, also distracted the Kennedy
administration. As a result, the responsibility for watching the situation fell
heavily on the US Embassy in New Delhi and Ambassador Galbraith. The
responsibility for monitoring the Embassy and Galbraith fell on Talbot at
NEA and Komer at the NSC. The idea that conflict would erupt simply did
not fit Galbraith’s preconceived notions about non-alignment. His lack of
insight also resulted from his dependence on senior Indian officials, whose
heads were firmly buried in the sand, for information. Nehru certainly did not
see the dispute erupting into a major border war. Even the Chinese may not
have believed that it would escalate, but they were prepared just in case. The
success of the Goa operation served as a catalyst that made Nehru and Menon
over-confident, significantly increasing their capacity for self-deception and
miscalculation. In Washington, die foreign-policy apparatus understood that
India could not successfully challenge China and believed that Nehru
understood it as well. They were wrong.

Galbraith believed that a war would not occur because India was militarily
unprepared and because Nehru was ideologically predisposed against the use of
force. The Ambassador chose to ignore the Goa adventure as an aberration.
The intellectual association of India with non-alignment, and non-violence,
coupled with the leftist leanings of Nehru himself, placed the potential for
hostilities outside Galbraith’s preconceived realm of possibilities. In addition,
Galbraith’s well-known hubris made it easy for him to discount any opinions
contrary to his own. The situation with the UAR magnified the impact of his
lack of appreciation of die potential for conflict. The Yemen conflict distracted
Talbot at the State Department and Komer at the NSC, despite the fact that

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279

Talbot, in particular, lacked confidence in Galbraith’s judgment. Talbot was
not alone in this sentiment; it was shared by other senior officials in the
administration. However, they were totally absorbed in the Cuban crisis. 1 As a
result, Washington deferred to Galbraith’s judgment much more than it might
otherwise have done.

Nehru’s miscalculation

By the fall of 1962, Nehru had backed himself into a corner with the
Chinese, and extrication, no matter in what way, promised to be painful. Nehru
and Menon had placed unprepared India on a military collision course with
China. To complicate die situation, the ‘stepmotherly attitude’ of the Congress
Party toward the military during the 1950s made military readiness a low
priority. The politicians resented the military, because many of the senior
officers had served the Raj. In addition, Nehru argued that Indian security was
based on the concept of ‘mutual rivalry. . . . No country will tolerate the idea of
another acquiring the commanding position [over India], which England
occupied for so long. If any power were covetous enough to make the attempt,
all the others would combine to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry
would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India.’ 2 Viewing
American-armed Pakistan as die primary threat, die Indian government refused
to allow the military to draw up even a contingency plan for the Chinese
border areas. This prohibition continued even after Beijing began to make
aggressive moves in the late 1950s. In 1957, Krishna Menon’s appointment as
Minister of Defense further undermined the professional military. Menon had
favorites and created a ‘promotion crisis,’ which severely damaged army
morale. With an under-equipped army, a demoralized chain of command, and a
leftist Defense Minister who was roundly despised by most of his subordinates,
India faced an experienced, tough, stubborn adversary in die Chinese.

The only bright spot for the Indian military, the Goa operation, had in fact
created more problems than solutions. As a result of Goa, surging popular
support in India for the government provided a seductive brew diat lowered
the threshold for aggressive military posturing. Nehru had opposed the military
option in settling disputes, but die muddled decision to go ahead with the Goa
operation provided a rationalization that was soon applied to China, namely:
‘to drive out an intruder who is in illegal occupation of part of out territory is
not aggression.’ 3 This so-called ‘forward policy’ vis-a-vis China became an
integral part of the January 1962 election campaign. Campaigning for Menon in
Bombay, Nehru declared that the Indian army was prepared to repel any direat
to Indian territory. Nehru added that the boundary dispute with China was
‘more important that a hundred Goas’. More significandy, he managed to
convince himself that the Indian military could actually defeat the Chinese. 4 He
also underestimated the lack of ideological synergy between India and China.
In reality, Maoist Beijing possessed a fundamental ideological antipathy toward
India. The Chinese resented India’s close ties with Washington, as well as its

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growing ties with Moscow. India had become a Chinese target that would allow
Beijing to demonstrate that it, not New Delhi, was the real power in Asia. 5

Blind to these realities, Nehru pushed his ‘forward policy’. Unwilling or
unable to offer more realistic advice, Menon and General B.M. Kaul stoked
Nehru’s intransigence by assuring him that the Indian military could handle the
Chinese. They ‘brow-beat’ local Indian commanders, stifled dissent, and placed
Indian army units in untenable positions. In September 1962, the Chinese
responded to the Indian aggressiveness with a forward policy of its own. New
Delhi concluded that the Chinese moves, particularly at Thag La Ridge, would
be the trip-line for Indian action. When the Indian press reported Chinese
advances in the vicinity of Thag La ridge, a violation of the McMahon Line,
which had been the established boundary of British India, failure to act would
have undermined public support for the government. 6 Nehru’s personal
control over foreign policy significantly increased the potential for a serious
Indian miscalculation. The aging Prime Minister lacked the energy, the basic
information, and tire focus to deal with the situation. In addition, there was no
dissent. Nehru controlled tire foreign-policy apparatus personally, and those
who disagreed with him were ignored or marginalized.

To complicate matters, the Indians lacked basic information and intelligence
to accurately evaluate the situation. B.N. Mullik, a former police official,
headed the so-called intelligence service. 7 He was obsequious and totally
unsuited for the job, owing his tenure in the Intelligence Bureau to Krishna
Menon. 8 The intelligence chief simply lacked either the experience or the
personal fortitude to provide Nehru with accurate and objective assessments.
Nehru might not have listened, but with Mullik in charge, there was almost no
information of substance on which to rely. On 9 September, Krishna Menon
convened a meeting of a handful of Defense Ministry officials. At tire meeting,
the Defense Minister declared that the Chinese must be evicted immediately
from the Thag La ridge area. Menon then took a strong public position on
ejecting the Chinese. Nehru immediately supported the decision. Neither
Nehru nor Menon saw the possibility of military disaster, only a quick Indian
victory and political gain.

Indian military commanders on Thag La ridge took a different view. They
protested that their troops were unprepared, only to have Menon browbeat the
area commanders. Resignations followed and morale plummeted further. On 3
October, Nehru appointed his own and Menon’s protege, General B.M. Kaul,
to command Operation Leghorn, the expulsion of the Chinese. The Prime
Minister told him in no uncertain terms that India had tolerated the Chinese
incursions for too long and that Beijing would be given the choice of
withdrawing its troops or facing forceful removal. 9 At the same time, the
Indians intensified their campaign for diplomatic support. On 4 October,
Secretary of State Rusk met with Indira Gandhi at the UNGA. He reassured
her of US support for India. Rusk pointed out that tire US had no influence
with China, but was willing to be of assistance should the situation warrant it. 10
On 13 October, Nehru, in Colombo for a conference, fueled the fire by

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281

making particularly belligerent statements to the press about Indian intentions
to drive the Chinese out. 11 The Kennedy administration actually welcomed
increased tensions between India and China. The situation promised to
translate into New Delhi’s support on Cuba and in Southeast Asia. Finally,
Washington hoped that the confrontation with Beijing would create problems
in Indian relations with Moscow.

In Beijing, the Chinese, decidedly unimpressed by Indian demands, called
for negotiations. On 6 October, the Indians not only rejected the Chinese
overture, but also announced New Delhi’s withdrawal from discussions
planned for 15 October. India’s refusal to negotiate was ‘categorical as well as
explicit’, even though the note blamed China for refusing to negotiate. 12 The
Kennedy administration found Indian feelers about military assistance
encouraging. 13 Washington clearly understood that it was New Delhi that had
refused to negotiate and welcomed Indian belligerence. No matter how
foolhardy for Nehru and his government, the prospect of a clash, diplomatic or
military, between China and India could be a windfall for Washington.
Although concerned about the condition of the Indian army, both Washington
and London believed that the difficult terrain in the border regions would lead
to either a military stalemate or a localized Chinese victory and then a move by
India toward a Western alliance. On 12 October 1962, given the hype in the
press, public expectations, and the approaching date for convening the next
Parliament, Nehru issued instructions to remove the Chinese from the Thag La
ridge by 1 November. Well aware of Indian intentions, the Chinese prepared to
teach the Indians and their American and Soviet backers an object lesson.

The Chinese teach Nehru a lesson

On the morning of 20 October 1962, concentrated Chinese mortar and
artillery shredded the vulnerable, poorly-deployed Indian front-line units. The
onslaught that followed left the Indian army in total disarray. 14 The Chinese
had attacked in force along the Thag La Ridge in the North-East Frontier
Agency and also in Ladakh, and the Indians collapsed. Casualties were
staggering. Shocked by the setbacks, the Indian press, public, and government
blamed Krishna Menon. Questions arose about India’s unwillingness to accept
Western military aid. A thoroughly-shaken Nehru immediately called on
London and Washington for help. Having predicted ‘no war’, Galbraith was in
London on vacation when the war broke out. Making frantic arrangements, he
returned to New Delhi and met with Nehru and M.J. Desai. The Indians were
in shock. Their Soviet friends told them that they could not restrain the
Chinese and advised New Delhi to agree to the Chinese terms. 15 From the
beginning, Washington viewed the war as an opportunity to gain influence in
New Delhi. To test its leverage, die US requested in a blatant quid pro quo that
India support a call at the UN for inspectors in Cuba. Concerned, Galbraith
viewed this tactic as counter-productive, and even asked for permission to
change the content of a letter from President Kennedy to Nehru because it
‘lacked tact’. In meetings with Nehru, Galbraith took a swipe at Menon,

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blaming him for the lack of US support and the poorly prepared Indian
Army. 16

In Washington, Komer wrote to Talbot: ‘Though we still see through a glass
darkly, we may have a golden opportunity for a major gain in our relations with
India.’ Komer briefly acknowledged ‘delicate tactical problems’, including
Pakistan, but added that Washington ‘ought to be prepared to move fast.’
Kennedy and his advisors hoped that the Soviet inability to pressure the
Chinese would sour Indo-Soviet relations. 17 On 26 October, Nehru’s letter to
President Kennedy reinforced White House excitement concerning the
possibility of a major policy breakthrough with India. Disingenuously, Nehru
stated that in its zeal for peace, India had decided against taking ‘immediate
action to resist’ the Chinese: ‘Being wedded to ways of peace, we combined
our effort to persuade Chinese to end dais aggression by withdrawing from our
territory.’ Nehru asked for US support to protect its territorial integrity. 18
Knowing full well that Nehru had provoked die crisis, Kennedy pragmatically
accepted the Prime Minister’s explanation, and promised support. On 28
October, having just castigated Nehru over the Goa operation, Kennedy, widi
tongue no doubt in cheek, stated that he understood how Nehru had tried to
‘put into practice what all great religious teachers have urged’, but ‘alas, this
teaching seems to be effective only when it is shared by both sides in a
dispute.’ 19 Talbot’s characterization of the potential for a military assistance
program to India as a ‘revolutionary development with far-reaching effects’
reflected the administration’s overall optimistic and opportunistic view of the
situation. 20

The British assessment more or less agreed with diat of Washington. On 12
November 1962, key Kennedy administration officials met with British
officials in London to discuss the Sino-India conflict. The British believed
‘there was a chance that India’s external policies might be realigned as a result
of the Communist Chinese attack.’ The British understood that Krishna
Menon had not been solely responsible for die Indian collapse, but welcomed
his political demise as a bonus for the West. London and Washington quickly
agreed to focus on arms for an entree into the Indian military establishment, to
counter Soviet influence, and to contain the conflict. The ultimate goal was the
‘preservation of a strong, stable and effective democracy in India’. 21 The British
also saw potential for increased Indian support in Southeast Asia and the
possibility that New Delhi might move to settle the Kashmir issue with
Pakistan. 22

Washington attempts to take advantage

The success of the Chinese attack appeared to knock India off the Cold War
fence. Hope soared that Nehru’s ‘panicky appeal’ for military aid would end ‘all
pretense of non-alignment’. For those advocating the primacy of India over
Pakistan, the border war was a godsend. Chester Bowles, Galbraith, and
Komer believed that ‘a whole new chapter in the relations with the
subcontinent’ had begun. The real question was how to take advantage of it. If

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283

it was only a limited border incursion, as most thought, then how long would
the Indian panic last, and what would the follow-on reaction be? The
confusion was apparent. Komer called the border war the end of
‘nonalignment’ and then, in almost the same breath, he asserted that it did not
affect India’s non-aligned status. He stated: ‘While not compromising India’s
position of nonalignment, we have now moved into being their prime
suppliers, both in the military and the economic field. In turn, Pakistan is no
longer our chosen instrument on the subcontinent with a veto on our Indian
policy.’ Far more skeptical, the realists at the State Department, the Pentagon,
and tire CIA saw a solution to Kashmir as an unlikely outcome. President
Kennedy sided with the realists and for good reason. He was again under
pressure from Ayub. The Pakistanis insisted that the United States withhold all
aid until India compromised on Kashmir. 23

The pro-India faction in the administration focused their short-term strategy
on emergency military aid to India and on immediate pressure to restrain the
Pakistanis. Galbraith, Komer, and Bowles wanted Pakistan neutralized.
Galbraith’s assessment of the situation showed the depth of division within the
administration: ‘These [Pakistani activities] continue to poison feelings here,
and McConaughy in Karachi and Talbot in Washington have both made
approaches to the Pakistanis. Unfortunately, both men are exceedingly soft.
The Pakistanis would not be aware that either had talked to them.’ Criticize as
he might, Galbraith had been outmaneuvered. The State Department and CIA
emphatically argued that when the shooting stopped, the chances of a
settlement on Kashmir would be remote. They saw immediate negotiations and
concessions from Nehru and Ayub as the only hope for progress. Galbraith
resisted arguing that the Indians would interpret this as the Pakistanis and
Americans attempting to obtain territorial concessions ‘just as the Chinese
were grabbing land’. As an alternative, Galbraith obtained permission to ask
Prime Minister Nehru to meet with Ayub and discuss their problems. In an
obvious delaying tactic, Nehru halfheartedly agreed to do so ‘on some
appropriate occasion’. The Pakistanis were demanding immediate action on
Kashmir, arguing that ‘the Chinese have very limited intentions and that the
Indians are using the dust-up as a way of getting military aid.’ Ayub also
predicted drat when the dust settled and the crisis was over, Nehru would be as
intransigent as ever on Kashmir. 24

Ayub understood India well, and urged that the US stop pressuring its
‘friends’ for policy concessions. He stated that Washington should encourage
India to establish normal relations with its neighbors and ‘court peace’ by
following up on its international obligations under the 1947 and 1948
agreements for a plebiscite in Kashmir. He pointed out that Pakistan was the
‘aggrieved party’, and yet Pakistan had been far more willing to compromise
than India. 25 On 13 November 1962, Galbraith noted: ‘We are facing a serious
problem as to what arms we should give the Indians for their protection. Until
now, it has been a few million dollars’ worth of items for immediate use by
their infantry. But they are about to come in with requests for arms

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manufacturing capacity, most of the raw materials to run it, tanks and other
armored equipment and an air force. Pakistan will want similar amounts; we
will then have the absurdity of arming both sides partly against each other.’ He
concluded that the US would provide military aid to India, but only as part of a
general setdement of disputes with Pakistan. 26

Problems with Pakistan

Recognizing die growing problem with Pakistan, Kennedy wrote Ayub on
27 November, stating that the United States intended to provide India with the
help it needed. He assured Ayub that any military assistance would not be used
against Pakistan. Kennedy also asked Pakistan not to take advantage of the
situation. Kennedy speculated that ‘the painful moments which India is now
experiencing will teach them how much more important the direat from the
North is to the whole of the subcontinent than any regional quarrels within
it.’ 27 Suspicious, Ayub laid die blame for the current situation squarely on New
Delhi: ‘This is the direct outcome of distorted and fallacious thinking on the
part of Mr. Nehru and his associates and consequence of a baseless foreign
policy.’ Ayub then described his view of Indian foreign policy:

(a) bend backwards to appease Communism; (b) hoist the white flag of
Neutralism to appease Communism and get other wavering nations to
join him; (c) intimidate and threaten Pakistan in order to politically isolate
it and economically weaken it; and (d) abuse the West, and especially the
U.S.A., in season and out of season. . . . No Mr. President, the answer to
this problem lies elsewhere. It lies in creating a situation whereby we are
free from the Indian direat, and the Indians are free from any
apprehension about us. This can only be done if there is a setdement of
the question of Kashmir.

Ayub sarcastically rejected Kennedy’s assurances that arms to India would not
be used against Pakistan: ‘This is very generous of you, but knowing the sort of
people you are dealing with, whose history is a continuous tale of broken
pledges, I would not ask a friend like you to place yourself in an embarrassing
situation.’ Ayub went on to assure Kennedy that die Chinese incursion was
limited and that the US arms would be turned on Pakistan ‘at the first
opportunity’. 28

Worse yet, Ayub believed that Kennedy had broken his word about
consulting with Pakistan on arms for India, and could no longer be trusted.
Ayub stated: ‘The U.S. attitude, in fact, was that India should have all sympathy
and support and that Pakistan would be well advised not to raise any
difficulties.’ 29 Ayub had hit the nail on the head. In Washington those
supporting closer alignment with India urged die President not to compromise
nor to apologize to Ayub. Leading the pack, Komer stated: “We’re in for a long
and painful dialogue widi Ayub, but one which was essential at some point and
which from our standpoint could hardly be conducted under better cover than

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285

now. The Chicom attack in effect justifies a long needed readjustment in our
policy.’ 30 They believed that the long-sought conditions for ‘a basic
reorientation of Indian foreign policy’ with ‘far-reaching implications for die
non-aligned states’ had arrived, along with die ‘best opportunity yet’ for solving
the Indo-Pakistani dispute. 31 Komer, Galbraith, and Bowles wanted no
compromises with Pakistan that might jeopardize their goals in New Delhi.

Ayub’s barbs with regard to US military aid to India and die ‘failure’ of the
US to consult with Pakistan added to White House anxiety. Kennedy
understood that Ayub had strong backers in the Congress, including Senator
Stuart Symington of Washington. No matter how large the potential
opportunity with India, the President could not allow the lid to blow off the
relationship widi Pakistan. On 18 November, Secretary of State Rusk sent an
‘eyes only’ cable to Galbraith to make certain diat he understood the situation:
‘Pakistan is now a central problem for India affecting its own vital security and
national existence. India must understand the limits upon our capacity to
influence Karachi. We ourselves cannot prevent a Pakistan-Peiping side deal
and a withdrawal of Pakistan from CENTO and SEATO.’ The Pakistanis had
‘whipped themselves into a near hysterical state’, and the administration had to
defuse the situation. Pakistan had to be convinced that its ‘basic long-range
interests’ lay in continued close relations with the United States and improved
relations with India. 32

Another Hardman mission

Once again, Kennedy dispatched Averell Harriman to Karachi and New
Delhi. As a result of his talks, Harriman concluded that the war with China had
brought ‘fundamental changes in Indian thinking’. He believed that the Indians
now viewed China, not Pakistan, as the primary military threat. Quoting
Nehru, who had said that India had been ‘living in a dream world’, Harriman
believed that the possibility of a compromise settlement of the Kashmir
situation existed, but he did not underestimate the challenge. Harriman quoted
Desai, who had stated that he preferred ‘defeat at the hands of die Chinese to
humiliation by Pakistan’. Apparently some important officials had not changed
their views on Pakistan as the primary enemy. Harriman also pointed out that
the Indian refusal to blame Communism indicated a desire to maintain its ties
with the Soviet Union, in the hope that Moscow would restrain the Chinese.
Despite Menon’s resignation, Harriman saw no Indian inclination to abandon
non-alignment. Harriman voiced his concern that despite the need for quick
movement, Nehru was moving ‘dangerously slowly’ because he was
‘emotionally’ unable to cross the ‘great chasm’ between ‘intellectual conviction’
and ‘meaningful negotiations’. 33

Meanwhile, Galbraith, Komer, and Bowles complained bitterly because aid
to India was moving so slowly. On 23 November, Komer wrote to Bundy:
‘Forgive my verbosity, but here’s a really big problem on which I can’t get
movement and which I think rates thought by you and indeed JFK. Making all
due allowance for Komer activism, State’s bureaucratic inertia is a more

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besetting sin. Major crises create opportunities for movement, which it would
be folly to neglect.’ 34 In likely coordination, the next day Galbraith compared
‘the State Department’s reaction time . . . [with] the rate at which the Chinese
can walk’. 35 On 27 November, President Kennedy decided to send a high-level
military mission to India to assess the situation and provide transport aircraft
and spare parts. 36 The same day, tire CIA reported that a unilateral Chinese
ceasefire was holding and that the Chinese objectives continued to be
‘essentially local and limited’. Changing its tune somewhat, the agency now
concluded: ‘Indian leaders, shocked by their recent military defeats, are likely to
give serious drought to the possibility of a rapprochement with Pakistan.’ 37

Prior to his talks with Ayub, Harriman received a telegram from the
President emphasizing that the ‘moment of truth’ had arrived in relations with
Pakistan, but he cautioned Harriman not to ‘push’ Ayub too hard. 38 Harriman
commented that most Pakistanis viewed India as their sworn enemy, ‘with the
notable exception of Ayub and some of his immediate entourage’. US military
aid to India had been a ‘shock’, magnified by the lack of ‘prior consultation’
with Karachi. The report stated that politicians of all stripes had exploited the
situation, and Ayub himself had ‘permitted’ and ‘encouraged’ the political and
press outcry. Harriman stated that Ayub believed that only a settlement of the
Kashmir issue on ‘acceptable terms’ could correct the problems and
rehabilitate Washington’s image. Domestically, Harriman also saw signs of
increased political pressure on Ayub. Harriman warned: ‘Progress on Kashmir
settlement may be crucial to [Ayub’s] continued ability to control the
government.’ 39 Ayub told Harriman that new constitutional procedures limited
his freedom of action, and that he expected Western assistance in ‘getting a fair
settlement’ with India. 40

In a meeting with British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys and
Harriman, Ayub agreed to meet with Nehru. Using shuttle diplomacy, Sandys
returned to New Delhi and met with Nehru, Desai, and Gundevia. After some
modifications, they agreed, in a vaguely-worded joint communique, to talks. 41
Steadily a consensus began to emerge that military assistance for India required,
if not a settlement, then major progress toward a solution on Kashmir. Prior to
Kennedy’s upcoming Nassau meetings with Macmillan, Talbot summed up his
recommendations: ‘India’s new anti-Chinese Communist and pro-West
(especially pro-U.S.) turn can give us a major breakthrough in Asia, provided
we can find ways to help India stand firm against the Chinese without
disrupting our relationships with Pakistan. India can become an important
asset in our confrontation with China.’ 42 The possibility of a major
reorientation of Indian foreign policy was simply too tantalizing to pass up, but
Washington could not afford to see the relationship with Pakistan disrupted.

New tactics for the pro-India faction

Having gotten the message about the importance of Pakistan, the pro-India
faction began to voice support for ‘ministerial level talks’ between India and
Pakistan. More realistically, Talbot predicted: ‘[Ayub’s] position is not

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287

sufficiently secure for him to face this prospect without anxiety.’ 43 Problems
arose from the outset. The Indian government released the communique on
Kashmir talks with Pakistan on 29 November 1962. The following day, the
Indian opposition attacked Nehru in Parliament, demanding a clarification of
the Kashmir issue. 44 Nehru indicated that he was ‘prepared to talk but not
budge’. On 2 December, Lai Bahadur Shastri publically commented:
‘ [Negotiations could not lead to any further division of the country.’ While
Kennedy hoped for a breakthrough, US diplomats closer to the problem had
become increasingly pessimistic. The political officer in New Delhi, Carol C.
Laise, stated: ‘Pressure must be maintained on Mr. Nehru if the talks are to
contribute to any improvement of Indo-Pak relations.’ Laise believed that
unless key Congress Party members, influenced by ‘strong’ US economic and
military aid, could convince Nehru of the necessity of a settlement, Nehru
would not compromise. Laise also pointed out that the ‘bouleversement’ of the
Chinese experience had reinforced die Indian government’s ‘notable lack of
logic and inability to relate phenomena’. Laise warned:

In this confused state of mind and humiliated posture, haunted by fear of
communal strife and without any real willingness to resolve the central
problem of Indo-Pak relations — Kashmir — except on India’s terms of an
adjustment of die cease-fire line, Indian opinion is likely to rely entirely
upon Nehru’s lead as far as Pakistan is concerned. ... All signs point to
continued unwillingness of the Prime Minister to trust us or to confide in
us. especially as regards Pakistan .

Laise insisted that in India, there would be ‘no retreat from the status quo in
Kashmir’. 45 Aldiough prophetically accurate, these views did not fit
Ambassador Galbraith’s agenda, and were relegated to internal memoranda
that were never sent to Washington.

On 7 December 1962, the same day as the Laise memoranda in New Delhi,
Komer wrote to Bundy at the White House, expressing his concern about the
improving situation in the Sino-Indian conflict. In a memorandum entided
‘Where do we go from here?’ Komer stated: ‘There are some real
disadvantages, from the US viewpoint, in die already pronounced trend toward
petering out of the Sino/Indian affair.’ Komer stated that limiting escalation in
the border war worked against US goals of getting India to side with the West
or to compromise on Kashmir. Komer also pointed out that the end of the
Chinese incursion undermined die justification for arms to India. He wanted to
press Ayub to show restrain and limit pressure on Nehru while hoping for
continued Chinese pressure on India. Komer advised: ‘If we can only manage
to continue using Peiping’s adventurism against it, we have the greatest chance
of making major gains.’ Komer suggested, ‘to put it crudely’, that the US
needed to convince the Indians to be ‘pugnacious’ with the Chinese so that the
crisis would continue. 46

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A solution to Kashmir

The Kennedy administration believed that die Chinese invasion had a ‘very
deep’ impact on India, moving it from a ‘first generation nationalism (anti-
imperialism) to a second generation concept of the independent state in need
of protection’. 47 Ironically, this view echoed those on Nasser having moved
from a ‘revolutionary’ to a ‘nationalist’ stage, with about the same degree of
misunderstanding. Having committed to a serious attempt to encourage
Indian-Pakistani talks on Kashmir, the administration predictably set up a
‘Kashmir Working Group’. As with the other ‘working groups’, Washington
had an agenda - emergency military aid, air defense, Kashmir, and a military
assistance program. There was concern about Ambassador Galbraith; as
Komer put it: ‘[the] subcommittee will have a hard time trying to keep up with
our distinguished delegate from Delhi. ... We ought to decide now how to
handle Galbraith’s consultation back here, because only WH will be able to
control him.’ 48 Despite concerns, Komer supported Galbraith’s view that
military aid to India should not be linked to progress on Kashmir and that
Washington should supplant tire British role in the joint effort. Komer did not
want concerns over Kashmir or Pakistani to ‘become too great a bar to doing
what may be necessary to keep India’s anti-Chinese nationalism at full tide’. 49

On 10 December, President Kennedy issued NSAM No. 209. The President
ordered the NSC Subcommittee on South Asia to come up with a plan of
action that would encourage a Kashmir settlement. Two days later, Talbot
clarified the fundamental problem: ‘The operational question is how the U.S.
and the U.K. can translate Nehru’s present reluctant agreement and Ayub’s
eagerness to talk about Kashmir into effective negotiations.’ Talbot concluded
that only continued diplomatic pressure from Washington and London could
cause Nehru to conclude that a settlement was to his advantage. Talbot
pointed out that ‘in the absence of further frightening Chinese military
successes’ progress would be ‘difficult and slow’. 50 By 17 December, there were
further indications that the initial scare in New Delhi had worn off. In
Washington, Ambassador Nehru requested a meeting with President Kennedy,
and complained about Pakistani efforts to use its relationship with the United
States to pressure India into an unfair settlement. The Ambassador promised
‘good faith’ on Prime Minister Nehru’s part but stated: ‘The Prime Minister
hopes that the president will realize progress may be slow and unspectacular,
even if the Pakistanis show more willingness to cooperate than they have done
until now.’ Kennedy stated straight out: ‘The question of Kashmir is
inescapably linked to what we can do to assist India militarily.’ Kennedy also
told die Indian Ambassador: ‘The best posture would be to enter seriously in
the discussions and show the world that India is determined to reach some sort
of settlement.’ 51

On 17 December 1962, in a memo to President Kennedy, Secretary of State
Rusk pointed out that essentially the US faced a no-win situation. He told the
President: “We’re heading for trouble.’ Rusk believed that Ayub had overplayed
his hand and that the US had encouraged him to do so. The Secretary believed

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289

that just by getting talks started, the US had performed its service to Ayub.
Rusk believed that Ayub saw US responsibility extending to the point of
actually leveraging a setdement. It was the Secretary’s view that a common
front against China and not a setdement on Kashmir should be the primary
goal: ‘Any realistic Kashmir setdement must reflect die actual balance of power
between India and Pakistan and will thus give less to Pindi than it might
expect.’ Rusk feared that Ayub’s unrealistic expectations would bring serious
instability there and the US ‘may even lose Ayub.’ He wanted pressure applied
to bring Ayub back to a more realistic position. 52

Growing misgivings about the early optimism concerning an Indo-Pakistani
rapprochement gave way to confusion within the administration about how to
rescue the effort. By 19 December, Komer described a policy picture that
largely contradicted his view of only a week before. In a memorandum to
Bundy, Komer stated that Hardman and the Department of Defense opposed
any aid, beyond the $120 million in emergency military aid and the air defense
assistance, without progress on Kashmir. Komer added that Talbot and
Galbraith wanted no linkage between aid and Kashmir for fear of hardening
Nehru’s views. Underlining for emphasis, Komer then argued that he
supported ‘Harriman’ because without the hint of ‘longer term buildup
dependent on Pak-Indian reconciliation Nehru will see no incentive to
compromise.’ 53 Komer misrepresented both his own position and that of
Talbot from only a week before. At that time, Komer had strongly supported
Galbraith’s contention that aid should not be linked to progress on Kashmir
and that Pakistani concerns should not ‘bar’ military aid to India. Ever the
realist, Talbot’s admonition about pressure on Nehru merely reflected what he
knew to be the Indian Prime Minister’s aversion to such tactics. Talbot had
always understood and valued what was at stake in intelligence sites in Pakistan
far more than Komer.

Just for good measure, Komer also reversed himself on the issue of India as
a counterweight to China in Asia. Having consistently supported Galbraith’s
view of India’s value to American policy in Southeast Asia, Komer now
ascribed this position entirely to Galbraith and labeled it ‘nonsense - Indians
can’t defend India, much less SEA.’ In another memorandum to Bundy on 19
December, Komer hinted that Galbraith had gone off the diplomatic
reservation: ‘Ken [Galbraith] must also stop talking about his ideas on Kashmir
setdement. Indians have already picked them up with ill-concealed satisfaction,
seeing in them a means of retaining Kashmir sovereignty while accepting a
little ‘European-type’ window dressing. This may be all we can get in the end,
but to float it now will only outrage die Paks and confirm Indian feeling
they’ve got us in tow.’ In the same memo, Komer expressed the opposite
concern that the Indians now viewed US involvement as problematic. Given
the reduced pressure on New Delhi resulting from the unilateral Chinese cease
fire and continued US pressure for a Kashmir settlement, Komer colorfully
concluded: “While the Chinks lie doggo, die Indians are already beginning to
fear we won’t help them any further unless Kashmir settled.’ With their hopes

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collapsing, Komer and other key administration officials called for immediate
military aid to India and for pressure to keep the talks going between Karachi
and New Delhi in the hope of avoiding an ‘explosion’ in Pakistan. 54 Now the
unilateral Chinese ceasefire had undermined US leverage in New Delhi and
hopes for an Indian policy realignment.

Administration concerns were well-founded. The British agreed that hopes
for real negotiations had significantly ‘deteriorated’. In New Delhi, reduced
Chinese pressure removed any sense of ‘urgency’ on the part of the Indians
with regard to Kashmir. Even among political figures that had supported such
a settlement, the reality of what it would cost had taken a toll. Krishna Menon
may have been out of power officially, but he and his leftist supporters agitated
against any deal with the West that involved Kashmir. Their argument was
simple: the Soviet Union would supply the necessary arms and aid without
strings. Non-leftists presented a corollary to this theme, arguing that because of
the Soviets, the West would provide military support with or without progress
on Kashmir. The net result was that the Indians convinced themselves
progress on Kashmir was not vital to their national security.

Then there was the problem of Nehru. In London’s view, Nehru’s ‘restless
garrulity’ in front of the media had severely damaged prospects for a
settlement; he called pressure to negotiate a settlement on Kashmir
‘opportunistic blackmail’. 55 On 20 December, Nehru told Washington Post
reporter Selig Harrison that the United States and Britain had better not use
‘pressure tactics’ on Kashmir. Just for good measure, the Prime Minister
accused the Pakistanis of an ‘attitude of blackmail’. 56 In Pakistan, Nehru’s
public statements merely served to underscore skepticism about his good faith.
In addition, talks of a ‘condominium’ or other solutions short of a plebiscite
were viewed as part of an Anglo-American conspiracy aimed at the ‘murder
[of] Pakistani freedom’ and an attempt to embroil Pakistan in a conflict with
China. 57 A settlement of the Kashmir dispute rested on the willingness of
Nehru to use his prestige to drive a settlement, and Nehru would not deliver.

On 20 December, President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan
met in Nassau, and discussed the pros and cons of providing military support
to India, and the possible ramifications of this in Pakistan. Macmillan and
Commonwealth Secretary Sandys proposed that the Anglo-American effort go
slowly. Macmillan supported Averell Harriman’s concern for the impact on
Pakistan. Concerned that Pakistan might abandon CENTO and SEATO,
Macmillan commented: ‘We support people who are troublesome, such as
Nehru and Krishna Menon, and abandon the people who support us.’ The
British were concerned that massive arms aid to India without progress on
Kashmir would leave such a taste of betrayal in Ayub’s mouth that Pakistan
might abandon its Western ties.

There was also the fear of Soviet arms deliveries to India. When asked about
potential MIG deliveries, Ambassador Galbraith, the man who had dismissed
the possibility of war with China, minimized die potential and stated that any
deliveries would only be ‘a symbolic gesture’. The British Foreign Minister,

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291

Lord Home, believed that Nehru would not compromise on Kashmir and that
nothing short of another Chinese attack would make a setdement possible. 58
Kennedy questioned the impact of Pakistan leaving CENTO and SEATO. At
that point, Sandys, Home, and Macmillan reminded him that it would be a
major psychological victory for the Communist bloc and that Iran would
doubtless quickly follow suit. The President and Prime Minister concluded that
they would continue with plans to provide air defense for India while
pressuring both Ayub and Nehru to come to an agreement on Kashmir. 59

On 26 December, the first ministerial-level meetings took place between the
Pakistanis and an Indian delegation headed by Sardar Swaran Singh, in
Rawalpindi, Pakistan. In the middle of the meetings, Pakistan announced an
agreement with China to negotiate a settlement of its northern border with
Tibet. The Indians debated using the announcement of negotiations as a
pretext for breaking off the talks but decided against it. 60 In the talks, the
Pakistani Foreign Minister, Bhutto, made it clear that Pakistan could not accept
the status quo. In response to a question by Swaran Singh, Bhutto stated that
Pakistan would consider a proposal to redraw the boundary line through
Kashmir, but that Karachi still supported a plebiscite. The Indians intended to
propose a redrawn boundary line that essentially confirmed the current
ceasefire line. This, of course, was entirely unacceptable. 61

On 27 December, while the talks with the Indians in Rawalpindi were in
progress, Ayub told US Ambassador McConaughy that he believed the crisis
between China and India was basically over and that only significant US and
British pressure would bring any modification in India’s position on Kashmir.
Ayub bluntly told McConaughy that he would tolerate the current levels of
military aid to India on condition that the US pressure India about Kashmir. If
that did not occur then Washington could expect his attitude to ‘harden’. 62
Reporting to Rusk on the situation, Talbot stated: ‘There is a sense of an
inescapable relationship between Kashmir and the extent to which we can aid
India militarily on the long run.’ 63 So began the effort to achieve a compromise
over Kashmir and hopefully to draw India into a closer alignment with the
West, without jeopardizing the alliance structure in which Pakistan participated.

The Kennedy administration had clutched at die Chinese border war as a
way to reorder the entire political map of South Asia, but had at first
underplayed and then later overplayed its hand. Galbraith, Komer, and Bowles,
the pro-India faction, had prevented massive pressure on Nehru at the
beginning of the crisis, and once the crisis abated there was no chance that
Nehru would compromise. To be sure, Nehru wanted military assistance and
diplomatic support, but the question remained: would he sacrifice a lifetime of
political conviction with regard to non-alignment and Kashmir? Quite simply,
if the Chinese incursion and the sound military defeat that Beijing administered
to the Indians did not fundamentally change the orientation of India, then
nothing would. In addition, if the United States and its Western allies
supported India in its moment of crisis and had nothing to show for it, then
the Kennedy administration’s assumptions about a more Western orientation

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on the part of New Delhi were fundamentally flawed. Supporting and courting
India at the expense of Ayub’s Pakistan had been a major mistake. From
Karachi’s point of view, military aid to India and Kennedy’s promises left the
US with only one option. Washington could attempt to pressure India into a
settlement of the Kashmir dispute that was acceptable to Pakistan, or
Washington could expect Karachi to take a very dim view of US policy and a
very skeptical view of US promises. The Kennedy administration’s entire policy
structure toward the non-aligned world hung in the balance in 1 963.

Chapter 16: 1963 — The New Frontier
in Tatters

With the arrival 1963 came the realization that in Dulles’ Greater Middle
East the policy ‘innovations’ of the New Frontier had either failed or teeter on
the brink of failure. The Arab-Israel peace initiative was stillborn. Neither side
had the inclination or much incentive to compromise, and Kennedy’s concern
over domestic political repercussions prevented any dramatic initiatives that
might alienate Israel and its supporters. Israel demanded more military aid,
refused to cooperate on any plan involving a setdement with the Palestinians,
and refused any meaningful inspection of its ‘peaceful’ nuclear program.
Nasser’s Yemen adventure underscored his intention to pursue a more radical
revolutionary course and his growing conviction that Washington had litde to
offer that would enhance up his standing in die Arab world. The border war
between India and China, which seemed to promise a major reorientation in
Indian foreign policy, ended in a Chinese-dictated truce. Bitterly disappointed
and broken by the Chinese inflicted humiliation inflicted, Nehru deeply
resented US attempts to use the war to leverage a compromise with Pakistan
over Kashmir. As a consequence, Nehru moved ever closer to cooperation
with the Soviet Union. 1 The Kennedy administration’s plan to co-opt non-
aligned Egypt and India were on life-support, leaving its advocates within the
administration struggling to salvage what was left of their hopes for a new US
role in the region.

The unhappiness of US allies with the administration was perhaps more
alarming. Kennedy’s initiatives with the non-aligned states threatened to wreck
containment. In Iran, the Amini experiment to ‘save’ Iran had collapsed.
Having given its support for the first time to a specific Iranian politician,
Washington now had little choice but to make a similar commitment to the
Shah. Thus, the longstanding Eisenhower policy of supporting Iran, but not
necessarily the Pahlavi regime, vanished in Kennedy’s effort to establish an
alternative to the Shah. The fortunes of the United States in Iran were now

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unambiguously tied to the Shah. In Pakistan, US military assistance for India,
Kennedy’s unwillingness to use economic aid to pressure New Delhi, and
Nehru’s refusal to compromise on Kashmir alienated President Ayub. This
development threatened Pakistani participation in CENTO and SEATO, as
well as US strategic intelligence interests. Ayub believed that President
Kennedy had intentionally misled him with regard to Pakistan’s role as
Washington’s principal partner in South Asia. Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan
were all at odds with US policy in the Arabian Peninsula to one degree or
another. Nothing had gone well.

Searching for a balance: Saudi Arabia,

Yemen, and the UAR

In addition to straining relations with its allies, the Yemen conflict had
placed US-UAR relations under considerable stress. Having recognized the
YAR, Washington now faced pressure from its allies to secure a UAR
withdrawal. 2 US Ambassador Badeau in Cairo sought Nasser’s agreement to
outside mediation. Recognizing the difficulty of this task, Badeau and the
administration attempted to put the onus for the Yemeni disengagement on
Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Feisal. Badeau argued that by prolonging the
conflict, the Saudi government raised the specter of instability and revolt. 3
Feisal’s supporters pointed out that not only was Saudi Arabia pursuing the
reforms that Washington had long sought, but, also under Feisal, the
government in Riyadh was more stable that it had been since the death of Abd-
al-Aziz al-Saud in 1953. These realists also argued that Western Europe and
potentially the United States needed Saudi oil significantly more than they
needed good relations with Cairo. 4 Realizing this, the administration tried to
‘leave the UAR with an honorable line of retreat’. 5 In Washington’s view, the
easiest way to secure an ‘honorable’ way out for Nasser was to pressure Feisal
to stop arms shipments to the Yemeni Royalists. 6 The assumption was that the
collapse of the Royalist cause would bring a UAR withdrawal.

Writing to Feisal, President Kennedy called on Riyadh to end its support to
the Royalists. Feisal responded by accusing Kennedy of selecting Nasser as the
‘chosen instrument’ of the US in the Arab world. An old charge dating from
the Eisenhower administration, it was doubly effective. It put Kennedy on the
defensive and put pressure on Nasser to demonstrate his independence from
Washington. Addressing Feisal’s accusations, he denied the existence of a
special relationship with Nasser, stating: “We avoid preferential relationships
and have no “chosen instrument” in the Near East.’ Defensively, Kennedy
stated that the United States had close relations ‘with monarchies around the
world, as well as with republics’. Kennedy referred to the ‘backward rule’ and
‘isolation’ of the Imamate, and then added: ‘It is with Saudi Arabia’s welfare in
mind - as with the peace and prosperity of the Near East as a whole - that in
December I sought to find a formula for disengagement of outside forces from
the Yemen, in order that this society, so long isolated and beset be poverty and
backward rule, might find its own true way.’ 7 Undoubtedly, Feisal drought that

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it was he, not the President, who had Saudi Arabia’s ‘welfare’ most ‘in mind’. It
appeared that Kennedy and his advisors failed to appreciate that while the frail
Crown Prince might have been born in Bedouin tent, he was a shrewd
politician, highly sophisticated in assessing his political and economic leverage,
and the politics of Arabia.

The British had a better appreciation of Feisal. When Prime Minister
Macmillan shared his response to a letter from Kennedy on the Saudi-UAR
situation, the indefatigable Sir Charles Johnston loosed an anti-American salvo
from Aden: ‘The Saudi regime is unstable at all times and could blow up
tomorrow. But Faisal is after all not a fool and is capable of judging his own
interest. ... The State Department are assuming a heavy responsibility in
claiming to understand Faisal’s interests - and King Hussein’s - better than
those Princes do themselves.’ Always at the head of the line to give
Washington a good bashing, Sir Charles stated that US policy was predicated
on two things: the Americans ‘wish to save Nasser from the consequences of
his adventure’, and ‘The American theory that an Arab Republic has something
inherently more stable about it than an Arab monarchy seems to me to be
more derived from ideology than fact.’ Obviously warming to the subject,
Johnston pointed out that Jordan, with everything going against it, had been
more stable than either Iraq or Syria. In conclusion, Johnston argued: ‘With all
respect I think that the Americans’ policy about Nasser is a menace both to
our interests and their own.’ 8 Sir Charles obviously believed that it was
Kennedy who needed the lecture on national interests from Feisal.

On 19 January 1963, Kennedy wrote to Nasser complaining that UAR and
YAR activities were die cause of Saudi and British alarm and intensified their
opposition to the revolutionary government in Sanaa. In a backhanded rebuke,
Nasser responded on 3 March chiding Kennedy. Nasser stated that his
willingness to discuss Arab matters widi outsiders was in and of itself a
‘significant concession’. 9 With calls for Arab unity in Syria and Iraq once again
ringing in everyone’s ears, Nasser told Kennedy that he ‘had to respond to
[Kennedy’s] great concern owing to my knowledge — and the confirmations
made to me by the American ambassador to Cairo Dr. John Badeau - of your
strong ties with the Saudi Arabian Kingdom.’ Nasser mentioned mounting
‘doubts’ about US ‘endeavours in the Yemen problem’. He pointed to the fact
that ‘die United States was tied up with powers hostile to Arab nationalism and
the Arab Revolution’ and that these ‘ties . . . cannot be overlooked.’ Laying the
problem at Kennedy’s door, Nasser stated that Saudi intervention had been
made possible by American assistance. He pointed out that die defecting Saudi
air force pilots did so in ‘American made [aircraft] and die cargo of arms on
board was still in die American aid cases’. He then informed Kennedy that the
UAR had documentary proof that American pilots in the employ of Saudi
Arabian Airlines were ferrying arms to the Yemen front’. Referring to the
Imamate, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia as the ‘remnants and residue of the past’,
the Egyptian leader asserted that his differences were ‘imbedded in the depths

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of the social condition prevailing in the Arab World’ and his ‘hope’ for the
future. 10

Badeau firmly believed that experience of tire Syrian breakup and Nasser’s
new foreign-policy direction, wahdat al-hadaf (‘unity of goals’), drove his support
of the YAR government, and not some plot against Saudi Arabia or US
interests in the region. 11 Seeing potential for a serious collision of interests,
Badeau attached his own summary to Nasser’s letter. He argued that the YAR
and UAR had acted with restraint given the magnitude of Saudi interference.
The Ambassador wondered: ‘How much concern expressed in reference
telegram stems from objective judgments USA interests and how much
represents drive by well known critics recent USA-UAR policy who seize upon
Yemen situations as effective instrument to consolidate their view.’ 12 Because
of Soviet gains and Washington’s ‘failure ... effectively to influence Feisel’,
Badeau pointed out: ‘If we decide Yemen conflict justifies radical policy change
take decision with eyes fully open to its implication.’ Badeau effectively argued
that the Egyptians were not going to change their policies without some
concrete response from Riyadh. 13 Badeau discussed ‘Yemen’s relative
unimportance’, as compared to further Soviet inroads with the UAR or to a
flashpoint for enlarged Arab conflict. 14 Ba’thists coups in Syria and Iraq, and
various reports that a new expanded UAR might be in the offing, also gave
pause for thought. Kennedy wanted to avoid alienating Nasser and other Arab
nationalist leaders, while at the same time placating pro-Western states by
urging ‘moderation, restraint and statesmanship’. 15

In March 1963, Kennedy sent Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker on a
mediation misison to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Bunker’s effort paralleled
another mission by Dr. Ralph Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special
Political Affairs. Bunche and Bunker performed shuttle diplomacy between
Cairo, Sanaa, and Riyadh. 16 Kennedy wanted the Bunker mission to: ‘(a)
reassure Faysal of US interest in Saudi Arabia; (b) convince him of the
importance of his disengaging from Yemen; (c) explain to him how we think
this can be done without loss of face.’ Cannily, Feisal refused to compromise
without concrete guarantees from die US. In return for the ‘temporary’ basing
of US fighters at Dhahran, Feisal finally agreed to end his support for the
Yemeni Royalists. Kennedy also promised to assist ‘at Saudi expense’ in
building up the Kingdom’s air defenses including a new airbase near the
Yemeni border at Najran. The cessation of Saudi support for the Royalists was
conditional pending an ‘initial’ withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. 17

Feisal also provided a long list of caveats associated with Saudi security that
made achievement of an agreement with the UAR virtually impossible unless
the US demonstrated its commitment to defend Saudi Arabia. 18 Feisal got what
he wanted in the form of ‘Operation Hard Surface’. 19 On 6 March, Bunker
offered to place US fighter aircraft at Dhahran air base in return for Feisal’s
compliance with a ceasefire in Yemen. On 7 April, after signing the Yemen
disengagement agreement, Feisal accepted the Bunker offer. On 13 April,
Radio Cairo announced that the UAR had agreed to a ceasefire, followed by a

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similar announcement from Radio Mecca on 15 April. 20 On 17 April,
Ambassador Badeau informed Nasser that this US ‘training mission’ would
conduct exercises near the Saudi-Yemeni border. In a thinly-veiled threat,
Badeau expressed concern that ‘grave consequences ... would arise from a
confrontation’ between US and UAR aircraft. 21

On 18 April, the day after the announcement of Hard Surface, Kennedy
reassured the UAR leadership that ‘United States policy has not changed, nor
do I see any current reason to change it.’ 22 Despite Kennedy’s reassurances,
Nasser, through his intelligence chief, Zakaria Muhyi al-Din, knew that Saudi
activities and Feisal’s support for the Yemeni opposition continued. This
created a credibility problem for Bunker, who was trying to obtain a UAR
commitment to withdraw its forces. In discussions with Nasser, Bunker finally
agreed to a token withdrawal of as little as half a company of troops. 23 The
Kennedy administration continued to believe that relations with the UAR
might yet blossom. Kennedy believed that the US and the UAR had always
been able ‘to find escapes from difficult impasses and to point the way toward
solution of problems that might at first glance have seemed impossible’.
Uncertain about the prospects for an expanded UAR, Kennedy congratulated
Nasser and his ‘Iraqi and Syrian collaborators ... on the formation of a new
and enlarged United Arab Republic’. 24

On 2 May 1963, in spite of solid evidence that the Saudis continued to
support the Yemeni Royalists, the US dispatched a Hard Surface advance team
to Dhahran with non-combat aircraft. Internal memoranda from Komer to die
President indicated that both were well aware of the commitments made to
Nasser that the squadron would not be sent until Saudi support for the rebels
had stopped, and they were also aware that Feisal had not lived up to his side
of the bargain. 25 From Cairo’s perspective, the arrival of US Air Force
components at Dhahran and the Saudi’s continued support to the Yemeni
rebels constituted a breach of faith. In trying to steer a middle course, the
Kennedy administration had damaged its credibility. The relationship with
Nasser was furdier complicated when Washington announced the sale of
Hawk missiles to Israel. According to Heikal, Nasser concluded that Kennedy’s
informing him of the Hawk transaction with Israel had been a ‘deceitful
maneuver’ and that the President ‘had double crossed him.’ This suspicion
undermined any attempts by Kennedy to gain Nasser’s cooperation with regard
to the situation in Yemen. 26 The Hawk deal with Israel, Israel’s perceived veto
over US policy, and the pressure on Nasser to accept the Johnson plan
destroyed Nasser’s confidence in Kennedy. For Nasser and die Egyptian
leadership, Kennedy had become little more than a rerun of the
disappointments from a decade earlier with the Eisenhower administration -
John Foster Dulles in a more urbane package.

A new dynamic: changes in Iraq and Syria

As the Yemen crisis threatened to boil over, coups in Syria and Baghdad
once again changed Washington’s perspective on Nasser’s utility and influence

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in the region. On 8 February 1963, in Baghdad, Ba’thist, nationalist, and
Nasserist army officers overthrew Qasim’s regime. From a Western
perspective, the destruction of the Iraqi Communist Party and the subsequent
damage to Soviet influence was the single most important outcome. Prior to
the coup, the ICP held positions of substantial influence and ‘advantage’ in
Iraq. Nasser had no influence. Qasim’s isolation created a situation in which
the ICP had become his most faithful supporter and the Soviet Union the
principal benefactor of his regime. Soviet military aid, economic support, and
technical assistance dominated Iraqi development. In return, Iraqi foreign
policy, diplomacy, and propaganda followed the Soviet line. The Iraqi
government regularly referred to the Soviets as ‘friendly people’ and the British
and Americans as ‘imperialists’.

The 8 February coup appeared to change the situation dramatically. By the
next day, Qasim was dead, executed ‘after a short trial’, along with the
Communist commander of the Iraqi air force, Brigadier Jalal Awqati, and other
Qasim supporters. 27 Radio Baghdad announced the formation of the yet
another RCC and called on the ‘masses to descend to the streets to see the
body of Qasim’. 28 The Communists knew the score. They would receive the
same consideration that they had meted out when they hung Ba’thists and
Nasserists from lampposts in Mosul in 1959. Just to make certain that there
was no ambiguity, the RCC issued Proclamation 13. It called for the
‘annihilation of anyone that disturbs the peace’ and exhorted die people to
inform against ‘die agent — Communists — the partners in crime of the enemy
of God’. 29 Washington welcomed the news that diousands of Communists
were either dead or in jail and that the shops in Baghdad were doing a booming
business in portraits of the new President, Abd-al-Salaam al-Aref, Qasim’s pro-
Nasserist co-conspirator in 1958. 30

Neither Washington nor London knew exacdy what the coup meant, but
bodi believed that it had to be an improvement over die Qasim regime.
Ironically, the broadly-held assumption that the coup resulted from US-UAR
cooperation created die biggest stir among the pro-Western states in the
region. 31 In Washington, administration officials told the Saudi Arabian
Ambassador, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khayyal, that the Iraqi coup coming on top
of the Yemen situation made it imperative for die Kingdom to cease its
involvement in Yemen for fear diat ‘emboldened . . . nationalist elements’
might move against die monarchy. 32 From the Saudi perspective, the coup and
the message appeared to be a US warning issued on behalf of the UAR. To
compound this speculation, both the Syrians and Jordanians openly discussed
the danger posed by the US’s ‘chosen instrument’, Nasser and resurgent Pan-
Arab nationalism. 33 The Arabs simply refused to believe that the Kennedy
administration and Nasser were not working hand-in-glove.

The Kennedy administration’s initial analysis concluded that Iraq would
continue to chart an independent course as a ‘separate pole of alignment’ in the
Arab world. In diis vein, Washington intended to be ‘as responsive as possible
to the new government so that we may have the maximum amount of

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influence with the new regime at an early stage.’ 34 Early predictions of ‘no
lasting gain for the UAR’ were encouraging. 35 Washington believed that the
same forces that had driven a wedge between Nasser and, respectively, Nuri
Sa’id and then Qasim, would separate the new regime from Cairo. The
potential downside was that the Ba’thists in Iraq might succeed in
overthrowing the monarchies in both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, possibly with
UAR complicity. 36 Kennedy and his advisors wanted an Iraq friendly to the
West and independent of Nasser. The administration now feared a coalescence
of interests between the Iraqi Ba’thists and Nasser that might overpower the
weaker pro-Western monarchies. There was also the outside possibility of
another Nasserist unification movement.

Given the problems over Yemen with Nasser, the possibility of an Iraq
cleansed of Communists and friendly to the West presented Washington with
an inviting potential for Baghdad to reclaim its traditional role as a
counterbalance to Cairo. In Cairo, the triumph of the Ba’th Party in Iraq
caused a shift in policy that brought condemnation of die Syrian Ba’thists and
proferred an olive branch to die Iraqis. On 15 February, in Al-Ahram, the ever-
creative Heikal pointed out that it was necessary to differentiate ‘between the
real Ba’th and the opportunists and profiteers’ in the party, the latter obviously
referring to the Syrian secessionists. Heikal stated that the UAR looked
forward to the possibility of fresh approaches that die Iraqi Ba’thists might
have with regard to furthering Arab unity. Nasser may have been disappointed
by the Iraqi Ba’th’s refusal to side with the UAR against its Syrian branch, but
he carefully left the door open for cooperation. 37

British assessments had a slightly different interpretation of the coup.
London concurred that the new regime would be domestically anti-Communist
and nationalist, but they believed that it would maintain correct relations with
the Soviet Union. There was too much Soviet military hardware laying around
for it not to be on speaking terms with Moscow. Because of their support for
Qasim, the British were concerned that their lack of connections with the new
government, the Nasserist influence, and the imposition of austerity programs
might effect Britain’s commercial position. They also worried about Kuwait. 38
The British also predicted good relations between Cairo and Baghdad but ‘no
attempt to establish joint institutions’. Sir Howard Beeley, the British
Ambassador in Cairo, commented that these ‘loose arrangements’ for
propaganda purposes would include die UAR, Iraq, Algeria, and the YAR. 39

Immediately following the coup, the new Iraqi Foreign Minister, Talib
Shabib, outlined the foreign policy of the regime. On the matter of Yemen, the
Iraqi government supported the YAR and UAR position. Baghdad made it
clear that the culprits standing in the way of progress and peace in the region
were the Saudis, who were subsidizing and supplying the Royalists, and the
British, who were creating problems on the southern border. Feisal and
Hussein were ‘going against the tide’. Officially the Iraqi government intended
to stay out of it but it ‘could not control’ die 45 newly-licensed Iraqi
publications. Shabib also stated Iraq’s intention to cooperate closely, but not

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federate, with the UAR, YAR, and Algeria. As for Syria, Baghdad expressed
specific concerns in light of reports that fugitive Iraqi officials had fled there.
Shabib stated that while Iraq did not plan direct action against Syria, he left no
doubt that Baghdad would welcome a more ‘congenial’ government there at
the earliest possible date. The wait was short.

The Baghdad coup left die Syrian government of President Nazim al-Qudsi
in an impossible position. In a desperate bid for political survival, Qudsi
resorted to what could only be described as a kind of policy schizophrenia. He
needed friends and could not afford to be too choosy. Following Syria’s
secession from the UAR, the US faced incessant Syrian media and propaganda
attacks, predicated on the proposition that Cairo and Washington were
working in consort to undermine Syria. In January 1963, the Syrian
government suddenly reversed itself and began to question US support for
Saudi Arabia in the Yemen conflict. High-level Syrian officials warned the US
that ‘overt US support’ could be the ‘kiss of death’ for the Saudi regime. 40 It
was a clumsy attempt to placate Nasser. Facing mounting problems with Syrian
Ba’thists, and believing that the US had the influence to put in a good word
with Nasser, Qudsi attempted to enlist US help against his Syrian Ba’thist and
Nasserist opposition. On 19 February, with the Iraqi coup as backdrop,
President Qudsi responded to a letter from Kennedy in which Kennedy
protested that Syrian accusations against US officials for allegedly supporting
UAR subversion in Syria were false. In a more or less friendly response, Qudsi
lodged an obligatory complaint about Israel, but agreed that the charges against
the US officials were unfounded. He also wrote that US-Syrian relations were
better than ‘they have been in the last decade’. 41 Isolated, with internal
opposition surging, the Damascus regime was simply flailing about in a futile
attempt to save itself.

On 8 March 1963, Ba’thist military and party elements overthrew the Syrian
government and announced a policy that supported Arab unity with Iraq, the
UAR, the YAR, and Algeria. The new regime also declared its opposition to
indigenous Communism. 42 In Syria, Michael Aflaq’s Ba’th of old had fractured.
His credibility undermined by his agreement with Nasser in 1958 to dissolve
the Ba’th party, Aflaq was no longer the dominant power in the new Syrian
Ba’th. Instead, a group of military officers, refered to as the ‘Military
Committee’, ran the show. This secretive cabal, composed of Muhammad
’Umran, Salah Jadid, Hafiz al-Assad, Abd-al-Karim Jundi, and Ahmad al-Mir,
resented Aflaq and Bitar because of their agreement in 1958 to dissolve the
Ba’th. All were members of minor sectarian groups: ’Umran, Jadid, and Assad
were Alawi, Jundi and Mir were Ismaili. Now the military Ba’thists no longer
needed the civilians in order to grab power. In addition, Nasser, not Aflaq,
remained the most visible symbol of Arab nationalism and unity. These factors,
along with the arrival in Damascus of exiled Syrian Nasserists, resulted in a call
on 14 March for ‘tripartite unity’ between the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. 43

Negotiations ensued in Cairo in March and April 1963 between Syria, Iraq,
and die UAR, paralleling the Yemen mediations. The Iraqis and Syrians arrived

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in Cairo expecting to conclude a quick arrangement with Nasser. Remembering
1958 and 1961, Nasser put them off. He explained that before negotiations
could begin, he had to clear the air between tire Syrian delegation and die UAR
with regard to the creation of the UAR and Syria’s secession. Nasser wanted
his pound of flesh in terms of an admission by the Syrian Ba’th of their past
sins, and submission to Egypt’s ‘Charter of National Action’ and ‘revolutionary
experience’ for inspiration. In short, unity required the humiliation of the
Syrian Ba’th. Nasser used his stature to intimidate the delegates. 44 The meetings
became an inquisition for the Syrian Ba’thists. Nasser set the tone early and
recorded the meetings. He opened with a question: ‘Are we asked to unite with
the Ba’th Party or with Syria? If the Ba’th party is ruling Syria and we are
supposed to unite with it, then I am not at all prepared to continue these
discussions. Union with Syria would be welcome, but to union with the Ba’th
my answer would, “no thank you”.’ The Ba’thists were taken aback. Nasser
pressed them: ‘Is the regime in Syria Ba’thist?’ One Ba’thist participant said:
‘No, a National Front.’ Another Abd-al-Karim Zuhur said: ‘It is not Ba’thist,
Sir, but die Ba’th is a partner’, and so it went on. 45 Nasser intended to string
out the talks, either obtaining the total supplication of both the Syrian and Iraqi
Ba’thists or gaining time for his own supporters to grab power in Damascus
and Baghdad. As the unity talks progressed, pro-Nasserist pressure in the form
of riots and demonstrations grew in Syria. On 17 April, Nasser appeared to
have triumphed when it was announced that Iraq, Syria, and Egypt would unite
in a federal state to be called the ‘United Arab Republic’. 46

Despite prognostications from the CIA and the State Department that Iraq
would maintain its independence from the UAR, Kennedy wanted to hedge his
bets. As long as the potential existed for Nasser to head a federated Iraq, Syria,
and Egypt, the White House intended to tread lightly on the Yemen issue. Like
Dulles and Eisenhower in 1958, the administration feared finding itself
confronted by a hostile Arab super-state. Kennedy’s conciliatory letter to
Nasser on 18 April reflected the uncertainty created by the tripartite
negotiations. He congratulated Nasser on the formation of the new UAR and
argued for restraint in Yemen. 47 Kennedy wanted to preserve his options with
the UAR while defusing the Yemen situation. To accomplish this, he preferred
the Saudis simply to withdraw support from the politically odious Yemeni
Royalists. He could then avoid a confrontation with the Nasser. Now with Iraq
and Syria, Kennedy saw the possibility that Nasser might pull another rabbit
from his political hat.

Soured relations with the UAR

Nasser’s unification talks, Jordan and Saudi Arabia once again became the
focus of concern. On 27 March, in Amman, the coups in Iraq and Syria and
internal dissatisfaction brought the fall of die Tal government. The King called
on the venerable Samir Rifa’i to form his last government. Regime instability
and domestic opposition to Hussein’s rule created die possibility, or in minds
the probability, of a Hashemite collapse. Such an event would bring the Israelis

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to occupy all or part of the West Bank. In addition, the Macmillan government
made it clear that it was ‘not wedded to the status quo in Jordan’. There would
be no repeat of the 1958 military rescue of the Jordanian Hashemites. Quite
simply, the potential damage of such a rescue to British petroleum interests in
the Arab world was now unacceptable. 48 The rhetoric from Damascus fueled
more concern. Leading Syrian Ba’thist Saladin al-Bitar told die US officials that
the ‘Hussein regime’ in Jordan was ‘entirely unacceptable’ to the ‘Arab
National Movement’ and to a majority of the Jordanian people. As a result, it
was ‘doomed to go’. 49 Pro-union demonstrations in various Jordanian and
West Bank towns resulted in Parliament passing a no-confidence vote in the
government. Annoyed, King Hussein dismissed Parliament. On 20 April,
Rifa’i’s government fell, but instead of backing down, die King appointed his
uncle, Sharif Hussein ibn Nasir, Prime Minister on 27 April. 50

The combination of Syrian rhetoric and Israeli threats from the ever-
irascible Ben-Gurion raised the Kennedy administration’s concern over the
Jordanian situation to new heights. On 25 April 1963, Ben-Gurion sent
President Kennedy a note citing the unification of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt and
their promise to liberate Palestine. While pointing out that Israel ‘can defeat all
three’, the Prime Minister lobbied for new weapons, because now ‘the Hawk
alone is not a deterrent.’ 51 The Ben-Gurion letter also coincided widi attacks
on Assistant Secretary Talbot’s statement on 22 April 1963 to the National
Foreign Policy Conference of Editors and Broadcasters that the administration
did not believe that the proposed UAR federation ‘measurably affected’ Israel’s
security situation. 52

On 26 April, the Israeli Ambassador met with State Department officials to
discuss the Ben-Gurion note. During the meeting, the Israelis stated that an
attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government would occur ‘within a few
hours or days’. The Israelis stated that they would not sit idly by and have a
hostile regime replace the Hashemites. When US officials expressed their
doubts about Nasser’s involvement, the Israelis stated that they believed that
the anti-Hashemite propaganda broadcasts were coming from Cairo and that
they feared a repeat of the Yemen scenario. Using the UAR unification
announcement, the Israelis expressed concern about die difference between
that possibility and the initial US view that the Syrian and Iraqi coups would
form a ‘counterpoise’ to Nasserist ambitions. Warning against Israeli action,
US officials pointed out that Israeli actions had a tendency to unify the Arabs.
As James Grant, the Acting Assistant Secretary in NEA, put it: ‘Left to
themselves, the Arabs have a very considerable capacity to decentralize and
neutralize themselves.’ The Israelis returned the next day with visiting minister
Modechai Gazit in tow. They were now complaining that Jordan was not the
‘major problem’ and pointing to die ‘declaration of a war of destruction’
against Israel by the UAR. The Israelis wanted to know how the US justified
economic and military aid in light of this. Department officials cautioned the
Israelis not to overreact to die situation. 53

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Ben-Gurion’s letters and the meetings in Washington had their desired
affect. The administration sent Ambassador Badeau scurrying to Egyptian
officials on 27 April with another warning about intervention in Jordan.
Badeau met first with Sami Sharaf, one of Nasser’s aides and a direct pipeline
to the Egyptian President, to warn about the situation in Jordan and to
complain about Egyptian propaganda emanating from the Voice of the Arab
Nation radio. Sharaf denied any knowledge of the station even when
confronted by Badeau with its exact location. 54 As a result of the demarche,
Nasser summoned Badeau to a meeting the next day, when he stated that
Sharaf s report about the situation in Jordan ‘kept him awake most of the
previous evening’ because his sources showed no indication of ‘imminent
action in Jordan’. Nasser was concerned that action might be taken based on
information unavailable to him and asked Badeau to keep him informed.

Acknowledging that any move against Hussein would be laid at his
‘doorstep’, Nasser stated that at the beginning of die unification talks he had
personally squelched a Syrian initiative to undermine the Hashemite regime. He
added that the overthrow of Hussein was inevitable and could happen at any
time, given the level of discontent in the officer corps, but he had no
information of an imminent direat. He warned the US that an Israeli move
against Jordan would provoke an Egyptian move against Israel and ‘nobody
knows where it will end.’ Badeau ended die conversation by telling Nasser that
the Washington would attempt to restrain Israel but that the UAR needed to
stand clear of any appearance or real involvement in the Jordanian crisis. In his
comments on the meeting, Badeau attempted to preempt any further demands
on Nasser for assurances, stating that guarantees would not be forthcoming. 55
Badeau also pointed out that Nasser was already under Arab pressure for
taking US aid in return for turning a blind eye to Israel. Concerned about
Nasser’s reaction to continuing pressure from Washington for UAR guarantees
on everything from Yemen to Jordan to Israel, and now the current move by
pro-Israeli elements in the US Senate to cut off aid to Egypt, Badeau worried
that Nasser would finally conclude that the ‘US will never support any genuine
Arab cause.’ 56

Just to make certain that Nasser understood who was behind the US
warning, no doubt in hopes of further complicating US-UAR relations, Ben-
Gurion gave interviews to several newspapers, warning that any takeover of
Jordan by the UAR would be ‘viewed by Israel as a grave action which would
endanger its security’. To add fuel to the fire, the Israeli newspaper Haarefc
reported from Washington that ‘Authoritative US Sources’ had made it clear
that ‘Nasser fully understands’ the US warning not to intervene in Jordan. 57
Ever adaptive, Israeli Ambassador Harman once again met with US officials
and changed the Israeli position on the UAR threat. Harman explained to
Averell Harriman that die perceived Egyptian threat really had nothing to do
with Jordan or UAR unity ‘at die moment’, but drat Ben-Gurion was actually
concerned about Nasser and the ‘constant military threat’ posed by Egypt. This
was the same military threat that Ben-Gurion had earlier assured Kennedy in

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writing that Israel could handle. The Israelis pushed the US to once again tell
Nasser: ‘There is a firm line.’ 58 US approaches to Nasser, followed by Israeli
public pronouncements and press reports, followed by more Israeli demands
for US approaches to Nasser, created the impression in Cairo and other Arab
capitals that Kennedy had become Ben-Gurion’s errand boy. The Israelis no
doubt calculated that Congressional pressure on the White House over aid to
the UAR, and the looming elections of 1 964, put Kennedy in a position where
he could not ignore Israeli demands. In addition, there was always the
possibility of an added bonus that an irritated Nasser might break with
Washington.

In Cairo, with Arab unity again perhaps within his grasp, Nasser needed to
demonstrate his independence from US pressure. US moves to ‘show military
interest in Jordan’ made this demonstration even more critical. The Kennedy
administration had dispatched a small joint exercise Air Force team with two
aircraft. The administration also concluded that regardless of other
considerations the maintenance of Jordan as an independent, pro-Western
state served US interests. 59 This was a major shift from the preceding year
when Washington cut all categories of aid to King Hussein. Now, in July 1963,
fearing a ‘crisis of confidence’ in Amman and the ‘cost to us if it folded’, an
alarmed White House brought Ambassador Macomber to Washington to talk
to the President. 60 Just to provide added impetus to the debate, Jordan
established diplomatic relations with Moscow and moved to improve relations
with the UAR. To improve his Arab credentials, Hussein asserted his position
vis-a-vis Israel by allowing Jordanian border guards in Jerusalem to fire on an
Israeli military patrol in a disputed zone. He also promised to support Syria in
its clashes with Israel. 61 The additional leverage earned King Hussein an
invitation to make an ‘informal’ call at the White House in early 1964 to ‘clear
the air’ on Arab issues and on problems in US-Jordanian relations. 62

Nasser had additional frustrations. The Ba’thists in Syria and Iraq had
become even more reluctant to enter into the kind of union proposed by
Nasser. Nasser wanted a plebiscite to be held on the question of whether rule
of the united UAR should be by committee or a single president.
Remembering 1958, the Syrian Ba’thists and government rejected the
plebiscite. This resulted in the resignation of the five Nasserist ministers. 63 On
18 July 1963, Syrian Nasserists attempted to displace die Ba’thists in a coup led
by Jaim ’Alwan. The coup failed and, rather than the usual exile, the coup
ringleaders were tried and executed. The coup and the subsequent suppression
effectively ended Nasserism in Syria. In addition to this defeat, Nasser correctly
concluded that US policy had favored the Ba’thists in Syria and Iraq as a
counterweight to a resurgent UAR. 64 In August 1963, Nasser withdrew from
the agreement of 17 April, and with a straight face accused the Ba’th of
attempting to use it for ‘their own political ends’. He also attacked the Ba’th
Party as an agent of Zionism and imperialism, claiming that he, not the
Ba’thists, was determined ‘to restore the rights of the Palestinian people’. 65 As a

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result of these setbacks, the US and Britain braced for Nasser’s policies to
‘swing to die left’. 66

The split with Nasser pushed the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’th parties into closer
alignment. On 26 August, Abd-al-Salaam Aref, Nasser’s old supporter and now
President of Iraq, agreed to unity talks with the Syrian Ba’th. On 8 October
1963, Iraq and Syria signed the ‘Military Unity Charter’ as an initial step toward
full unification. Despite outward signs of progress, relations between the two
Ba’th party branches had already begun to unravel. Basically, the strong
Nasserist element in Iraq and staunch Iraqi nationalists would not reconcile
themselves to Syrian Ba’thist domination. Nasser’s refusal to consider an
alliance with any government in which the Ba’thists were a member increased
the pressure. On 18 November, Aref displaced the Iraqi Ba’thists in a coup. 67
Aref, however, did not purge the Iraqi government of all Ba’thists, but rather
controlled their access to power. 68 In Cairo, Nasser waited for events to settle
down, assuming that the Ba’th in Iraq was finished. 69 Aref acted quickly and
outlawed the Ba’th, established a non-party nationalist leadership, and invited
Nasser to Baghdad for a state visit. With Syria isolated, it looked like Nasser
might regain his status as the ‘die guide and guardian of modern Arab
Nationalism’. 70

To protect his flank from Arab criticism over Washington’s perceived
influence in Cairo, Nasser sought a pretext for an attack on US policy. It was
not hard to find. In response to anti-Nasserist pressure from die Israeli lobby
and from the pro-Western Arab states, the US Congress amended the foreign
aid bill, threatening to end PL 480 wheat grants to Egypt. Nasser now had to
face the prospect of losing US aid altogether if he did not toe the US policy
line. In addition, Kennedy sent Nasser a pointed verbal message via Badeau
expressing his ‘concern’ that Egyptian troop withdrawals from Yemen were
‘inconsistent’ with the terms of the UN agreement. 71 Fed up with US pressure,
Nasser bitterly attacked the administration, stating that the UAR’s experience
in 1956 left him convinced that the West was an unreliable partner and, despite
hopes to the contrary, now ‘it seemed clear that [he] must “go back” to 1957.’ 72
Nasser concluded that even when relations were good, US policy would change
course without regard to clear US interests in the region. 73 The use of aid as a
‘club’ to alter UAR policy, particularly its Arab policies, had always been a non-
starter. 74 As Bundy pointed out to Senator J. William Fulbright on 11
November: ‘Dispatches from Cairo make it clear that the Gruening
Amendment has had a strong impact there, but unfortunately the effect is the
opposite of what supporters of tire Amendment must have intended. . . . We
make people more, and not less, nationalistic by action which seem to them to
be “neo-colonial pressure”.’ 75

Iran: another year, another crisis or two

Just as Kennedy’s policy iniatives with Cairo had collapsed, the
administration faced setbacks with allied states as well. By late 1962, with the
Amini government behind him, the Shah told Washington that he intended to

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carry through with die reform program. So there would be no doubt that he
was in charge, the Shah appointed Asadollah Alam, former head the Pahlavi
Foundation and a palace creature, as Prime Minister. During the fall of 1962, a
lull fell over Iranian politics. Never happy with the Shah, Komer at the NSC
stated: ‘Anyone familiar with this feeble country knows this as just another lull
before the storm.’ Komer went on to comment drat the Amini period had
been ‘instructive’. Although running scared, the Tehran regime had opted for a
new approach, but ‘once the Shah and his entourage realized the crisis was
over, they resumed the perennial game of cutting die new boy down to size.
We too relapsed into our usual preoccupation with the military rather than
internal problems.’ 76 While accurate as far as it went, Komer’s view failed to
consider that the US had no real alternatives, and that his own view of Amini
as the ‘last hope’ had been badly flawed and had failed. Neverdieless, activist
elements in the administration continued to want to do something about the
Shah, and Komer even mused about encouraging the Iranian opposition.
Returning to reality, and underlining for emphasis, Komer wrote: ‘ But there is
no presendy foreseeable alternative better than some combination of the Shah
and a reformist cabinet widi his full backing or at least acquiescence .’
Grudgingly, Komer admitted: ‘I’m persuaded of one thing — the Shah does
mean something in Iran. He’s more than a symbol; with all his weaknesses he’s
the chief existing source of power in a country with few if any competing
power centers.’ 77 Like it or not, the Shah provided the only viable pro-Western
source of power.

In addition, no matter how misguided or half-hearted his efforts, the Shah
really did want to reform Iran, albeit in a manner acceptable to him. In
December 1 962, borrowing an idea from King Hassan II of Morocco, he toyed
with the notion of holding a national referendum on his reform programs. The
Shah and Prime Minister Alam wanted to hold an up-or-down vote on land
reform, the sale of government factories, profit-sharing for workers, a national
literacy corps, a new election law including women’s suffrage, and the
nationalization of forests. 78 Feeling confident that land reform was ‘a fact of
life’, the Shah indicated that he planned to hold Majlis elections in 1 963. 79 The
problem was that the Shah’s land-reform program had alienated support
among rural landowners and the religious establishment. 80 The Shah held his
referendum, and the Iranian public, despite a boycott by the National Front,
approved the goals of what now became known as die ‘White Revolution’. 81
The Shah’s move to break with the past and with the ‘traditional moneyed,
land-owning, and religious elites’ received strong support in Washington. 82
Komer stated: ‘It’s been a long time since we last massaged die Shah, so his
reform program and referendum provide a first-class occasion for JFK to do
so (and remind him that big brother is wa telling).’ 83 In a more sober
assessment, Roger Hillsman in INR cited the landowner, religious, and
nationalist opposition to die Shah’s program, and warned that ‘grave problems’
remained. 84

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On March 14, 1963, having just authorized the new military-assistance
program for the Shah, President Kennedy ordered a full policy review for Iran
to answer the question: ‘Is the thrust of existing U.S. policy toward Iran still
basically valid?’ As expected, Holmes in Tehran painted a generally positive
picture, but with one sobering note: tire Shah ‘has aroused the animosity of the
dispossessed elite and the fanatical clergy, and having not yet consolidated the
support of the emancipated peasantry, he is dependent in the immediate future
to a greater degree than ever on tire support of the military and security
forces.’ 85 With regard to elections, on 29 May the British Ambassador in
Tehran suggested that elections might undermine the opposition to the Shah’s
reform program. 86

Unfortunately, trouble with the clergy had already begun. An associate of
Ayatollah Borujerdi of Qom, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had been
preaching openly against the referendum and the reforms. The message first
attacked land reform and then later, women’s suffrage under the planned
election law. There was only one consistent theme: the Shah was the puppet of
the Americans. To support this claim, Khomeini and other nationalists pointed
to the status of force agreement being imposed on the Shah by the Kennedy
administration and the US Congress. In return for military aid, the Iranian
government had to give up the right to try US military and aid personnel in
Iranian courts for crimes committed in Iran. This smacked of the old
concession system practiced by various and sundry colonial powers in Qajjar
Persia and Pahlavi Iran and, perhaps as much as any other issue, branded the
US a colonial power. It was an issue tailor-made for the Shah’s opposition.

In March 1963, in retaliation, Iranian paratroopers broke into the madrasa
where Khomeini preached and arrested him. Several students were killed in the
process. Khomeini was released a short time later but resumed his attacks.
Sporadic outbreaks incited by disaffected clergy continued during the spring. 87
Then, on 3 June 1963, Khomeini launched a violent attack on the Shah and US
influence in Iran. He was arrested the next morning on Muharram, the day of
Husayn’s martyrdom. When word got out, chaos erupted. In several major
cities, Muharram crowds, already massed and emotionally charged, rioted,
calling for the overthrown of the regime. The uprising went on for several
days, but was finally suppressed by security and military units, with heavy loss
of life. The cooperation between religious opponents of the regime and
nationalist began with the rioting of June 1963, and a little-known cleric from
Qom became a widely-known and influential opponent of the regime. 88

Following the June 1963 uprising, the assessment by the Kennedy
administration was virtually unanimous. The Shah’s White Revolution had
challenged the traditional foundations of Iranian society. As a result, the
monarch’s survival rested on the loyalty and efficiency of the military and his
security services. In addition, land reform had reduced the focus on long-term
development, with the probable outcome being immediate and mid-term
economic problems. 89 Finally, taking US advice, the Shah was attempting to
restructure Iranian society and focus on economic development. As a result,

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the opposition labeled him an American puppet. It was the reform program
that had served as the catalyst for the uprising. Military assistance contributed
to die problem, but it was die Shah’s attempt to modernize Iran and his White
Revolution that sparked the revolt. Kennedy’s advisors now realized that the
Shah, with Washington’s encouragement, had alienated the traditional centers
of support for the monarchy. For the Shah to succeed or even to survive, the
military and security services would be the key. The June eruption dampened
carping in Washington about liberalization and complaints that the Shah had
not sufficiently reduced the armed forces. 90 On 20 June, Kennedy, in a
personal message, commended the Shah for ‘surmounting the disturbances’
and encouraged him to improve the economic situation to ensure the success
of his reforms. Kennedy also cautioned the Shah about the stresses that reform
put on a society. 91 Kennedy, the progressive reformer, was cautioning against
rapid reform; he wanted reform in Iran, but not if it resulted in the collapse of
the Shah’s regime. The administration had returned to its Eisenhower roots in
Iran. As for the Shah, he now had the long-sought, undivided attention of the
Kennedy administration and felt reasonably sure that Washington saw no real
alternatives to his rule.

India and Pakistan

The situations in India and Pakistan also defied the Kennedy touch. On 4
January 1963, the British expressed their reservations about the Kashmir
situation. Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, stated categorically: ‘H.M.G.
should avoid becoming involved at this stage either in details of the
negotiations between Pakistan and India on Kashmir, or in any capacity of
“honest broker”.’ 92 Kennedy hoped that the Chinese threat would cause India
to reach a settlement with Pakistan, stating that a ‘Kashmir settlement is our
chief goal.’ He also wanted Nehru to understand that significant US military
assistance against China required a compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir
and Indian help against the Chinese elsewhere in Asia. 93 Komer cynically made
the US position abundantly clear: ‘Whatever we can do behind the scenes to
keep this [Chinese] threat visibly evident will serve our long-term ends.’ 94 On
16 February, Nehru wrote to Kennedy, stating that he could not offer Pakistan
more than he had offered India — in effect nothing — without creating ‘an
uproar in India and put[ting] our Government in a very difficult position’.
Nehru added: ‘The talks had as good as broken down.’ 95

Reaching the same conclusion, Ayub was simply unwilling to accept the
limited adjustments that Nehru might offer. 96 As the Kashmir talks simmered
on, a downturn in the Pakistani economy emboldened Ayub’s internal
opposition. There was a rising sense that Ayub’s rule had run its course and a
belief that Pakistan was descending into yet another period of political
instability and economic stagnation. In addition, senior government officials
and army officers felt that Washington had sided with India and that support
for the West counted for little in terms of military and economic aid. Fear
existed among Pakistani officials that India would take over the subcontinent

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while the US stood by and watched. 97 Embassy reporting from Pakistan
indicated a building crisis on domestic issues and discussion of taking Kashmir
by force. These rumors resulted in what Pakistan perceived as its abandonment
by die US. 98

By April 1963, the bilateral talks on Kashmir had yielded nothing, and
comments by Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto and Nehru were
discouraging. 99 Predicting a major crisis in the negotiations, Walt Rostow called
the obstruction an insurmountable ‘psychological [and] political . . . stone wall’
that the participants anticipated from die very beginning. 100 On 15 April, in a
meeting with Galbraith, Nehru’s ‘vehement’ anger left no doubt that his
‘antipathy’ for Pakistan simply would not allow any meaningful compromise. 101
In addition, the Chinese repatriated 3,000 Indian prisoners of war, indicating
that there would be no more pressure on Nehru from that quarter. 102 India
only stayed in the talks hoping for military aid from the West. Sandys, the
British facilitator, believed that once India obtained military aid, all hope for a
compromise on Kashmir would evaporate. As a result, both the US and Britain
took the position that while a setdement on Kashmir was not a precondition to
arms aid, India should not ‘expect arms aid in advance of a setdement’. 103

No matter what support existed in the Indian Government for a
compromise and setdement - and the rumors varied - Nehru categorically
opposed any agreement that potentially meant the loss of Kashmir. Having
spent a lifetime arguing for a secular, united India, he could not bring himself
to compromise. 104 As the negotiations deteriorated, the Kennedy
administration began to consider any option that promised the slightest chance
of success. 105 On 21 April, Nehru sent another letter to Kennedy, in which he
stated: ‘Pressurizing Governments ... can hardly be useful.’ He added: ‘Ill-
considered and ill-conceived initiatives ... made it impossible to reach any
setdement.’ 106 By June, the bilateral talks between India and Pakistani had
failed completely. 107 Despite this obvious failure, Kennedy was willing to go
ahead with an arms package to India. Then the situation changed.

During the summer of 1963, a series of developments further undermined a
compromise on Kashmir. First, Prime Minister Nehru, in increasing ill-health,
suffered a series of internal political setbacks. Historically, Nehru had used
Krishna Menon and K.D. Malaviya (both leftists) to balance the conservative
wing of the Congress Party. Menon was gone, and in July 1963, conservatives
in Congress forced Malaviya from power. Nehru, himself a leftist, found his
power and prestige reduced, leaving him little room to maneuver on the
Kashmir issue, even were he so inclined. 108 Second, in Pakistan a general
review of foreign policy began. Karachi criticized the joint communique issued
by Kennedy and Macmillan following the Nassau meeting on 30 June, saying
the guarantees for Pakistani security were ‘meaningless’. In addition, the
‘opposition’ in the Pakistani National Assembly argued that CENTO and
SEATO membership, as well as the alliance with the US, had brought greater -
not reduced — insecurity. Pakistani politicians of every stripe recommended
that serious consideration be given to nonaligned status in the future. 109 In

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addition, Pakistani disillusionment created a groundswell for closer ties and
even a mutual-defense arrangement with Beijing. This development would
indeed represent a serious setback for US containment policy in the region . 110
Lastly, the Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia, offered the Indians a
massive arms deal on highly- favorable payment terms . 111 The US realized India
really wanted its own modern air force, with a manufacturing capability. If an
arms deal with the West did not offer this, then Soviet-Indian cooperation was
highly likely . 112 The cost of providing a Western-style aircraft industry was
prohibitive. Kennedy summed it up well: ‘if we give too little we might lose
India and ... if we give too much we might lose Pakistan .’ 113

The Pakistanis pressed Washington citing their reluctance to seek other
allies in the region, meaning the Chinese, while making the case that leftist
influence in India and cheaper weaponry made closer ties with the Soviet
Union almost inevitable . 114 The most disturbing issue to those supporting
military aid to India was the attitude of President Kennedy; he stated that he
understood Ayub’s concerns. John McCone, Director of the CIA, reiterated
the vital importance of the ‘Peshawar facility’ and the need for its now stalled
expansion . 115 In a September meeting with George Ball, Ayub pointed out that
Nehru showed no inclination to negotiate on Kashmir, and he reminded the
administration that both Truman and Eisenhower had attempted to work with
India over the Kashmir issue and failed; given die situation, ‘Pakistan saw no
alternative but to proceed toward normalization of relations with Communist
China and ultimately with the Soviet Union .’ 116 Ayub had concluded that the
defense arrangements with the United States were worthless in the event of an
attack by India and that continued isolation from China and the Soviet Union
was unwise . 117

Chester Bowles, now the new Ambassador to India, had already begun to
formulate an alternative approach that might avoid Soviet military assistance to
India and a total collapse in US-Pakistan relations. Knowing that the
administration would ultimately decide that it had too much at stake in
Pakistan to risk military aid to India, Bowles asked: ‘Does anyone believe that
there are any predispositions on the part of the Indians and Pakistanis to reach
a settlement at this time, or indeed to do anything more than attempt to secure
a tactical advantage enabling one to embarrass the other? My conversations . . .
lead me to conclude that it would be futile for us to proceed with this venture
now .’ 118 Wanting to avoid a further bad press for Nehru, Bowles urged that the
mediation be dropped, while the pro-Pakistani contingent argued that giving
up showed bad faith toward Pakistan and played into India’s hands . 119 The
offer went forward. Pakistan accepted and India rejected it . 120

Bowles then urged a dual-track policy, whereby both countries received
defensive weapons on an equal footing. Bowles, now the principal spokesman
for the pro-India group, realized that concern over Pakistani overtures to the
Chinese would wreck any chance for military aid to India. Knowing that he had
litde time, he pushed hard for this approach, arguing that India was ‘not only
friendly democratic power but most outspoken Asia enemy of Chicoms ’. 121 In

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a separate evaluation, the State Department concluded that efforts to supply
India with US weapons had severely undermined the relationship with
Pakistan, which would now attempt to build relations with the Chinese and to
curry favor with the Soviets. 122 Washington was convinced that despite
flirtations with China and the Soviets, US economic and military aid placed an
effective ‘limitation’ on how far these relationships with Pakistan could go. 123

During the fall of 1963, Bowles continued to push for a major US military
aid program for India to counter the threat of a major Soviet arms deal with
New Delhi. Talbot, Rusk, and McNamara opposed him, discounting Soviet
assistance. According to Bowles, Kennedy asked him to work something out.
Bowles returned in November 1963 with a plan to provide arms to India that
he believed would not upset the Pakistanis. He managed to get Komer’s
attention, and the latter coordinated a meeting with the President. Komer
explained: ‘Chet Bowles is very anxious to get some flavor of your current
thinking about India-Pakistan tomorrow. He’s putting up a brave front but
actually feeling a bit low, and wondering whether we’re still signed on to
moving ahead with India. The important thing to do with Bowles is to reassure
him that we intend to go forward with India, while getting him to set his sights
a little lower and more realistically.’ 124 Bowles presented his plan to Kennedy.
The President believed that it only had a ‘50-50 chance of success’ because it
only amounted to $50-75 million per year and did not create a modern air
force. With reference to the plan, Komer asked: ‘If Bowles turns out to be
over-optimistic, have we really lost very much?’ 125 Rusk, Talbot, and
McNamara continued to oppose Bowles, and Kennedy set a follow-on meeting
for Tuesday, 26 November to discuss modifications and alternatives. The
meeting never happened. 126

The day after Kennedy’s assassination, Bowles pressed for a positive
decision on the Indian military-assistance program. Komer relayed die message
and requested that President Johnson approve it. In his memo to Bundy,
Komer stated that Johnson was known to be pro-Pakistani and die plan for
India needed a sign-off before a potential change of heart occurred. Komer
referred to Talbot’s alleged fears that the Pakistanis would take ‘great heart
from LBJ’s advent’ and be more difficult than ever about arms for India. He
also stated that die Indians were very nervous. He asked that Bowles be given
five minutes of LBJ’s time so that he could take a personal message back to
Nehru about the arms. 127 This exercise marked a last-ditch effort on the part of
Bowles and Komer to salvage arms for India. In fact, Komer’s statement that
this was Kennedy’s policy was something of an overstatement. Kennedy only
authorized Bowles to explore his plan with New Delhi. Given the record and
Bowles’ belief that Talbot had undermined the pro-India policy, it is unlikely
that Talbot had been a party to this effort to slip die India arms deal by the
new President. Bowles knew that he had lacked the clear-cut support of
Kennedy and that McNamara, Rusk, and Talbot actively opposed him;
therefore, he tried to use a quick meeting with President Johnson to commit
him to the India arms deal.

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On 30 November, the meeting on aid to India finally occurred, but without
Bowles; Johnson met rather with Bundy and CIA Director McCone. McCone
insisted that the intelligence relationship with Pakistan was of the ‘greatest
importance’ to the security of the United States. McCone couched this
argument not in terms of the Middle East, but in terms of the hard-intelligence
collection sites that directly affected US security. They reviewed with President
Johnson the commitments made to Pakistan with regard to an attack by India
and the recent deterioration in US-Pakistan relations. Johnson responded,
expressing the ‘greatest of confidence in Ayub’ but also stating that the US ‘had
not been forceful enough . . . and had not given him a feeling of confidence in
our motives and he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in
favor of India.’ Johnson then instructed Bundy and McCone to ‘correct’ this
situation ‘in the most positive manner’. 128

The legacy of 1963

The Kennedy administration attempted a transformation of US foreign
policy. From top to bottom, Kennedy and his advisors believed that they could
bring significant improvement to the baseline foreign policy handed them by
Eisenhower. By 1963, it had become apparent that they had no tiring to show
for their efforts. The administration had failed to give proper consideration to
or to try and understand exactly what the Eisenhower experience had been.
Kennedy found himself pursuing policies that had failed eight years before.
The relationship with Nasser provides a good example. Kennedy’s early
approach to Nasser had almost all of the goals and attributes of early
Eisenhower efforts. As in the 1950s, Nasser and die UAR continued to pursue
their goal of pan-Arab revolution. The UAR could not be enticed to make
further compromises with Israel or to withdraw its forces from Yemen for any
amount of aid. When pressured by the US to follow a certain policy, they
defied Washington and ignored threats to cut off aid. In Iran, Kennedy’s
attempts to find an alternative to the Shah failed, and left the US identified
more than ever with the Pahlavi regime. With US encouragement, the Shah
then charged ahead with reform at such a frightening pace that it appeared to
threaten his own survival. This situation left the reform-pushing Kennedy
administration counseling caution and emphasizing the critical need for loyal
military and security forces. With regard to India and Pakistan, the opportunity
posed by the Sino-Indian border war turned into a mirage and worse. US
pressure on India coupled with Washington’s unwillingness to provide New
Delhi with an indigenous manufacturing capability for advanced arms, resulted
in a broad program of military cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow.
In Pakistan, the limited arms that India did receive angered and frustrated
Ayub Khan. To show his displeasure, Ayub opened relations with Communist
China and accused President Kennedy of bad faith. For Kennedy and his
advisors, 1 963 saw virtually all of their ideas and hopes for the Greater Middle
East unravel. The planned great opening to the non-aligned world collapsed
with the down-turn in relations with India and the UAR. The situation in

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which the Kennedy administration found itself in 1963 was a far cry from
where it had confidendy assumed that it would be three years earlier. In fact,
Kennedy found himself struggling just to maintain die more conservative
policy positions established by Eisenhower between 1958 and 1960.

Conclusion: Reform and the
Primacy of Containment

The policy of global containment of the Soviet Union, China and
indigenous Communist movements dominated US foreign policy for more
than 40 years. The Truman administration created the model first in its
commitment to the defense of Western Europe and Japan and then in its
strong support for economic development and reconstruction as a means of
undermining Communism’s political influence. This commitment to military
confrontation, for example in Korea, or deterrence through defense alliances
like NATO and economic development and reconstruction programs like the
Marshall Plan became the models for US Cold War policy. Although it was
clear what this meant in terms of Western Europe and Japan, the exact form
and meaning of containment in the developing world and particularly the
nature of its application were vague to non-existent. For example, historians
have argued argued that this lack of definition sparked the Korean War and
created a muddled situation in Indochina that led from the French to the
American war in Vietnam. For 40 years American administrations took the
Truman model for Western Europe and Japan, used it as a baseline, and for
better or worse, attempted to construct a Cold War policy paradigm for the
developing world. It was an ad hoc learning process that reflected all die pitfalls
of ‘real-time’ ‘on-the-job’ policy development and execution in cultural and
political environments where Washington’s understanding of the situations
ranged from marginal to opaque. Truman created a containment policy that
held the line against Communist expansion in Western Europe and Japan, but
he bequeathed to his successors the unenviable and complex task of creating a
workable formula for containment in the developing world.

Truman drew the line on containment in Europe and the Far East, but it
would be the Eisenhower administration, through trial and error, that would
develop and, to a large degree, instituationalize containment in Latin America,
Africa, and die Greater Middle East. Later administrations might embellish or

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 315

at times peripherally modify the policy approach, but attempts to substantially
deviate from the course set by Eisenhower, almost universally, had one of
three results: a corrective return to Eisenhower’s cautious policy course, as in
Kennedy’s experiences with Ayub, Nasser, and Nehru; a lasting policy
complication, like Kennedy’s policy shifts with regard to Israel and the Shah; or
a disaster like that in Indochina. In 1953, the Eisenhower administration
arrived in Washington believing that long-term political stability and staunch
anti-Communismn could come only from economic development and political
reform. Eisenhower believed that the new nationalisms of die Middle East and
developing world had to be encouraged or tolerated, as the case may be, and
supported through economic-assistance programs and, if need be, military
assistance as well. The initial emphasis lay clearly on the economic side of the
equation. Eisenhower and Dulles believed that military assistance should
conform to the requirements of internal security and order. This primacy of
economic development and political reform as the best guarantor of
containment and Western interests in the Middle East had strong support from
White House advisors like Walt W. Rostow, who first served the Eisenhower
administration and then became a key policy-maker in the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations.

Between 1953 and 1955, the Eisenhower administration tried to implement
this vision of containment. This effort included attempts to use economic
assistance to entice Egypt into the Middle East Defense Organization, obtain a
solution to the Arab-Israeli problem, bring an end to the Kashmir dispute
between India and Pakistan, and stymie Soviet attempts to penetrate the
region. It included pressure on the Shah of Iran to reorient his focus from
building his military to concentrating instead on developing the economy and
on bringing social reform and political liberalization to Iran. Eisenhower and
his advisors fundamentally accepted the idea that traditional regimes in the
region would ultimately succumb to nationalist revolutions. Despite India’s
non-aligned status, die administration strongly supported economic assistance
and Nehru’s focus on development. Eisenhower pushed Pakistan toward
democracy, economic development, and social reform. In each case, adherence
to a Western defensive organization, whether the Baghdad Pact or SEATO,
represented more of a political commitment than a military one. Military aid to
allies of the West was niggardly compared to economic assistance. Military aid
was a vehicle intended to pacify the various officer corps in order to maintain
their political identification with the West and to encourage their support for
economic and political development. The litany of complaints from members
of the Baghdad Pact concerning the lack of military aid dominated the history
of the organization through 1958. Even the crisis of 1956 failed to garner
significantly more military aid for aligned states. Initially, in Eisenhower’s view,
containment first required economic development, followed by political and
social reform, and only enough military assistance to maintain internal stability.

The Baghdad Coup of July 1958 shifted the paradigm. A key pro-Western
regime in die process of instituting reforms collapsed in revolution. Worse yet,

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what was thought to be a Nasserist revolution instead turned out to be a
nationalist revolt strongly supported by the Iraqi Communist Party and the
Soviet Union. Suddenly, short-term stability and a pro-Western political
posture took priority over the longer-term theoretical benefits offered by
economic development and the uncertainties of reform. This re-prioritization
brought a shift in Washington’s thinking about the importance of stability in
the quest of reform. The maintenance of pro-Western stability became the
baseline for economic development and political reform. This shift began a
process in which the United States found itself increasingly identified with
authoritarian monarchical or military regimes. In terms of military and
economic aid, Iran and Pakistan were the greatest beneficiaries of 1958, but
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others benefited as well. Fearing another
Baghdad-style coup, the Eisenhower administration raised the priority of
shoring up military loyalty and internal-security forces. Despite this, the
administration continued to press for economic development: fear of unrest
and instability brought a very cautious approach to reform. In 1959 and 1960,
the Eisenhower administration adopted a more flexible approach to both die
non-aligned and aligned states. Relations improved and economic assistance to
the UAR and India increased, as did economic and military aid to aligned
Pakistan, Iran, and Jordan. It was dais proportionally greater and, therefore,
much more visible increase in military aid that resulted in the Eisenhower
administration being unfairly characterized as weak on economic development.
The military aid constituted a pragmatic reaction to die events of 1958; it did
not end Eisenhower’s focus on economic development, but was instead a
means to provide internal security and stability for the very economic
development that Washington believed would maintain pro-Western regimes.
It became an instrument for top-down reform and economic growdi.

In 1960, when Kennedy took office, he inherited a pragmatic, working
foreign policy, which he largely adopted. While Kennedy had run for office on
a foreign-policy platform that attacked Eisenhower and Dulles for their alleged
blunders between 1955 and 1958, the adjustments made by die Eisenhower
White House between 1958 and 1960 restored stability and direction to US
policy in the Middle East. Containment remained the centerpiece of the US
policy thrust, but the administration adjusted the application of those policies
to meet the challenges of non-alignment and revolutionary nationalism.
Despite these improvements, Kennedy and his advisors, including Rostow,
believed that through superior management and sophisticated application of
economics they could attain results that would far exceed those of Eisenhower
and Dulles.

Instead of objectively assessing Eisenhower’s policies to see what had
worked and what had not in the 1953 to 1955 time-frame, Kennedy and his
advisors concluded that Eisenhower and, particularly, Dulles had been too
doctrinaire and lacked the creativity to achieve their key policy goals. As a
result, the Kennedy administration, to a large extent, adopted many of the
goals and even the policy approaches that had already been tried and had failed

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 317

under Eisenhower. Kennedy made the UAR the center of its efforts to achieve
an Arab-Israeli peace, and attempted to dampen radical Arab nationalism by
encouraging Cairo to focus on economic development. It was vintage
Eisenhower circa 1953. Pushing the Shah toward economic development and
away from his fixation on military assistance paralleled similar Eisenhower
efforts. Eisenhower, like Kennedy, attempted to identify an alternative to the
Shah’s rule. The Kennedy administration also attempted to foster better
relations with India and a more pro-Western orientation through economic
assistance and the promise of military aid, in return for a settlement of the
Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Eisenhower had entertained the same
proposition. Kennedy, no less than Eisenhower, found himself tied to Ayub’s
regime in Karachi because of its key position in tire Western alliance structure
and because of intelligence sites critical to the strategic defense of the United
States.

Given the similar policies, what were the real differences between
Eisenhower and Kennedy? Kennedy, due to over-confidence and a lack of
appreciation for the degree of change that had occurred in the Middle East
during the 1950s, failed to learn from Eisenhower’s setbacks. In one sense,
Kennedy had the luxury of inheriting a set of stable, functioning policies,
something that Eisenhower had acquired by trial and error; but in another,
Kennedy failed to apprehend the magnitude of the difficulties encountered
during the 1950s, and as a result blamed Eisenhower and Dulles for policy
shortcomings. This lack of objectivity and perspective condemned Kennedy
and his administration to repeat many of Eisenhower’s early mistakes.

The activist bent of tire Kennedy administration also created problems.
Eisenhower had learned through bitter experience that the Middle East often
required a wait-and-see approach to developments. Kennedy’s can-do attitude
created an imperative to take a proactive approach to developments and issues.
As a result, aggressive administration pronouncements and policies often
brought exactly the opposite results from what was intended. Pressing Nasser
on the issue of a settlement with Israel made the Egyptian leader vulnerable to
criticism from his Arab rivals, including pro-Western Arab states. Despite
warnings from Ambassador Wailes, attempting to replace the Shah with Prime
Minister Amini left the US in the end even more closely identified with and
firmly tied to the Pahlavi dynasty. Campaign rhetoric concerning support for
India created a situation in which Kennedy had to demonstrate the importance
of Pakistan to US interests, and this in turn discredited Washington in Nehru’s
eyes. This credibility problem was further complicated by overt, even crude,
attempts to leverage the border war with China into an Indian compromise on
Kashmir. The overwhelming desire for action, to get something done, caused a
series of miscalculations that actually undermined US stature and influence vis-
a-vis the gains made by Eisenhower between 1958 and 1960. Arguably, by late
1963 the US position in the Greater Middle East had taken a clear step
backward from its position in 1960 at the end of the Eisenhower era.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Lessons in containment and economic
development, 1953-1958

The events of 1953 to 1958 underscored the prophetic accuracy of
Eisenhower’s 6 January 1953 conversation with then Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. Eisenhower told the Prime Minister:

Nationalism is on the march and world Communism is taking advantage

of that spirit of nationalism to cause dissention in the free world.

Moscow leads many misguided people to believe that they can count on

Communist help to achieve and sustain nationalistic ambitions.

Eisenhower and Dulles recognized the problems associated with rising
nationalism, British imperial baggage, and the Soviet threat. The administration
believed that through astute policy-management the US could successfully
contain, and perhaps even undermine, Soviet influence. The key to long-term
stability and a pro-Western political posture was economic development. The
Eisenhower administration shared the views of Walt Rostow and others that
economic assistance would foster economic self-sufficiency, which in turn
would bring a pro-Western political orientation and hopefully stable
democratic institutions. Eisenhower added: ‘with our experience and power,
[the US] will be required to support and carry the heavy burdens of decent
international plans, as well as to aid infant nations towards self-dependence.’
Eisenhower went on to say that this leadership required ‘persuasion and
example’, ‘patient negotiation, understanding and equality of treatment’, and
not a ‘take it or leave it’ approach. 1 Both he and Secretary Dulles viewed
economic development as the most viable path to stability and a pro-Western
orientation.

If economic development constituted the principal thrust of Eisenhower’s
containment policy, then why did the administration pressure states in the
Middle East to join Western defensive alliances and provide military assistance?
It has been on this point that Eisenhower’s policies have been most
misunderstood, misrepresented, and criticized. Whether the Baghdad Pact or
SEATO, Western defensive alliances constituted political rather than military
organizations. Adherence to the Western alliances represented a statement of
pro-Western political orientation and solidarity. No-one in Washington, and
certainly not President Eisenhower, believed that any of die members of the
pro-Western defense pacts, eidier alone or collectively, could stand up to the
Soviet Union. For this reason, military aid was limited. For example, the
members of the Baghdad Pact continually complained about die lack of
military assistance, the lack of a command structure, and the utter
ineffectiveness of the organization as a real military alliance. Washington quite
simply saw litde or no military value-added in the pacts. Military aid was either
intended to placate the various military establishments or provide for internal
security, or both. Between 1953 and 1958, Eisenhower avoided large-scale
military assistance that provided any real offensive capability. Military

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 319

assistance was to provide enough internal stability and control to allow for
economic development, the real guarantor of long-term stability and
containment.

The situation with Egypt represented a clear case in point. It was the
unwillingness of the Eisenhower administration to provide sufficient military
assistance to Egypt in order that Cairo might challenge Israel that brought on
the Czech arms deal. This precipitated a crisis in relations with the West that
ultimately led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal and tire resulting Anglo-
French-Israeli debacle of 1956. Historians have often credited Nasser’s
unwillingness to join a Western defense pact as the Eisenhower
administration’s primary reason for not supplying arms to Egypt. In reality, had
Nasser joined a Western pact, Egypt would not have received either die quality
or quantity of arms that it sought to confront Israel. Eisenhower intended to
limit arms and military assistance to the essentials required for internal security.
Between 1953 and 1958, no country in the Western alliance systems in the
Greater Middle East was satisfied with the level of military assistance provided
by Washington; Egypt would have been no different. The Eisenhower
administration steadfastly refused to contribute to an arms race in die region,
preferring instead to offer economic aid and to encourage economic
development. Nasser could not get what he wanted, so he turned to the Soviet
Union.

Nasser’s realization that sufficient arms would not be forthcoming from the
West provided an additional impetus toward non-alignment. The situation
became more complicated when the Turko-Iraq pact of 1955 led to the
creation of the Baghdad Pact. Now the West had refused to arm Egypt while
arming its Iraqi rival. The Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955 merely iced
Nasser’s cake. Now he faced an immediate threat to his rule from Western-
supported Israel, while Washington was unwilling to provide arms for Egypt’s
defense. The Soviets were the natural choice to provide what die West would
not. In Nehru’s case, the US arms for Pakistan under the 1954 Turko-Pakistan
alliance placed him squarely at odds widr the Eisenhower administration. No
matter how limited in scope, Washington had not only armed India’s bitter
enemy, but had also attacked the very ideological foundations of Nehru’s view
of the developing world’s place in the Cold War environment. Ultimately 7 ,
Nehru too would turn to the Soviets as a counter-balance. In a real sense, the
pro-Western northern-tier alliance linked Indian and Egyptian interests at a
critical historical moment. The governments in Cairo and New Delhi were
attempting to consolidate internal political power in the face of potentially
serious opposition, while at the same time facing what drey viewed as external
threats funded by Washington. No amount of economic aid could compensate
for the political pressure created by 7 insufficient arms for Egypt and any
amount of arms for Pakistan. For Nasser, the quid pro quo for cooperation with
the West would not be what he needed in the way of arms, and would probably
cost him the support of the Egyptian military, a potentially fatal political
development. For Nehru, US military aid for Pakistan, and the Kashmir

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

problem, threatened India’s very integrity. Despite their differing political
practices and ideological proclivities, Nehru’s and Nasser’s confluence of
political interest at the 1955 Bandung conference produced a revolution in
Middle East politics. Bandung provided the crowning blow to the Eisenhower
administration’s initial plans for die defense of the Greater Middle East. Egypt
provided India with an effective counter-balance to Pakistani influence in the
Islamic and Arab states, and Nehru provided Nasser with global stature and,
most of all, a Chinese mid-wife in the form of Chou En-Lai for the delivery of
Soviet arms.

Egyptian-Indian policy also profoundly affected Western allies in the region.
Countries like Iran, Pakistan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia learned to barter their
allegiance in ever-escalating demands for economic and military aid from the
United States. While Washington continued to push economic development
and reform, its allies pressed for arms to compete with their non-aligned
neighbors or with the Soviet threat. Ultimately, Washington found that
influencing even its allies became increasingly difficult as it attempted to
maintain a balance between the demands of its erstwhile allies and their actual
needs. US parsimony generated threats to quit the Baghdad Pact from Iraq,
Iran, and Pakistan. Eisenhower’s good intentions in 1953 for economic
development and an Arab-Israeli peace had degenerated into confrontations
with Nehru and Nasser, the leaders of what Eisenhower and Dulles believed to
be the two most important states in the region. Eisenhower moved, from faith
in the power of economic development to influence not only the political
process but also the political orientation of states in the Middle East, to a more
realistic view that took into account the balance between economic
development and political considerations generated by regional rivalries.

Containment revamped 1958-1960

Despite these problems, Eisenhower and Dulles never lost sight of their
goals in the Middle East. In the post-Suez and Eisenhower Doctrine
environment, with expectations scaled back, they sought to regenerate working
relationships with Nehru and Nasser. Military aid was out of the question. As a
result, the administration once again focused on economic development.
Eisenhower and his advisors hoped to correct the inability of the US to project
the good intentions of its policies properly, and thereby gain greater acceptance
from non-aligned and nationalist movements. By late 1957, the Eisenhower
administration concluded that policy revisions were in order. In 1957, Nasser’s
rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Nehru’s refusal to compromise over
Kashmir coupled with broad instability among the pro-Western regimes to
force a major reevaluation of US policy.

In February 1958, the union between Syria and Egypt and the formation of
the United Arab Republic accelerated the process. Washington might have
arrived at the same policy course in its own good time, but Nasser’s diplomatic
coup brought an immediate shift in US policy toward the new UAR. Believing
that it was only a matter of time before pro-Western regimes in the region

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 321

collapsed and joined the UAR or defected to the neutralist camp, Eisenhower
decided to resurrect a working relationship with Cairo, using economic and
financial incentives. Still conflicted about working with Nasser, on the one
hand, Washington courted him, while on the other it encouraged Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan to resist UAR pressure. The administration had
concluded that it needed improved relations with the UAR and to work with
Cairo on a case-by-case basis. Based on his experience over the previous five
years, Eisenhower had decided on a more flexible but conservative course that
allowed the US to improve ties with Egypt and India while pursuing its
strategic Cold War objectives in the region. The administration had no
expectation of major breakthroughs with regard to Nasser’s revolutionary
activities, die Arab-Israeli dispute, Nehru’s non-alignment, or the Kashmir
dispute, but it hoped to garner limited influence from economic and financial
aid.

Then, on 14 July 1958, Brigadier Qasim’s detour through Baghdad
destroyed the Hashemite regime and most of what remained of British prestige
in die Middle East. If Iraq’s entry into the Western security system had sent
tremors through the region, its exit was an earthquake. The British were more
than willing to settle for a new arrangement with Qasim that protected their oil
interests. In the confusion that followed, Eisenhower, assuming Nasser was
behind the coup, ordered a military operation to support the Lebanese
government against intervention from the Syrian UAR. The US also pressed
the British to provide similar support to Jordan. Fearing US intervention in
Syria, Nasser sought immediate Soviet support and lambasted Anglo-American
intervention. This situation direatened to wreck improved ties between Cairo
and Washington, as the effects of the Iraqi coup rippled across the northern
tier, undermining improving US-Indian relations.

Fearing the collapse of die Western alliance system and of containment, the
White House immediately increased the flow of military and economic aid to
what remained of the Baghdad Pact. The administration continued to believe
that economic development and reform held the key to long-term, pro-
Western stability, but Washington’s focus shifted dramatically to the short-term
perspective, namely the survival of pro-Western regimes. As a result,
Eisenhower put a priority on stability, economic development, and controlled
reform, in that order. Economic and military aid to Pakistan and Iran increased
dramatically. The aversion to engendering New Delhi’s ill-will largely
disappeared: Pakistan was simply too important to US security and intelligence
interests. In October 1958, Pakistan became even more attractive as an ally
when General Ayub Khan replaced the dysfunctional civilian government in a
military coup. Military rule stabilized die situation in Karachi, providing what
the White House hoped would be a stable environment conducive to
economic development and safe reform. Unfortunately for Nehru, he could ill-
afford to risk a break with die US. Not only did India need US aid, but it also
faced an increasingly threatening dispute widi Beijing along its northern

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

border. In Cairo, Nasser was also obliged to look the other way, given the
increasing enmity between die Qasim regime in Baghdad and the UAR.

For Iran, the collapse of Iraq was a transformational experience. Bouts of
depression and vacillation aside, the Shah had become the real center of
political gravity for containment. Survival of a pro-Western regime, if not the
Pahlavi dynasty, became an absolute priority in Washington. As a part of its
conservative approach to Iran, the Eisenhower administration assiduously
avoided direct commitments to either the Shah or his dynasty. Washington
wanted to maintain the option of supporting a more broadly based pro-
Western ruler, on the off chance that such an alternative might arise. As a
result, the White House assured Tehran that the United States was committed
to the ‘independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of Iran, not the Pahlavi dynasty.
The inability or unwillingness of the Shah to bring constructive change
frustrated the administration. As a result, the US provided die minimum
amount of aid necessary to maintain the Tehran regime. The Shah deeply
resented and vigorously complained about the niggardly dole from
Washington, particularly for the military. The Iraqi coup was a godsend for the
Peacock Throne. The Shah recognized die opportunity immediately, and began
to demand additional military and economic support. He interspersed these
demands with random soliloquies about the virtues of non-alignment and
accommodations with Moscow. Bluff or not, die Eisenhower administration
was in no position to take a chance, dramatically increasing economic and
military aid.

In addition, the Iraqi coup had an unexpectedly positive impact on US-UAR
relations. Within weeks of the coup, Qasim and his Communist allies began to
undermine Nasserist elements in the government. As disagreements escalated,
Nasser found himself under increasing attack from Baghdad, while his
supporters in Iraq found themselves in prison or worse. Strong Communist
support for the Qasim government also brought strong Soviet support and
military aid from Moscow. From Khrushchev’s perspective, he finally had an
Arab client who did not hang Communists as an avocation. In the ensuing
Arab Cold War, the hostility between Nasser and Qasim spread to die UAR’s
relations with the Soviet Union. Much to the delight of the Eisenhower
administration, Nasser finally shared Washington’s concern about the threat of
Communism. Ironically, the British once again faced a situation in which
Nasser, with the encouragement and assistance of the Eisenhower
administration, was bent on undermining Qasim, whose fall would threaten
British petroleum interests in Iraq. The US and UAR found themselves on
even better terms because of the political synergy created by their joint
aversion to Qasim’s Iraq. The Eisenhower administration suffered no
misconceptions about the depth of cooperation. Washington and Cairo had a
mutual problem in Iraq, but there was no expectation that cooperation on Iraq
or compromises over the situation in Lebanon would translate into solutions
for more vexing regional problems like the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 323

Between 1958 and 1960, die Eisenhower administration constructed a
pragmatic Middle East policy based on lowered expectations and cooperation
with India and Egypt. The White House really believed, that no matter how
problematic it might at times become, a working relationship with Nasser and
Nehru was critical to US interests in the region. This realization was in fact an
acknowledgement that the region had undergone a fundamentally
revolutionary change. In 1953, both the President and Dulles had recognized
the nature of the coming change, but their strategies were overwhelmed by its
complexity. Between 1958 and 1960, they reconstructed US relations in the
Middle East based on new political realities and more limited goals. At the
same time, they managed to maintain the fundamentals of their containment
strategy with regard to the Soviet Union. By December 1960, with the
knowledge that tilings could have been far worse, Eisenhower could look back
with satisfaction on the progress that had been made since 1958, particularly in
US relations with Egypt and India. The policies of 1958 to 1960 did not
include dramatic breakthroughs, but they were balanced and workable.
Through eight very tough years of policy ups and downs, the Eisenhower
administration had learned that some regional problems were simply insoluble,
that die situation was usually neither as bad nor as promising as it appeared,
and that the US had little leverage, economic or otherwise, to force solutions.
Thus, tactical muddling-through usually provided the only option. January
1961 would bring a new administration and its own understanding of the
lessons of the Eisenhower years.

Kennedy’s Middle East and the Eisenhower legacy

In January 1961, the Kennedy administration had die options of continuing
with Eisenhower’s conservative but workable foreign policy in the Middle
East, or embarking on the series of activist initiatives proposed during die
presidential campaign, or both. In an almost exact reflection of Eisenhower’s
attitudes about Truman in 1953, the Kennedy administration arrived in
Washington determined to replace what they considered the lethargy and
mismanagement of the Eisenhower administration with activist programs.
Kennedy and his team intended to get things done. Just as Eisenhower and
Dulles had believed diat their ability to manage foreign policy would
immeasurably enhance US interests, so Kennedy believed that his technocrats
and intellectuals would correct the shortsighted policies of die past and open a
new era of US influence in the developing world - the ‘pay any price, bear any
burden’ approach. In an intellectually selective way, the new administration
viewed US Middle East policy in terms of the turmoil of 1955 to 1958, rather
than over the continuum of the entire Eisenhower period. They also ignored
the fact that the junior senator from Massachusetts had often supported
Eisenhower’s policies when the majority of Democrats had opposed them.
Here again was a rough parallel with the Eisenhower administration’s arrival in
1953. Eisenhower criticized the very Truman policies that he had helped create
as NATO Supreme Commander.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Given the close election, no one could expect Kennedy and his advisors to
compliment Eisenhower on the improving situation in the Middle East after
1958, but once in power, a more even-handed evaluation of US policy from a
broader context would have provided the White House with a better
understanding of how that policy had arrived at its current juncture. Instead,
Kennedy took office committed to correcting what he viewed as the mistakes
of the past. He wanted to translate into policy his campaign rhetoric about the
importance of India, the UAR, an Arab-Israeli settlement, and an
accommodation with non-alignment. Distrusting the traditional channels of
foreign-policy development, Kennedy brought with him a cadre of experts and
technocrats who believed that they had the answers. Using these outsiders,
Kennedy sought to bypass the bureaucracy and put his personal stamp on US
foreign policy. Thus, a small group of ‘experts’ attempted to reshape policy
largely without the benefit of an objective evaluation of what had gone before.
In the Middle East, the quiescence of the Arab-Israeli dispute, die shared views
of Nasser and Eisenhower on Iraq, and growing Indian preoccupation with
China tended to mask the chronic nature of regional conflicts. The situation
created the illusion that key states in the region were actually moving toward
more moderate positions and away from confrontation or revolutionary
agitation.

As a result, Kennedy and his foreign-policy advisors concluded that more
activist policies could result in major gains. For example, Kennedy advocated
more aid to India, criticizing Eisenhower for ignoring the importance of Indian
economic development. The new administration arrived to find an extensive
aid program in place, which Rostow and other Kennedy advisors believed
required no additional funding. 2 During the campaign Kennedy had advocated
economic aid to the UAR in an attempt to turn Egypt away from revolutionary
activity and toward economic development. The new administration arrived in
ofice to find aid programs already in place, including a large Public Law 480
wheat-purchase program. Kennedy pronouncements about a new opening to
the non-aligned countries had raised the expectations of both Nasser and
Nehru. When Washington deemed the existing programs sufficient, there was a
sense of disappointment and a feeling that the New Frontier largely
represented a continuation of Eisenhower policies.

This is not to say that Kennedy’s activism had no impact. It did, but not the
impact desired. The Eisenhower administration had learned from bitter
experience between 1953 and 1955 that aid often translated into only limited
leverage in the Middle East, and the new administration failed to learn from
that experience. Like Eisenhower and Dulles in 1953, Kennedy was far too
optimistic about economic aid generating a political quid pro quo. For example,
Kennedy concluded that US aid and an increased Egyptian focus on economic
development would open the door to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. He
failed to consider that funding for Aswan had not altered Nasser’s arms deal
with the Soviet Union or his Arab nationalist policies. Aid had little effect on
Ben-Gurion, who was even more opposed to a settlement. The new foreign-

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment 325

policy team also saw positive potential in escalating problems between India
and China. With increasing aggressiveness, the administration attempted to
exploit the growing rift and later the border war itself. First, Washington
attempted to gain Indian support in opposing North Vietnamese and Chinese
policy in Laos and Vietnam, and then attempted to use the border war itself to
leverage a settlement of the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. This effort only
succeeded in worsening relations with New Delhi. Across the board, the
administration’s efforts to find solutions to chronic regional problems failed.

These same activist policies that were to improve relations with non-aligned
India and the UAR precipitated a series of problems between Washington and
its allies in the region. Neither the Shah nor Ayub Khan were particularly
enamored of Kennedy’s campaign pronouncements about increased support
for non-aligned states. In Pakistan, pro-India statements by candidate Kennedy
necessitated an immediate campaign to reassure Iran and Pakistan of continued
US support. Kennedy was no less committed as a Cold Warrior than
Eisenhower, and he had every intention of keeping Pakistan and Iran in the
Western camp. In fact, Kennedy had to be even more circumspect about
maintaining the Western alliance system than Eisenhower. The latter’s stature
as a famous military figure provided him with a latitude vis-a-vis security issues
that Kennedy did not enjoy. Thus a move by any significant US ally in the
Greater Middle East toward neutrality or accommodation with the Soviet
Union constituted a major credibility problem for the Kennedy administration.

With regard to Pakistan, word of Ayub’s unhappiness with Washington
prompted high-level reassurances from Washington that US policy had not
changed. Kennedy could ill-afford to lose the hinge between CENTO and
SEATO. Worried, Kennedy’s effusive assurances of support in 1961 for
Pakistan and for a compromise settlement of the Kashmir dispute did little to
endear the administration to Nehru. In Iran, the Kennedy administration, like
Eisenhower’s before it, started off with a crisis. Where Eisenhower and
Churchill toppled the Musaddiq government, unrest resulted in Kennedy’s
open support for Prime Minister Ali Amini. This move in favor of a specific
Iranian politician departed significantly from past policy. Despite Eisenhower
and Dulles’ role in placing the Shah back on the throne in 1953, the US had
refused to provide specific support to any politician in Iran, including die Shah.
Under Eisenhower, Washington supported only the independence and
territorial integrity of Iran. The administration believed that it needed options,
given the political instability of the regime and its disappointing track record
with regard to reform. Having removed the day-to-day management of the
Iranian crisis from the State Department and placed it under a special Iran
Task Force, the more limited group concluded that Amini was the ‘last hope’
and that his survival required direct US support. As a result, die administration
committed to supporting a particular Iranian politician, who, as it turned out,
was totally reliant on the Shah for survival. When Amini fell, the administration
found itself tied even more firmly to the Shah. Now US interests in Iran were
irrevocably tied to the Pahlavi dynasty.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

The Kennedy administration’s failure to appreciate the parallels between its
plans and those that had failed during the Eisenhower administration two years
earlier constituted a clear case of political myopia. Kennedy’s desire to
influence India and Egypt through economic aid mimicked that of Eisenhower
and Dulles, as did his conspicuous lack of success. The plan to bring about an
Arab-Israeli peace was stillborn. In Iran, crises greeted both administrations.
Eisenhower put the Shah back on his throne because he lacked another
realistic option. In the end, Kennedy’s direct support for Amini backfired, and
tied US fortunes directly to the Pahlavi dynasty. The collapse of the Syrian
union ushered in a revolutionary surge on Nasser’s part that ultimately led to
the Yemen revolution and strained US relations with tire UAR and its allies,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Britain. The 1963 Ba’thist coups in Iraq and Syria
created regimes less objectionable to Washington and independent of UAR
control. Resenting Western support for the new Iraqi regime, and suspecting
that the US and Britain had attempted to undermine Arab unity talks in March
and April 1963, UAR policy gravitated toward a renewal of closer relations
with Moscow. With regard to India, the euphoria created in Washington by the
border war with China dissipated rapidly. The thinly-veiled attempt to force an
agreement over Pakistan angered Nehru, and when the threat passed, drove
India into the close military relationship with Moscow drat continues to this
day. The modest provision of US arms to India and Washington’s failure to
pressure New Delhi successfully during die China crisis sparked simmering
resent in Karachi, and soured US-Pakistani relations.

By November 1963, the US position was weaker than when Kennedy took
office. The realities of US Cold War commitments came into conflict with the
same regional political realities that had plagued Eisenhower and Dulles. The
US position with the key non-aligned states of the region, India and the UAR,
was in tatters. New Delhi and Cairo had turned to broad military assistance and
economic-cooperation programs with the Soviet Union. Following the Chinese
border war, undisguised US pressure to compromise on Kashmir in return for
arms had pushed New Delhi into an arrangement with the Soviets. Upset by
limited US military aid to India, Pakistan now pursued closer relations with
Beijing. Nasser concluded that the combination of Saudi Arabian oil and
increasing Israeli domestic political pressure on Kennedy left little to be gained
in better relations with Washington. In the Arab Middle East, the traditional
regimes of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the clients of the British were now the
principal US allies. Ties with Israel had strengthened, further isolating the US
from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In Iran, the fortunes of the Shah would now
determine those of the US as well. Convinced of their intellectual and
management superiority, Kennedy and his advisors misunderstood the broader
political context in the region. Often relying on personal diplomacy, Kennedy,
and his advisors seemed oblivious to the fact that their initiatives were almost
identical to the failed Eisenhower initiatives of 1953 through 1955. Like
Eisenhower in 1953, the Kennedy administration imagined itself to be
fundamentally different from and superior to its predecessor. In reality,

Conclusion: Reform and the Primacy of Containment ill

Kennedy was bound by Eisenhower’s policies emphasizing economic
development, coupled with the necessity of military assistance for internal
security.

Eisenhower, Dulles, and Herter weathered die turmoil of the Greater
Middle East during the 1950s, and emerged on the other side of Macmillan’s
‘tempest’ with the Western alliance system largely intact. Eisenhower
successfully blunted Soviet expansion and, after 1958, maintained reasonable
working relationships with India and the UAR. In the process, the United
States largely displaced die British as the guardians of Western interests in the
Middle East, and did so with relatively litde political or economic dislocation.
They pushed for change in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, and settled on a
policy of top-down reform. Kennedy inherited die Eisenhower policies. Where
Kennedy maintained Eisenhower’s limited goals, things went well. Where he
pushed for more activist approaches, he usually repeated Eisenhower’s failures.
Kennedy learned that pressure on Nehru and Nasser brought negative results.
He learned diat neither the Arabs nor Israel really wanted a peace setdement.
He learned that personal diplomacy put the prestige of the presidency on the
line, and often backfired. And by November 1963, Kennedy learned, as
Eisenhower had in 1953-1956, that chronic regional problems were largely
unsolvable and that no amount of economic or military aid could force a
setdement. Kennedy learned that the maintenance of US containment strategy
in the Middle East required a pragmatic, deliberate approach, tempered by
limited expectations. Political conflicts and regional rivalries took precedence
over any amount of economic or military aid. The Johnson administration took
these lessons to heart and pursued policies that focused on allies in the region
and a narrower view of US interests.

NOTES

Introduction

1 Rostow, Walt W. and Max F. Millikan, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. New
York: Harper, 1957, pp. 140-141.

2 Ibid, pp. 44-48.

3 Klaus Larres, in Churchill’s Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002), pp. 200-210, 254, argues that it was Eisenhower and not
Churchill that took the initiative in attempting to exploit Stalin’s death in March 1953.
He paints the Eisenhower administration as the real hardcore anti-Communists. In
reality Churchill’s anti-Communism was selective. Larres manages to avoid mentioning
the fact that it was Churchill, in 1953 and 1954, who advocated getting rid of Musaddiq
in Iran and the Egyptian government, Neguib or Nasser, because of the opening that, in
his view, both provided to the Communists. Larres makes it clear that while John
Foster Dulles and Charles E. Wilson, the strongly anti-Communism Secretary of
Defense, argued that the use of ‘liberation rhetoric’ could have dangerous repercussions
and urged caution, others in the administration, including Rostow, saw Stalin’s death as
‘the really first big propaganda opportunity’. Fearing a Soviet peace initiative that might
endanger French ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC), Rostow,
who was serving as an ad hoc member of C.D. Jackson’s Psychological Strategy Board
(PSB), drafted a speech for Eisenhower designed to forestall any Soviet overtures. It
called for free elections in Germany, a solution to the Austrian problem, and high-level
talks on disarmament. It made any high-level meetings with the new Soviet leadership
contingent on the Soviets ending the Korean War. Rostow was clearly in the hard-line
camp, and played a key role in countering Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov’s ‘peace
campaign’. Larres describes Rostow and his boss in the PSB, C.D. Jackson, as
‘Eisenhower’s trusted associates’ and the driving force behind ‘plans for a psychological
warfare offensive’ aimed at Moscow. This underscores the fact that from the very
beginning, Rostow was heavily involved, at the highest levels of the Eisenhower
administration, with critical policy issues related to contaianment and anti-Soviet
policies. Rostow’s association with both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations
also supports the contention that a strong relationship existed between the policies of
both with regard to the relationship between economic development, political reform,
and the over-arching strategy of containment. In Europe After Stalin: Eisenhower’s Three
Decisions of March 11 , 1953 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 6-7, 55, 65, 69-

Notes

329

83, Rostow’s view of the PSB and its activities differs significantly from that of Larres.
Rostow states that the PSB, including himself and C.D. Jackson, strongly supported a
summit conference with the Soviet leadership immediately following the death of Stalin.
He argues that it would have headed off the Soviet ‘peace initiative’, and might have
resulted in the unification of Germany on terms favorable to the West. Rostow
emphasizes Eisenhower’s inclination in April 1953 to seek a breakthrough with the
Soviet Union, stating: ‘We are in an arms race. Where will it lead us? At worst, to atomic
warfare. At best, to robbing every people and nation on earth of the fruits of their own
toil. ... Now, there can be another road before us — the road of disarmament. What
does this mean? It means for everybody in the world: bread, butter, clothes, homes,
hospitals, schools — all the good and necessary things for decent living. So let this be the
choice we offer.’ On March 11, Eisenhower made three decisions: he rejected a summit
with the Soviets; he decided to give a speech to ‘give the people of the world hope for
peace’; and he called for a ‘Western’ summit to discuss what course of action to take.
What happened to Eisenhower’s sentiments for ending the arms race? Rostow provides
several explanations. Churchill’s intervention and suggestions were believed to be
premature, and even Macmillan and Eden expressed concerns in that regard;
Eisenhower functioned in staff mode and allowed controversial decisions to sort
themselves out, thus precluding a decisive initiative from the top. The President, Dulles,
and the State Department had all criticized ‘summitry’ in the form of Yalta and
Potsdam and were afraid of domestic ‘right-wing’ Republican criticism and the rising
influence of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Finally, there was concern that negotiations with
the Soviet leadership might undermine Western European support for the EDC. These
differences in interpretation notwithstanding, the fact remains that Rostow played an
important part as a ‘Cold Warrior’ in the policy-formulation process in the Eisenhower
administration. At times, he may have advocated a more aggressive approach to
engaging the Soviets but it was always with the same strategic view of subverting the
Soviet empire. This work is well worth reading for a well-documented perspective on
the decisions of March 11 and a birds-eye view of Rostow’s early involvement with
Cold War policy and the Eisenhower administration. See also Rostow’s The Dynamics of
Soviet Society (New York: Norton, 1953) pp. 231-259. Rostow analyzed Soviet society in
light of the expected departure of Stalin from the political scene. Completed just prior
to Stalin’s death, Rostow revised the last chapter after it. Entitled ‘Post-Stalin’, it was
intended to ‘take stock of the position within the Soviet union as of the interim date
May 15, 1953’. The author cited five ‘elements making for change’ and, while warning
that the regime continued to possess the levers of power necessary for control, he
argued that ‘conflict at the top of the Soviet structure’ would potentially ‘bring them
into play’ enhancing the potential for a ‘more peaceful and stable world . . . (in) accord
with our interests’. Given the timing of this book and the views on Soviet society
expressed therein, it is evident why he was selected to participate on the PSB. The work
provides a useful glimpse into the thinking the drove policy advisors and the
Eisenhower administration in the immediate aftermath of Stalin’s death. Rostow’s book
The Process of Economic Growth (New York: Norton, 1952) also increased the level of his
participation in early Eisenhower policy planning. Written from research generated in a
graduate seminar at MIT in 1950-1951, the work includes a detailed discussion of ‘The
Take-off into Self-sustained Growth’. Rostow attempts to explain within a historical
context the phenomenon of economic development. His discussions of stages of
growth and the requirements for transition from one stage to another caught the
attention initially of Eisenhower’s and later of Kennedy’s administration. The book
provides insight into the importance of economic development as a policy pillar in both
administrations. It was revised and reprinted in 1960 and 1962.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

4 Iraq from 1958 to 1961 was the one exception to this rule. In an effort to preserve their
oil interests, the British maintained a working relationship with Abd-al-Karim al-
Qasim’s regime, despite its reliance on Communist Party support, and pressed the US
to be more accommodating as well. When Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait in 1961,
British policy shifted to an anti-Qasim stance closely in line with that of the US.
Ideology and association with the Communists drove US policy, while economic
interests drove the British.

5 ‘Muhammad Musaddiq, Man of the Year’. Time, 7 January 1952, p. 59.

6 Macmillan, Harold, Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 141.

Chapter 1

1 Eisenhower, Dwight D., The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1956. New
York: Doubleday, 1963, p. 142. In 1952, as Eisenhower was leaving his post at SHAPE,
he stopped in London for talks with Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.
With the Prime Minister’s blessing, Eden had broached the subject of the new potential
American Secretary of State and ‘expressed the hope that [Eisenhower] might appoint
someone other than Dulles.’ Eisenhower informed them that ‘he knew of no other
American so well qualified’ to become Secretary of State. Harold Macmillan, in The Blast
of War 1939-1945 , makes it plain that the British concerns about Dulles began with their
contacts with him during the Second World War. In July 1942, in discussing the
Caribbean situation as a part of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, Dulles
told the Colonial Secretary that ‘American public opinion regarding the British Colonial
Empire’ harbored a ‘deeply embedded ... fundamental distrust of what they called
‘British Imperialism’.’ Dulles told the British that ‘it was utterly futile’ for London to try
to convince the US public of the benefits of colonialism. Only through working in
cooperation with the US to better the lot of developing nations could something
positive be achieved. (See pp. 133-134.)

2 Ferrell, Robert H. (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries. New York: Norton, 1981, p. 221. In
1951, Dulles worked on Far East issues for the Truman administration. British Foreign
Minister Herbert Morrison believed that Dulles had acted duplicitously on a series of
issues, including the trilateral ANZUS Pact with New Zealand and Australia that
excluded Britain, a bilateral pact with Japan that did not (as Dulles had promised) allow
Japan to make its own choice about recognizing one of the two Chinas, and a bilateral
pact with the Phillipines that excluded Hong Kong and Malaya. (See Hoopes,
Townsend The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973, pp. 107-
109.) This lack of trust in Dulles reflected itself in Eden’s relationships with him. On 13
November 1952, Eden met with Dulles, who asserted that the Western nations had to
present a united front in dealing with non- Western problems in the developing world.
Eden agreed, but he may have been alerted by Herbert Morrison that Dulles could not
be trusted, undermining any real willingness on Eden’s part to work with the Secretary
of State. (See Ovendale, Richey, Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Tower in the
Middle East, 1945-1962. London: Leicester University Press, 1996, p. 63.)

3 It should be noted that the British readily accepted Dulles’ view of the Middle East as
encompassing the Arabic-speaking states, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and stretching to
the borders of India. In fact, in traditional British parlance, the ‘Middle East’ referred to
the Persian Gulf and what is now referred to as Southwest Asia. Just as Britain worried
about the political connectivity and the impact of events in the Arab Middle East on the
situation in Iran, Afghanistan, and British India in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations also treated the region as politically,
economically, and culturally connected in the mid-20th century. Policy-makers then
broke their responsibilities down by sub-regions and ‘country desks’. This
conceptualization varied between agencies, but even these variances tended to

Notes

331

underscore the view of an overall cohesiveness of the broader region. As a case in
point, the State Department lumped Greece together with the Middle East, in a desk
that had responsibility for Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Because of the NATO connection,
the CIA placed Greece and Turkey in Europe and Iran in its Near East Division, which
also included Pakistan and India. The State Department also placed Pakistan and India
in the same bureau, that of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. The State
Department placed North Africa, with the exception of Egypt and sometimes Libya,
into the Africa bureau, while the CIA placed all the Arabic-speaking countries in the
Near East Division. At the NSC level, these slight organizational differences were
totally transparent because the same set of experts had responsibility for what
amounted to the Muslim Middle East — Morocco to Pakistan and India, and often
beyond to Southeast Asia. Thus the historical view of the region contributed not only to
connectivity in policy formulation, but also to the bureaucratic organizational structure
set up to deal with the region, which tended to reinforce this broader conceptualization
of region. While there were peripheral organizational differences, a cohesive core
existed based on Egypt, the Levant, Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Iran, Pakistan, and India.
That is what principally concerns this study.

4 Louis, W. Roger, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 . Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984, pp. 54-102. Louis’s work lays out the various schemes through
which the British hoped to maintain their influence in the Arab Middle East and Persian
Gulf under the Labour government of Clement Atlee, 1945-1951. He points out that
Atlee’s government had no desire to pull out of the Middle East or to allow
independent states to pursue policies detrimental to British interests. Rather, the Labour
government hoped to use regional collective security arrangements to maintain its
influence and indirect control. Churchill’s overarching foreign policy goals, namely
British influence and control, were the same; Churchill was merely more willing to use
coercive means to accomplish them. See ‘Diary Entry by Eisenhower about a foreign
policy meeting with Dulles, 10 January 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD Series, Box 9, p. 2.
The entry, on a January 10 strategy meeting on foreign policy in the Middle East,
indicates clear frustration with the British version of the ‘northern tier’. Dulles and
Eisenhower opposed the British plan to include Arab states and criticized London’s
ignoring of US advice on the dangers of ‘pressuring’ Jordan to join the ‘Northern Tier
Pact’. Eisenhower fumed that the British ‘went blindly ahead’, and domestic riots forced
the Jordanians to withdraw, not only handing London a diplomatic defeat but also,
clearly more annoying, making the United States, as well as Britain, the focus of local
unrest.

5 ‘DDE Diary Entry, 8 February 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD Series, Box 9, p. 2.

6 ‘DDE Diary Entry, 6 January 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD, Box 9, pp. 4-6.

7 Interview with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2002. Rostow served as an advisor to the
Eisenhower administration from 1953 to 1958. He stated that Eisenhower favored the
use of economic aid and modernization as the best defense against Communist
infiltration in the developing world, but that in the the first administration he never
asserted himself with the ‘right-wing’ of the Republican Party, which, in Rostow’s view,
staunchly opposed them.

8 ‘DDE Diary Entry, 6 January 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD, Box 9, pp. 6-7.

9 Ibid, p. 7.

10 ‘DDE Diary Entry, 10 January 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD Series, Box 9, p. 2. See also
‘DDE Diary Entry, 8 February 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD, Box 9, p. 2. On February 8,
in talks with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, Eisenhower recommended
that the British attempt to settle the Buraimi Oasis issue with Saudi Arabia by direct
high-level talks, and reaffirmed American support for the tripartite agreement of May
25, 1950 made by France, Britain, and the United States on controlling potential Arab-

332

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Israeli hostilities. The exchange leaves the impression that Eisenhower sought to warn
the British against a more aggressive approach to its regional problems.

11 ‘Minutes 133rd NSC Meeting, 24 February 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 4, p. 2.

12 ‘Minutes 132nd NSC Meeting, 19 February 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 4, p. 2. See
also Eisenhower’s Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 , pp. 159-166. Eisenhower’s
remembrance of events diverges somewhat from the historical record. In his memoirs,
the President stated that he had ‘confidence that the ‘young Shah’ would prove an
effective leader of his people’. The Shah’s failure to remove Musaddiq, followed by his
abdication, shook official Washington to its core. Washington’s real confidence
centered on General Zahedi as he ‘rumbled through the avenues of Tehran in a tank.’
President Eisenhower’s 1963 reflections on Musaddiq focused much more on the
Iranian Prime Minister’s ‘stability’ than did contemporary accounts. Apparently
Musaddiq’s habit of appearing in his pajamas perturbed the President — he mentioned it
several times in his memoirs.

13 ‘Minutes 135th NSC Meeting, 5 March 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, p. 5.

14 ‘Communism in the Middle East, 20 October 1955’. DDEL, WHO, NSC Staff Papers
1948-1961, OCB, p. 9. The 1951 assassination of General Razmara became the feared
model for what might happen to the Musaddiq government. Washington believed the
National Society for Struggle Against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the League of
Peace Partisans, and numerous other organizations to be Communist- front
organizations, and cited the August 1951 statement in the Cominform Journal that
‘conditions are now maturing for building an anti-imperialist front capable of uniting
the progressive national forces.’

15 ‘Minutes 136th NSC meeting, 12 March 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 4, p. 14.

16 ‘Summary of Reactions to PSB D-22, ‘Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle
East’, Appendix A, May 1953’. DDEL, WHO, NSC, OCB, Box 77, p. 8.

17 Ferrier, Ronald ‘The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute’. In Bill, James A. and William Roger
Louis (eds.), Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil. London: Tauris, 1988, p. 190.

18 ‘Minutes 178th NSC Meeting, 30 December 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 5, pp. 3-6.

19 Afhavi, Shahrough ‘The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954’ and Rajaee,
Farhang ‘Islam, Nationalism and Musaddiq’s Era: Post-revolutionary Historiography in
Iran’. In Bill, James A. and William Roger Louis (eds.) Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and
Oil London: Tauris, 1988. These articles examine the role of the clergy in the coup of
1953. The Shi’a Ulama strongly opposed the Tudeh and secular nationalist forces in
Iran, and played a significant role in the fall of Musaddiq. Opposition to the Shah would
follow, but use of Islamic influence in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union
and various Communist and Socialist groups became a standard feature of US policy,
reaching its apogee in the Afghan War of the 1980s. See also Bill, James A., The Eagle
and the Eion: The Tragedy of American-lranian delations , New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1988, pp. 51-72. Bill describes the defection of Ayatollah Abul Qassim Kashani
from the Musaddiq coalition in early 1953 as ‘the major blow’ to the National Front
government. The move forced Musaddiq into a position more dependent on the leftist
parties and particularly the Tudeh.

20 ‘Eisenhower to Acting Secretary of State, April 23, 1953’. DDEL, AWF, Dulles-Herter
Series, Box 1, p. 3.

21 Macmillan’s diary, May 6, 1953. Macmillan Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.
Also quoted in Harold Macmillan’s Tides of Fortune , pp. 502-503. It is interesting that
Dulles’ first major trip through the Middle East and South Asia coincided with a ‘crisis’
in Anglo-American relations that became the major topic of an NSC meeting even
before the Secretary returned home. See also ‘Who Likes Dulles — Who Doesn’t’.
Newsweek 27 January 1958, p. 28. The British dislike of Dulles reflected a difference in
personal style. They saw him as ‘too rigid’ and detested his moralizing. Dulles liked to

Notes

333

talk and he liked the limelight. Bridling at the competition, Churchill allegedly stated: T
am told that on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, Mr. Dulles makes a speech. And
that on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, he holds a press conference. And that on
Sundays he is a lay preacher. With such a regimen, there is bound to be a certain
attenuation of thought.’

22 ‘Dulles in Baghdad to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953’. DDEL, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series,
Box 1, p. 1. An interview with William C. Lakeland, in Berkeley, California, 23-24
September 2003, sheds additional light on British frustration with the situation in Cairo.
Much to the chagrin of the British, the American Embassy in Cairo had imposed itself
as the ‘go-between’ for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. American Ambassador Jefferson
Caffery used his relationship with British Ambassador Sir Roger Stevens and the
relationship between his political officer William Lakeland, Muhammad Heikal, and
Nasser himself to gain a bird’s-eye view of the negotiations. Lakeland became the
intermediary carrying versions of the agreement back and forth between the Egyptians
and the British. Lakeland’s role would have consequences later, when he was branded
by key British officials in the Jordanian crisis of 1960 as too pro-Nasserist and willing to
give up on the Hashemite regime.

23 ‘Dulles in Baghdad to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953’. Box 1, p. 1.

24 Heikal, Muhammad, The Cairo Documents. New York: Doubleday, 1972, pp. 48-51.

25 Interview with Lakeland. Lakeland stated that only the belief that significant ‘economic
and military aid’ would be forthcoming from the US convinced the Egyptians to
compromise on the departure date of the British, on issues related to British
redeployment to the Canal Zone, and on the issue of independence for Sudan. Heikal
stated that Nasser took Dulles at his word and sent Ali Sabry to Washington to
negotiate for arms. At the same time, Nasser assured officers in the Egyptian army that
the US would provide them with modern arms. As Heikal put it, all Nasser got back
was Ali Sabry himself — an embarrassment to both Nasser and Sabry. The latter became
an implacable foe of US interests in Egypt and the region.

26 ‘Dulles in Cairo to Eisenhower, May 12, 1953’. DDEL, AWF, Dulles-Herter, Box 1, p.

1 .

27 ‘Dulles in Baghdad to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953’. Box 1, p. 3. Dulles rejected Syria and
the Shishakli regime as ‘very unpopular’ and potentially unstable. ‘No one can guarantee
tenure or even life of dictator like Shishikli.’

28 ‘Australian High Commission, New Delhi [R.H. Birch] to DEA, 13 January 1954’. File
No. 7/3/2/2, Memo No. 69, NAA, A1838/276, 169/11/148, Part 6, p. 1.

29 Podeh, Elie, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle Over the Baghdad Tact.
Leiden: Brill, 1995, p. 69. This work provides a very good narrative of the process
through which the Baghdad Pact came into being, and of the Egyptian struggle with
Iraq for influence in the Arab world. It does not treat the ramifications of the Pact on
India. In addition, in treating anti-American propaganda on the part of Egypt, Podeh
appears to ignore, or is ignorant of, the CIA’s role in supporting Nasser. During part of
1954, in order to protect Nasser from internal criticism, the CIA was actually assisting
in creating anti-American propaganda.

30 Polk, William R., The United States and the Arab World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1969, p. 265.

31 ‘Minutes 145th NSC Meeting, May 23, 1953’. DDEL, AWD, NSC, Box 4, pp. 2-3.

32 ‘Churchill Letter to Eisenhower, 19 December 1953’. DDEL, AWD, Box 4, pp. 1-2.

33 ‘Eisenhower Letter to Churchill, 21 December 1953’. DDEL, AWD, Box 4, pp. 1-3.

34 Ibid. See also ‘Memorandum Eisenhower-Churchill Conversation, Bermuda Conf, 4
December 1953’. DDEL, AWF, International Meetings, Box 1, p. 1.

35 ‘Churchill Letter to Eisenhower, 22 December 1953’. DDEL, AWD, Box 4, pp. 1-3.

36 Macmillan, Harold, Tides of Fortune, p. 504.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

37 Nutting, Anthony, Nasser. New York: Dutton, 1972, pp. 70-73. In Egypt, various
groups opposed the 1954 compromise agreement on two basic grounds. It allowed the
British almost two years to complete their withdrawal from the Canal Zone, and it
provided for the ‘reactivation’ of the British bases in the event of war or a threat to the
Canal. Neguib and his supporters, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, attacked Nasser
as a ‘traitor’. When a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser in
October 1954, he used the incident as justification to crush the Brotherhood and his
other political opponents

38 Copeland, Miles, The Game Player London: Aurum, 1989, p. 167. Copeland states that
the CIA brought in Paul Linebarger, ‘perhaps the greatest ‘black’ propagandist who ever
lived’, to coach the Egyptians and that a ‘goodly portion’ of the anti-American
propaganda coming out of Cairo was written with CIA help.

39 Nutting, Nasser , p. 69. Also, interview with Lakeland, 23-24 September 2003, supports
this view.

40 Podeh, Hegemony, p. 97.

41 Ibid, pp. 69-70.

42 Ibid, pp. 107-122. See also Spain, James W., ‘Middle East Defense: A New Approach’.
Middle Hast Journal, Summer 1954, Volume 8, pp. 251-266. This article provides an
interesting contemporary perspective on the ‘northern tier’ concept, and the difficulties
faced by the Eisenhower administration in its early attempts to come up with a
containment strategy for the Middle East.

43 ‘Eisenhower to the Acting Secretary of State, 23 April 1953’. DDEL, AWF, Dulles-
Herter Series, Box 1, pp. 2-3.

44 ‘Dulles in Baghdad to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953’. p. 3.

45 ‘Discussion 207th NSC Meeting, 22 July 1954’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 5, pp. 12-13.
There was a long discussion of the role of the American Zionist lobby at the NSC
meeting on July 22, 1954. Eisenhower’s impression of Israel showed a remarkable lack
of understanding of the nature of the Jewish state. Referring to a conversation with a
visiting Israeli who told him ‘that the government of Israel was thoroughly unreligious
and materialistic’, the President said he had been ‘astounded by such a statement, since
he had been of the opinion that a good many members of the Israeli Government were
religious fanatics.’ At the meeting, Nixon commented that decisions had to be made on
the basis of ‘national security’ and not ‘domestic political considerations’. ‘Presidents
Truman and Roosevelt had been obliged to assure themselves of the Jewish vote and
they had largely secured this vote. The Republicans, on the other hand, do not require
this vote and aren’t likely to get it, no matter how hard they tty.’ In fact, Nixon went on
to say that a sensible policy from the White House could actually gain support from
‘moderate and wise Jews’.

46 ‘Outline of Suggested Program for Peace in the Near East, 1 December 1953’. DDEL,
AWD, Box 4, pp. 1-3.

47 ‘NEA to Eisenhower, 7 October 1953’. NACPM, GRDOS-59, Johnston Mission, Box
1, p. 1-2. The State Department attempted to dampen optimistic expectations related to
the Johnston effort stating: The refugees are an important key to the problem and
agreement on the use of the Jordan waters offer [ing] the only opportunity to settle
quickly a substantial number.’ It was not anticipated that the Johnston Mission would
bring back a clear-cut solution; it was intended as an exploratory step to determine
whether a basis for agreement existed.

48 ‘Dulles in Baghdad to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953’, p. 3.

49 ‘Discussion of Need for Early Diplomatic Initiative by Washington on Palestine Issues,
17 August 1953’. NACPM, GRDOS-59, Johnston Mission, Box 1, pp. 1-6.

50 ‘NEA to Johnston clarifying Presidential Letter of October 7, 1953, 13 October 1953’.
NACPM, GRDOS-59, Johnston Mission, Box 1, pp. 1-3. President Eisenhower

Notes

335

charged Eric Johnston with ‘securing agreement of the states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan
and Israel to the division and use of the waters of the Jordan River Basin’, instructing
him to ‘secure agreement from Jordan and Israel on plans that may be prepared for the
internationalization of Jerusalem.’ As for Jerusalem, the NEA stated: ‘The objective of
the United States is to obtain the agreement of Israel and Jordan to a plan for the
functional internationalization of Jerusalem which will also prove acceptable to the
Catholic countries and command the necessary majority in the General Assembly. ... In
the execution of your mission, you will receive the full backing of this Government.’
See also ‘Report to the President on NE Mission, Summary of Conclusions, 17
November 1953’. NACPM, Johnston Mission, Box 1, pp. coversheet, 1-8. The new
administration saw the Jordan waters as ‘a central element of American policy in the
Near East. Decisions with respect to American political support and economic
assistance should be conditioned upon the attitude displayed by the states concerned
toward the United Nations proposals. ... With respect to the Arab-Israel conflict,
generally, it is clear that we are not leaving the problems to solve itself. The peril of a
policy drift, based on the assumption that time will iron out the difficulties, has been
demonstrated by the recent outbreak of serious border incidents, the quarrel over water
rights on the upper Jordan and other events. ... The impasse can be broken, in my
opinion, only by the exertion of strong pressure from the outside, mainly by the United
States, Britain, and France, on behalf of measures calculated to remove irritants and
promote indirect cooperation between the parties on a practical rather than a political
level.’ See also ‘Discussion of Need for Early Diplomatic Initiative, 17 August 1953’,
pp. 1-6. Incidentally, concerns about the influence of the Zionist lobby surfaced in
discussions of the Johnston effort. ‘If the U.S. is to win back a measure of confidence in
its good will and impartiality in the Near East as well as broad domestic support for its
new policy, it should take some action, however limited, to demonstrate its attitude
before Israel seizes the diplomatic initiative and the initiative with American public
opinion.’

51 ‘Report on Eric Johnston’s Trip to the Near East, 7 May 1954’, DDEL, AWF, Dulles-
Herter Series, Box 3, p. 1 .

52 ‘Bermuda Meeting, December 4-8, 1953, Unified Plan for Jordan Valley Development,
27 November 1953’. NACPM, Johnston Mission, Box 1, p. 4.

53 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Johnston, 5 March 1956’. DDEL, AWD, Box 5, pp. 1-2.

54 ‘Ambassador Johnston’s Statement to the Israeli Committee on Jordan Waters, 31
January 1955’. NACPM, Johnston Mission, Box 2, p. 3.

55 Neff, Donald, Warriors at Sue Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1981, pp. 30-35. Neff makes an excellent case that the Gaza raid was
the key event that ultimately drove Nasser to Moscow for the arms that the United
States would not provide. The Egyptian Army comprised Nasser’s political constituency
and he had to deliver arms, and at least the appearance of military parity with the
Israelis, if he was to survive. See also Stephens, Robert, Nasser ; A Political Biography. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1971, pp. 151-155. The Gaza raid was as much the result of
internal Israeli politics and the gross embarrassment caused by the Lavon Affair as it
was about security-related issues on the border. In the Lavon Affair, the Egyptians had
uncovered an Israeli covert operation in which Israeli agents in Egypt were to attack
British and American consulates and embassies with explosives. The goal was to blame
the attacks on the Egyptians and increase Anglo-American anti-Arab sentiment. When
it was uncovered, the operation significantly embarrassed the Israeli military (IDF) and
Pinhas Lavon, the Israeli Labor Party (Mapai) Defense Minister, resigned. Ben-Gurion
returned to the government in his place. To restore morale in the IDF, Ben-Gurion
pressed Moshe Sharett to authorize the raid. Ben-Gurion then made sure that the raid
would have maximum impact by appointing a young paratrooper, Ariel Sharon, to carry

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it out. Sharon had previously carried out a violent raid against the Palestinian village of
Qibya with numerous non-combatant deaths. The scale of the casualties not only
horrified Sharett but also placed Nasser in potentially the same internal political
situation as that experienced by King Faruq following the failure of Egyptian forces in
the 1948 war. Nasser told Sir Ralph Stevenson that he had to have arms to maintain his
government, no matter what the source. (See Heikal, Cairo Documents , p. 53.) Nasser
delivered the same message to US Ambassador Byroade in Cairo. See Neff, Warriors , p.
67 — Neff shares this view and quotes Nasser’s comments to columnist Cyrus
Sulzberger: ‘Our revolution was stimulated in the Army by a lack of equipment. If our
officers feel we still have no equipment, they will lose faith in the government.’ Neff
further cites Nasser’s comments to his Central Intelligence Agency contact Miles
Copeland when buzzing Israeli jets interrupted their Cairo conversation: ‘I have to sit
here and take this — and your government won’t give me arms.’ See Vatikiotis’ Modem
Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 390. Vatikiotis also credits the combined impact of
the Gaza Raid and the Baghdad Pact negotiations as the determining factors causing
Nasser to embrace ‘non-alignment’ and seek arms from the Soviet Union. See Amam,
Abdullah, Nasir wa Amir (al-qahira: nashir al-yulia, 1985), p. 56. Amam focuses
primarily on justifying the demise of Egyptian Field Marshall Abd-al-Hakim al-Amir
following the 1967 war. The author emphasizes the theme of the Egyptian military
being out of step with Nasser’s political goals and agenda. Amam’s view, while
something of a rationalization, fits closely with the views of Neff on the subject of
Nasser’s need to placate the military in general and Amer in particular.

56 Heikal, Cairo Documents , p. 54.

57 ‘OCB Progress Report on the Near East’. DDEL, WHO, NSC Staff Papers, OCB, Box
78, 5 April 1956, p. 6. In an assessment, the OCB and White House issued a summary
stating: [T]he controversy over the Israeli proposal to divert Jordan River water
threatened to erupt into war. With the dismissal of General Glubb from the Jordan
Arab Legion, an incipient military struggle for power was added to the already volatile
compound of refugees’ hatred for Israel, and anti-British, anti-West, anti-Baghdad Pact
sentiment. No progress was made towards the settlement of the Arab refugee problem,
nor towards an agreed and equitable division of the waters of the Jordan River system.’

58 ‘Poem in Jordan Waters file, 23 September 1955’. NACPM, GRDOS-59, Johnston
Mission, Box 2, p. 1 .

59 ‘Congressional Presentation FY 1961 of Jordan Valley Development, March I960’.
NACPM, GRDOS-59, Johnston Mission, Box 3, p. 1.

60 Nutting, Nasser , pp. 144-156.

61 Nehru, Jawaharlal, ‘Asia Finds Herself Again: A Speech Inaugurating the Asian
Conference, New Delhi, 23 March 1947’. Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches
1946-1949. New York: Day, 1950, p. 298.

62 ‘Attachment, Memcon Eisenhower and Churchill, Bermuda Conference, 4 December
1953’. DDEL, AWF, International Meetings, Box 1, p. 1.

63 ‘Australian HC, New Delhi (Birch) to DEA, 13 January 1954’. 7/3/2/2, No. 69, NAA,
DEA, A1 838/276, 169/11/148, Part 6, p. 1.

64 Macmillan, Harold, Hiding the Storm 1956-1958. New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 381.
Macmillan took pride in his attempt to foster a climate of mediation and cooperation
between India and Pakistan at the Commonwealth Conference, 1957. On July 5, he
arranged a luncheon at No. 10 that ‘was rather a risk’. It included himself, Nehru, and
the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Husayn Shaheed Suhrawardy. Suhrawardy and Nehru
had never met and were ‘on the worst of terms’. At this meeting, Macmillan encouraged
both to accept the International Bank’s proposal to settle claims related to the Indus
River waters. The Prime Minister believed that this might be the first step to a
negotiated settlement on Kashmir. He viewed the eventual agreement in 1960 as ‘an

Notes

337

impressive reminder of the lost unity of the sub-continent following the disappearance
of the British Raj’. This very British view is interesting in that it reflects the British view
that a unity existed on the subcontinent under the Raj — a contention that continues to
be debated today.

65 ‘Bilateral Talks during December 1952 NATO Meeting - Kashmir from Christopher
Van Hollen to Secretary of State [Marshall], Negotiating Paper, Kashmir, December 10,
1952’. NAPCM, GRDOS59, NEA, NEA/INC, Records on Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box
1, pp. 1-3. Also Interview with Christopher Van Hollen on 12 June 2003, Washington,
DC; Van Hollen is the former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. He
stated that neither the Truman nor Eisenhower administrations saw any real chance for
compromise on India’s part with regard to Kashmir. While some in the Kennedy
administration believed that compromise actually might be possible, events would prove
this to be an ‘erroneous assumption’. ‘Memocon US Ambassador Gross and UN
Representative Bunche, New Delhi, February 26, 1953’. NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-3. In
February 1953, Dr. Ralph Bunche of the United Nations discussed Indian attitudes in
general and Kashmir in particular with the US Ambassador to India, Ernest A. Gross,
and his staff. Bunche stated that Nehru had no apparent successor, and in fact carried
the Congress Party through his own charisma. He commented that the Indians had
emphasized the military in a recent National Day celebration and that this was directed
not toward Communism, but toward Pakistan. It also appeared that the Indian officials
whom he had met were ‘discouraged’ by the prospect of years of economic struggle to
get the country on its feet and deal just with the population and food problems. He
reported that, in Pakistan, the military received even greater focus and that Kashmir
remained the dominant theme in all discussions. The Pakistanis were deeply concerned
that India wanted the situation to ‘drift’, and solidify into permanent Indian control.

66 ‘Eisenhower ‘Personal and Confidential’ Letter to Captain E.E. ‘Swede’ Hazlett,
December 24, 1953’. DDEL, AWF, AWD, Box 4, p. 3.

67 ‘Discussion 176th NSC Meeting, 16 December 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 5, p. 6.

68 ‘Australian HC, New Delhi [Birch] to the DEA, 13 January 1954’. NAA, A1 838/276,
169/11/148, Part 6, p. 1.

69 ‘President’s Statement on Military Aid to Pakistan, 16 February 1954’. DDEL, AWF,
Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2, p. 1.

70 ‘Discussion 176th NSC Meeting, 16 December 1953’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 5, p. 6.
Within the context of the discussion on Pakistan, Nixon commented that in his talks
with the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi in Iran, both focused on military aid. He
clearly believed that stability in Iran depended on a strong military and that this model
also applied to other countries in the region. He also supported direct immediate aid
because he believed that the northern-tier organization would take too much time to
unfold.

71 ‘Eisenhower to Nehru on Military Aid to Pakistan, 16 February 1954’. DDEL, AWF,
Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2.

72 ‘Deputy Under Sec State Hoover to Eisenhower, 16 February 1954’. DDEL, AWF,
Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2. See also ‘Eisenhower to Dulles, 27 October 1953’. DDEL,
AWF, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2. Eisenhower had suggested in late October that the
United States should wait until after Indian troops were disengaged from peacekeeping
in Korea to ‘say something publicly about our admiration of the whole India
contingent’. The President wanted to wait because ‘we might compromise — at least in
Soviet propaganda — the neutrality of the Indian participants.’ In Prospects for Communist
China (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1954), pp. 88, 200, Walt Rostow commented that the
Indian initiative on Korean in December 1952 was done with ‘Chinese Communist
knowledge and backing’, including the ‘prisoner of war resolution’. Rostow saw the
Indians as surrogates for Chinese policy in Asia and also viewed Soviet opposition to

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the Indian resolution as an indication of ‘Moscow-Peking differences’. Rostow points
out later that ‘deep undercurrents of raw nationalism set distinct limits within which
Moscow can control Peking without risking serious rupture.’ Rostow should get credit
for seeing early signs of a Soviet-Chinese split over national interests. He speculated
that China would move to ‘complete the conquest of Indo-China’ and make other
moves against Thailand, Burma, India, and Indonesia to ‘pose as the leading power of
Asia’. See also ‘Suggested Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister
Nehru, 16 February 1954’. DDEL, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2. See also Ram,
Janaki, F6K Krishna Menon: A Personal Memoir. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.
86, 101, in which Ram discussed Menon’s role in the Korean ‘peace’ process. Ram
highlighted not only Western opposition to some of the content in Menon’s plan for
prisoner of war repatriation in Korea but also Soviet attacks on him at the United
Nations. In these attacks, Soviet delegate Vishinsky called Menon, much to his shock
and embarrassment, ‘a lackey of the British’. Ram was something of an apologist for
Menon and attempted to explain away many of his obvious shortcomings. Ram called
the ‘Jeep Scandal’ a ‘mistake’ rather than malfeasance, and he appeared to be using the
incident with the Soviets to portray Menon as something other than a Communist or
Soviet agent of influence. Daluit Sen Adel in Krishna Menon and Contemporary Politics ,
(New Delhi: Institute for Socialist Education, 1997), pp. 124, 127, provides a clearly
leftist interpretation of events, but stated that Menon was ‘bitterly’ surprised by the
Soviet attack on his 17-point plan to solve the prisoner of war impasse in Korea. This
comment is all the more significant when viewed in the context of Adel’s interpretation
of Korean events. ‘On June 25, 1950, the South Korean army of Sygmund Rhee
launched a surprise attack on the northern half of Korea along the entire 38th parallel.

. . . The situation became more explosive with the use of biological weapons by the
United States of America which carried bacilli plague, cholera and other infectious
diseases’. The point here is that even those holding radical leftist views of events found
themselves taken aback by the vehemence of the Soviet attack on Menon.

73 Rostow, Walt, Prospects for Communist China, p. 310.

74 Talbot, Phillips and S.L. Poplai, India and America, A Study of Their delations. New York:
Harper, 1958, pp. 87-88. William Phillips Talbot published this work when he was the
executive director of the American Universities Field Staff. Sources for the following
biographical information include a personal letter from Phillips Talbot to Roby Barrett
on July 3, 2002, an interview with Talbot by Roby Barrett at the Century Association in
New York on May 31, 2002, and a reprinting of his letter to the Institute of Current
World Affairs provided by the New India Digest Foundation, Pune, India at
http:/ 1 www.rediff.com I freedom / gandhi.htm. Educated at the University of Illinois, Talbot
received a Crane Grant to study South Asian politics and history in 1938 in Britain,
followed by a course of study at Aligarh College in India. When World War II broke
out, Talbot served in naval liaison in the China-Burma-India theater, returning to India
after the war as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News to cover the transfer
of power in 1947. Talbot knew many of the leading figures of Indian politics personally,
including Nehru, Gandhi, and Patel. The Institute of Current World Affairs published
an account of his walk and conversation with Gandhi in the East Bengal district of
Noakhali during the turmoil of 1947. Talbot returned to the United States and
completed a doctorate in South Asian studies at the University of Chicago before
joining the Field Staff. In 1961, Talbot became the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs and one of the key drivers of regional policy from
Cairo to Calcutta. Days after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Talbot
would play an instrumental role in the maintenance of the pro-Pakistani tilt in US
foreign policy in South Asia under the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.
For these reasons, Talbot’s views on the situation in South Asia, often published in the

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339

Field Staff journals, are particularly germane to the story of continuity between the
policies of Eisenhower and Kennedy through the region.

75 Talbot, India and America , p. 91. Talbot states: ‘India feels that its security and other
interests are best served by encouraging “neutralism”, by cultivating extremely friendly
relations with Egypt, and by befriending the Arab countries and cold-shouldering Israeli
claims.’

76 Gopal, Sarvepalli, ]awaharlal Nehru, A biography. Volume II: 1947-1956. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 185. See also pp. 183-193, in which Gopal pointed
out that Nehru was concerned as early as 1952 during the Truman administration about
the possibility that Pakistan might join a Western defense structure. He viewed it as a
mistake on the part of the United States and Britain to ‘rely more and more on the
military aspect’ of alliances instead of focusing on economic development. Nehru noted
on November 25, 1952: India counts for them and they will not easily adopt such a
policy. But if military opinion is dominant, they might very well override political
considerations.’

77 ‘Australian HC, New Delhi [Birch] to the DEA, 13 January 1954’. NAA, A1838/276,
169/11/148, Part 6, p. 1.

78 ‘Indian HC London [D.N. Chatterjee] to MEA New Delhi [Morari Desai], 27 February
1954’. NAI, MEA, United Kingdom, K/54/132/141, p. 6.

79 ‘NEA to Dulles on UN Observer Group in Kashmir, Washington, March 24, 1954’.
NACPM, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, pp. 1-2. The US quickly complied with India’s
request ‘so that US-Indian relations, already seriously impaired by our aid to Pakistan,
not be further worsened’.

80 ‘Australian HC, New Delhi [Birch] to the DEA, 13 January 1954’. NAA, A1 838/276,
169/11/148, Part 6, p. 1.

81 ‘Canadian HC New Delhi [Escot Reid] to DEA, Ottawa, 11 November 1954. No. 1298,
NAA, A1 838/272, 169/11/161 Part 4, pp. 2-3, 6-7.

82 Brown, Judith, Nehru, A Political Life. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003, p.
259. Brown struggles with balancing Nehru’s political theory and its practical
application. Pointing out that relations with the US deteriorated after the 1954 arms
agreement with Pakistan, she state that Nehru really would have preferred to forego
economic assistance from the US. There is just as sound an argument that the arms
agreement provided Nehru with an ‘out’ vis-a-vis negotiations with Pakistan over
Kashmir, and that he was more than happy to get that bonus along with his economic
aid from Washington. Nehru was nothing if not a practical politician, and as such,
principles were usually fine as long as the price was not too high.

83 ‘Brief Economist article, “India Progress and Plan, 22 January 1955”, circulated to Dulles,
Harold Stassen, Nelson Rockefeller from President Eisenhower’. DDEL, AWF, AWD
Series, Box 5. This particular article came to the President’s attention and he thought it
important enough to have it circulated to senior administration officials with the
notation to ‘Stick this in our diary’.

84 ‘India: The Tea Fed Tiger’. Time, 2 February 1962, cover, p. 16. Menon made the cover
of Time, with a snake charmer’s pipe on one side and a menacing cobra on the other.
The symbolism was clear. The article describes him as ‘abusive, rude, and overbearing’,
pointing out: ‘Nehru values Menon highly as a friend, confidant and traveling apostle.’
The article goes on to say: ‘Nehru admires his provocative intelligence, uses him as a
shock absorber to take attacks that might otherwise be directed at him to his
government.’ The article quotes an Indian politician comparing Menon to a ‘wind-up
car’. ‘Nehru sets its pace by winding it and watching go around. Whenever the car
comes to an obstacle, Nehru removes the obstacle from its path and rewinds it.’

85 Adel, Menon and Contemporary Politics, pp. 1, 4, 42, 112-115. Menon had close contacts in
the British Labor Party dating from the 1930s, and appeared to be the logical choice to

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represent India to the Atlee Labor government following independence. Appointed
High Commissioner to Britain in 1947, scandals forced Menon to resign in 1952.
Menon paid over $300,000 for 15 British army surplus Jeeps, none of which would run
or had spare parts. He also purchased a palatial mansion as the residence and a Rolls
Royce for the High Commissioner. He did all of this at a time when the Indian
government faced a monumental economic crisis. Adel, a sympathetic leftist himself,
even states that ‘Krishna Menon made a wrong start by accepting the office of High
Commissioner in the United Kingdom’ because it only served to make him a target of
the Congress Party conservatives. See also Ram, Janaki, VK. Menon: A. Personal Memoir.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 92. Ram, a nephew, wrote that the Jeep
Scandal was an error of judgment in that Menon arranged the contrast privately and not
through government channels. See also Arora, Menon — A Biography , p. 98. Another pro-
Menon biographer explained the scandal in terms of a controversy centered on Sudir
Gosh, who was Vallabahbhai Patel’s candidate for the London post, and Menon. This
account claims that the Gosh brought the Jeep scandal to light and Patel used it to
discredit Menon. Interestingly, not even his most ardent supporters offered any
explanation of what happened to the money.

86 Arora, Menon — A Biography , Foreword.

87 Lengyel, Emil, Krishna Menon. New York: Walker, 1962, p. 239.

88 Adel, Menon and Contemporary Politics , p. 131. Adel also asserts that Menon became the
favorite target not only of the US Congress, but also of Indian Congress Party
conservatives.

89 Akbar, M.J., Nehru, The Making of India. London: Viking, 1988, p. 491. Akbar criticized
the US for ‘sniping’ the Control Commission into ‘impotence’, but at the same time he
felt that the ‘backlash’ against Menon, because of his ‘acerbic, and garrulous speeches’,
was detrimental to India and to Nehru personally. The author also argued that the
foreign policies of Truman and Eisenhower were the ‘same’. See also Gopal, Nehru ,
Volume III, pp. 191-192. Gopal stated that Nehru obtained a resolution calling for all
‘Great Powers’ to stay out of Vietnam and to let the Vietnamese settle their differences.
In support of Nehru’s arguments, Menon gave over 200 interviews, lasting an average
of two hours each, in just three weeks. Gopal clearly believed that Menon made a
positive contribution, and that the genesis of any difficulties lay in US support for
leaders ‘who to Nehru symbolized the most decadent aspects of Asia’.

90 Cooper, Chester L., The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970,
p. 186. Cooper commented that the best that could be said for the Indian
predisposition to discuss ‘broad international profundities’ was that it ‘provided an
occasional oasis of amusement in a desert of dull speeches’. See also p. 75, where
Cooper was almost as critical of John Foster Dulles, stating: ‘Like Shakespeare’s
whining schoolboy, the American delegation ‘crept like a snail unwillingly’ to Geneva.’
He lends credibility to Akbar’s view of US ‘sniping’ stating: ‘Eisenhower and Dulles had
been fighting a rearguard action against the conference for months, hoping that
somehow the whole unpleasant affair would go away.’ Describing Dulles as ‘hardly an
ebullient personality even under the most salubrious circumstances’, Cooper states that
his arrival that ‘gray April day lent little joy’ to either the ‘cheerless’ surroundings or the
‘oppressive mood’ of the US delegation.

91 Arora, Menon — A Biography , p. 173.

92 Gopal, Nehru , Volume II, p. 189.

93 Interview of Walt Rostow by Roby Barrett on June 12, 2002 at LBJ Library in Austin,
Texas. Walt W. Rostow, who served as a consultant to the Eisenhower Administration
from 1953 to 1958 and then as National Security Advisor in the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, tersely summed up the majority American view of Krishna Menon: ‘He
was a slob.’ Rostow repeated that assertion a second time for emphasis. Rostow

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341

explained that his comment referred not to Menon’s physical appearance but rather to
the fact that he was an untrustworthy, hypocritical, pro-Soviet example of the worst
form of cronyism. Rostow stated that Nehru also was anti-American and
untrustworthy. See also Ram, Menon: .A Personal Memoir , p. xv. Janaki Ram, Krishna
Menon’s nephew and a more sympathetic voice, states: ‘He [Menon] was quite
ineffectual at public relations and said rather optimistically that one’s deeds were the
best public relations. This might have been true, up to a point, in the British
environment he was so familiar with, but in India, where he had no roots due to his
long absence, he made no effort to publicize his sacrifices. . . . Consequently he was
treated as an upstart in politics depending on the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, for
support, patronage and sustenance. This is why he is so misunderstood.’

94 ‘Minute from Desai to Nehru, 25 January 1954’. NAI, MEA, United Kingdom,
K/ 54/132/41, p. 5.

95 ‘Indian HC London [Chatterjee] to New Delhi [Desai], 14 January 1954’. NAI, MEA,
UK, K/54/1 32/41, p. 1.

96 ‘Indian HC London [Chatterjee] to New Delhi [Desai], 9 March 1954’. NAI, MEA, UK,
K/54/1 32/41, p. 24.

97 Mende, Tibor, Conversations with Mr. Nehru. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1956, p. 94.
This lengthy interview published in book form provides interesting first-hand responses
by Nehru to a series of questions affecting policy in the mid-1950s. It is a part of a
much larger collection of Indian government publications at the Australian National
Library, Canberra.

98 ‘Biographic Report on the Delegates from India to the United Nations General
Assembly, Ninth Session, 15 September 1954.’ DOS, Office of Libraries and
Intelligence Acquisition, Division of Biographic Information, CRES, CIA-RDP80-
01446R000100170033-3, p. 10. The report contains a series of personality profiles from
a ‘controlled American source’. With regard to the Colombo incident, it stated that
Ceylonese Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala ‘jumped up’ and ‘demanded’ that Menon
either apologize or ‘leave the Conference’ on the threat that Kotelawala would ‘walk
out’ if Menon did not do one or the other. Menon backed down and apologized. The
report credits Menon with being ‘a brilliant orator of the rabble rousing type’.

99 ‘Message from the Australian High Commission Karachi [HC L.E. Beavis] to DEA,
Canberra, 5 May 1954’. Memo No. 334/54, File No. 502/2, NAA, DEA, A1838/276,
169/11/148 Part 6, pp. 3-4.

100 ‘Telegram from US Consulate Singapore to WDC, 7 January 1955’. NACPM, GRDOS
- 59, African Republics (AF), CDF, 670.901/1-655, p. 1.

101 ‘New Delhi [Flanagan] to WDC, 3 January 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/1-355, p. 1.

102 ‘Memcon on Afro-Asian Affairs [Dulles], Washington DC, 14 January 1955’. NACPM,
670.901/1-455, pp. 1, 2, 4. The participants in the meeting discussed the lack of a clear
British position on the conference, citing a lack of any instructions on the matter from
London. See also ‘New Delhi to WDC, 11 January 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/1-1155, p.
1. The Embassy in New Delhi commented that the British attitude toward the
conference was one of cautious welcome.

103 ‘The Asian-African Conference, Top Secret Eider, 6 April 1955’. NSA, CRES, CIA-
RDP80R01 443R000300300002-5, pp. 3, 12.

104 ‘Memcon Afro-Asian Affairs [Dulles], 14 January 1955’. pp. 3-4.

105 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 15 January 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/1-1555, p. 1. The particular
article also called on the United States to ‘urge friends to participate’ in the effort
because it was intended to avoid controversial topics and focus on ‘economic
cooperation’.

106 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 28 January 1955’. NACPM, AF, CDF, 670.901/1-2855, p. 1.

107 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 28 January 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/1-2855, p. 2.

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108 ‘Memcon Asian Town Hall [Dulles], 27 April 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/4-2755, p. 1.

109 Stora, Benjamin, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2001, pp. 67-68. Stora’s history lives up to its billing: it is short, but useful. In
three very short chapters on the Algerian war: ‘The War of the Algerians 1954-1958/
‘De Gaulle and the War 1958-1959’, and ‘The Wars within the War 1960-1961’, the
author provides good summaries of the phases of the war and a snapshot of the
broader political context in which it occurred. This raises a broader and perhaps in
some quarters more controversial point about the Algerian conflict and the present
work. Why is the Algerian war relegated, almost literally, to a footnote since it was an
ongoing event in Dulles’ geographic definition of the Middle East that chronologically
duplicates the footprint of this work? There are two reasons for this exclusion: first, the
Algerian conflict was a sideshow to the central theme of pan-Arab nationalism that
dominated the Arab struggle between Baghdad and Cairo; second, Algeria was a civil
war, and more European in many respects than Middle Eastern; and third, it was not
central to the US policy of containment. In fact, remarkable unanimity existed between
the Western powers, the Arab states, and the non-aligned states that the French needed
to get out of Algeria. This unanimity did not always take the same form, but the basic
premise was that self-determination should be the basis for the outcome of the struggle
in Algeria. Despite Cairo’s support for the FLN, the US never felt as threatened by
Nasserism in Algeria because there was a fundamental recognition that the
independence movement was indigenous and that the Algerian leadership was almost as
concerned about maintaining its independence from Nasser as it was about gaining it
from France. In addition, the Algerian movement had very strong critical support from
pro-Western and anti-Nasserist political leaders in Tunisia and Morocco. Algeria was a
special case, and only fit into the Middle East policy models pursued by Eisenhower
and Kennedy from the standpoint that both administrations understood that
colonialism in Africa and Middle East was coming to an end and both wanted to see
independent non-Communist, if not pro-Western, states emerge. Algeria was a
stumbling block to NATO policy in Europe and a problem for French political stability,
posing bilateral problems for the US and France. The problem was more binary in
nature, and revolved around decisions in Paris, not in Arab capitals. For these reasons
Algeria is not central to this study.

110 ‘Memorandum from DOS South Asia Office to Far East [Robertson], 30 April 1955’.
NACPM, 670.901/4-2755, p. 1. See also ‘Memorandum from DOS South Asia Office
(Allen) to NEA (Allen), 30 April 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/4-2755, p. 1. It should be
noted that Washington was as yet unaware that Nehru’s facilitation of a meeting
between Chou En-lai and Nasser had resulted in a major Soviet coup in the Middle
East: the Czech arms deal for Egypt. Within a matter of months, the importance of the
conference and its impact on the Eisenhower administration’s perception of Western
interests in the region would become more apparent. See also ‘Memorandum from
NEA [Richard H. Sanger] to Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA) [Jones], 5 May 1955/
NACPM, 670.901/1-2855, pp. 1, 3. Adam Clayton Powell, the U.S. Congressman from
Harlem who attended the Bandung Conference without the blessing of the
administration, commented: ‘Nehru was the greatest loser at the Conference. Part of the
reason was because he now depends so much on Krishna Menon, who was with him all
the time and went around in white robes and consciously posed as an Indian Holyman
or saint. Menon made it clear he was anti-west and anti-U.S. Nehru had drifted far from
Gandhi. Nehru’s influence declined after the very first day. He became jumpy and
irritable. In fact he suggested someone who was mentally ill.’ This is a harsh judgment
coming from a sympathetic advocate of the Civil Rights movement in the United States
who was presumed sympathetic toward Gandhian ideas on non-violent protest. It is
indicative of many American reactions to meeting with Nehru in person. Kennedy had

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a similar reaction at his first meeting with the Indian leader, a topic to be discussed later.
It is also interesting that when theState Department attempted to dissuade Powell from
attending, officials described the US attitude toward Bandung as ‘benevolent
indifference’. In addition to Powell, Chester Bowles had discussed attending, but was
convinced by the White House not to do so.

111 ‘Indian Permanent Mission to UN [Arthur Lall] to MEA [B.K. Nehru], 10 January
1955’. NAI, MEA, Asian- African Conference, 1(9) - AAC/55, p. 1.

112 ‘Memo Counselor DOS [Douglas MacArthur II] to Dulles, 21 January 1955’. NACPM,
670.901/1-2155, p. 1.

113 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 28 January 1955’. NACPM, 670.901/1-2855, p. 1.

114 Heikal, Muhammad, Qasa al-Suisa. Beirut: sharikat al-mutabua’t li tawzia wa al-nashar,
1988, p. 51.

115 ‘Indian Embassy Jakarta to MEA, New Delhi, 31 January 1955’. NAI, MEA, Asian-
African Conference, 1(2) — AAC/55, p. 1. See also Nehru, Jawaharlal, Glimpses of World
History. New Delhi: Indraprastha, 1982, p. 736, in which Nehru compares the respective
positions of India and Egypt in the British colonial system. Writing in 1933, Nehru
stated: ‘The nationalist movements of India and Egypt have adopted different methods,
but, fundamentally, the urge to national freedom is the same and the objective is the
same. And the way imperialism functions in its efforts to suppress these nationalist
movements is also much the same. So each of us can learn much from the other’s
experiences.’ He went on to elaborate: ‘Among all these [Arab] countries the nationalist
movement first took shape in Egypt, and it was thus natural for Egyptian nationalism to
become a model for the other Arab countries.’ Nehru had been thinking about the
synergy between Egypt and India. It is hardly surprising that Nasser would become the
focus of a campaign to bring Egypt into the non-aligned group. See also Nehru,
Jawaharlal, The Discovery of India. New Delhi: Indraprastha, 1981, pp. 548-549, in which
Nehru compares the Soviet Union and the United States, stating: ‘All the evils of a
purely political democracy are evident in the U.S.A.; the evils of the lack of political
democracy are present in the U.S.S.R.’ Nehru speculated that the clash between the two
systems would lead to ‘another era of imperialism’ in which the ‘moral urges of
mankind and its sacrifices are used for base ends.’ Nehru believed that the developing
world had to find a middle way.

116 Abdel-Malek, Anouar, Egypt: Military Society - The Army Regime, the Teft, and Social Change
under Nasser. New York: Random House, 1968, p. 227.

117 Interview with Muhammad Hakki, Washington, DC, 8 August 2003. Muhammad Hakki
graduated from Cairo University in 1954. In 1955, he became information officer at the
Egyptian Embassy in Washington. He would later work for Muhammad Hussein Heikal
at Al-Ahram during the height of the Nasserist era. According to Hakki, Bandung is the
key to understanding Nasser and Nasserist Egypt. Bandung convinced Nasser that his
ideas and vision transcended those of his comrades in the RCC. He now viewed himself
as a world leader, not just an Egyptian one. This self-image of superiority and
importance drove everything he did in the 1950s and 1960s. Bandung went completely
to his head. Nehru and Sukarno told him that he was the leader of the Arab world and
he believed it. ‘He was convinced that the whole Arab world was his sphere of
influence.’

118 ‘Observations on the Likely effect of Bandung on the UN from British UN Mission
[Pierson Dixson] to FO and Whitehall [Macmillan], 7 May 1955’. NAA, DEA,
A1838/278, 3002/1 Part 6, p. 6. See also ‘Asian-African Conference Bandung 18-24
April 1955 [MEA R.G. Casey], 30 May 1955’. NAA, DEA, A10299/1, A3, pp. 1-12.

119 Nutting, Nasser, p. 101. Something of a consensus exists that Nasser, like many other
world leaders, viewed dealing with Nehru as tedious. An intellectual with personal

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participation in many of the most momentous events of the 20th century, Nehru tended
to deliver aggravatingly didactic lectures that were tests of endurance and patience.

120 Neff, Warriors , p.76.

121 Eveland, Wilbur Crane, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle Fast. London:
Norton, 1980, pp. 90-105. Eveland provides an excellent description of the arms
negotiations with Nasser. The US was willing to provide $20 million in arms and
equipment suitable for internal security purposes. Nasser wanted $100 million with
which to confront Israel. Eveland commented that Mossad had organized the Zionist
lobby in Washington to oppose the arms deal even before the exploratory delegation
had departed Cairo. In addition, the CIA, represented by Copeland and Roosevelt, had
no legal basis on which to negotiate a major arms agreement because it required
Congressional approval. Eveland stated that Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and Deputy
Chief of Mission G. Lewis Jones were concerned that Nasser’s expectations had risen to
the point that the likely failure of the CIA effort to broker an arms deal would have
serious long-term consequences. Their concerns proved well-founded.

122 Interview with General Andrew Goodpaster, 7 August 2003, Washington, D.C.
Goodpaster stated: ‘In my own mind, I believe that President Eisenhower’s heart attack
was the catalyst for the Soviet move.’ Goodpaster stated that the Soviets took advantage
of what they perceived as a moment of ‘weakness and confusion’ in the US
administration to renege on their agreements and move into the Middle East. He
speculated that Moscow calculated that should Eisenhower die, the ensuing change in
administration would offer additional opportunities to expand their influence.
Goodpaster firmly believed that if Eisenhower had not had a heart attack, the Czech
arms deal would never have happened.

123 ‘Indian Embassy Jakarta [Ambassador BFHB Tyabji] to Commonwealth Affairs
Secretary [Dutt], New Delhi, on Bandung Conference, 28 April 1955’. NAI, MEA,
Section: Asian- African Conference, 1(37) — AAC/55, p. 4. The Indians and Nehru
viewed the conference as disappointing. The Indian Ambassador in Jakarta reported:
‘Unfortunately, the Indian point of view did not get good local publicity. I have not
seen the foreign reports. Partly, ... China stole the limelight from India because the
Chinese and Indian views happened to coincide; and people are inclined to think when
this happens, that India has yielded to China, rather than the other way around. And
partly, it is due to the pro-West opposition parties who have made much of alleged
Indian attempts and desire to dominate the Conference, and to deprive Indonesia of the
credit in organizing it.’ See also Asian-African Conference, 18-24 April 1955: Prime Minister
fawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches and the Final Communique from the Publications Division of the
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (New Delhi: Government of India, 1955), found in
the India collection at the Australian National Library, Canberra. This was published to
counter the impression that India and Nehru had taken a back seat to other nations at
the Bandung Conference.

124 ‘Memcon NEA Qernegan and Hannah] and British Embassy [Scott and Morris], 13
September 1955’. NACPM, 788.00/9-1355, pp. 1-3.

125 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Seldan Chaplin] to WDC, Assessment of the Shah’s Government, 21
April 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/4-2156, pp. 1-3.

126 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 4 June 1956’. NACPM, 788.11/6-456, pp. 1-3.

127 ‘US DefAtt Tehran to WDC, 27 December 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/12-2756, p. 1.

128 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Francis Stevens Charge], to WDC, 29 [anuary 1957’. NACPM,
788.00/1-2957, p. 5.

129 Srodes, James, Alien Dulles, Master of Spies. Washington, DC: Regency, 1999, pp. 460-
461. In Washington, Kermit Roosevelt, the almost mythic hero of Tehran 1953, refused
to participate in British-sponsored schemes to overthrow Nasser. CIA Director Allen
Dulles stated that both his older brother John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower badgered

Notes

345

Roosevelt into surveying the situation first-hand in Cairo. Upon returning, Roosevelt
told the White House that the sole reason that Tehran had worked was because the
momentum against the Musaddiq regime already existed. In contrast, he pointed out
that Nasser was actually popular and that a coup had no chance of success. ‘I tried to
tell them that these operations never work, if you are going against the grain of events.
You have to have so much going your way before you dare undertake them. First and
foremost, you have to have the vast majority of the people behind you. We did in Iran.
And you have to have a leadership that is better than the one in power and one that can
take control. We had in Iran in the army and the power structure; and the Shah himself
was a very gentle and reasonable person, although later he turned into a tough
customer.’ Roosevelt advised the White House to get used to Nasser because an Tran
option’ simply did not exist. Roosevelt actually became so aggravated with the elder
Dulles that he quit over persistent attempts to enlist him in attempts to overthrow
Nasser. Srodes believes that Roosevelt’s friendship for Nasser played a role in the
decision. Roosevelt stated: ‘Foster became too demanding. He had the idea that I could
solve almost anything, anywhere. That just wasn’t true. Allen was upset about it and
recognized eventually that I couldn’t take it any longer. Allen tried to protect me and he
would try to reason with Foster as long as he thought he could, and then he would give
up and go to ground.’

130 Nabih A. Faris, in The Crescent of Crisis (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1955), pp.
102-103, argues that the Cold war placed the Middle East ‘between two mill stones: the
United States and Russia’. In addition, the US lacked ‘a long-range and independent
Arab policy . . . [that did] not necessarily parallel those of her allies [the British, French,
and Jewish pressure to support Israel] or subject to local political pressures.’ ‘In the
absence of an independent American policy, these interests (petroleum and geopolitical
presence) have led the United States to align itself with Britain and France, against
whom the Arabs are continuing their struggle for independence. At the same time, the
influence of the local American scene on American foreign policy has hoodwinked
American policy-makers into espousing the cause of Israel, and has so far thwarted all
efforts to disengage American Arab policy from that of Israel.’ Faris was an American-
educated Palestinian who had served as the Head of the Arab Desk in the Overseas
Operations Branch of the Office of War Information. This work provides an interesting
perspective on the growing perception that US policy in the 1953-1954 timeframe had
fallen under British and Israeli influence. This was written prior to the Soviet arms deal
with Nasser, and Faris predicted that Arab perceptions of US policy would result in
major policy gains for the Soviet Union in the Arab Middle East.

131 Macmillan, Tiding the Storm, p. 138.

132 Kyle, Keith, Sue% New York: St. Martin’s, 1991, pp. 148-152, 278.

133 Kyle, Suev^ pp- 157-158, 194, 259, 553. Interspersed throughout his narrative, Kyle
provides a series of excellent snapshots of the Indian role. Despite a disagreement over
tactics and concern in India that problems with the Canal would harm the Indian
economy, Nehru supported Nasser’s right to nationalize the Canal. Krishna Menon told
the British that India could not come out publicly against Nasser, but that India would
push for an international conference and encourage the Egyptian leader to attend.
Menon attempted to get Nasser to the negotiating table, with no success because
Nasser ‘did not like or trust Krishna Menon, whom he suspected of having some link
with the Russians.’ Kyle concluded by saying that Nehru’s solution of an international
conference appealed to Eisenhower. The author blamed Menon as an ‘unfortunate’
choice as a mediator because he ‘antagonized in turn everybody in sight’. Although
something of a reach, Kyle infers that had Nehru taken a more personal role Suez might
have been avoided. Najma Heptulla, in Indo-West Asian Relations: The Nehru Era (New
Delhi: Allied, 1991) states that Menon’s failure to carry out Nehru’s policies in the Suez

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crisis successfully underscored Menon’s limited utility at the UN. See also Lall, Arthur,
The Emergence of Modern India. New York: Columbia, 1981, pp. 136-137. Lall, a senior
Indian diplomat and the self-described ‘closest aide’ to Krishna Menon for 17 years,
related Nehru’s disillusionment with Menon. The latter failed to gain acceptance of
Nehru’s plan for avoiding war over Suez, and then voted against the US resolution
condemning the Soviet Union for its actions in Hungary. Lall provided a rationalization
of these actions: ‘Krishna Menon was highly intelligent but also impetuous. Moreover,
his health played great tricks with him, and on a bad day his impetuosity was as swift as
lightning.’ As a result, Nehru telephoned Lall every morning with specific instructions
for Menon to carry out in that day’s UN session. Lall described Menon as ‘galled’ but
obedient.

134 Heikal, Qasa al-Suisa , p. 56. Heikal argues that Suez underscored waning British
influence and the beginning of real problems for the British in protecting their oil
interests in the Middle East. In Sue% 1956: A. Personal Account (London: Trinity, 1978),
Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, offered a systematic, if biased, assault on
American policy, arguing that it was simply naive and wrong-headed. See also ‘The ‘Get
Dulles’ Campaign’, Newsweek , 4 February 1958, p. 21. Following Suez, Dulles’ credibility
and competency came under attack. In January 1957, testifying before a joint session of
the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in an attempt to get
support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, Senator J. William Fulbright accused Dulles of
‘wasting the fruits of billions in U.S. largesse showered on friendly nations and of
precipitating a ‘disastrous and remarkable collapse’ in relations with our closest allies,
British and France.’ Fulbright stated: ‘I’ve about decided that if support of the Mideast
resolution is going to be considered as an expression of confidence in Dulles’ conduct
of foreign policy, them I will have to vote against it.’ See also Mosley, Dulles , pp. 418-
435. The author discusses the general confusion and disagreement among presidential
advisors and military officers when it became apparent that the Anglo-French attack
was under way. According to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Dulles ordered him to prepare to
engage anyone in the Mediterranean, including the French and British. The Secretary of
State then headed off to talk to Allen Dulles and the President. The direction to Burke
would later be denied, as would the refusal to float the pound sterling unless the British
troops were withdrawn. Mosley also points out that Dulles was preoccupied with
Hungary, exhausted, and would be hospitalized within days for major cancer surgery.
Nevertheless, there was an undercurrent in the administration that the US stance against
intervention had been a mistake. In 1958, upon learning that the US would land troops
in Beirut, Macmillan telephoned Eisenhower and said: ‘You are doing a Suez on me!’
The President is said to have ‘laughed’. See Finer, Herman, Dulles Over Sue%. Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1964, p. 264. In less understanding accounts, Eisenhower and Dulles had a
choice of ‘Nasser or Eden’ and they chose the ‘assassin’ over their old ally. See also
Neff, Warriors , pp. 422, 293, 441, 425-426. The Democrats pounded both Dulles and
Eisenhower for betraying allies. Adlai Stevenson stated: ‘The Eisenhower
Administration acquired for itself ... a reputation for unreliability which is about as
damaging a reputation as a Great Power can have ... one question which arises
irresistibly out of the Middle Eastern crisis is this: has the President of the United States
really been in charge of our foreign policy?’ On November 17, the Netv York Times
commented that the United States had enabled Nasser to ‘pull a political victory out of
his military defeat’. Neff concludes: ‘Eisenhower emerged from the crisis under severe
criticism for opposing America’s traditional allies, and historians since then have
generally been critical of his actions during this period. In fact, his firm insistence that
the rule of law be obeyed is one of the high points of his presidency.’

135 Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey, The Middle East in Evolution. London: Macmillan, 1970, pp.
105, 129, 130, 138. Trevelyan’s account of the events leading up to the Suez Crisis is an

Notes

347

interesting first-hand view of events and well worth reading. Later, the author was
British Ambassador to Iraq following the July coup. Trevelyan stated that he never
supported intervention, either in Egypt in 1956 or Iraq in 1958, because both lacked any
real chance of success given the post-World War II environment. No Arab government
put in power by the West could survive. He stated: ‘No Government set up by the
occupying Forces would last/ About Iraq, he said: ‘No Government established by
British force could have lasted.’ Trevelyan clearly viewed the post-1958 period as an
‘epilogue’ to British dominance in the Arab Middle East. See also Vernon Bogdanor’s
article ‘Suez changed everything’ in The Times, 29 October 2006, p. 21. In an article
commemorating the 50th anniversary of Suez, Bogdanor argues that Suez ‘ruined
British foreign policy, destroying national self-confidence for 25 years until Margaret
Thatcher regained the Falklands, and led to Harold Macmillan making Britain the
‘junior partners in the Pax Americana’. He also pointed to later comments by
Eisenhower regretting that the US had intervened as it had in the crisis. These views
tend to reflect a British school of thought which was prevalent at the time in the
Colonial Office that Suez was a net negative for Britain in the Middle East. To the
contrary, with pretentions about prerogatives in the former colonial empire gone, the
British government could focus on downsizing its commitments; London no longer had
the ability to support the breadth of its former commitments in the Middle East, nor
was it necessary to do so. British foreign policy was hardly ‘ruined’; rather, it merely
took a different and perhaps more effective and certainly more sophisticated form.
Macmillan shifted the responsibility and the costs largely to the United States, and yet
maintained a very effective program of influence over those policies through
Washington. Eisenhower’s decision was correct in 1956 and even more correct in the
hindsight of 50 years. His lament about not supporting the British arguably had as much
to do with wishing that the British, as opposed to the US, still had responsibility for the
region than it did getting rid of Nasser. As for Bogdanor’s comment on the Falklands,
Thatcher knew that she required the support of the US, politically and with tactical and
strategic US intelligence support, and she got it. She acted exactly as Macmillan would
have with the cover of the ‘Pax Americana’. Bogdanor also blames Suez for Britain’s
estrangement from Europe, and for the French commitment to Europe.

136 ‘OCB Report US Objectives and Policies Near East, 23 November 1956’. DDEL,
NSC/OCB, Box 78, p. 7.

137 ‘The Middle East — How and Why the U.S. Aims to Fill the Vacuum’. Nemmek 7
January 1957, p. 24.

138 ‘Warsaw ... Cairo ... Moscow’. Nemmek 28 January 1957, pp. 41-42. The British
privately voiced their concern that, given the unlikely possibility of a direct Soviet attack
on the Middle East, the Eisenhower Doctrine was ill-advised and served only to inflame
local nationalism and anti-Western sentiment.

139 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 239. In November 1956, Ben-Gurion made withdrawal even
more difficult by claiming in the Knesset that the Sinai was historically a part of Israel,
and by asserting Israel’s ‘right’ to expand beyond its 1956 borders. Although partly for
domestic Israeli political consumption, his statements and intransigence confirmed in
Arab minds the aggressive and expansionist aims of the Jewish state.

140 ‘OCB Memorandum of Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Middle East
Informational Activities, 18 January 1957’. DDEL, WHO, NSC, OCB, Box 77, p. 2.

Part I

1 Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, p. 26.

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Chapter 2

1 Copeland, Miles, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1969, pp. 214-218. Copeland offers an entertaining account of the various
reactions to the Eisenhower Doctrine. First, he quoted a member of the US Middle
East Policy Planning Committee asking the CIA: ‘Would you fellows like to send
someone along on the mission that’s going out to explain it to the Arab chiefs of state?
We can’t afford to associate ourselves with every lunatic scheme that comes along.’ He
quotes Nasser as saying: ‘The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut
stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility
that there may be something to them we are missing.’ Complicated or not, Copeland
points out that Nasser understood that the Eisenhower Doctrine targeted his version of
Arab unity and his influence in the region. At the same time, it encouraged his enemies,
chief among them Nuri Sa’id and the Hashemites in Iraq.

2 Ferrell, Robert H. (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries , p. 350. See also Nutting, Nasser , p. 59. At
their first meeting in October 1952, during a dinner, Nasser made it clear to Kermit
Roosevelt that Neguib was a figurehead by dismissing or ignoring contemptuously
everything that the General said. See Copeland, Game , pp. 74-77. Copeland credits
William Lakeland, the Political Officer at the US Embassy in Cairo, with being the first
official American to grasp that Nasser was the real power in the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) and not Neguib. It was through Lakeland’s friendship with
Muhammad Heikal, then just a reporter in Cairo, that the primary early conduit for
communication between the Embassy and the RCC was established.

3 Kerr, Malcolm, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1967,
p. 1. Kerr commented on Arab nationalism, particularly the 20th-century version,
stating that it was a ‘mystery that neither Arab nor western historians have satisfactorily
explained. . . . (T)his obsession, whatever its causes, is an important psychological force,
and therefore a political reality, which warring politicians seek to use against each other.’

4 Ismael, Tariq Y., The Arab Eeft. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1976, pp. 78-
79. See also Mitchell, Richard P., The Society of Muslim brothers. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993, pp. 105-164. Nasser’s view of a ‘sound democratic life’ fell
somewhat short of pluralistic democracy. He was suspicious of political parties,
particularly after the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate him in 1954 and
leftist elements strongly supported more radical measures and closer ties with the Soviet
bloc. Arms from the Soviet Union were one thing, but political challenges from the Left
were another. Nasser responded to both movements with brutal suppression. Richards’
work is in large part a contemporary chronicle of events. Richards, an American student
in Cairo in the early 1950s, knew many of the Ikhwan members personally. His narrative
of events in the 1953-1954 timeframe presents an historical narrative that is also a first-
hand street-level view of events.

5 Al-Atasi, Jamal, Al-Thawra li Jamal Abd-al-Nasser wa ala Fikrihi al-lstratiji wa al-Tarikhi.
Beirut: Mahad Al-Agmaln Al-Arabi, p. 7. See also Shalaq, Al-Fadhi, ‘Concepts of the
Nation and State with Special Reference to the Sunnis in Lebanon’. In Choueiri,
Youssef M. (ed.), State and Society in Syria and Eebanon. New York: St. Martins, 1993, pp.
122, 123. Nasser’s Philosophy of devolution was partly propaganda to establish ideological
credentials and partly a reflection of his personal revolutionary nationalism. Nasser
believed in the permanence of the revolutionary struggle, and would repeatedly return
to revolutionary activities when moderate policies failed. In addition to his support for
‘positive neutralism’ and ‘non-alignment’, Nasser declared that Egypt stood ready to
play a key role in ‘three circles’: Arab, African, and Islamic. See also Abd-al-Nassar,
Jamal, ‘The Principles that Guide Egypt’s Political Life’. In Karpat, Kemal H. (ed.),
Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1963, p.

Notes

349

202. Here again, Nasser couched this ideology in terms of the ‘elimination of
imperialism’, ‘eradication of feudalism’, and ‘eradication of monopoly and the
domination of capital’.

6 ‘Foreign Policy: On the Firing Line’. Newsweek , 21 January 1957, p. 25.

7 ‘352nd NSC Meeting, 22 January 1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 9, pp. 7, 8, 12.

8 ‘Notes Cabinet Meeting, 6 February 1958’. DDEL, Dulles Papers, Smith Series, Box 3,
pp. 1-4. Various calls for Arab unity over the years had anesthetized official Washington
to the possibility of a real union. The degree of surprise associated with the Egyptian-
Syrian union was attributed to a lack of adequate intelligence, and reflected itself in all
manner of speculation, including the possibility of oil-sharing between Iraq and Egypt,
the need to protect Kuwait and Iran, and Dulles’ comment that if Jordan fell, a general
Arab /Israeli war would result.

9 Nutting, Nasser, p. 215. See also, ‘Telegram British Embassy WDC [Sir H. Caccia] to
FO, 27 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/134386, p. 1. The Egyptian Charge in Damascus
told the American Ambassador ‘the [Syrian] delegates burst into tears and fell on their
knees before Nasser in order to get him to agree to help them out’.

10 Stephens, Nasser, p. 277 . Taken from an article by Emile Bustani, ‘Can Arab Unity
Survive?’ New Statesman, 5 January 1962, p. 48

11 Kerr, Arab Cold War, pp. 12-16.

12 Devlin, John, The Ba’th Tarty: A History from Its Origins to 1966. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1976, p. 115.

13 ‘Analysis Formation of the UAR [Lampton Berry, NEA] to Dulles’. NACPM, GRDOS
- 59, CDF 55-59, NEA, 611.86B/2-758, Box 2555, February 7, 1958, pp. 1-3. See also
Nutting, Nasser, p. 219. Nasser apparently confided in Raymond Hare, the US
Ambassador in Cairo, that the union with Syria would become a ‘great headache’ and
that most of the RCC actually opposed it. Zacharia Mohieddin described Nasser’s
reasoning by stating that the entire scheme ‘would be an unnatural association built on
sentiment and hampered by geography’. Most accounts of Nasser’s reluctance to form
the union came from a later period, after its collapse, and as a result ring somewhat
false. There is little doubt that by 1962-3 Nasser regretted his decision but, in 1958,
riding the crest of popularity and seeing a future full of promise, there is little doubt that
he believed that he could manage the difficulties. See also Copeland, Game, p. 221 .
Copeland recounts the Egyptian optimism at the time: ‘My Egyptian friends confidently
predicted that during 1958 ‘Chamoun, Hussein, and Nuri will fall — and in that order’.’
Clearly, in 1958, the Syrian adventure represented the welcomed first step on the road
to Arab unity.

14 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 21.

15 ‘The Middle East — Between Thunder & Sun’. Time, 31 March 1958, p. 17. When Nasser
spoke in Cairo to announce the UAR, he linked himself with the legendary Arab leader
Saladin: ‘Always the Arab peoples were able to conquer invaders whenever they joined
and stood together in one army — as in Saladin’s day.’ The crowd responded by
proclaiming Nasser the new Saladin. Stage-managed or not, the crowd clearly reflected
the mood in the much of the Arab world.

16 ‘Egypt, Syria: Shotgun Wedding’. Newsweek, 10 February 1958, p. 52.

17 Copeland, Game, p. 224. Copeland points out that Nasser believed US assertions about
Soviet designs on Syria, but he found American protestations of innocence in that
regard somewhat disingenuous. Copeland states that with respect to Syria,
circumstances drove Nasser to ‘break one of his cardinal rules: take authority wherever
you can get it, but avoid responsibility like the plague’.

18 ‘Telegram US Delegation, Baghdad Pact Meeting, Ankara, 25 January 1958’. FRUS,
1958-1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII, p. 408. See
also ‘Memorandum NEA [Lampton] to Dulles, 7 February 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS-

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59, NEA, CDF 1955-1959, 611.86B/2-758, pp. 1-4. Barry Lampton, the Egyptian desk
officer in NEA, provided a briefing memorandum to the Secretary of State that
included a background paper describing the sources for and development of the union.
He traced the union effort back to a fundamental Egyptian and Syrian hostility to the
Baghdad Pact and the Syro-Egyptian military pact of October 20, 1955, which provided
for a joint military command under an Egyptian general officer. He then cited Syrian
activity in pushing for a political union during 1956 and 1957. In this interpretation, the
Turko-Syrian crisis of September 1957 created the catalyst for a vote in both the Syrian
and Egyptian parliaments on November 17, 1957 to explore political union. Lampton’s
argument followed the line of reasoning offered by Nasser, namely that the latter feared
a Communist takeover. NEA also pointed out that the Syrians granted the Egyptian
leader virtual dictatorial powers, making it an offer that Nasser could not refuse. See
Nutting, Nasser ; p. 213. Nutting provides an interesting evaluation of Abd-al-Hamid
Sarraj, the head of the Syrian intelligence and security service or muhabbarat. According
to Nutting, the American military attache in Damascus approached Sarraj and told him
that ‘Washington had lost all faith in party politics government in the Arab World’ and
would be willing to back an army regime ‘of good moral standing’, if that regime
declined ‘to go all the way with Nasser’. True or not, the Eisenhower administration’s
frustration with civilian government throughout the Middle East-South Asia region had
brought the US government to just such a conclusion. Military rule meant stability and
was preferable to a civilian rule that invited plurality and Communist infiltration.

19 ‘Baghdad Pact Meeting Delegation Ankara to WDC, 25 January 1958’. FRUS , 1958-
1960, Volume XII, p. 408.

20 ‘Memo NEA to Dulles, 7 February 1958’. NACPM, 611.86B/2-758, pp. 2-3.

21 Heikal, Muhammad, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Influence in
the Middle Fast. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, pp. 88-93. Heikal comments that the
Soviets ‘were obliged to give the union their reluctant support’, despite the arrest of
Communist supporters. According to Heikal, it was the combination of the union and
the suppression of Communist elements that made Nasser’s April 28, 1958 visit to
Moscow a top-priority item in the Kremlin. Washington was not the only Great Power
attempting to gauge the potential for a relationship with the Egyptian leader. The
Soviets had their own problems. Heikal believed that the Soviets not only were intent
on impressing Nasser but also wanted to calibrate his relationship with the US, his
views on the Arab-Israeli dispute, and their own long-term potential for a relationship.
It was Nasser, not Khrushchev, who brought up the issue of UAR suppression of the
Communist Party. According to Heikal, the Soviet leader responded that it was ‘entirely
your [an Egyptian] affair’. Interview with Muhammad Hakki, 8 August 2003. Hakki
commented that Heikal’s remembrances were often illuminating and always interesting;
however, ‘they must always be evaluated in the broader context.’ According to Hakki:
‘When Heikal quotes Nasser, one never knows whether it is what Nasser actually said,
what Heikal thought Nasser should have said, or what Heikal would have said if he
were Nasser.’

22 ‘Memorandum NEA [Lampton] to Dulles, 7 February 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS-59,
NEA, CDF, 611.86B/2-758, Box 2555, p. 4. See also ‘353rd NSC Meeting, 30 January
1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 9, p. 4. The report on the situation in Syria reflected
Nasser’s own explanation. ‘Nasser had been reluctant to become involved in the Syrian
picture and had been worried by Soviet opposition to the union, but had favored the
union as a means of warding off Communism in Syria. The Syrians had been motivated
by Pan- Arab nationalism, and by the Syrian Army’s fear of eventual Communist control
of Syria.’ The popularity of the union with the Arab ‘street’ and its unpopularity in Saudi
Arabia, Lebanon, Israel and among Syrian Communists was noted. Interestingly, there
was no mention of Iraq or support for an alternative union.

Notes

351

23 ‘New Mideastern Gambit’. Nation, 15 February 1958, p. 129.

24 ‘Egypt, Syria: Shotgun Wedding’. Newsweek, , 10 February 1958, p. 52. See also ‘Mutual
Security Problems, 15 June 1956’. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(Historical Series), Volume VIII, Eighty-Fourth Congress Second Session, 1956.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 409-432. In this session of
the Committee, funding for the Baghdad Pact came under vociferous attack by Senator
Wayne Morse, who opposed the aid on grounds that the US should ‘do more for Israel’.
Morse, in arguing with the other Senators, stated that the US should support ‘free
states’, which in his view excluded most of the states in the Middle East and Africa. He
pointedly stated: ‘There is no individual liberty in these Arab States. They are police
states, and Iraq is a good example. The individual has no freedom in Iraq, so we are
going to pour our money in there.’ When it was pointed out to Morse that he supported
Turkey and Spain, the Senator tried unsuccessfully to separate out those authoritarian
states that were not moving in ‘a totalitarian direction’. In the same session several of
the Senators expressed concern that Nasser was playing the US off against the Soviet
Union on the issue of the Aswan Dam. Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.
had made the case earlier that the dam at Aswan ‘would be built’; it was just a question
of whether it would be with Western or Soviet aid. Despite this, several Senators
opposed supporting the project. Given the lack of support in Congress, whether the
administration supported the dam or not may was probably irrelevant; there was
considerable Congressional opposition. The debate was indicative of the difficulties that
the administration had in getting the aid that it wanted to support containment policy in
the Middle East and to maintain a balanced policy in the region that included support
for allies, aid to the non-aligned, and placating the pro-Israeli lobby.

25 ‘Our Secretary of State, Americans Like Him — But...’. Newsweek, 27 January 1958, p.
33.

26 Tamer, A.M., ‘Who Likes Dulles, Who Doesn’t: The Arab States’. Newsweek, 27 January
1958, p. 29.

27 Copeland, Game , pp. 226-236. Copeland’s description of the atmosphere in Beirut
matches exactly the reality of double-dealing, so long a part of the Lebanese political
landscape. While his descriptions of the camaraderie between competing intelligence
services is to a degree exaggerated, there is some truth to it. His account of the ‘Beirut
Four’ is entertaining. Sa’ib Salaam, Abdullah Yafi, Adnan Hakim, and Abdullah
Mashnuq were pro-Nasserist operatives around whom the Egyptians built their strategy
to mobilize the street mob. The Four were supported with money and weapons by
Egyptian intelligence and Sarraj.

28 Copeland, Game , p. 234.

29 ‘Instructions, Dulles to Beirut, 3 February 1958’. NACPM, 611.83/2-358, pp. 1-3. In
Muhammad H. Heikal’s Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Sue% through Egyptian Eyes (London: Andre
Deutsch, 1986), the author points out that within the framework of the Baghdad Pact,
so-called ‘free nations’ were not allowed to address certain issues that were central to
their own security. At the Baghdad Pact meeting on February 11, Zionism and Israel
were, according to the American representative, topics that he had no authority to
discuss with Pact members. Heikal comments (p. 228): ‘These words, written almost on
the eve of the pact’s demise, could well serve as its epitaph.’

30 ‘British Embassy Ankara [Bowker] to the FO, 26 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/134386.

31 ‘Minutes on Syrian Situation, 28 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/134386.

32 ‘British Embassy Ankara [Bowker] to the FO, 28 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/134386.

33 ‘British Embassy, Ankara, 29 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/134386. See also ‘British
Embassy Amman [Mason] to FO, 3 March 1958’. PRO, F0371/134198, p. 1. At the
time of the Syrian-Egyptian union, Sa’id was not the Prime Minister, although he
represented Iraq at the Baghdad Pact conference in Ankara. Because of Sa’id’s penchant

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for grandiose plans, Jordan’s King Hussein, on March 3, 1958, learning that the Iraqi
government had resigned, expressed the hope that Sa’id would not be asked to form a
new one. His thinking was that Sa’id would cause an intensification of Egyptian and
Syrian attacks and propaganda against both Jordan and Iraq. Hussein did not like Sa’id
on a personal level, and wanted his role limited to behind-the-scenes support for any
new government.

34 ‘Minute UAR interference in Lebanon, 19 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118. The view
that Nasser and the Soviets were in league in Lebanon persisted. As one supporter of
stronger policy toward Nasser and the Soviets in region put it: ‘The present unrest and
rioting in Lebanon is — as no doubt you are well aware — due to Soviet-backed
Nasserism.’ See also ‘Letter FO to Secretary of State, 16 May 1958’. PRO,
F0371/134118. ‘There is no need for any investigation into what has been quite
obvious for some time past, viz: that the present trouble in Lebanon is due to Nasser’s
attempt to grab that country and incorporate it in his Arab Republic. Apart from Iraq
and Jordan — Saudi Arabia continues to sit on the fence — there would then be no
opposition to his plan of allowing Russia to establish herself in the Middle East in
return for her acknowledgement of himself as head of the Arab States.’ Although
distorted, these views were widely held in 1958.

35 ‘British Emb Beirut [Middleton] to FO, 27 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/134386, p. 1.

36 ‘Minute [R.M. Hadow] FO on Egyptian/Syrian Union, 28 January 1958’. PRO,
F0371/ 134386.

37 ‘British Emb WDC [Caccia] to FO, 30 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/ 134386, p. 2.

38 ‘British Embassy Ankara [Sir J. Bowker] to the FO, 28 January 1958’. PRO,
F0371/1 34386, p. 1. Dulles’ address to those present in this ‘restricted meeting’ of the
Baghdad Pact, if rendered correctly by Bowker, was almost insulting to the delegates.
‘Dulles noted that Nasser acted on the strength of Soviet backing, but he was not sure
that any Arab State seemed prepared to act on the strength of United States backing; in
fact, the only people who were prepared to take effective action in the area were Nasser
and Ben-Gurion.’ Perhaps this was a goad directed at Nuri Sa’id, since the initiator of
any action had to be an Arab state and he represented the only Arab state present. Sa’id
wanted a week to ten days to think about it. This was rejected, and discussions resumed
the next day.

39 ‘British Embassy Ankara [Sir J. Bowker] to FO, 30 January 1958’. PRO,
F0371/1 34386. See also ‘British Embassy Baghdad to FO, 13 February 1958’. PRO,
F0371/143197, in which Sir Michael Wright outlined the British view of a Jordanian-
Iraqi union. Wright believed that union would strengthen the two weak Hashemite
regimes and undermine UAR attempts to divide them. Wright feared that Nuri was
overreaching in his plans, but that the US and Britain could hardly veto his activities for
fear of demoralizing the anti-Nasser factions.

40 ‘Dulles to Baghdad, 8 February 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, p. 420.

41 ‘Letter from Sir Charles Johnston Amman to FO, 8 April 1958’. PRO, F0371/133147.
Johnston’s report resulted from a meeting with none other than H.A.R. (Kim) Philby,
used his erstwhile position as Middle East ‘correspondent’ for The Observer and The
Economist, as a MI-6 cover while he really worked for the KGB. Johnston attached
summaries of Egyptian news accounts to further illustrate the kind of pressure now
confronting the Saudis. A.l-A.hram made the most of the ‘plot’ and referred to calls by ‘a
large number of Saudi amirs’ for an investigation; the paper further stated that the Saudi
government maintained its grip on power only through repression, and used Prince
Talal’s ‘stormy’ meeting with King Saud as an example of the high-level unrest and
dissatisfaction with the King’s ‘extreme policies’. See Page, Bruce, David Leitch, and
Phillip Knightley, The Philby Conspiraty. New York: Ballantine, 1981, p. 272. Despite his

Notes

353

‘kitchen Arabic’, Philby used the reputation of his father (St. John Philby) as an eminent
Arabist to mine information, particularly on Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

42 ‘British Embassy, Beirut, [Middleton] to FO, 7 March 1958 (No. 212)’. PRO,
F0371/ 134390. This telegram included a complete listing of the positions and
appointees to the new UAR government. Sarraj was the deputy to Nasser as head of the
Executive Council for the Syrian Province.

43 ‘U.A.R. — Father Ibrahim’s Plot’. Time, 17 March 1958, p. 24. See also ‘The Middle East:
Undertow’. Newsweek, 17 March 1958, p. 40, and ‘British Embassy, Beirut, [Middleton]
to FO, 7 March 1958, (No. 213A)’. PRO, FO371/134390.

44 Nutting, Nasser , p. 227 .

45 ‘Letter, Johnston, Amman to FO, 8 April 1958’. PRO, F0371/133147. ‘Between
Thunder and Sun’. Time, 31 March 1958, p. 18. Contemporary analysis of the situation
illustrates the degree of uncertainty and concern, particularly over Saudi Arabia.
‘Whatever his sympathies Saud cannot afford to ignore Nasser’s appeal to his
impoverished subjects. Every Saudi Arabian village has radios tuned to Cairo’s
broadcasts. Egyptian technicians and teachers have deeply infiltrated the kingdom. For
all his oil riches, Saud’s financial position is so bad that world banks ceased several
months ago to honor Saudi letters of credit. Educated Saudis almost to a man are
disgusted. Said one: “The King is burning up our wealth wasting, wasting everywhere —
palaces, women, bribes. He is destroying our country. It is a crime that cannot go on”.’

46 ‘Minute [G. Lucas] FO on letter from Johnston Amman, 8 April 1958’. PRO,
F0371/133147. The FO comments were signed off by A.R. Walmsley, and included
the following comment: ‘Mr. Philby’s comments are, in my view, worth a good deal. . . .
They also have the virtue of according with our own final assessment of these events.’
This move on the part of Saudi Arabia represented a major setback for their perceived
role in containing Nasser’s ambitions. During much of 1957, many viewed King Saud as
the most effective opposition to Nasser.

47 ‘Minute [Lucas] Foreign Office attached to Telegram Beirut to FO on Feisal policy
statement, 21 April 1958’. PRO, F0371/133146. The British understood that the price
of relations with Saudi Arabia required the British to withdraw support for Omani
claims to the Buraimi Oasis. ‘Minute [D.M.H. Riches] attached to an assessment: The
Middle East and Communism, 29 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/133146. As Riches put
it, the British ‘could not abandon our friends’, meaning the Sultan of Oman.

48 Eisenhower, Dwight D., The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 . Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1965, p. 264.

49 ‘Discussion 358th NSC Meeting, 13 March 1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 9, p. 13.
Casting about for something positive to report, Dulles passed along rumors of a
possible union between Tunisia and Morocco, commenting: ‘Such a union would be
anti-Nasser and, accordingly, advantageous to the United States if it were
consummated.’ This underscored the level of desperation for good news to which the
administration had sunk.

50 Ibid. The administration faced growing pressure in the press on the Middle East, and it
was an election year. Ernest K. Lindley, a conservative columnist, wrote an article
entitled: ‘How to save the Middle East’. Newsweek, 6 January 1958, p. 25. Lindley stated:
‘Soviet imperialism is on the offensive and making gains. The free world is on the
defensive and losing ground. Unless this trend is checked and reversed, the free world
will eventually suffer a catastrophic rout.’ He then provided nine actions that the
administration should take and closed by stating: ‘The Middle East can be saved. If it is
lost, it will be basically for the same reasons that we lost the missile-satellite race.’
Eisenhower was in a no-win situation. He had no control over events, but was being
pilloried for doing nothing to reverse the situation.

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51 Eisenhower, Waging Peace , p. 264. Describing Feisal as ‘pro-Nasserist’ emphasizes the
unsophisticated view of the Middle East held at the highest levels. Saud was an
incompetent and arguably a degenerate as well, but the administration had pinned its
hopes on him for leadership. In contrast, Feisal would do more real damage to Nasser’s
position in the Arab world than any another Arab leader. Feisal was a realist who
understood that reforms had to be made in Saudi Arabia if the Kingdom were to
survive. See ‘British Embassy WDC [Benest] to FO [Walmsley], 23 May 1958’. PRO,
F0371/133149; in May 1958, D.L. Benest wrote to A.R. Walmsley at the FO about his
meeting with Feisal, who was in the States for medical treatment, stating: ‘[Feisal]
seemed quite at ease, and he has apparently landed on his feet once more.’ Feisal
showed his interest in reforming the Kingdom, and explained what he was doing to
reorganize the central administration of the government. He also speculated on Yemen
and stated that he hoped there would be no outside interference in Lebanon.

52 ‘US Embassy, Cairo, to WDC, 17 April 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, p. 441.

53 ‘Memcon US Consulate, Alexandria, 3 May 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS-59, NEA, CDF,
611.86/5-358, pp. 1-3. The Alexandria Consulate used Nicolas Rigos, a Greek
businessman with excellent contacts in the Egyptian government, as a sounding board
and information source. Rigos believed that the US’s ‘new policy’ was so badly timed
that much of the potential benefit was lost. Its close proximity to the Moscow trip made
it appear that Nasser and the Egyptians were in the driver’s seat. Rigos argued the US
could not regain its position in Egypt because while Washington talked of aid, Russian
factories were actually arriving in Egypt and Egyptian cotton was going to the USSR.
He believed it was too little, too late. See also ‘Dispatch US Consulate, Alexandria to
WDC, 8 May 1958’. NACPM, 611.86/5-858, pp. 1-2 An article by Dana Adams
Schmidt, ‘Nasser Believed Warier of Soviet’, in the New York Times , 9 May 1958, p. 5,
quoted Assistant Secretary Rountree as stating that: ‘encouraging signs of a growing
realization of what constitutes true neutralism and of what wholesale Soviet offers of
assistance are really worth’ were emerging. Schmidt wrote that: ‘Officials reject the idea
that they United States is ‘wooing’ President Nasser’, but that the US wanted to see
normal relations develop with the UAR.

54 For a perspective on Nasserist activities in the Sudan, see ‘Dispatch [Cole Charge]
Khartoum to WDC containing “Comments on the Pre-Election Period in the Sudan”,
February 8, 1958’. NACPM, 745W.00/2-858, pp. 2, 46. See also ‘Dispatch [Cole]
Khartoum to WDC on National Unionist Party reaction to Egyptian/Sudanese Border
Dispute, March 8, 1958’. NACPM, 745W.00/3-858, pp. 1-7. In the Sudan, the Umma
and Mahdist parties generally followed an anti-Nasserist line. The Peoples’ Democratic
Party (PDP) was essentially Nasserist, as were elements of the Nationalist Union Party
(NUP). Both often cooperated with the Communists. Egypt’s proximity to and
historical involvement in Sudan made any form of ‘union’ with the UAR a bedrock
point of political debate. Sudan had historically opposed Egyptian expansion, having
experienced Egyptian rule first-hand. The British, having mid-wifed the creation of an
independent Sudan, did not want to see it fall under Egyptian domination. Such an
eventuality would have been embarrassing, all the more so if it occurred through the
ballot box. The Nasserists had the problem of projecting a Sudanese nationalist image
within the context of a pro-Nasserist program. A February 1958 border dispute with
Egypt brought the issue of Sudanese nationalism to the forefront. The NUP took the
position that Sudan should not surrender territory, while Nasserist elements argued that
closer cooperation and coordination with Cairo would avoid such incidents in the
future. Given the upcoming elections, the PDP and NUP recognized that support for
formal union with Egypt would be political suicide. They announced their intention to
work for a union between all the ‘progressive’ opponents of the Umma Party, branding
it ‘the only stumbling block in the way of an enlightened Sudan, “Nasser style’”. See

Notes

355

also ‘Dispatch Khartoum to WDC on Sudanese Elections, March 28, 1958’. NACPM,
745W.00/3-2858, pp. 1-2. Just prior to the election, the Nasserists announced that they
would join with the Umma and Mahdist parties in return for an agreement affirming
Sudan’s non-alignment and adherence to ‘positive neutrality’. The internal political
situation quickly turned problematic when the PDP demanded half of the cabinet posts,
including the Ministry of the Interior for an ardent Nasserist, Ali Abdal al-Rahman. The
Umma rejected both the demand for cabinet posts and Rahman’s appointment, because
of his ‘leftist utterances and the strongly pro-Egyptian attitudes (that) made him
singularly ill-suited to that sensitive post’. All involved anticipated additional Nasserist
attempts to gain influence through the coalition government. See also ‘Middle East: Our
Edge in the Sudan’. Newsweek , 24 March 1958, p. 49. With pro-UAR elements now in
the government, most Western observers believed Nasser and ‘his Communist allies’
would ‘make mischief.

55 Macmillan, Riding the Storm , p. 503. See also Leonard Moseley’s Dulles: A Biography of
Eleanor, Allen, and John Roster Dulles and Their Tamily Network (New York: Dial/James
Wade, 1978), p. 412, an excellent analysis of the British view that Dulles had given the
green light for the Suez operation.

56 Dresch, Paul, A Histoy of Modem Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000,
p. 81. Imam Ahmad had ruled Yemen since the 1948 assassination of his father, Imam
Yahya. Imam Ahmad was quite the survivor, most probably because those closest to
him were not. Colin Reid of the London Daily Telegraph compiled a list of Imam Yahya’s
fourteen sons that survived childbirth. The list was reprinted in ‘And then there were
only. . .’. Newsweek , 18 February 1958, p. 39. It is instructive on the nature of Yemeni
internal politics, ordered from the oldest Ahmad to the youngest Abd-al-Rahman.
Ahmad became the Imam; Muhammad drowned (not easy in Yemen, without
assistance); Hassan was exiled; Hussein was murdered; Ali moved to Coventry (no
doubt motivated by self-preservation); Abdullah was beheaded; Qazim exiled; Mutahir
died in Cairo; Ibrahim disappeared; Ismail went ‘abroad’ and apparently stayed there;
Abbas was beheaded; Yahya disappeared; Muhsin was assassinated; and the youngest,
Abd-al-Rahman continued to live in Yemen. Interview with Lakeland, 23-24 September
2003. Following his tour in Cairo 1951-1955, Lakeland was given the post of Consul
General in Aden and accredited to the Imamate in Yemen. In November 1955, he
traveled to Ta’iz and then on to Hudaydah on the coast to meet with Imam Ahmad.
There was at the time no real road from either Ta’iz or Hudaydah to the capital in
Sanaa. Holding court in Hudaydah, the Imam, wearing a large turban, sat on a raised
dais and took petitions from his subjects. He had a unique filing system. When an issue
of importance came up, the Imam would jot down a few notes on a scrape of paper,
take off the turban, put the note inside the turban, and put the turban back on.
Lakeland missed Thanksgiving with his family in Aden that year because the Imam
decided that he needed ‘more exposure to Yemeni culture’ and refused to allow him to
depart until early December.

57 O’Ballance, Edgar, The War in Yemen. Hamden, CN: Archon, 1971, p. 59.

58 ‘British Legation Ta’iz, Yemen [Kemp] to FO [Riches], 31 December 1957’. PRO,
F0371/ 132962. Looking for help, the British Consul in Ta’iz reported that King Saud
had expressed his ‘deep concern’ over the presence of Soviet Communist in Yemen. See
also ‘Yemen: Grappling Demons’. Newsweek , 11 February 1957, pp. 45-46. Badr, in fact,
believed that with Soviet arms and Egyptian assistance the British could be driven from
Aden and the Protectorate. See also Yemen briefing provided to the members of the
Baghdad Pact, 17 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/132955. For Badr, the arms had an
additional purpose: distributed to his supporters, they would presumably ensure his
accession to the crown

59 ‘Minute [Riches] on US attitudes in Yemen, 20 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/132962.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

60 ‘British Legation Ta’iz [Kemp] to FO, 24 January 1958’. PRO, FO371/132950. See also
‘British Legation Ta’iz [Kemp] to FO [Fretwell], 1 January 1958’. PRO, FO371/132950.
The coup chronology is interesting and amusing. On December 28, 1957, Hadarani,
identified as the ‘Imam’s Court Poet and Jester’, appeared at the British Legation to tell
Kemp about a ‘plot to get rid of the Imam’. Also known as the Imam’s ‘spy and agent-
provocateur’, Hadarani excited Kemp’s concern that he and the British government
were about to be blamed for something. Hadarani told Kemp that the coup would bring
about ‘the accession of someone more reasonable than the Imam and Crown Prince
and would lead to the expulsion of the Communists and bring peace ... on the border
of the (Aden) Protectorate.’ Wary, Kemp told Hadarani: ‘All [Britain is] interested in [is]
the improvement of Anglo-Yemeni relations and ... the succession [is] the Yemenis’
own affair.’ This being Hadarani’s third visit, Kemp knew that something was definitely
up. Fretwell at the Eastern Department of the FO thought he knew Yemen well, and
told Kemp that he saw no cause for concern. In Ta’iz, Kemp had developed that
peculiar paranoia which comes from residing in Arabia Felix: the constant certainty that
something bad is about to happen — because it usually does. ‘British Legation Ta’iz
[Kemp] to FO, 24 January 1958’. PRO, FO371/132950. One of the plotters allegedly
had a letter on his person that implicated both the Americans and British.

61 ‘Minute [Fretwell] on coup report from Ta’iz, 28 January 1958’. PRO FO371/132950.

62 ‘Minute [Riches] on situation in Yemen, 9 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/132962.

63 ‘Minute [Riches] on US attitudes in Yemen, 20 January 1958’. PRO, F0371/132962.
The attempted coup was peculiarly Yemeni. In making their way down the street to the
palace in Ta’iz, the plotters were intercepted and arrested. The Yemenis of course
believed that the British and their friends the Americans were behind the coup.

64 ‘Press release communicated by US Embassy Damascus to the FO on Badr’s Syrian
Speech, 29 January 1958’. PR0, J F0371/132955

65 ‘Minute [Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar] on Yemen and the Commonwealth, 24 March
1958’. PRO, F0371/132973.

66 ‘Memorandum Sir H.|.B. Lintcott to Hoyer-Millar, 24 March 1958’. PRO,
F0371/132973. Lintcott wanted to inform the ‘Old Dominions’, get Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand on board, and then later follow-up with the ‘new’ dominions of
Pakistan and India, hoping that they would quietly acquiesce.

67 ‘Memo Eastern Dept FO [Riches] to Hayter, 30 April 1958’. PRO, F0371/132968.

68 ‘British Legation Ta’iz [Oldfield] to FO, 29 April 1958’. PRO, F0371/132952. This also
covered a rumor about the imminent demise of the Imam and Crown Prince Badr’s fall.
It was the Yemeni rumor-mill at its best.

69 ‘Minute [Fretwell] on UN role in Yemen conflict, 6 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/132968.
Fearing further pressure from Washington, and knowing the US contact to be
Muhammad al-’Amri, the Deputy Foreign Minister, the British attempted to undermine
his credibility. The British argued that ’Amri had consistently misrepresented their
position in order to get the Imam’s permission to talk to the British.

70 ‘British Legation Ta’iz [Oldfield] to FO, 18 June 1958’. PRO, F0371/132969.

71 ‘Minute [Fretwell], 23 June 1958’. PRO, F0371/132969.

72 ‘Letter Horace Phillips to Colonial Office [J.C. Morgan], 18 June 1958’. PRO,
F0371/132969. See also Phillips, Horace, Envoy Extraordinary: A Most Unlikely
Ambassador. London: Radcliffe, 1995; this is an interesting memoir on his career in the
colonial service. Phillips was a particularly interesting character. Having previously
served in Jidda, he became Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1968, at which point the
Jewish Chronicle ran a story about his appointment, including the fact that he was born to
a poor Jewish working-class family in Glasgow. At that point. King Feisal ordered his
credentials withdrawn and Phillips left Saudi Arabia.

73 ‘Minute [Fretwell], 22 July 1958’. PRO, FO371/132970.

Notes

357

74 Macmillan, Killing the Storm , p. 505. See also ‘Discussion 371st NSC Meeting, 3 July
1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 10, p. 11. ‘British Legation Ta’iz [Oldfield] to FO, 18
June 1958’. PRO, F0371/132969. In early July 1958, the Sultan of Lah’j, a member of
the Aden Confederation, defected to the Imam. It was unfortunate timing, occurring
only two weeks before the Iraqi coup. At the regular NSC meeting, Dulles reported the
incident saying: ‘The British . . . had suffered another reverse in the Aden area.
Approximately one-half of the British-trained army of the Sultanate of Lah’j had
defected to the Yemenis, taking with them valuable equipment.’ This added to the US
view that the British had lost their touch in the Middle East.

75 ‘Cairo [Hare] to WDC, 10 February 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, p. 424.

76 ‘WDC to Baghdad, 21 February 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, p. 431.

77 ‘Memcon with UAR Amb Ahmed Hussein, DOS, WDC, 3 March 1958’. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Volume XIII, p. 433.

78 Cairo [Hare] to WDC, 20 March 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 435-436.

79 ‘WDC to Cairo [Hare], 25 March 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 437-438.

80 ‘Cairo, to WDC, 17 April 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 442-446.
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 262-263. In his memoirs, Eisenhower fails to mention the
new policy toward Egypt. He refers to Nasser’s political leanings as ‘still something of a
mystery’ and briefly speaks of the ‘troubled and confused atmosphere’ at the close of
the Baghdad summit. See also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 502. Using similar words,
Macmillan stated that 1958 ‘proved the signal for a period of confusion and even
anarchy in which the Western powers were to become progressively involved’.

81 ‘Text of News Conference Held by Secretary Dulles’. New York Times, 9 April 1958, p.
10. Pressure had also been building in the press for a new policy approach to the Middle
East. The day before the press conference, C.L. Sulzberger, in an article entitled
‘Foreign Affairs: A Time for Diplomatic Calm’ ( New York Times, 7 April 1958, p. 20),
had addressed the issue of Arab nationalism: ‘There is no reason why the United States
should oppose the principle of Arab unity. Indeed, we appear to support the recent
Iraq-Jordan federation; we would not object to an eventual link between Morocco,
Tunisia and Algeria; and we inferentially blessed the Syrian-Egyptian union when we
recognized it. It might be wise for us once again to make some mild show of approval
for Nasser’s new state in order to demonstrate that it need not look only to Russia for
help and psychological sympathy. But we cannot go too far. We cannot abandon our
friends elsewhere now openly reviled by Cairo. What we must make plain is that while
we have no objection to Nasser’s confederation or to its extension through peaceful,
voluntary adherence by other lands, we cannot tolerate moves to expand it by
conspiracy or force. This need not be said by public declaration. We have tended to
make too many such statements in the past. They have a hollow ring.’

82 ‘Letter Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee [Humphrey] to Rountree, 9 April
1958’. NACPM, 611.86/4-958, p. 1.

83 ‘Letter Rountree to Humphrey, 17 April 1958’. NACPM, 611.86/4-958, pp. 1-2.

84 ‘USIA Beirut, to WDC, 11 April 1958’. NACPM, 611.86/4-1158, pp. 1-2.

85 Caruthers, Osgood ‘Nasser Calls a Halt to Attacks on U.S.’. New York Times, 15 April
1958, p. 1.

86 ‘WDC to London, 9 April 1958’. NACPM, 61 1.86/4-958, p. 2. See also ‘WDC to Cairo,
16 April 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 439-440 and footnote.

87 ‘Memo [Asst Sec NEA Rountree] to Dulles, 16 April 1958’. NACPM, 611.86/4-1658, p.
1. An article by Edward Weintal, ‘Behind-Scenes in Washington: A Change Toward
Nasser’ ( Newsweek , 21 April 1958, p. 53) concluded that the new policy ‘gamble’ had a
good chance of paying off with better relations and Egyptian gratitude for American
assistance.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

88 ‘WDC to US Embassies in the Middle East and Europe, 25 April 1958’. NACPM,
611.86/4-2558, pp. 1-2.

89 ‘Cairo, to WDC, 26 April 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, CDF, 611.86/4-2658,
Section I, p. 2. The United States only released Egyptian assets after the British and
French had done the same, but it was still viewed as a reaction to Nasser’s Moscow trip.

90 Ibid, Section III, p. 2.

91 ‘Russia - Our Dear Guest’. Time, 12 May 1958, p. 26.

92 Seale, Patrick, The Struck for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1965, pp. 70-71, 272-282. See also ‘Record of Conversation
between Dulles and Hammerskjold, 18 |une 1958’. PRO, F0371/134125.
Hammerskjold told Dulles that he believed that the Syrians really had more control over
the operations in Lebanon than the Egyptians. Hammerskjold felt that Nasser ‘was not
happy with the situation’ and wanted it to quiet down and wait for the elections, but
that Sarraj and the Syrians had their own ideas about the disposition of Lebanon. He
also felt that, left to their own devices, the Lebanese ‘genius for compromise’ would
work things out. See also, Copeland, Game, p. 237. This is not to say that Nasser would
have been unhappy with a pro-U.A.R. government in Beirut. To the contrary, it would
have been a major plus, but having supplied the arms and encouraged his new Syrian
partners to support the revolt, his control was probably limited at this point. Copeland
makes an interesting point about Chamoun. Chamoun ‘had been an “Arab” long before
Nasser ever heard the word; at the American University of Beirut, where intellectual
Arab nationalism was born, Chamoun had been an ardent advocate of Arab unity and
united Arab resistance to the rise of Zionism.’ In the 1950s, he became ‘disenchanted’
with the ‘Moslem politicians of the worst type’ who used Arab nationalism as a smoke
screen for supporting Nasserist ambitions. While Nasser probably agreed with
Chamoun’s concern over linking Arab nationalism and Islam, the Lebanese President’s
support of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the West in general made him a target for
subversion.

93 ‘Minute on UAR interference in Lebanon, 19 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118.

94 ‘Beirut to WDC, 7 May 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Lebanon/Jordan, Volume XI, pp. 32-
33.

95 ‘Beirut to WDC, 1 1 May 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 35-37 and ‘Telegram
Beirut [McClintock] to DOS, WDC, 11 May 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp.
38-40. Also see ‘Minute on U.A.R. interference in Lebanon, 19 May 1958’. PRO,
F0371/134118 for reference to the attack on the border post.

96 ‘Memo White House, WDC, 13 May 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 45-48.

97 ‘Minute FO [Rose] to British Embassy WDC, 20 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/1341 18.

98 ‘Amman to WDC, 30 June 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 294-296.

99 ‘British Embassy Beirut to the FO on US Ambassador in Cairo conversation with
Nasser, 22 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118.

100 ‘British Embassy Beirut [Middleton] to FO, 22 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118.

101 Copeland, Game, p. 207.

102 ‘Cairo to WDC, 16 June 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, p. 453.

103 ‘Cairo to WDC, 26 June 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIII, pp. 456-457.

104 ‘British Embassy Beirut to FO, 22 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/1341 18.

105 ‘Minute [Riches] attached to an assessment: The Middle East and Communism, 29
January 1958’. PRO, F0371/133146. See also ‘Memcon with J ordanian Ambassador, 28
March 1958’. PRO, F0371/133146. The Jordanian Ambassador complained to the FO
about pro-Nasserist statements in the British press, one of which stated: ‘the population
in Iraq and Jordan were in the very large majority in favour of Nasser.’ At the same
time, the Ambassador argued that the press ignored the ‘unanimous vote’ in the
Jordanian parliament for union with Iraq. Wanting at least to appear sympathetic, and

Notes

359

perhaps also concerned, die FO concluded that The Times’ diplomatic correspondent
was irresponsible and ‘one of Colonel Nasser’s abler propagandists’.

106 ‘British Embassy [Caccia] WDC to the FO, 21 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118.

Chapter 3

1 Rubenstein, Alvin, Red Star on the Nile. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977,
P- 5 -

2 Pack, Chester J. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1991, p. 162. In light of pronouncements against Nasser,
Pack and Richardson state that the Administration’s position on Suez was hypocritical
and inconsistent. Washington had overthrown the government of Iran, toyed with
subverting Nasser’s government, branded Nasser a ‘Middle East variety of international
Communism’, denounced the illegal nationalization of the Suez Canal, and preached the
dangers of radical nationalism in the Middle East to all who would listen. When the
opportunity to get rid of Nasser’s regime appeared, Eisenhower and Dulles failed to act,
for presumably domestic political reasons related to the election of 1956, use of the
Israelis, and personal pique at not being fully informed by the British and French.

3 ‘Minute FO [E.M. Rose] to British Embassy WDC, 20 May 1958’. PRO
F0371/134118.

4 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 511.

5 ‘Minister’s meeting on Lebanon chaired by Prime Minister Macmillan, 14 May 1958’.
PRO, F0371/134118.

6 Macmillan, RJding the Storm , p. 511.

7 Copeland, Game , pp. 231-233. Despite Chamoun’s ever shriller calls for support, the US
and Britain had managed to limit involvement to clandestine assistance. Then the
assassination of Nasib Metni, an effective, anti-Chamoun, pro-Nasser journalist,
elevated Chamoun to prime suspect. This set off an all-out revolt, fully aided and
abetted by Sarraj, the Syrian security and intelligence chief, and various anti-Chamoun
factions in Lebanon.

8 ‘FO and Whitehall to British Embassy WDC, 20 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118. The
British wanted to make sure that Canada and Australia were on board should a military
operation be mounted. Canberra and Ottawa wanted to bring in the UN, but London
demurred because ‘the State Department do not regard Lebanon’s claims of large scale
outside intervention as substantiated and doubt whether the Lebanon could make a case
against the U.A.R. in the Security Council.’ In other words, it was questionable whether
Nasserist Syria was the source of the problem or merely supporting pro-Nasserist
indigenous Lebanese.

9 ‘British Embassy WDC [Caccia] to FO, 21 May 1958’. PRO, F0371/134118.

10 ‘Discussion 366th NSC Meeting, 22 May 1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 10, p. 3.

11 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Macmillan, Washington, 9 June 1958’. DDEL, AWF,
International Series (IS) Box 24, Section One, p. 1. See also ‘WDC [Rountree] to
Amman and Baghdad, 12 June 1958’. DDEL, AWF, IS, Box 35, pp. 1-2. Macmillan
convinced Eisenhower to offer more support to Jordan and Iraq. This increased aid
included $25 million to cover Jordan’s entire share of the costs of Jordanian-Iraqi union
and part of Iraq’s share.

12 ‘Memocon Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, Washington, 9 June 1958’.
DDEL, Section Two, pp. 1, 3. During this meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for
NEA Rountree brought up the idea of replacing Chamoun with General Fuad Chehab,
the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army. While those present complained that Chehab
had ‘recently shown a lack of political astuteness’ — Chehab had made the West
unhappy by playing both sides in the Lebanese struggle — they concluded that Chehab
was one of the few acceptable candidates.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

13 ‘Minute FO [Rose] on Lebanon, 16 June 1958’. PRO, F0371/134125.

14 ‘British Embassy WDC [Hayter] on Conversation with Dulles, 24 June 1958’. PRO,
F0371/134125. See also ‘Minute on Hayter Telegram by Hoyer-Millar, 25 June 1958’.
PRO, F0371/134125. Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, the Permanent Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, stated: ‘It is, however, rather disquieting to see the rather wild
ideas ventilated by Mr. Dulles.’ See also ‘British Embassy WDC [Caccia] to FO, 25 June
1958’. PRO, F0371/134125 in which the British were clearly aghast at Dulles’
suggestion of getting the French, Turks, and even Pakistanis involved in any potential
Lebanese operation. ‘Memcon Selwyn Lloyd and Israeli Ambassador Elath, 2 May
1958’. PRO, F0371/134284. On May 2, 1958, Mr. Elath brought up the subject of
Nasser with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister. Asked what he thought, Lloyd
provided a revealing response: ‘[Nasser] suffered from schizophrenia: there was one
side of him which would like to have an accommodation with the West but there was
another which had dreams of a Middle Eastern and African Empire which could only
be procured at the expense of Western interests. As with all schizophrenics, one did not
know exactly what he was going to do, but on the whole one could assume that
anything he did would be nasty.’

15 ‘Memcon Dulles and Hammerskjold, 18 June 1958’. PRO, F0371/134125.
Hammerskjold warned Dulles that Charles Malik, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, was
difficult and unreliable: ‘At one moment screaming for action and the next wanting
nothing done at all. At the moment, he seemed to be trying to force a crisis so that the
Lebanese could call for Western intervention.’

16 ‘British Embassy Beirut [Middleton] to FO, 25 June 1958’. PRO, F0371/134125. In
making a case for outside intervention, Chamoun accused the UAR of providing the
funding and leadership for the Lebanese revolt. He argued that rebel forces in Lebanon
were actually Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian ‘volunteers’. In typical contradictory
fashion, Chamoun stated that after Cairo’s the 1957 attempt to undermine Jordan, he
knew Lebanon would be next; yet while he deplored Cairo’s action, he had no intention
of cutting off relations with the UAR.

17 ‘WDC to Cairo [Hare], 25 June 1958’. NACPM, NEA, 611.86/6-2458, pp. 1-2.

18 ‘Discussion 371st NSC Meeting, 3 July 1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 10, p. 11.

19 ‘Beirut to WDC, 1 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 190-193.

20 ‘Memo Lord Hood and Rountree, 3 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, p. 198.

21 ‘Beirut to WDC, 10 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, p. 205. General Chehab
had maintained strict neutrality in the civil conflict. As a result, the US administration
had difficulty understanding where he stood in the conflict. Washington had assumed
that Chehab, a Maronite Christian, would support Chamoun, but the Lebanese
imbroglio was not that simple. See also ‘Discussion 367th NSC meeting, 29 May 1958’.
DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 10, p. 3. Dulles believed that Chehab was ‘sitting on his
hands’ and not prosecuting the war against the rebels and insurgents vigorously. He was
afraid that Chehab’s failure to act would necessitate intervention.

22 ‘Dispatch Baghdad to WDC, 18 March 1958’. NACPM, NEA, 787.00/3-1858, p. 1. In
the Foreign Service cables are usually written so that the officer in question can always
argue that they were with right, or at least partially right. No doubt, in July 1958, A.
David Fritzlan, Counselor of the Embassy, would liked to have had this dispatch back
so that he could better choose his wording.

23 ‘Telegram from British Embassy Baghdad [Wright] to FO [Lloyd], 11 February 1958’.
PRO, F0371/134222.

24 Ibid.

25 ‘Minute FO [Rose] on Wright’s telegram and analysis, 21 March 1958’. PRO,
F0371/ 134222. See also ‘Minute on Wright’s telegram, 27 February 1958’. PRO,

Notes

361

F0371/1 34222, that gives a more detailed analysis of Kuwait’s role, including the fact
that it kept keep France and Britain supplied with oil during the Suez crisis.

26 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Macmillan, Washington, 9 June 1958’. DDEL, Section
Three, pp. 1-2. Macmillan learned of Nuri’s threat from Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Rountree during the 9 June meeting with Eisenhower. Sir Patrick Dean, a
Macmillan advisor, quickly downplayed Sa’id’s remarks: ‘Nuri wants money more than
he does Kuwait, which he can’t really expect to have by this weekend.’ See also
‘Dispatch British Legation Consulate Basra [Judd] to Baghdad [Falle], 23 June 1958’.
PRO, F0371/134199. Judd reported: ‘Anti-Union [with Jordan] feeling, never very
intense, seems to have given way to indifference as far as Jordan is concerned. Interest
in the possibility of Kuwait’s adhesion remains as strong as ever and any appearance of
luke-warmness on the part of Her Majesty’s Government in encouraging this would
cause great resentment. . . . The King, whether by good management or good luck, has
appeared as one bearing gifts to a province which has long been deprived of the fruits
of the oil it produces. The monarchy is probably more popular here than it has ever
been.’

27 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Wright] to FO [Lloyd], 11 February 1958’. PRO,
F0371/ 134222. Sir Michael Wright recommended the consideration of a ‘crash’
program to build a pipeline from Kirkuk to the Persian Gulf and a deepwater offloading
facility on the Fao Peninsula near Basra. He recommended that, as a stopgap measure,
London issue a clear declaration stating that any move against the pipeline in Syria or
Lebanon would be considered ‘an aggressive act’ and be met by ‘any available means’.

28 ‘Briefing on the Middle East Situation, 22 July 1958’. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (Historical Series ), Volume X, Eighty- Fifth Congress Second Session,
1958. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 561.

29 Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s
Old Fanded and Commercial Classes and of it Communists, Ba’thists and Free Officers. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 806. Batatu provides an outstanding analysis of
social and political movements in Iraq and how these movements and individuals
interacted to produce the July revolution of 1958. He suggests that ‘one must take a
wider view of things’ in order to understand the importance of elements other than the
military. The events of July 14 must be seen in their natural historical context. From this
perspective, they are the climax of the struggle of a generation of the middle, lower-
middle, and working classes. July 1958 was ‘the culmination of an underlying, deeply
embedded insurrectionary tendency of which the coup of 1936, the military movement
of 1941, the Wathbah of 1948, the Intifadah of 1952, and the risings of 1956 were other
manifestations’. The author believes that this class involvement is what made July 14th a
true revolution and not just another coup. Batatu views the coup as the product of class
struggle and irresistible historical forces; there is more than a little hindsight in this
evaluation. The coup was hardly inevitable; arguably it was the result of bad luck and
incompetence. It came as a big surprise, and it happened in an historical window that
allowed it to survive — it endured. It could have easily been just another of the many
failed Iraqi revolts.

30 Warner, Geoffrey, Iraq and Syria 1941. Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1974,
p. 86. According to Warner, the British were able to reestablish control in Iraq because
of the poor planning of the plotters, the lack of a solid military concept of operations,
no Axis support, and the escape of the regent, Abd-al-Tlah, Nuri Sa’id, and other key
pro-British elements. Also, in 1941 there was never any doubt in London of what the
course of action would be. Warner’s short book on the coup in Iraq and the following
campaigns in Iraq and Syria provides solid insight into the events in 1 941 that returned
Iraq to the British fold. In 1958, Qasim would argue that his ‘revolution’ was merely the
fulfillment of 1941. See also Lyman, Robert, Iraq 1941: The Battles for Basra, Habbaniyah,

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Fallujah, and Baghdad. London: Osprey, 2006. This provides an excellent overview of the
entire Iraqi campaign, including maps, diagrams, and pictures. The military analysis is
first-rate and the political analysis, although more limited, is also very good.

31 ‘Diary Entry [Eisenhower] on meeting with Churchill’. DDEL, 6 January 1953, pp. 5-6.
Eisenhower made his views clear on the British in the Middle East in his first meeting
with Churchill after the election.

32 ‘Minute FO [Wright] on Baghdad Coup, 26 July 1958’. PRO, FO371/133068. It should
be noted that Qasim met with ‘catastrophic success’, to quote Donald Rumsfeld, but
knew how to deal with it. See also ‘Telegram Baghdad to WDC, 11 August 1958’.
NACPM, 787.00/8-1158, p. 1. Qasim published a new series of laws: 23 articles divided
into two sections. The first dealt with plotting against the security of the state, and the
second with ‘corrupting’ the state. Plotting against the security of the state included:
‘bringing the country nearer to the danger of war’, ‘using or threatening to use the
armed forces against other Arab countries’, ‘plotting to overthrow existing regimes of
Arab countries or interfering in their internal affairs’, ‘giving refuge to plotters against
Arab governments’, and ‘attacking heads of Arab states through publications’. For
added leverage against political enemies, the new regime made the law retroactive back
to September 1 1939.

33 Macmillan, Riding the Storm , p. 510. See also ‘Despatch Baghdad to WDC, 7 August
1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, CDF, 787.00/8-758, pp. 1-8. This is an interesting
analysis of what the US Embassy believed to be prearranged ‘mob’ action in the
immediate aftermath of the coup. See also ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Wright] to FO
[Lloyd], 21 August 1958’. PRO, FO371/133068. Sir Michael Wright provided an
excellent narrative of events on 14 and 15 July in Baghdad. See also ‘British Embassy
Baghdad [Wright] to FO, 26 August 1958’. PRO, F0371/ 133068. This telegram
included a list of those being tried for crimes against the Iraqi people. These fell into
four categories: first, members of the Iraqi and Arab Union cabinets and the internal
security organizations; second, key military officers, including the Chief of Staff, his
deputy and various division and brigade commanders; third, press figures responsible
for attacks on Nasser; and fourth, supporters of the old regime in the Chamber of
Deputies.

34 Macmillan, Rddingthe Storm, p. 511.

35 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Dulles, Washington, 14 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XI, p. 209.

36 ‘Briefing on the Middle East Situation, 22 July 1958’. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume X, p. 572.

37 ‘Memo for Record, Washington, July 14, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 210-
211. The Pentagon suggested that planning also include also Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and the
West Bank. General Twining wanted a coordinated approach that included British,
Turkish, and Israeli participation. Cooler heads prevailed after Ambassador Frederick
Reinhardt pointed out that the scale of Western intervention would probably determine
the nature and scale of Soviet reaction.

38 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 270.

39 ‘Conference with Eisenhower, 14 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, p. 212.

40 ‘Beirut [McClintock] to WDC, 14 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, p. 214.

41 Ibid, pp. 214-215. In the course of the conversation, Eisenhower mused: ‘the most
strategic move would be to attack Cairo in present circumstances, but of course this
cannot be done.’ During the meeting, Vice-President Nixon, no doubt with an eye
toward the 1960 elections, urged the President to consult Congress and the Democrats.
Others present were reluctant to do this because they feared continued Democratic
criticism.

Notes

363

42 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 273. See also ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Wright] to FO, 15
July 1958’. PRO, F0371/134199. In Baghdad, the Western embassies braced for more
rioting on rumors of plans for intervention. Wright and US Ambassador Jernegan
sought assurances from the Iraqi security chief, Brigadier Ahram Ahhad, that foreigners
and foreign installations would be protected.

43 ‘Macmillan to Eisenhower, 14 July 1958’. DDEL, PPDDE, AWF, IS, Box 22, pp. 2-3.

44 ‘Eisenhower to Macmillan, 18 July 1958’. DDEL, Box 22, p. 2. Remembering 1954,
Eisenhower commented that India would have issues with the US providing Pakistan
with additional military aid.

45 ‘Memcon Dulles and Foreign Secretary Lloyd, Washington, 17 July 1958’. DDEL, Box

22, p. 1.

46 Nutting, Nasser, pp. 239-243. Murphy, Robert, Diplomat among Warriors. New York:
Doubleday, 1964, p. 458. See also ‘Briefing on the Middle East Situation, 29 July 1958’.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume X, pp.
645-651. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Allen Dulles,
Director of the CIA, stated: ‘Nasser was taken by surprise by the timing of the plot, but
according to the reports we have, not by the fact that the plot existed.’ Dulles provided
a fairly accurate account of what actually happened, emphasizing the impromptu, now-
or-never aspect of Qasim’s move. He also added that the Iraqi government had been
much more lax about security than the weaker governments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia,
and this accounted for their survival. To his credit, Dulles told the senators: ‘I do not
foresee this movement so sweeping over this as to lead to any permanent United Arab
world going from the Atlantic to the Tigris and Euphrates. . . . There are elements of
unity but there are great elements of divergence. You take Iraq. I do not believe for a
minute, even the present government, which has many of Nasser’s followers in it, has
any idea of turning over its oil resources to Nasser.’ This view undoubtedly was based
on the British evaluation of the situation after it had filtered through the State
Department and CIA.

47 ‘Minute FO [Riches] on Iraq, 14July 1958,’ PRO, FO371/132502.

48 Stephens, Nasser, pp. 293-295.

49 ‘Memo from Director INR Cummings], to Dulles, 5 November 1958’. NACPM, CDF,
NEA, 787.00/11-558, p. 1.

50 ‘Memo INR [Gumming] to Dulles, 25 November 1958,’ FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XII, p. 353.

51 ‘Memo INR [Cummings] to Dulles, 5 November 1958’. NACPM, 787.00/11-558, p. 1.

52 ‘Memo Rountree NEA to Acting Secretary of State Dillon, 22 December 1958’. FRUS,
1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 370.

53 ‘Memo INR (Cummings) to Dulles, 5 November 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XII, p. 352.

54 Nutting, Nasser, p. 244.

55 ‘British Embassy Beirut to FO and Whitehall, 4 August 1958’. PRO, F0371/134313.
Eisenhower’s special envoy, Robert D. Murphy, related his conversation with Ben-
Gurion to the British Ambassador in Beirut, Sir F.B.A. Randall. Murphy stated that he
believed that the Israeli ‘provision’ for the Arab population of the West Bank really
meant that ‘most of them would be driven out ahead of the Israeli army.’ See also
‘British Embassy Tel Aviv to FO, 19 August 1958’. PRO, F0371/134286. In this
report on a conversation with Golda Mier, the Israeli Foreign Minister, the Embassy
related Tel Aviv’s intentions of moving into the West Bank in the event of a collapse in
Jordan. Randall, the British Ambassador, stated that he believed that the Israelis might
have second thoughts about such a move: ‘The [Israeli] Government must realise that
they cannot get away again with driving 800,000 Arabs into Transjordan nor control

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

them if they stay.’ Randall also discounted US fears that an Israeli seizure of the West
Bank would bring a general Middle Eastern war, simply because Nasser was not ready.

56 ‘British Embassy Beirut to FO, 6 August 1958’. PRO, F0371/134313. Washington
took the Ben-Gurion statements seriously, and informed the Israeli Ambassador in
Washington that ‘the Israel Government could not expect any support from the United
States Government if they took such action.’ The Israeli Embassy tried to explain that
Ben-Gurion’s remarks had been off-the-cuff, and did not represent a policy statement.
Nevertheless, Nasser could not help but take heed of any Israeli threat and of the
bellicose editorials in the Israeli press. See also ‘British Embassy WDC [Hood] to FO
and Whitehall, 8 August 1958’. PRO, F0371/134313. British discomfiture at not being
taken into Washington’s confidence on the initial approach to the Israelis was
interesting. Also see ‘British Embassy Tel Aviv to FO, 6 August 1958’. PRO,
F0371/134313 and ‘FO to British Embassy WDC, 7 August 1958’. PRO,
F0371/134313, for more on their ‘surprise’ that ‘the Americans should apparently be
keeping us in the dark over a question which, since it was the subject of a personal letter
from Mr. Dulles, is presumably of some importance.’

57 ‘FO to the British UN Mission, 18 August 1958’. PRO, F0371/134313. When
questioned on the subject, Dulles stated that he refused to warn the Israelis formally
against intervening in that he saw no reason to ‘save Nasser any territory’ in the event of
a coup or revolution in Amman. Just the same, the US refused to be a party to any
Israeli occupation. ‘Memcon Armin Meyer, NEA, and Yohanan Meroz, Israeli
Embassy, WDC, 7 November 1958, pp. 1-2. For months after the Ben-Gurion
statement, the Israelis continued to try to clarify what he ‘really meant’. ‘Meroz stated
that Israel’s basic hope and expectation is that the status quo in Jordan can be
preserved. If, however, there should be a “profound change” in Jordan or a change
which could be termed a takeover of the country by outside forces, Israel has made
clear that this would five rise to very acute problems for her.’ Meroz wanted to know
the US position on this. Meroz included the assassination of King Hussein or the
establishment of a UAR republic. Meyer told Meroz that ‘aggressive military action by
Israel on the West Bank would not be in Israel’s best interest.’ Meroz had supported a
hard line against the Arabs for his entire two-year tenure in Washington.

58 ‘Cabinet Meeting (Minnich), 18 July 1958’. DDEL, AWF, IS, Box 11, pp. 1-4. Quoting
Lenin, Dulles discussed the Soviet use of nationalism and colonialism to influence the
developing world. He stated that the Soviet Union had three great advantages in the
Middle East. First, they had Israel as an issue to use with the Arabs. Second, the West
needed oil and had to support the traditional regimes that owned most of it. Third, ‘the
USSR has a real asset in the personality of Nasser — who with great ability and
fanaticism has given voice to the extreme pan- Arab movement. Nasser is the hero who
has walked upon the stage which has been set ...’ presumably by the Russians. Dulles
made the point that from 1953 to 1955, the US had ‘tried to work with Nasser’.

59 ‘What Now?’ ( Nation , 2 August 1958, pp. 42-43) concluded that ‘Anglo-American oil
operations have been a prime cause of revolutionary ferment in the East’ and that ‘Arab
nationalism has grown in more or less direct ratio to oil exports.’ It cited the dangers of
‘Nasserism’ but stated that ‘we should stop trying to force the Arab peoples to “choose
sides” in the cold war and that we should accept Arab neutrality.’ See also Geoffrey
Barraclough ‘Anarchy of the Jungle’ ( Nation , 2 August 1958, pp. 44-45), which states:
‘For the United States, the Iraq revolution was a question of heads you win, tails I lose.’
Barraclough, Professor of International History in the University of London, added:
‘Where there is no policy, there can be only expedients. Because Mr. Dulles squandered
the unique opportunities to build up good relations with the Arab world which America
enjoyed on the morrow of the Suez War.’ The author equated intervention in Lebanon
and Jordan with the Soviet intervention in Hungary, stating that in all three instances a

Notes

365

‘tottering regime without popular support is being upheld by foreign arms. ... In all
three cases, intervention was due not to considered policy but to blind fear and the lack
of a viable policy; it stemmed from the failures of the preceding years and months.’ The
article argued that America had ‘no conceivable grounds for conflict with Nasser’ or
with Arab nationalism. Barraclough represented a left-of-center view of the situation,
but the views from right of center were hardly less critical. An article entitled ‘Where
Do We Go from Here?’ (Newsweek, 28 July 1958, pp. 15-16) called the intervention a
‘desperate risk’ with ‘not a moment to spare’ to save Jordan and Lebanon, ‘friendly
nations which were being torn from their roots to be delivered into the eager hands of
Egypt’s empire-hungry Nasser’. The article advocated encouraging moderate Arab
nationalism that did not threaten regional stability. In the same edition, ‘The Clock
Struck 2’ (Newsweek, 28 July 1958, pp. 23-24) attacked Allen Dulles’ management of the
CIA. ‘Not only was the news [from Iraq] momentous: the fact that it came as a surprise
to Dulles and his CIA represented a sorry failure of U.S. intelligence’. See also Edward
Weintal (‘Intelligence Disaster in Iraq’. Newsweek, 4 August 1958, p. 20), lamenting the
loss of Baghdad Pact intelligence files.

60 ‘London [Whitney] to Dulles, 16 July 1958’. NACPM, 787.00/7-1658, p. 2.

61 ‘Memcon Dulles and Lord Hood, 15 July 1958’. NACPM, 787.00/7-1658, p. 1. Dulles
complained to Lord Hood about a ‘great lack of information’, revealing that the US was
unclear about British intensions in Iraq and Jordan. Speculation was that the British
might intervene.

62 ‘Australian Embassy WDC [Beale] to DEA Canberra [Menzies and Casey], 18 July
1958’. No. 1233, NNA, DEA, A1838/269, TS854/10/13/20 (Security Council Iraq),
pp. 1-4. Selwyn Lloyd presented these views to Australian Ambassador Beale, Canadian
External Affairs Minister Sidney Smith, Canadian Ambassador to Washington Norman
Robertson, and Lord Hood, the British Charge.

63 ‘Minute FO [Riches] to Hayter, 14 July 1958’. PRO, FO371/132502. Riches’ career in
the Middle East and Horn of Africa dated back to 1934.

64 ‘Aden [Luce] to Colonial Office [J.C. Morgan], 18 July 1958’. PRO, F0371/ 132502. Sir
William Luce, the Governor General in Aden, endorsed these comments from two
members of the Legislative Council in Aden, named Bashraheel and Bayoomi, and sent
them on to London. Colonial Office officials saw this as evidence of ‘another strain in
Arab society which is not dazzled by the glory of Nasser, and realises where the true
interests of the Arabs as a whole lie’. These two men were co-opted and supported by
the British government in Aden, and were hardly unbiased observers.

65 ‘Minutes on Aden Telegram [Luce] dated 18 July to CO [Morgan], 24 July 1958’. PRO,
F0371/1 32502. In reacting to Luce’s views, the FO attempted to placate the Colonial
Office by being ‘as politic as possible without telling a straight lie’.

66 ‘Baghdad [Rockwell] to WDC, 16 July 1958,’ NACPM, 787.00/7-1658, p. 2.

67 ‘Discussion 373rd NSC Meeting, 24 July 1958’. DDEL, AWF, NSC, Box 10, pp. 3-4, 9.
Allen Dulles often failed to get justifiable credit for his long-term projections because of
his pronouncements on near-term events. For example, to Dulles, meetings between
the Emir of Kuwait and Nasser signaled that Kuwait might join the UAR, when in fact,
the Emir merely sought leverage against Iraq. See also Tripp, Charles, A. History of Iraq.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 177.

68 ‘373rd NSC Meeting’. Box 10, p. 6. A debate took place about previous policy that not
joining ‘pacts with indigenous countries was a very undesirable concept’. The coup in
Iraq sparked real concern that Iran might be next, and drove sentiment for the US to
more closely align with Tehran as a further guarantee against just such an occurrence.

69 Weintal, Edward ‘Intelligence Disaster in Iraq’. Newsweek, 4 August 1958, p. 20.

70 ‘Discussion 374th NSC Meeting, 1 August 1958’. DDEL, Box 10, pp. 6-10. This NSC
meeting was a particularly interesting one. First, Dulles expressed his surprise that all

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the members of the Baghdad Pact encouraged the US to recognize the new regime in
Iraq. Vice-President Nixon went so far as to postulate that perhaps the United States
should consider encouraging ‘our friends not to align themselves too openly with the
West; we may have to support independent national neutralism.’ The frustration came
through when Dulles referred to Nasser as being ‘like Hitler’ and when he described
Nasser’s ambitions as ‘insatiable’, despite the underlying desire to work something out
with the Egyptian leader.

71 ‘Intelligence and State Department Synopsis of Events, 23 July 1958’. DDEL, AWF,
Diary Series, Box 34, p. 1.

72 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO [Hadow], 30 October 1958’. PRO,
F0371/ 134021. Sir Charles did not like Rifai’ because Rifai’ was pro-American and did
not take Sir Charles into his confidence. Johnston believed that British Embassy in
Washington and the FO were too affected by US pessimism regarding traditional
regimes, and tended to overlook Washington’s infatuation with Nasser. See also ‘Letter
from British Embassy WDC [Morris] to FO [Hadow], 13 October 1958’. PRO,
FO371/134021, in which Willie Morris precipitated Johnston’s rebuttal letter by stating
that the US was more than happy to let Britain handle Jordanian affairs, until the Glubb
dismissal and the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Morris believed that
Dulles and Eisenhower viewed the survival of Jordan as not only important, but also a
realistic possibility, while NEA believed that British military support for the Amman
regime was only a ‘reprieve’ in the process that would lead ‘inevitably’ to collapse.

73 ‘Memcon with Eisenhower, 24 July 1958’. DDEL, AWF, Diary Series, Box 35, pp. 1-3.
See also ‘Telegram from British Embassy WDC to FO, 9 September 1958’. PRO,
F0371/134279, in which the Eisenhower administration expressed its frustration at
being handicapped by British colonialism and by Zionism. Dulles described Israel as a
‘millstone around his neck’, stating that ‘except for Israel we could form a viable policy’
in the Middle East. See ‘Memcon with Eisenhower, 24 July 1958’. DDEL, Box 35, p. 1,
in which Dulles commented: ‘Israel is a hostage held against us.’ In ‘British Embassy
Tel Aviv to FO, 19 July 1958’. PRO, F0371/134284, the British expressed concern that
Ben-Gurion would use the Jordanian situation and British over- flights to extract new
formal treaty arrangements from the West, guaranteeing Israel’s frontiers and a supply
of advanced weaponry. Fearing that Washington might agree, the British encouraged
the US to resist Israeli demands for a guarantee of Israel’s territorial integrity, and for a
formal agreement recognizing Israel’s unilateral claim to assistance. The British urged
Washington to maintain a ‘free hand’ on the basis of its current relationship with Israel.

74 ‘British Emb Baghdad [Wright] to FO [Lloyd], 9 October 1958’. PRO, F0371/133070.

75 ‘Discussion 386th NSC Meeting , 13 November 1958’. DDEL, NSC, Box 10, p. 2.

76 ‘Discussion 384th NSC Meeting, 31 October 1958’. DDEL, Box 10, p. 13.

77 Ibid, pp. 16-17. The modifications included a statement on improving US-Yemen
relations to counteract Soviet penetration there. In addition, there was an
acknowledgement of the problem of the British in Aden. The US would ‘seek to lend
good offices to the extent possible to improve United Kingdom-Yemen relations.’

78 ‘Attachment Discussion 384th NSC Meeting, 31 October 1958’. DDEL, Box 10, p. 1.

79 ‘INR [Cummings] to Dulles on Iraq, 4 December 1958’. NACPM, GRD059, NEA,
CDF, 787.00/12-458, p. 2.

80 ‘Memo on Iraq to Cummings, 23 December 1958’. NACPM, 787.00/12-2358, pp. 1-2.

81 ‘Discussion 392nd NSC Meeting, 23 December 1958’. DDEL, Box 10, p. 2. See also
‘British Embassy Baghdad [Crawford] to Consulate Kirkuk [Brown], 5 November
1958’. PRO, FO371/133073. In this message, Crawford discusses in detail the strong
Communist opposition to any formal alignment with Cairo. In a communique, the Iraqi
Communist Party stated: ‘But the fact indicates day after day that those calling for the
union did not give up their call, but on the contrary, they exploited their sharing in

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367

power using the press and radio as well as all the other capabilities for continuing in
their call. We have received some confirmed information as we hear also different
statements indicating that they are actually heading for measures to be taken
preliminarily for the realization of the plan [union with the UAR] .... They are working
in isolation from the people in order to take the nationalist forces and the masses by
surprise and place them before the fact within a short time.’ The Communists went on
to state that they viewed a ‘federal union’ like that between Yemen and the UAR as the
proper relationship, and not unification. The declaration went on to argue that the
union between Egypt and Syria had its problems as well.

82 ‘Memo NEA [Rountree] to Acting [Dillon], 22 December 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 370. By the end of 1958, Nasser had concluded that the real threat to
his leadership of the Arab nationalist movement and to his vision for the UAR lay in
Baghdad. In discussions with Rountree, Nasser offered ‘a scarcely-veiled invitation to
collaborate on Iraq’. See also ‘Discussion at the 39nd NSC Meeting, 23 December
1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 372-374. In reporting on his visit to
Baghdad, Rountree stated that the Communist-controlled press attacked with equal
ferocity any hint of a Qasim-Nasser or Qasim-U.S. rapprochement. He also stated that
Soviet aid to Egypt and the state of UAR-Iraq relations contributed to a real ‘conflict of
interests’ for Nasser. Rountree also briefly discussed the widely-held belief in Baghdad,
which the Communists fostered, that both the US and the UAR were plotting against
the Qasim regime.

83 ‘London [Barbour] to Dulles, 15 December 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, CDF,
787.00/12-1558, p. 2.

84 ‘Statement of policy and options by Sir Roger Bentham Stevens, Deputy Under Sec FO,
9 December 1958’. PRO, FO371/133093.

85 ‘FO Statement of policy in the Middle East [C.A.E. Shuckburgh], 24 August 1958’.
PRO, F0371/1 32454. The FO assumed that Washington had a contingency plan to
take and hold Dhahran if necessary, and felt that Washington expected London to
maintain its position in the Persian Gulf and Kuwait.

86 ‘British Embassy WDC [Morris] to FO [Hadow], 7 November 1958’. PRO,
FO371/133086.

87 ‘FO Minute on Telegram from British Embassy WDC [Morris], 19 November 1958’.
PRO, FO371/133086.

Chapter 4

1 Ranelagh, John, The Agency: The Rase and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1986, pp. 316, 651.

2 Bill, Eagle and the Eton, pp. 113-116. Bill points out that during the Eisenhower years, the
US provided over $1 billion in economic and military aid to the Shah’s regime. This
investment was critical to the Shah’s survival. Bill faults this investment as misguided.
He believes the aid allowed the US to control Iranian foreign policy and fostered
corruption instead of progress. Along with others, Bill argues that this aid was the basis
for the animosity of Iranian nationalists toward the US, and that this animosity led
directly to 1979. Bill sees US policy as the source for emphasis or imbalance in
assistance toward military and security functions. This popularized view of
Eisenhower’s policy simply fails to give credit where credit is due. The Eisenhower
administration was as concerned as the Kennedy administration and latter-day critics
about the Shah’s insecurities, his paranoia, and his preoccupation with military aid. Prior
to 1958, Washington pressed for reforms, hoping to see the Shah’s rule evolve into a
stable constitutional monarchy. After 1958, the fear of another ‘Baghdad’ placed the
initiative increasingly in the hands of the Shah, making it more difficult to ignore his
priorities. Over the course of this study, we will see how the relationship between the

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Shah and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations evolved into one dominated by
the Shah’s preoccupation with military aid.

3 Interview with Walt Rostow, October 2001, Austin, Texas.

4 ‘Dispatch Consulate Meshed [Thomas Cassilly] to WDC, 26 July 1955’. NACPM,
GRDOS59, NEA, CDF, 788.00/7-2655, p. 2. For evidence of Anglo-American
pressure on the Shah for reform, see also ‘WDC to Tehran, 9 July 1955’. NACPM,
788.00/7-955, p. 1. In this telegram, Washington instructed the Embassy to press the
Shah over the ‘ineffective manner Government handling task organizing economic
program and general lack firmness in managing Government affairs’. The British made
a parallel approach, and Washington cautioned the US Embassy not to leave the
impression with the Shah that London and Washington were joining forces against him.

5 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 4 September 1955’. NACPM, 788.00/9-455, p. 1.

6 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 23 January 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/1-2356, p. 1.
The Iranian government arrested, tried, and executed members of the Fedayan-e-Islam,
whom it believed had been responsible for the assassination of General Ali Razmara on
March 7, 1951. Razamara’s assassination led almost immediately to the assumption of
power by the National Front under Musaddiq and to the nationalization of foreign oil
assets. By early 1956, the Shah felt strong enough to open a broad investigation of
events surrounding the assassination and to arrest those responsible. These arrests
included that of Ayatollah Kashani, who had issued a fativah calling Razmara an ‘enemy
of Islam’. Rumors floated around Tehran that the swift trials, the executions, and the
death of one witness ‘shot while trying to escape’, were to cover up ‘palace’ contacts
with the Fedayan prior to Razmara’s assassination. This indicated the Shah’s growing
confidence, because the government had up to then been unwilling to tackle the
problems associated with an investigation of the assassination, despite pressure from
the military. See also Ladjevardi, Habib ‘Constitutional government and reform under
Musaddiq’ and Akhavi, Shahrough, ‘The role of the clergy in Iranian politics, 1949-
1954’. In Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil ’ pp. 69-90, 91-117.

7 ‘Tehran [Chapin] to WDC, 23 August 1955’. NACPM, 788.00/8-2358, pp. 2-3.

8 ‘Discussion 296th NSC Meeting, 6 September 1956’. DDEL, Box 8, p. 1. NSC staff
expressed concern that any British or French action against Nasser over Suez would
lead to more Soviet pressure on Iran. In order to obtain more aid, the Shah busily
stoked fear in Washington of Soviet efforts to ‘neutralize’ Iran.

9 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 26 March 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/3-2656, pp. 3-4.

10 Dispatch Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 26 March 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/3-2656, pp. 4, 7.
See also, ‘Dispatch Tehran [Bowling] to WDC, 28 May 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/5-2856,
p. 3. It should be noted here that Bowling would become a important figure in US-
Iranian policy in the Kennedy administration. In this report, the Embassy discussed a
growing list of complaints against the Shah’s government, related to rising prices, free
elections, and foreign influence. ‘Both the Parliament and Cabinet are full of British
stooges.’ ‘This is the government of the thousand families; the rich get richer and the
poor get poorer.’ ‘We gave our oil back to the foreigners, but in return Ebtehaj is lining
the pockets of the foreigners in return for things like strategic roads and airfields.’
Iranians also voiced strong criticism that the infrastructure improvements were aimed at
projects useful to the Baghdad Pact and the military alliance with the West. See also,
‘Dispatch Tehran [Bowling] to WDC, 11 September 1956’. NACPM, 788.13/9-1156, p.
4. In this discussion, Bowling viewed the end of martial law in Tehran and the
establishment of a new security agency headed by General Bakhtiar as ‘reform’.

11 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Campbell] to WDC, 15 August 1956’. NACPM, 788.13/8-1556, pp.
1-3, and ‘Dispatch Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 1 September 1956’. NACPM, 788.13/9-
156, p. 1-8. These dispatches contain detailed reports on the reforms in the Foreign

Notes

369

Ministry, the Information Office, and the Justice Ministry. They point out that the old
‘conservative’ families would be hardest hit by these reforms.

12 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 26 March 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/3-2656, p. 3.

13 ‘Dispatch from U.S. Embassy Tehran to WDC, 17 October 1956’. NACPM, GRDOS —
59, NEA, CDF 1955-1959, 888.00/10-1756 (Box 4963), p. 2.

14 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 26 March 1956’. NACPM, 788.00/3-2656, p. 9.

15 ‘Tehran [Chapin] to WDC [Dulles], 25 July 1957’. NACPM, 788.00/7-2457, pp. 1-2. See
also ‘Memcon Grant E. Mouser [GTI] and Iranian Ambassador Dr. Ali Amini, 20
August 1957’. NACPM, 788.00/8-2057, p. 2. Many senior officials in the Iranian
government shared this view of the Shah. Dr. Ali Amini, the Iranian Ambassador in
Washington, stated that he had attempted to convince the Shah to work through his
ministers so that they would take the blame for failures. The Shah refused. He was
determined to take charge personally and to run the government himself. Dr. Amini
attributed the Shah’s refusal to take advice to the monarch’s ‘fear’ of most prominent
Iranians. In Amini’s opinion, ‘this was perhaps the basic flaw in the Shah’s character.’ In
addition, Dr. Amini described the Plan Organization as being in ‘chaos’ and requiring
‘drastic measures’. During his sojourn as Ambassador in Washington, Amini learned a
great deal about what US officials wanted to hear vis-a-vis stability in Iran and the
Shah’s rule. To some degree, by telling official Washington what they wanted to hear,
the Ambassador constructed his own American constituency. This would have very
important future consequences.

16 ‘Dispatch from U.S. Embassy Tehran [Clock] to WDC, 20 July 1956’. NACPM,
GRDOS - 59, NEA, CDF 1955-1959, 788.00/8-2057 (Box 3811), p. 1.

17 Ibid. Embassy reporting attributed the Shah’s lack of confidence and lack of success to
two factors: ‘(1) The Shah is indecisive to an alarming degree; he does not seem to have
the ability to make up his own mind. The formidable image of Reza Shah dominates
him and he seeks to imitate it; yet his personal characteristics inhibit. (2) The Shah is
probably the most isolated man in this country. He has no personal staff he feels he can
trust and his most frequent contacts are with a corrupt ineffective Court group, which
seeks to influence him in its own personal behalf. The wide variety of opinions, rumors,
and suggestions which pour in on him in this isolation combined with an innate
tendency to intrigue continually probably leave him hopelessly confused and unsure of
whom to trust.’ Although these interpretations of the Shah became the standard fare of
his Western detractors, the apparent vacillations and indecision, real and contrived, may
in fact have worked in the monarch’s favor. The Shah was attempting to placate
political constituencies as diverse as the make-up of Iran itself. It was simply impossible.
Whether by design or merely scrambling for survival, the Shah managed to keep his
opposition divided and his foreign benefactors placated in what was a careening drive
toward modernization. Even the end of the dynasty in 1979 was something of an
accident, that could have gone in any direction, including that of the Peacock Throne’s
survival.

18 Ibid, p. 3.

19 ‘Memcon Mouser [GTI] and Ambassador Amini, 20 August 1957’. NACPM, 788.00/8-
2057, pp. 1-3. Making a similar statement about economic aid, Amini stated that
increasing oil revenue probably alleviated Iran’s need for economic aid, but that the
withdrawal of US aid would create a ‘psychological and political problem’. See also
‘Dispatch Tehran [Stelle] to WDC, 4 January 1958’. NACPM, 888.00/1-458, p. 5.

20 ‘Dispatch FO [Lloyd] to Dulles, 6 December 1957’. NACPM, GRDOS — 59, Office of
GTI, Records of the Iranian Affairs Desk 1958-1963 (Iran Desk 1958-1963), 1958
Status of Forces thru 1960 - 3-A/l Military Assistance (MilAsst), Box 1, pp. 2, 9. Pegov
was Soviet Ambassador to Iran until 1963, and later became Soviet Ambassador to
India during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

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21 ‘INR [Dreessen] to GTI [Mouser], 17 January 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59, GT1, Iran,
MilAsst, Box 1, p. 2.

22 Streit, Peggy and Streit, Pierre ‘Close-Up of the Foreign Aid Dilemma’. New York Times,
13 April 1958, p. 10. The Streits evaluated a small, impoverished Iranian village where a
USAID program had improved wheat production by 200 per cent. Because of the land-
tenure system, the landlord who supplied the land, the seed, the water, and the ‘beasts
of burden’ received 80 per cent of the proceeds while the laborers received only 20 per
cent.

23 ‘British Emb Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 28 January 1958’. PRO, FO371/133013.

24 ‘Tehran [Dulles] to WDC, 26 January 1958,’ NACPM, 888.00/1-2658, pp. 1-2.

25 ‘British Emb Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 27 January 1958’. PRO, FO371/133013.

26 ‘British Emb Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 28 January 1958’. PRO, FO371/133013.

27 ‘British Embassy Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 27 January 1958’. PRO,
FO371/133013. See also ‘British Embassy Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 28 January
1958’. PRO, FO371/133013.

28 ‘Tehran [Dulles] to WDC, 26 January 1958’. NACPM, 888.00/1-2658, pp. 1-2. See also
‘Minute by David West FO on Dulles visit to Iran, 12 February 1958’. PRO,
FO371/133013, in which the FO credits the Dulles visit to Tehran with heading off the
Shah’s ‘dark hints’ about withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact.

29 ‘WDC [Dulles] to Tehran [Chapin] Message for the Shah of Iran, 27 February 1958’.
NACPM, 788.11/2-1758, p. 1. See also ‘Memo White House [B.G A.J. Goodpaster] to
DOS [Fisher Howe], 17 February 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/2-1758, p. 1. See also ‘Letter
from the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Irwin] to NEA [Rountree], 16 April 1958’.
NACPM, 788.1 1/4-1658, p. 1. The Shah’s schedule included visits to Taiwan and Japan
prior to his arrival in Washington. This raised concerns that the large-scale military
programs in those countries would bring more ‘exorbitant’ demands from Tehran for
military assistance. The concern was so acute that the Pentagon asked for guidance
from the State Department. The Acting Assistant Secretary, John Irwin, stated: ‘I think
it would be wise if we dispatched a joint State-Defense message to all U.S. civilian and
military officials with whom the Shah might come in contact during this visit in the
Pacific area, fully apprising them of our position regarding additional aid to Iran.’ See
also ‘Letter NEA [Rountree] DOD [Irwin], 22 April 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/4-2258, p.
1. Rountree concurred that alerting civilian and military officials to ‘the problem’ of the
Shah would be a good idea, but he added: “While we want to avoid any ostentatious
display of U.S. military aid in the countries through which the Shah will pass enroute to
the United States, I do believe that it would be useful if we could find means of
demonstrating to him the potential U.S. strength in the Pacific area and what it means
to the protection of the Free World.’ See also ‘Letter Deputy Secretary of State
[Murphy] to Assistant Secretary of Defense [Mansfield Sprague], 6 June 1958’.
NACPM, 788.11/6-658, p. 1, in which a military program had been agreed upon for the
Shah. It included naval demonstrations. Strategic Air Command briefings, and plane
rides.

30 ‘Minute FO [D.J. West] to Selwyn Lloyd, 15 April 1958’. PRO, F0371/133006.

31 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 8 June 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/4-1658, Section 2, p. 2.

32 ‘Memo Dulles to Eisenhower, 28 June 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/6-2858, p. 1. See also
‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 8 June 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/4-1658, p. 1. This telegram
details some of the problems that the Eisenhower administration had with the Shah’s
unrealistic requests for military aid. A lack of trained personnel was the critical issue.
For example, the Shah asked for two destroyers despite the fact that the commander of
the Iranian Navy privately told the Embassy that he could not crew more than one
corvette.

Notes

371

33 ‘Memo NEA to Eisenhower on visit by Shah of Iran, 23 June 1958’. NACPM,
788.11/6-2358, p. 2.

34 ‘Dulles to Tehran, 7 July 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/7-758, p. 1.

35 ‘Memcon Shah and Eisenhower, 1 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 574.

36 ‘Dulles to Tehran, 7 July 1958’. NACPM, 788.11/7-758, p. 2. This message from
Washington failed to quote the Shah exacdy, calling his political philosophy ‘positive
nationalism’ instead of ‘constructive nationalism.’

37 ‘Memcon the Shah and Eisenhower, 1 July 1958’. FRUS , 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp.
572-573. The Shah commented that Nasser ‘was essentially a conspirator and was
motivated by “wrong doing’”. In the conversation, Dulles made a surprisingly
sophisticated comparison between pan-Germanism and pan-Arabism: German
romanticism had clearly influenced the pan- Arab movement. The Shah then began to
talk about Nasser’s Philosophy of the Revolution as a parallel to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Their
processes in this regard were interesting, and Dulles’ fascination with comparing Hitler
and Nasser belied a more sophisticated grasp of Nasser’s predicament. In fact, the
impression emerges at times that Dulles’ theories in conversations with other leaders
were more the arguments of a lawyer attempting to sway a jury than they were his own
personal view of the situation.

38 ‘Tehran to WDC, 15 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 575 (footnote).

39 ‘WDC to Tehran with message from Eisenhower to Shah, 19 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Volume XII, p. 576.

40 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to Dulles, 20 July 1958,’ FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 578.

41 ‘Memo Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination [Barnes] to DOS [Dillon], 24
July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 581.

42 ‘Defense Attache Tehran to WDC, 17 July 1958.’ NACPM, 788.00/7-1758, pp. 1, 4.
The Defense Attache also reported that Reza Afshar, the President of Iranian Airlines,
had alerted the American in charge of pilot scheduling to prepare a contingency plan for
evacuating the royal household should the army revolt. Afshar stated that the army was
not loyal to the Shah or its senior commanders, and that trouble from junior officers
was anticipated. See also ‘Minute on Telegram from British Embassy Tehran [Stevens]
on loyalty of the Iranian Army, August 8, 1958’. PRO, F0371/ 133006. In London, the
FO feared that another military coup might be in the offing, like that in Iraq or the
attempted 1954 coup in Tehran. There was genuine concern that elements from the
1954 coup might be active again and that the Iranian security service might not know
what was going on. In addition, the British were also concerned about Iranian army-unit
distribution. They feared another opportunity like the one in Baghdad, in which no loyal
units had been available to support the palace.

43 ‘Dispatch Tehran [Stelle] to WDC, 12 August 1958’. NACPM, 788.00/8-1258, pp. 1, 2.
The Iranian government took the position that the Iraqi regime under Nuri Sa’id and
the Hashemites was so unstable that a new regime with broad popular support would
be welcomed and might ‘settle down in peace with its neighbors, turning its attention to
internal reform and economic development’. This view reflected more hope than
expectation. In the short-term Tehran expected increased tensions and problems with
the Qasim and with whatever government came after it.

44 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC [Dulles], 14 August 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p.
584. See also ‘British Embassy Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 20 August 1958’. PRO,
F0371/1 33006. Stevens began by stating: ‘Sir, I have the honour to report that, for the
last two weeks, Tehran has been the prey of rumours and disquieting talk of every kind.’
Sir Roger then recited the rumors of dissatisfaction in the officer corps and the
outspoken opposition to the regime on the street.

45 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to Dulles, 26 August 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 586.

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46 ‘Memo NEA [Rountree] to Dulles, 9 September 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII,
p. 590. See also ‘Discussion 379th NSC Meeting, 18 September 1958’. DDEL, Box 10.

47 ‘Memcon on Iranian Budgetary Crisis, 9 December 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XII, p. 620.

48 ‘Dispatch British Embassy Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 7 August 1958’. PRO,
F037 1/1 33006, pp. 1-2, 9.

49 ‘British Embassy Tehran [Stevens] to FO [Lloyd], 21 August 1958’. PRO,
F0371/133006, p. 2. This lengthy and alarming report reflected concerns, British and
American alike, about the future for the regime. These concerns served to support
further demands by the Shah for military and economic assistance.

50 ‘Memo Iranian Desk [Waggoner] to GTI [Jones], 30 July 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59,
NEA, GTI, Mil Asst, Box 1, pp. 1, 7, 8. This long memorandum on Kurdish issues and
the lack of US knowledge and expertise in the region suggested that at least one Arabic-
and Farsi-speaking Foreign Service officer be trained in Kurdish.

51 ‘Attachment to Memo Iranian Desk [Waggoner] to GTI [Jones], 30 July 1958’.
NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, GTI, Mil Asst, Box 1, pp. 1, 7, 8. The Baghdad broadcasts
complemented broadcasts from the UAR designed to attract Kurds to a broader
nationalist base.

52 ‘Dispatch Tabriz to WDC, 2 September 1958’. NACPM, 787.00/9-258, pp. 1, 3, 4.

53 ‘Memo NEA [Eagleton] to NEA [Lakeland], 14 November 1958’. NACPM,
GRDOS59, NEA, GTI, Mil Asst, Box 1, p. 1. In a meeting with the Kurds in Baghdad,
Eagleton pointed out that the word ‘assimilation’ should be avoided, even though the
US wanted to point out to the Kurdish leadership, Mulla Mustafa, a Barzani leader, and
Shaykh Latif of Sulaymaniya, that linkages with Iran were much more workable than
those with Baghdad or Moscow. See also ‘Memo NEA [Mouser] to Lakeland [GTI], 8
December 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, GTI, Mil Asst, Box 1, p. 1.

54 ‘Memo NEA [Lakeland] to GTI, 14 November 1958’. NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA,
GTI, Mil Asst, Box 1, p. 1.

55 ‘Dispatch British Embassy Tehran [Russell] to FO [Lloyd], 27 October 1958’. PRO,
F037 1/1 33007, pp. 13-14.

56 ‘Dispatch London to WDC, 7 November 1958’. NACPM, 787.00/11-758, pp. 3-4.

57 ‘Dispatch British Embassy Tehran [Russell] to FO [Lloyd], 27 October 1958’. PRO,
F037 1/1 33007, p. 14.

Chapter 5

1 Heptulla, Najma, Indo-west Asian Relations: The Nehru Era. New Delhi: Allied, 1991, p.
187.

2 ‘Diary Eisenhower, 16 December 1956’. DDEL, AWF, IS, India, Box 29, and ‘Diary
Eisenhower, 18 December 1956’. DDEL, PPDDE, AWF, International Series, India,
Box 29. These two entries form an amusing commentary on the meetings between
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nehru. Apparently, State Department
officials were concerned that Eisenhower would have difficulty engaging the
notoriously difficult to-talk-to Nehru and that ‘problems’ might result. In briefings prior
to a luncheon on 16 December, the President commented that he ‘did not mind (the
briefings) so much, except that the State Department was so afraid that he would say or
do the wrong thing.’ The Department was properly ‘berated’. On 18 December,
Eisenhower acknowledged the difficulties in dealing with Nehru: ‘It was difficult to be
with someone you did not know for such a long period. . . . sometimes Nehru would
not speak, sometimes he would talk for an hour.’ The entry writer commented that the
President did not like the one-on-one: ‘I think he [Eisenhower] missed us all.’ Nehru
was notorious for sitting silently for long periods even in one-on-one meetings. British

Notes

373

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to it as a ‘silent conversation’ with Nehru.
When first encountered, it was disconcerting.

3 ‘Memcon Nehru and Eisenhower, 17-18 December 1956’. DDEL, Box 29, pp. 1-3.
Nehru made some unintentionally amusing and at the same time ‘disparaging’ remarks
about Nuri Sa’id and Iraq. Here again, the Indian aggravation with the Baghdad Pact
and its implications for arms and Pakistan mirrored the Egyptian annoyance over
Baghdad as a competing center of Arab power. Desptie Nehru’s concern over the
closing of the Suez Canal, ideologically and geopolitically he, like Nasser, had problems
with the Western alliance system.

4 Ibid, p. 10. During the meeting. President Eisenhower attempted to get Nehru to bring
up the subject of Krishna Menon. Menon had become a target of Western wrath after
he voted against UN resolutions condemning the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Hungary. Nehru knew the complaints that would follow any mention of Menon, and
skillfully avoided the subject.

5 Ibid.

6 ‘Memo for Dulles, Karachi Conference, March 1956, on Kashmir Issue, February 23,
1956’. NACPM, GRDOS59, NEA, INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, (Box 1), pp. 1-3.

7 ‘Memo NEA Rountree to Dulles on meeting with the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Firoz
Khan Noon, June 19, 1957’. NACPM, (Box 1), pp. 1-2.

8 ‘UN Resolution on Kashmir attached to Memo [Frederic P. Bartlett] to NEA Rountree
on the Kashmir Dispute, December 5, 1957’. NACPM, Box 1, p. 2. The US clearly
wanted Britain to take the lead on the Kashmir issue, promising support in the UN
Security Council. For a brief explanation of this relationship see ‘Memo for Bermuda
Meeting of March 21-23, 1957, March 14, 1957’. NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-3. The British
had pointed out early on to the US that the latter’s ‘role in the subcontinent should
supplement and not supplant the UK’. See ‘Problems of the Indo-Pakistan
Subcontinent attached to Briefing Memorandum for George McGhee’s Discussion with
British Officials, London, September, 1950, April 25, 1950’. NACPM, Box 1, p. 1. See
also ‘UN Resolution, Commission for India and Pakistan on 1 3 August 1948’. NACPM,
Box 1, pp. 1-8.

9 ‘Memcon NEA [Withers] and British Emb WDC [Bottomley], 12 April 1957’. NACPM,
Box 1, p. 1.

10 ‘Memcon Pakistani Ambassador WDC [Muhammad Ali] and NEA [Rountree], 20 May
1957’. NACPM, Box 1, p. 2.

11 ‘Letter Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker New Delhi to NEA []. Jefferson Jones III],
March 14, 1957’. NACPM, GRDOS59, Records Relating to South Asia 1947-1959 (SA
1947-1959), Entry 1330 Miscellaneous Files, Lot file No. 62, D 43 (1 of 3) General
Subject Files Relating to South Asian Affairs, 1957-1959, 790.00/3-1457, p. 1-3.

12 ‘Memcon NEA [Withers] and British Embassy WDC [Bottomley], 12 April 1957’.
NACPM, GRDOS - 59, NEA, INC, Kashmir , Entry 5252, Box 1, p. 1.

13 ‘Memcon NEA [Withers] and British Embassy WDC [Bottomley], 7 June 1957’.
NACPM, Box l,p. 1.

14 ‘Letter Bunker, New Delhi to WDC, 6 May 1957’. NACPM, Lot file No. 62, D 43 (1 of
3) 790.00/5-657, p. 1.

15 ‘Memcon NEA [Withers] and British Embassy WDC [Bottomley], 7 June 1957’.
NACPM, Box 1), p. 1. See also ‘Memcon British Embassy WDC [Bottomley] and NEA
[]. Jefferson Jones III], 7 June 1957’. NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-2; ‘Memorandum from
NEA/SOA [Jones] to NEA [Rountree], 6 June 1957’. NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-2;
‘Memcon British Embassy WDC [Bottomley] and NEA [[ones], 14 June 1957 (3 p.m.)’.
NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-2; ‘Memo NEA/SOA Qones] to NEA [Rountree], 14 June 1957’
NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-3; ‘Memcon British Embassy WDC [Bottomley] and NEA

374

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

[Jones], 14 June 1957, (6 p.m.)’. NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-2; and ‘Memcon British
Embassy WDC [Bottomley] and NEA [Jones], 15 June 1957’. NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

16 ‘Briefing paper for Pakistani Foreign Minister Suhrawardy’s Visit, 3 July 1957’.
NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

17 Kux, Dennis, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001, p. 91.

18 ‘Memorandum from NEA [Rountree] to Dulles, 18 October 1957’. NACPM, Box 1,
PP- !- 2 -

19 Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir, A Study in India-Pakistan Relations. New York: Asia/India Council
of World Affairs, 1966, p. 322. See also ‘Memo Rountree to Dulles on Meeting with
Pakistani Foreign Minister Noon, Washington, June 17, 1957’. Box 1, p. 1. On the
subject of a Soviet veto, the US recognized the certainty of it and discussed the matter
with Pakistani Foreign Minister Noon during his June 1957 visit to the US. Noon came
expressly to line up support for the Pakistani position on a plebiscite in Kashmir. See
also ‘Memcon Noon and Under Secretary of State Christian Herter, June 19, 1957’.
NACPM, Box 1, pp. 1-3. Among other things, Noon, in what was supposed to be a
brief courtesy call to Under Secretary Herter, launched into the Kashmir issue, claiming
that the Indians were using a Nazi-trained officer, Allama Mashriqi, to train pro-Indian
irregular troops in the region. See also ‘Memcon British Embassy [Bottomley] and
NEA/SOA [Withers], June 21, 1957’. NACPM, Box 1, p. 1. The British were eager to
convince the US to take the lead in the UN. London viewed Washington’s assessment
and planned course of action as broadly similar to London’s position, but the British
saw no upside to leading the charge. Of London was ‘anxious to know what happens in
the meetings’ so that they could influence US policy. ‘Memcon [Bottomley] and
NEA/SOA [Withers] , J une 2 1 , 1 957’. NACPM, Box 1 , p. 1 .

20 Arora, K.C., U.K. Krishna Menon —A Biography. New Delhi: Sanchar, 1998, p. 150.

21 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Indian Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari, 9 October
1957’. DDEL, AWF, IS, India, Box 28, p. 3.

22 Talbot, Phillips ‘Raising the Cry for Secession, the Ambitions of the “Political
Dravidians”. Letter from Tiruchirappalli, South India, May 22, 1957’. American
Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Volume II, No. 8. New York: AUSF,
1957pp. 2, 5. The cartoon appeared in Murasoli, a pro-DMK Tamil-language weekly, on
May 10, 1957. It consisted of four block pictures. In the first, Gandhi predicted that
Jinnah would drop his demand for Pakistan. In the second, Jinnah’s image appeared
next to a map of India showing an independent Pakistan. In the third, Madras Finance
Minister Subramanyam predicted that C.N. Annadurai, the DMK leader, would drop his
demand for a separate Dravidian state. The fourth displayed a map of India with a
separate Pakistan and Tamilnad with Annadurai looking on. Talbot did not invent the
comparison; rather, the Tamil Madrasis saw a parallel with Jinnah and the Muslims.

23 Ibid, pp. 3-7.

24 ‘Karachi [James M. Langley] to Dulles, January 31, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XV, p. 620. Ambassador Langley emphasized his excellent rapport with President Mirza
and the latter’s willingness to listen to the his advice. Washington’s response provides
an even more instructive view of the trepidation in the US government concerning the
situation in Pakistan. The Department instructed Langley not to become involved with
Mirza to the point of giving advice: ‘(B)elieve that the USG must as a matter of
principle avoid any semblance tutelage of Pakistani leadership.’ Because of the unstable
situation, a close Embassy relationship with any particular politician or group could
place the US on the wrong side if the government changed. ‘Telegram from John Foster
Dulles, Secretary of State, to Langley, Washington, February 4, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Volume XV, p. 622.

Notes

375

25 Talbot, Phillips ‘A Glimpse of Pakistan: First Impressions of a Returning Visitor,
Lahore, October 31, 1956’. AUFS-SAS, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 1-4. Talbot, Phillips ‘Pakistan
Doesn’t Like It: Reactions to the Egyptian Crisis, Lahore, November 8, 1956’. AUFS-
SAS, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 5. Anti-British attitudes in Pakistan resulting from partition
manifested themselves during the Suez crisis. First the populace wanted the Pakistani
government to do something substantive to show solidarity with Egypt. Second, they
demanded a withdrawal from the British Commonwealth. Lastly, they demanded a
withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, or the ejection of Britain. American demands that
the French, British, and Israelis withdraw temporarily raised the US image. Although
Talbot anticipated no overt action by Pakistan, he believed that the rise in ‘Pan-Islamic
feeling’ foreshadowed more animosity toward Britain and new challenges to Pakistan’s
pro-Western foreign policy. Campbell-Johnson, Alan, Mission with Mountbatten. New
York: Atheneum, 1986, p. 242. The issue of impartiality on the part of Mountbatten
continued as a hotly-debated subject. Nehru had better and more frequent access than
Jinnah. Particularly over Kashmir, Nehru’s relationship with Montbatten’s wife allowed
him more immediate influence. In November 1947 The Pakistani Times claimed that
Mountbatten was in ‘active command’ of Indian troops confronting Pakistani and
Muslim tribal forces in Kashmir. As Campbell-Johnson put it: ‘the bolder the lie the
wider the credence.’

26 Talbot, ‘A Glimpse of Pakistan’, pp. 3, 8, 9. The ‘writ’ of the government running
through the country was no doubt something of an exaggeration if the Pashtun tribal
areas along the Afghanistan border are taken into account; tribal law prevailed there.
This assessment was optimistic given the circumstances, and the overall tone tended to
reflect an interest or perhaps even a bias on the part of Talbot.

27 ‘Letter British Embassy Karachi [Symon] to Lord Home, 14 April 1958’. PRO,
F0371/136187, pp. 6-7, 10.

28 Talbot, Phillips ‘A Note on India and Pakistan, New York, September 12, 1957’.
AUFS-SAS, Vol. II, No. 9, p. 16. The characterization was important, since within a
few years Talbot would be Assistant Secretary for NEA.

29 ‘Reuters news bulletin from CIA/FBIS on Nehru’s statements on Kashmir, 9 April
1958’. DDEL, AWF, IS, India, Box 29.

30 ‘Memo from Dulles to Eisenhower, 17 April 1958’. DDEL, Box 29.

31 ‘Memo from Eisenhower to Dulles, 21 April 1958’. DDEL, Box 29.

32 ‘Letter from Eisenhower to Nehru, 14 May 1958’. DDEL, Box 29.

33 ‘New Delhi [Bunker] to WDC [Dulles], 2 June 1958’. DDEL, Box 29, p. 1.

34 ‘New Delhi [Bunker] to WDC [Dulles], 8 June 1958’. DDEL, Box 29, Section 2, p. 3.

35 ‘New Delhi [Bunker] to WDC [Dulles], 11 June 1958’. DDEL, Box 29, p. 1.

36 ‘WDC to Karachi, May 21, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 648.

37 ‘Letter Karachi (Langley) to NEA (Rountree), Karachi, July 1, 1958’. FRUS, 1 958-
1960, Volume XV, p. 651.

38 ‘Dacca to WDC, May 29, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 649-650. The
Consul General, William L.S. Williams, stated: ‘If we should countenance a dictator in
Pakistan, we would destroy our reputation as a democratic people with a democratic
government, our strongest link with the populace and the vast majority of its leaders. . . .
[The] [propaganda value to our enemies of Pakistan Army using US arms and
equipment to quell rebellion against a dictatorship is inestimable.’

39 ‘Airgram Karachi to WDC, July 9, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 635.

40 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 93-95. US Ambassador Horace Hildreth, whose
daughter was maried to Mirza’s son, departed Pakistan in the summer of 1957. Hildreth
had a real affection for Pakistan and avoided negative evaluations of the situation.
When James Langley, a New Hampshire newspaperman with close ties to Sherman
Adams, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, took over, policy toward Pakistan got an

376

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

unexpected scrubbing. Langley quickly concluded that policy toward Pakistan was
largely based on ‘wishful thinking’ and that ‘the present military program is based on a
hoax, the hoax being that it is related to the Soviet threat.’ During the same period,
Ayub Khan, Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Armed Forces, worked with some success to
convince Allen Dulles at the CIA and DOD officials that India threatened
‘containment’ policy, and that military aid was a small price to pay for the use of
intelligence and U-2 facilities. Ambassador Langley may have had excellent access to the
administration, but Ayub had his own Washington advocates.

41 ‘Karachi to WDC, July 24, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 656-658.

42 ‘Memo for the File [Ambassador Langley], 17 September 1958,’ FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XV, p. 661.

43 ‘Karachi to WDC, October 5, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 665. See also
“WDC to Karachi, 6 October 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 667.

44 ‘Karachi to WDC, October 15, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 674-676.

45 ‘Memo Gleason on comments by Allen Dulles, CIA, 31 October 1958’. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Volume XV, p. 679.

46 ‘Letter NEA Frederick Bartlett to Bunker New Delhi, Washington, October 27, 1958’.
FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 679-680. See also ‘The Economic and Political
Consequences of India’s Financial Problems, Washington, September 2, 1958’. FRUS,
1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 452-460. Given the anti-Western, pro-Soviet, and socialist
elements in India, real concern existed about the problems India faced in its the Second
Five-Year Plan. New Delhi had already reduced the plan’s goals; without immediate
additional foreign aid it would fail. Bunker made it clear what was a stake. He argued:
‘The recent trend toward a weakening of the Congress party and toward an increase in
Communist strength would almost certainly be intensified.’ His report went on to state
that if India got the aid that it needed, the reverse would happen and ‘the prospects for
maintaining an effective parliamentary system under moderate leadership will be
strengthened.’

47 ‘Karachi to WDC, 31 October 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 681.

48 ‘Annual Political Report for 1958, from Indian Embassy WDC [K.L. Dalai, First
Secretary] to MEA New Delhi, 15 April 1959’. INA, MEA 50 (9) AMS/59.

49 ‘Letter, “Secret - Eyes Only” Bunker to Bartlett, 3 December 1958’. NACPM, Lot file
No. 62, D 43 (1 of 3), Subject Files SA 1957-1959, 790.00/12-358, pp. 1-2.

50 ‘Letter from Bunker to Bartlett with attached Memcon betweeen Bunker and Nehru,
Delhi, 19 July 1958’. NACPM, 790.00/7-1958, pp. cover letter, 1-6. This letter, with its
attached memorandum, clearly underscored the nature of the relationship between the
US and India. Bunker presented a letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister
Nehru explaining US reasons for intervention in Lebanon on the heels of the coup in
Iraq and asking for ‘moderation’ in Nehru’s public comments on the situation. Nehru
plainly told Bunker that he viewed the Iraqi coup a positive thing and that he had
regarded the now dead Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said as ‘a strange 19th-century feudal
character . . . [who] had little concept of the changes, economic or social, which had
come over the world in the last generation’. Nehru rejected the idea that Nasser was
behind the coup in Iraq or instability in Lebanon. He stated that it appeared that the
more direct cause of the Lebanese problem was a political breach of faith on the part of
Lebanese Christian President Chamoun, who had attempted to amend the constitution
and succeed himself as President. Nehru bluntly stated that the important issue was to
get American troops withdrawn as soon as possible.

51 ‘Letter, “Secret — Eyes Only”, from Bunker to Bartlett, Delhi, December 3, 1958’.
NACPM, Lot file No. 62, D 43 (1 of 3), 790.00/12-358, pp. 1-2.

52 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 8 January 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 474-475.

53 ‘Letter Bunker) to NEA/SOA Bartlett’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 473.

Notes

377

54 ‘Letter from US Ambassador Langley) to NEA Rountree, 27 December 1957/
NACPM, Lot file No. 62, D 43 (1 of 3), 790.00/12-2758, pp. 13.

55 ‘Letter, ‘Secret - Eyes Only’ Bunker to Bartlett, 3 December 1958’. NACPM, Lot file
No. 62, D 43 (1 of 3), p. 1.

56 Akbar, Nehru , pp. 486-487. See also, Gopal, Nehru , Vol. Ill, p. 57, in which he states
that US support for Pakistan left Nehru with an ‘uneasy mind’ about the lengths to
which the US would go in pursuit of its Cold War objectives.

Part II

1 Interview with General Andrew Goodpaster, 31 July 2003.

Chapter 6

1 Malcolm Kerr, in his excellent essay The Arab Cold War devotes a scant dozen pages to
the discussion of the events of 1959 and 1960. He focuses instead on the revolutionary
events of 1958, and then begins again with a more detailed narrative in 1961. To be
sure, he hits the highpoints of 1959-1960, but his treatment skims over much of the
complexity and confusion of the period. Kerr provides little detailed explanation of this
or its longer-term consequences. Malik Mufti, in Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and
Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) covers the
period in five pages, in his chapter entitled ‘Nasser and Qasim’. Here, too, the
complexity of the period is largely ignored. The author focuses primarily on the bilateral
issues between Syria and Iraq, and particularly on the radically different mutations of
their Ba’thist governments. Marion and Peter Sluglett in Iraq since 1958: From Involution to
Dictatorship (New York: Tauris, 2001) capture the situation in Iraq during the period by
using the coup attempts against Qasim as the backdrop for their historical narrative, but
here, too, the complexity and continually shifting nature of the overall situation is
alluded to but largely missed. The story is much the same for Charles Tripp’s A History
of Iraq , although the author does provide limited additional insight into the external as
well as the internal players. Although somewhat dated, Anthony Nutting’s Nasser is the
best biography. Nasser was at the center of the political storm, and thus a biography of
the Egyptian leader touches most of the events of 1959-1960. Still, the Nutting book is
a biography and thus, by definition, focuses on Nasser and not the overall situation in
the region.

2 The term ‘wave of the future’ became synonymous with Nasser. In interviews with
Phillips Talbot, General Andrew Goodpaster, William ‘Bill’ Lakeland and Walt Rostow,
each used the term at one point or another to describe the US evaluation of Nasser and
the Nasserist wave that seemed to be sweeping the Arab Middle East. It is interesting to
note that in a recent television interview, when questioned about the viability of the
Saudi monarchy, the then Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abd-al-Aziz refered to the
widespread belief in Nasser as the ‘wave of the future’ to state that the Saudi monarchy
was still here in the 21st century and pointedly ask: ‘Where is Nasserism?’

3 Tripp, History of Iraq, p. 153.

4 ‘Dispatch from the U.S. Embassy Baghdad [David Fritzlan] to WDC, 9 January 1959’.
NACPM, GRDOS-59, CDF 1955-1959 (Box 3799), 787.00S/1-959, p. 1.

5 St.John, The Boss , pp. 299-300.

6 Roi, Yaacov (ed.) From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Polity in
the Middle East, 1945-1973. Jerusalem: Israel Universities, 1974, p. 277 .

7 ‘Radio Cairo 23 December 1958’. In Roi (ed.) From Encroachment to Involvement , p. 211 .

8 Stephens, Nasser , p. 296.

9 Heikal, Cairo Documents , p. 141.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

10 Nikita Khrushchev ‘Opening Speech at the 21st Communist Party Congress in
Moscow, 27 January 1959’. Reprinted from Pravda , 28 January 1958, III, pp. 59-60. In
Roi (ed.) From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 279.

11 Heikal, Sphinx , p. 104. This work provides excellent detail on the ups and downs in the
Egyptian-Soviet relationship. Heikal was certainly a witness over the years to this roller-
coaster ride between Moscow and Cairo. Despite his prejudices, his views have to be
taken seriously within the context of other official documents on exacdy what
transpired. Muhammad Hakki, who worked for Heikal at Al-Ahram during this period,
stated (interview, 8 August 2003) that with regard to Nasser’s statements and actions:
‘One is never quite sure whether it is what Nasser said or did; what Heikal thought
Nasser said or did; what Heikal thought Nasser should have said or done; or what
Heikal would have said or done if he had been Nasser.’ Nevertheless Heikal’s views on
the events of the period provide a quasi-official record of the positions of the Egyptian
government and must be weighed and evaluated against what actually occurred, just as
official US and British government records are evaluated.

12 Heikal, Sphinx , p. 104. Nasser chided Khrushchev pointing out that he had been a party
to persecuting and executing numerous Communists, who he called ‘very bad men’
because they had deviated from an acceptable political course. Nasser listed Stalin,
Beria, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Zhukov, Molotov, and Bulganin to make his point, and
asked: ‘What is Mr. Khrushchev trying to tell me? That it is not permissible to attack
communists?’

13 St.John, Boss , p. 300.

14 Lacouture, Jean, Nasser. New York: Knopf, 1973, p. 201.

15 Interview with Muhammad Hakki, Washington, DC, 8 August 2003. Hakki was an
Egyptian Information Service officer attached to the Egyptian Embassy in Washington,
DC from 1957 to 1958. In early 1959, he joined the staff oiA.l-A.hram , where he worked
closely with Muhammad Heikal. In 1973, Hakki stated that Anwar Sadat tapped him to
head the Information Ministry, but the appointment was cancelled following Sadat’s
assassination.

16 Interview with Muhammad Hakki, Washington, DC, 8 August 2003. Qasim’s failure to
respond ‘appropriately’ and ‘positively’ to Nasser’s overtures quickly found a
rationalized explanation in private Egyptian leadership circles in the view that Qasim
was an ‘Iraqi’ and exhibited the worst traits of an Iraqi. He was brutal — witness the
slaughter of the Hashemites and mutilation of Nuri Said, as compared to King Farouk
and General Neguib departing into comfortable exile. He was dependent on outside
forces for his tenure, i.e. the Soviet Union by way of the ICP. He refused to be civilized
by exchanging letters and holding talks. All of this reflected parochialism indicative of
an Iraqi, the antithesis of progressive, Arab nationalist regimes. These differences, of
course, would have been much easier to overlook had there been a political meeting of
minds.

17 St.John, Boss , p. 301.

18 Heikal, Muhammad, Matha Jar a fi Suria. Cairo: National, 1961, p. 103.

19 ‘Annual Political Report on Syria for 1959 from the Indian Consulate Damascus [A.N.
Safrani] to MEA New Delhi, 5 January I960’. INA, MEA 21 -A (1) WANA/60, pp. 1-3.
The Indian Consul had a pro-Iraqi bent. He stated that: ‘Iraq gave promise of becoming
a seat of democracy causing grave concern to the authorities in the U.A.R.’ With regard
to US-UAR relations, he stated that: ‘The American were quick to realize that Nasser
had burnt his boats as far as Russians were concerned and consequently they were in a
hurry to rush and embrace him.’

20 Nutting, Nasser , p. 263. See also ‘Report from the Indian Embassy Damascus to MEA,
27 May I960’. INA, MEA 21 A (24) WANA/60, pp. 4, 6. In evaluating the Syrian-
Egyptian Union, Safrani, the Indian Consul in Damascus, provided a fair assessment of

Notes

379

the situation. He posed the question: ‘In what then are the Syrians disappointed and
how does one explain the malaise that has crept in and is still growing in Syria?. The
answer is simple. The Syrians opted for unity believing that they will be equal partners
with Egypt and they joined the unity believing that their own surrender of freedom was
but a prelude to the general realization of an Arab entity. In both these hopes they have
been disappointed.’ Safrani argued that Nasser relied too much on the Ba’thists; thus,
when he removed them and replaced them with Egyptians, no Syrian party had a stake
in the UAR. ‘Henceforward there was to be no delegating of power to any Syrian. . . .
This constitutes the main grievance of the Syrians. No Syrian is in any position of
power. . . . For every small matter the Syrians have to go to Cairo.’ In an attached
minute dated 31 May 1960, Nehru commented that Safrani’s ‘broad appraisal of the
situation in Syria is on the whole a good one’.

21 There has been a debate about whether Sarraj was acting on his own, i.e. without
Nasser’s knowledge, and whether Nasser really would have taken the risks associated
with a coup attempt against Qasim. However, it strains credulity to believe that Nasser
did not know and approve of Sarraj’s preparations for the coup against the Qasim
regime. Given Nasser’s predisposition for intrigue and skullduggery, it absolutely lacks
credibility that he did not know and approve of Sarraj’s actions and plans at some level.
Since the Iraqis in Mosul acted prematurely, obviously neither Nasser nor Sarraj knew
the exact timing or exercised tactical control, but both were behind it. Nutting, in
Nasser, p. 259, probably comes closest to the truth when he states that Nasser was
furious with Sarraj not for supporting the coup, but for failing and thus embarrassing
the UAR.

22 ‘Report on Iraq for the NSC Briefing, 24 Februrary 1959’. CIA, CIA Resource
Extraction System (CRES), CIA-RDP79R00890A001 100020006-7, pp. 1-2.

23 Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, pp. 66-68.

24 Nutting, Nasser, p. 257.

25 St. John, Boss, p. 301

26 Nutting, Nasser, p. 259.

27 Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, p. 68.

28 ‘Baghdad [Jernegan] to WDC, 12 March 1959’. NACPM, 787.00/3-1259, p. 1.

29 St. John, Boss, p. 301.

30 ‘British Embassy Baghdad to FO, 25 March 1959’. (No. 261) (Eql017/ll) PRO,
FO371/140711, p. 1.

31 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Sir H. Trevelyan] to FO [Hoyer-Miller and Stevens], 24
March 1959’. (Ebl0393/ll) PRO, FO371/140711, p. 1. The Iraqi Foreign Minister
stated that he believed that by leaving the Pact, relations with the members would
improve ‘since it would diminish the misunderstandings arising from their membership’.
Although not stated, the withdrawal would also remove a major issue that Nasser could
use in attacking the Qasim regime, while at the same time paving the way for more
Soviet support. In March 1959, Britain still had troops and Royal Air Force personnel at
Habbaniya Air Base in Iraq. On hearing the news, Ambassador Trevelyan immediately
stated that Britain would now want to remove its military personnel as soon as possible.

32 ‘British Embassy Beirut [Crossthwaite] to British Embassy WDC [Ormsby-Gore] and
FO, 21 March 1959,’ No. 285, PRO, FO371/140398, p. 1. '

33 ‘London [Whitney] to WDC, 10 February 1959,’ NACPM, 787.56/2-1059, p. 1.

34 Nutting, Nasser, p. 257.

35 ‘SNIE, The Communist Threat to Iraq, 17 February 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XII, pp. 381-383.

36 ‘Baghdad to WDC, 26 March 1959’. No. 2758, Part 1, DDEL, Staff Secretary, Box 8,
Section II, pp. 1-2.

380

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

37 ‘Telegram from WDC (Herter) to US Embassy Baghdad, 27 March 1959’. DDEL, Staff
Secretary, Box 8, p. 2.

38 Interview with Lakeland, 23-24 September 2003.

39 ‘Discussion 398th NSC Meeting, 5 March 1959’. DDEL, NSC Series, Box 11, p. 2.

40 Interview with Andrew Goodpaster, 7 August 2003.

41 ‘Cabinet Paper entitled “Policy Towards Iraq”, 25 June 1959’. PRO, CAB 21/5595, pp.
1-4,5,13.

42 ‘Baghdad to WDC, 3 April 1959’. DDEL, Office of the Staff Secretary, Box 8, Section
1, p. 1. See also ‘Memcon Lloyd and Herter, WDC, 4 April 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 41.

43 ‘Memo on Iraq, John A. Calhoun, Executive Sec, DOS, to Goodpaster, 15 April 1959’.
DDEL, Box 8, pp. 8-9.

44 ‘British Embassy WDC [M.D. Weir] to FO [C.M. LeQuesne, Eastern Department), 1
May 1959’. (Eql0316/96) PRO, F0371/140940, p. 1.

45 ‘Baghdad to WDC, 3 April 1959’. DDEL, Box 8, Section III, p. 1. Secretary Herter
reported on 20 April 1959 that: ‘the relatively complacent British Government view of
developments in Iraq had not significantly changed’. ‘Discussion 403rd NSC Meeting,
23 April 1958’. DDEL, Box 11, p. 2.

46 ‘Memorandum from Calhoun to Goodpaster, 15 April 1959’. DDEL, Office of Staff
Secretary, Box 8, pp. 2-3.

47 ‘Discussion 402nd NSC Meeting, 17 April 1959’. DDEL, Box 11, pp. 1, 8-11. At this
meeting of the NSC, the resignation of John Foster Dulles was announced.

48 Ibid, pp. 4-11.

49 ‘Report on Iraq for Senate Briefing, 27 April 1959’. CIA, CIA Resource Extraction
System (CRES), CIA-RDP82R00025R0001 00060023-4, pp. 1-3.

50 ‘Memo from Calhoun to Goodpaster, 15 April 1959’. DDEL, Staff Sec, Box 8, pp. 2-3.

51 Ibid.

52 Interview with Goodpaster, 7 August 2003.

53 Ibid, pp. 4-5.

54 ‘Discussion 404th NSC Meeting, 30 April 1959’. DDEL, Box 11, pp. 9-10.

55 ‘British Emb Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 28 April 1959’. PRO, FO371/140957, p. 1.
See also ‘British Mission NATO [Roberts] to FO, 8 May 1959’. PRO, FO371/141011,

p. 1.

56 ‘British Emb Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 28 April 1959’. PRO, FO371/140957, p. 1.

57 Ibid. See also ‘British Mission NATO [Roberts] to FO, 8 May 1959’. PRO,
FO371/14101 1, p. 1.

58 ‘British Embassy Baghdad ITrevelyan] to FO [G.F. Hiller], 19 |uly 1959’. PRO,
FO371/140948, p. 1.

59 St.John, The Boss, p. 302.

60 Nasser, Gamal Abdel ‘Speech delivered in Damascus, 15 March 1959’. In Roi (ed.),
From Encroachment to Involvement, pp. 296-302. Nasser also used the speech to cast doubt
on Qasim’s credentials as a revolutionary, crediting Abd-al-Salaam al-Aref as the leader
of the 1 4 J uly coup and casting Qasim in the role of opportunist.

61 Khrushchev, Nikita ‘Speech delivered at a reception for an Iraqi economic delegation,
16 March 1959’. In Roi (ed.). From Encroachment to Involvement, pp. 303-307.

62 Nasser, Gamal Abdel ‘Speech delivered in Damascus, 20 March 1959’. In Roi (ed.),
From Encroachment to Involvement, p. 308.

63 Stephens, Nasser, pp. 299, 309.

64 St. John, Boss, pp. 303-304. St. John states that during these escalating exchanges with
Moscow, Egyptian Field Marshall Abd-al-Hakim al-Amer repeatedly made the point to
Nasser: ‘Spare parts, Gamal! Please remember we need spare parts.’ This, of course,
referred to Egyptian reliance on Soviet military hardware and spares. Whether or not

Notes

381

the quote is accurate, it is easy to imagine the concern that must have existed in the
Egyptian military about a total break with Moscow and the effect on its Soviet-supplied
military establishment.

65 ‘Canada House Cairo to FO, 20 April 1959’. PRO, F0371/140940, p. 1.

66 ‘Discussion 404th NSC Meeting, 30 April 1959’. DDEL, Box 11, p. 10.

67 ‘Memo INR [H.W. Glidden] to 1NR Director [Cumming], 13 March 1959’. NACPM,
787.00/3-1359, pp. 1-2.

68 ‘Baghdad [Jernegan] to Dulles’. NACPM, 611.87/3-1859, Section II, p. 1. This telegram
is a memorandum of aconversation between the US Ambassador in Iraq, Jernegan, and
Qasim. In the conversation, Jernegan complained of the bad treatment of the US in the
local press and that ‘Iraqi press articles and statements by popular organizations
sounded exactly as if they had been drafted in Moscow by PRAVDA’.

69 Tripp, History of Iraq, p. 157.

70 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 2 May 1959.’ PRO, FO371/140915, p. 1.

71 ‘Memcon Profumo, Hoyer-Millar, and Nutting FO, 9 June 1959’. PRO,
FO371/140953, p. 1. Nutting had just returned from Iraq and a round of meetings with
various Iraqi officials. He met with Profumo and Hoyer-Millar at the FO to discuss his
findings, and the memorandum of their conversation at that meeting was sent to
Ormsby-Gore, Sir Roger Stevens and Lord Landsdowne.

72 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 9 ]une 1959’. PRO, FO371/140953, p. 1.
See also ‘Letter British Embassy Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO [G.F. Hiller], 3 June 1959’.
PRO, F0371/140960, p. 1. Jawad, the Iraqi Foreign Minister had raised this issue with
Trevelyan, who discounted it. Jawad also raised it with the Pakistani Ambassador, who
naturally blamed it on an Indian diplomat. Trevelyan believed that Jawad’s concern was
the end result of rumors emanating from the talk about a UAR/Lebanon/Jordan anti-
Communist front.

73 ‘Memcon Profumo, Hoyer-Millar, and Nutting, FO, 9 June 1959’. PRO,
FO371/140953, p. 1.

74 ‘Report on Iraq for the NSC Briefing, 17 June 1959’. CIA, CIA Resource Extraction
System (CRES), CIA-RDP79R00890A001 100060025-2, pp. 1-3.

75 Tripp, History of Iraq, p. 158. One of the assassins, 22-year-old Saddam Hussein, would
flee to Cairo, where at UAR government expense he earned a university 7 degree.

76 ‘Savingram Australian Embassy WDC to DEA, 27 November 1959’. NAA, DEA,
A1 838-250/1 0/5/6 Part 2, p. 1. The information on the current situation in Baghdad
came from Australian Embassy discussions with William Lakeland , Jordan-Iraq desk at
the State Department. Lakeland also updated the Australians on Qasim’s condition
following the attack, and described the Iraqi leader as ‘even more rambling and lacking
in lucidity than before’. ‘The trouble was that as a leader he seemed completely
bankrupt of ideas.’ Lakeland downplayed Qasim’s threats against the Syrian-UAR ‘as no
more than an attempt to pay Nasser back in the same coin for his interference in Iraq’.
See also ‘Cablegram Australian Embassy WDC to MEA Canberra, 5 November 1959’.
NAA, DEA, A1 838-250/10/5/6 Part 2, p. 1. See also ‘Cablegram Australian Embassy
WDC to MEA Canberra, 5 November 1959’. NAA, DEA, a\ 838-250/10/5/6 Part 2,
p. 1. In a separate meeting, Lakeland pointed out that once responsibility for the
assassination attempt had been firmly established there would be ‘serious trouble’
internally.

77 ‘Cablegram Australian Emb WDC to Canberra, 5 November 1959’. NAA, DEA,
A1 838-250/1 0/5/6 Part 2, p. 1.

78 ‘Dispatch Baghdad [Lee F. Dinsmore] to WDC, 12 January I960’. NACPM, 787.00/1-

1260, p. 1.

79 ‘Dispatch Baghdad [Jernegan] to WDC, 30 January I960’. NACPM, 787.00/1-3060, p.

1 .

382

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

80 ‘Comments by the Shah in a meeting with John Strachey in a memo from Geoffrey
Harrison British Embassy Baghdad to Sir Roger Stevens, British Ambassador Baghdad,
25 January I960.’ PRO, F0371/149866, p. 1.

81 ‘Indian Embassy Baghdad |D.S. Kamtekar, First Secretary via I.S. Chopra, Ambassador]
to the MEA New Delhi [V.H. Coelho, Joint Secretary] 3 January I960.’ INA, MEA, 6-
A(2) — WANA/60, pp. 10-11. ‘Indian Embassy Baghdad [D.S. Kamtekar, First
Secretary via I.S. Chopra, Ambassador] to the MEA New Delhi [V.H. Coelho, Joint
Secretary] 3 January I960’. INA, MEA, 6-A(2) - WANA/60, p. 7. There is little doubt
that most observers would have largely agreed with this assessment. The Indian
Embassy in Baghdad at this time was decidedly anti-Qasim. In this lengthy report, they
denigrate Qasim’s contribution to the revolution, giving others including Abd-al-Salam
Al-Aref, more credit. The Indians decribed Qasim as follows: ‘sick mind’, ‘irrational
search for power’, ‘the evil side of a split personality’, ‘absurd contradictions’, and
having the characteristics of ‘mendacity and unreliability’.

82 ‘Baghdad [Jernegan] to WDC, 12 January I960’. NACPM, 787.00/1-1260 CAA, p. 2.

83 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 936-931. Batatu’s work is an unrivaled tome that deals
in minute detail with the revolution and its aftermath. It is hard to imagine another
work in more detail on any set of political events in recent Arab history. See also
‘Baghdad [[ernegan] to WDC, 10 February I960’. NACPM, 787.00/1-1060, p. 1. While
Batatu carefully covered the internal political conflicts in Iraq, he did not have available
at the time some of the documentation since declassified by the US and British
governments. It is clear that Qasim authorized Foreign Minister Hashim jawad to
convey to the US Ambassador the message that he was bringing the mainline Iraqi
Communists to heel. This lack of access hardly detracts from the internal political story,
but more recently released sources place events in a broader context.

84 See ‘Dispatch Baghdad [David Wilson, First Secretary] to WDC, 11 January I960’.
NACPM, 787.00/1-11-60, pp. 1-5, and ‘Baghdad [Jernegan] to WDC, 19 January I960’.
NACPM, 787.00/1-1960, pp. 1-2.

85 ‘Baghdad [Jernegan] to WDC, 10 February I960’. NACPM, 787.00/1-1060, p. 1. This
telegram resulted from a conversation with Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi Foreign Minister,
who was closely aligned with the National Democratic Party of Iraq. In Old Social
Classes, p. 844, Batatu states that Jawad was a Sunni, born in 1911.

86 Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 941.

87 ‘Dispatch Baghdad [Dinsmore] to WDC, 29 February I960.’ NACPM, 787.00/2-2960,
p. i and enclosure. ‘Savingram Australian Embassy WDC to Department of External
Affairs (DEA) Canberra, 29 March I960’. NAA, DEA, A1838-250/10/5/6 Part 2, p. 1.
Speculation existed in relation to the Mahdawi’s reaction to the commutation of the
many of the conspirators’ sentences. Mahdawi, the chief judge and Qasim’s brother-in-
law, refused any comment, and in fact reduced his own profile significantly. He had no
intention of attempting to defy Qasim’s order.

88 ‘Memcon with Ambassador Sulaiman, Iraqi Embassy WDC, with Turner B. Shelton,
USIA, 7 March I960’. NACPM, 787.00/3-760.

89 ‘Savingram Australian Embassy WDC to Department of External Affairs (DEA)
Canberra, 16 March I960’. NAA, DEA, A1838-250/10/5/6 Part 2, p. 1.

90 ‘Australian Embassy WDC to DEA Canberra, 21 April I960’. NAA, DEA, A1838-
250/10/5/6 Part 2, p. 1.

91 ‘Dispatch London to WDC attached The Guardian on 29 July 1960, 3 August I960’.
NACPM, 787.00/8-360, attachments.

92 ‘Baghdad LJernegan] to WDC, 18 July I960’. NACPM, 787.00/7-1860, pp. 1-2.

93 Kerr, Arab Cold War, p. 28.

94 Nutting, Nasser, pp. 250-251.

Notes

383

95 ‘British Mission Cairo [C.T. Crowe] to FO and Whitehall, 18 August I960’. PRO,
F0371/371/ 150903, p. 1. Nuruddin Khahala was Vice-President; Fakher Kayyali was
Minister of State; and Faid Zainuddin was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

96 Heikal, Matha ]ara fi Suria , pp. 104-111. This work was the first attempt at a quasi-
official explanation of the coup in Syria. Sarraj was in prison in Damascus, having had
the misfortune to time his return from Cairo just before the 28 September coup.
Heikal’s book was an attempt to lay the blame at the feet of anyone but the Egyptian
government and Nasser. Written in a typically Arab newspaper editorial style, the book
presents series of questions and answers to explain the coup. With regard to Sarraj and
his role as a catalyst for disaffection in Syria, Heikal debates the issue of Sarraj’s alleged
‘love of power’. He brings up the fact that King Saud attempted unsuccessfully to bribe
Sarraj, and he points out that the power accumulated by Sarraj was not for personal gain
but for the defense of Arab unity. The book explains the years 1959 and 1960 as ones in
which Nasser and the loyal supporters of Arab nationalism and unity in Syria, of which
Sarraj was the most prominent, attempted to preserve UAR unity against the forces of
imperialism and reaction, which were strongly represented by Qasim, King Saud, and
King Hussein. In Muhammad Abd-al-Aziz Ahmad and Wafiq Abd-al-Aziz al-Tahmi’s
Tajraba al-Wahida baynMisriva Suria (Cairo: National, 1962), pp. 56-62, the authors argue
that the ‘people of Syria’ overwhelmingly approved of and support the union with
Egypt. They then make the argument that the idea of Arab unity was part and parcel of
the Syrian attempts to free itself from imperialism, and that the union with Egypt was a
natural step in this progression. For support, these two authors quote voting returns on
the various referendums on unity. In this section they particularly focused on 1960. This
was an apparent attempt to combat criticism that the union showed signs of
disintegration at a very early stage. They also recited the list of Syrian calls for unity,
including 1955 and 1956. This work and Heikal’s, although focused on explaining the
split between Syria and Egypt and justifying the Egyptian position in this matter,
provide an interesting insight into how the Egyptians chose to interpret the events of
1959 and 1960. These are period pieces providing a window on Egyptian attitudes
toward Syria; they also reflect the inability of Egyptians to understand the problems that
the UAR administration created for itself in Damascus. This also in some sense
provides an insight into Nasser’s own inability 7 during this period to really understand
Syrian resentment, and thus the dangers posed to the union, and into his failure to heed
Sarraj’s warnings. In Nutting’s Nasser ; p. 266, Sarraj probably had the most telling
response of all. When asked if he had been too heavy-handed and repressive in his
tactics as head of the muhabbarat in Syria during the 1959-1960 timeframe, he stated that
‘allowed a free hand’ the coup would never have occurred. Nutting states: ‘Sarraj
undoubtedly held the union together by the brutal efficiency of his intelligence network
and by the sheer terror which his name exercised in the minds of any would-be
secessionists.’

97 Nutting, Nasser, p. 265. ‘Minute by John G.S. Beith, Levant Department, FO, 15
September I960’. PRO, F0371/ 150901, pp. 1-2. On the jacket of Beith’s minute
someone speculated that Sarraj’s appointment, as head of the Syrian Executive, was the
means to eventually get rid of him, as a gesture to the ‘will of the people’. As early as
September 1959, rumors abounded that because of Sarraj’s prickly relationship with
Nasser and his clashes with Amer, he would be promoted to Vice-President and moved
to Cairo. The conclusion was that the ‘most critical of all factors in assessing the
stresses in the Syro-Egyptian union is the Nasir [ti<r] -Sarraj rivalry.’

98 ‘British Embassy Beirut [Eden] to the FO, 12 September 1959’. No. 740 PRO
F0371/150901, p. 1. Virtually all of the British information came through the
American Consul Reams, in Damascus. This particular report came from the American
Embassy via the Regional Information Officer in Beirut, who had visited Damascus.

384

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Chapter 7

1 Salibi, Kamal, The Modem History of Jordan. London: Tauris, 1998, pp. 201-203. Given
Jordan’s precarious and highly vulnerable position, Salibi provides very little substance
and even less analysis of the situation. Coverage of the 1959-1960 is spotty and
disjointed. To the author’s credit, he does state that the practice of laying all political
unrest, plots and coup attempts at the feet of Nasser in Cairo was probably more
politics than reality: ‘Certainly, there were Nasserist involvements in a number of cases,
but not necessarily in all. There were many in people in Jordan who felt hostile enough
towards the regime, for one reason or another, to attempt acts of sabotage or terrorism.’
That said, the author’s presentation of what he calls ‘The Difficult Years’ overlooks
Hussein’s contributions to his own problems in the propaganda war with Nasser, and
Jordanian concerns about the sincerity of US support for his regime. Influential
elements in the US government viewed Jordan as a lost cause and a waste of aid money.
This study will attempt to better place Jordan within the context of the Arab Cold War.

2 ‘British Embassy WDC [M.D. Weir] to FO [LeQuesne], 1 May 1959’. PRO,
F0371/140940, p. 1. The situation in Jordan differed from that in Iraq in that the US
Embassy in Amman took a more antagonistic line toward British pressure to support
the Jordanian regime. In Iraq, the State Department actually informed the British
Foreign Office that US Ambassador Jernegan ‘reflected too closely’ London’s view of
the situation in Baghdad. Jernegan’s British view of the situation and, in general, his
recommendations ran counter to the views and policy direction that the Eisenhower
administration wanted to pursue.

3 Johnston will reemerge during the Kennedy administration as a persistent gadfly vis-a-
vis US policy in South Arabia. Following his tenure in Amman, he was posted to Aden
as Governor-General. This occurred during the border wars in which Yemen received
Egyptian support. He was there during the Yemen Revolution of 1962 and the
subsequent introduction of Egyptian troops into the Yemen civil war.

4 ‘Letter British Embassy WDC [Weir] to FO, 13 February 1959’. PRO, F0371/142117,
p. 1. See also ‘Minute attached to letter from British Embassy WDC [Weir] to FO, 13
February 1959’. PRO, F0371/142117, p. 1. The British were relieved when they
learned that there would be no ‘switch’ in sources of supply. The Jordanian army was
largely supplied with British arms, and both the British FO and the Ministry of Defence
were concerned that the US government might insist that US military aid dollars be
spent on US military equipment. J.D. Adams at the FO commented in a minute: ‘It is
satisfactory to have this re-assurance that there will be no switch from British to
American sources of supply for the J.A.A.’ ‘Letter British Embassy WDC [Weir] to FO,
24 February 1959’. PRO, F0371/142117, p. 1. The British made a concerted effort to
see what kinds of military equipment were on the list prepared by the Americans in
order to protect orders for high-dollar equipment that the Jordanian had already made.
They were very concerned that the US survey would not include radars. General Hart,
the head of the US military mission, had stated that his primary goal was ‘to keep down
costs ... in view of the poverty of the country’. Jordan had placed an order for an
expensive Marconi radar system, and intended to pay for it with the US aid. By deleting
radar from the list, the US military mission placed the onus on the Jordanians to come
up with the money or the British to come up with the aid. Willie Morris, of the British
Embassy in Washington, argued that in a country like Jordan: ‘the army played an
important educational and social role, as well as being the key political factor. It was
therefore important that due weight should be given to the importance of maintaining
the army’s morale.’ From London’s point of view, maintaining morale was particularly
important when it involved a large-scale sale of British radar purchased with US aid
dollars.

Notes

385

5 TOC to Amman, 4 February 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 670-681.

6 ‘Letter British Embassy WDC (Morris) to FO, 19 March 1959, (Vj 10345/3)’. PRO,
F0371/142117, p. 1.

7 ‘Letter from British Embassy WDC [Morris] to FO, 19 March 1959/) PRO,
F0371/142117, p. 1. See also ‘Letter from British Embassy WDC [Morris] to FO, 19
March 1959, (Vjl0345/1)’. PRO, F0371/142117, p. 1. British concern about the
rapprochement between Jordan and the UAR came from conversations in Washington
with William Lakeland, the Iraqi desk officer. Lakeland’s close relationship with Nasser
and the Egyptians during the negotiation of the 1954 treaty for the removal of British
troops from the Suez Canal Zone tended to raise British suspicions about Lakeland’s
presumed pro-Egyptian sentiments. During the period 1952-1954, Lakeland was on a
first-name basis with Nasser, Amer, and Heikal, all of whom were guests at Lakeland’s
apartment on al-Gazira island from time to time. Interview with William Lakeland, 23-
24 September 2003. The British were highly concerned because a link with Nasser
would not only severely weaken their influence in Amman, but might, they believed,
start a change of events that would result in the loss of their petroleum interests in Iraq.
Morris informed London that Lakeland, speaking for himself and ‘several of his
colleagues . . . felt that the sooner Jordan were associated with the U.A.S. [sic — UAR] the
better’. Morris pointed out that Lakeland was sometimes ‘out of line’ with the powers-
that-be in the State Department, but that clearly there was a debate going on about the
degree of support that Nasser’s anti-Communist campaign should receive.

8 ‘National Intelligence Estimate, The Outlook for Jordan, 10 March 1959’. FRUS , 1958-
1960, Volume XI, pp. 681-687. Also see ‘Memo Rountree to Herter, 14 March 1959’.
FRUS , 1958-1960, Volume XI, pp. 687-690.

9 ‘British Emb Amman [Johnston] to FO, 16 March 1959’. PRO, FO371/142102, p. 1.

10 Ibid, p. 2. Johnston described a series of internal scenarios that he believed could occur
in the absence of the King and Prime Minister. All centered on the Bedouin element in
the army and the armored brigade that they controlled. Johnston feared that repression
by Bedouin army units or the replacement of the al-Rifai’ government with a military
dictatorship would lead to a Nasserist revolt, or that the Jordanian army might take the
Qasim route and overthrow both al-Rifai and the King. ‘While the loyalty of the
Bedouin rank and file is unquestionable, some of the senior Bedouin officers probably
have their price.’ See also ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to the FO, 16 March
1959’. PRO, FO371/142102, p. 1. In this follow-up telegram, Johnston informed
London that: ‘a fairly reliable Jordanian informant tells me that a pro-Nasserite coup is
being plotted by elements in those who are usually believed to be loyal to King
Hussein.’ This informant stated that when approached by the group Nasser had offered
his assistance. The coup itself had mutated from a movement against al-Rifai’ to one
that now included the monarchy itself.

11 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to the Foreign Office, 21 March 1959’. PRO,
FO371/142102, p. 1. Johnston worried constantly about playing second fiddle to the
Americans. He was well aware of who really paid the bills in Jordan, and saw every new
development as a threat to British interests in Jordan. See also ‘Amman to WDC, 11
July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, p. 298.

12 ‘Amman [Lester Wright] to WDC, 21 April 1959’. NACPM, 611.85/4-2159, Section I,
p. 2. Rifai’ went so far as to state that if al-Shara was arrested or replaced that he (Rifai’)
would resign from the government. Informed speculation can make a very case for the
possibility that Lakeland knew about Shara’s plotting against the Hashemite regime
through US intelligence. This information was undoubtedly available to MI6 through
liaison contacts or its own sources within the Jordanian security services. Given the
British views of where they wanted Jordanian policy to go vis-a-vis the UAR, it is not

386

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

hard to imagine that the British had been encouraging the King to arrest Shara, and thus
feared that Shara might escape the King’s grasp by defecting while in the US.

13 Sahbi, Jordan, p. 204.

14 ‘Memcon Hussein and Herter, 24 March 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, p. 694.

15 ‘Letter NE Affairs [Rockwell] to Amman [Wright], 2 April 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XI, pp. 707-709.

16 ‘Amman to WDC, 21 April 1959’. NACPM, 611.85/4-2159, Section III, pp. 12.

17 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO, 7 April 1959’. PRO, F0371/1421 17, p. 1.

18 ‘British Embassy Amman Johnston] to FO, 7 April 1959’. PRO, F0371/142117, p. 2.
This is a reference to Sulayman al-Nabulsi, the former pro-Nasserist Prime Minister in
Jordan. See also ‘Minute by R.M. Tesh on telegram Amman Johnston] to FO, 7 April
1959’. PRO, F0371/142117, pp. 1-2. The FO minutes relative to the Johnston telegram
suggest that the way to pressure the Americans was to get the Israelis involved, by
pointing out to them that Iraq mightt be Communist it had no potential to occupy
Jordan, while Nasser did. They believed that they could use the Israelis and Jewish
organizations to guard against a change in US policy toward Jordan.

19 ‘FO to British Embassy WDC, 14 April 1959’. PRO, F0371/142117, p. 3. Johnston
was extremely concerned about the British position in Jordan, particularly with
reference to the Jordanian military. As an example of his sensitivity, at a dinner party in
May 1959 the US military attache accused the British of undermining Prime Minister
Rifai’ because he was too pro-American, and replacing him with the pro-British Majali.
Additionally, Johnston reported that the American military attache stated that he was
sick of paying the bills in Jordan while the British got the credit. Johnston stated that he
was concerned that the Americans were saying these things to the Jordanians, and
perhaps even to the press, and asked for instructions on any action the he might take.
See also ‘Minute attached to a Letter from Amman Johnston] to FO, PRO,
FO371/142130, pp. 1-2. In this minute to Johnston’s letter, the FO commented:
‘Irresponsible and inexperienced [vis-a-vis the Arabs] as the Americans may be, it does
not follow to my mind that a remark made at dinner in a colleague’s house would
necessarily be passed to the Jordanians — or the international press.’ London had an
almost full-time job keeping Johnston on an even keel. His paranoia about growing
American influence and his fundamental dislike of any who disagreed with him,
particularly if they were American, would also emerge in the Kennedy administration.

20 ‘British Embassy Amman Johnston] to FO [Stevens] 16 September 1959’. No. 781,
PRO F0371/142131, p. 1.

21 ‘FO [Stevens] to British Embassy Jordan Johnston], 18 September 1959’. No. 1115,
PRO F0371/142131, p. 1.

22 ‘British Emb Amman Johnston] to FO [Stevens] 16 September 1959’. No. 792, PRO
F0371/142131, pp.1-2.

23 ‘FO [Beith] to British Embassy Amman Johnston], 22 September 1959’. No. 4122,
PRO F0371/142131, p. 1.

24 ‘British Embassy Amman Johnston] to FO [Stevens] 22 September 1959’. No. 781,
PRO F0371/142131, p. 1.

25 ‘FO [Stevens] to British Embassy Jordan Johnston], 24 September 1959’. No. 1147,
PRO F0371/142131, p. 1. See also ‘British Embassy WDC [Weir] to FO [LeQuesne], 1
May 1959’. PRO, F0371/140940, p. 1. A few months before, London had had its
fingers burned with regard to the situation in Iraq when the American Ambassador’s
judgments had been called into question because they were too optimistic and tended to
echo those of the British Ambassador and the Foreign Office.

26 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 24 September 1959’. PRO
F0371/142131, p. 2.

Notes

387

27 ‘Dispatch British Embassy WDC [Weir] to FO [Rothnie], 26 September 1959’. PRO
F0371/142131, p. 1, attached minute, attached article.

28 ‘Dispatch Amman [Andrew I. Kilgore] to WDC, 18 May I960’. NACPM, 785.11/5-
1960, pp. 1-2. See also ‘Memo from C.M. Anderson, British High Commission, New
Delhi to Y.K. Puri, MEA, New Delhi, 7 March I960’. 1NA, MEA, 8/A(3) -
WANA/60, p. 1. Instability in Jordan had become a widely-followed regional topic; so
widely-followed that the British Embassy in New Delhi felt obliged to explain to the
Indian government the nature of proposed British and American aid to the Hashemite
kingdom.

29 ‘Amman [Mills] to WDC, 7 January I960’. NACPM, 785.13/1-660, Section I, pp. 1-2.

30 ‘British Embassy Amman Qohnston] to the Foreign Office, 15 March I960’. PRO,
FO371/151058, p. 2.

31 ‘Letter from British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to the Foreign Office Q.G.S. Beith,
Levant Department], 19 May I960’. PRO, FO371/151058, p. 2.

32 ‘FO Minutes on Telegram from Amman [Johnston] to FO, 18 June I960’. PRO,
FO371/151058, p. 2.

33 ‘Minute by P.H. Moberly British Emb Cairo, 6 July I960’. PRO FO371/151058, p. 1.

34 ‘Letter British Embassy Amman [L.C.W. Figg] to FO, 15 March I960’. PRO,
FO371/151058, p. 2.

35 ‘FO to the British Embassy Amman, 6 July I960’. PRO FO371/151058, p. 2.

36 ‘WDC to Amman, 16 August I960’. NACPM, 785.11/8-1660, p. 1.

37 ‘Letter British Emb Amman [Morris] to FO, 8July I960’. PRO FO371/151058, p. 1.

38 ‘Amman to WDC NIACT Immediate, 29 August I960’. NACPM, 785.11/8-2960, p. 1.

39 ‘Amman [Kocher] to WDC, 2 September I960’. NACPM, 785.13/9-260 HBS, p. 1.

40 ‘Amman [Kocher] to WDC, 30 August I960’. NACPM, 785.13/8-3060 HBS, pp. 1-4.
The issue of Majali’s ‘liberal nature’ centered on the fact that the two perpetrators of the
bombing plot apparently had known anti-government views and had previously
participated in anti-government activities. Despite this Majali ‘himself had suggested
their employment as part of his general policy to attempt [to] rehabilitate those
Jordanians whom he considered unjustly suspected’. The view was that, given the
apparent result, the release of political prisoners would cease while ‘interrogation,
round-ups, arrests [were] all likely to increase’.

41 Interview with William C. Lakeland, 23-24 September 2003. BOGHAKYPU was the
acronym for ‘be of good heart and keep your pecker up’. William ‘Bill’ Lakeland was the
Iraq-Jordan Desk Officer from the summer of 1958 to the summer of 1960 when he
became the political officer in Baghdad. Lakeland viewed the Jordanian regime as a
nuisance and a waste of foreign aid, a widely-held view in the foreign-policy
establishment.

42 Nutting, Nasser, pp. 280-281.

43 ‘Amman [Kocher] to WDC, 2 September I960’. NACPM, 785.13/9-260 HBS, p. 1.

44 ‘Amman [Kocher] to WDC, 30 August I960’. NACPM, 785.13/8-3060 HBS, p. 4.

45 ‘Memcon Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to the US and G. Lewis Jones, NEA, 29
September I960’. NACPM, 785.11/9-2960, pp. 1-2. The US desire for good relations
with Nasser had not gone unnoticed in Amman. The Turkish Ambassador to the
United States, Melih Esenbel, told G. Lewis Jones, NEA, that many Jordanians blamed
the US for the assassination of Majali. They believed that only the US had the actual
influence in Cairo to deter Nasser’s aggressive intentions toward Jordan. As a result,
they surmised that the US had condoned Nasser’s activities. Jones responded that while
the allegations were absurd, the US would do everything in its power to calm the
differences between Jordan and the United Arab Republic. Jones hoped that a meeting
might be arranged between Nasser and King Hussein since both had elected to attend
the UNGA meeting in New York. In response to Esenbel’s concerns over the reception

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accorded King Hussein, Jones stated that the US intended to give Jordan every
indication of its continuing support.

46 ‘CRO to Commonwealth members, 10 September I960’. PRO FO371/151045, p. 1.

47 ‘Telegram from the CRO to Commonwealth members, 13 September I960’. No. 428,
PRO FO371/151045, p. 1.

48 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO [Hoyer-Miller and Stevens], 12 September
I960’. No. 808, PRO FO371/151048, pp. 1-2. Additionally, Johnston pointed out that
Fawaz Haher, a Circassian commanding the divisional headquarters, Majali’s own Chief
of Staff, another Circassian, Izzat Hassan, and Kasim Ohan, the Armenian Director of
Military Training were all opposed to the adventure, but ‘their protests are being
ignored’.

49 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO, 12 September I960’. No. 804, PRO
FO371/151048, p. 1.

50 ‘Minute by Sir Roger Stevens on Cabinet Brief for Prime Minister Macmillan, 14
September I960’. PRO FO371/151048, Cover Sheet. See also, ‘British Embassy Tehran
[Millard] to FO and Amman, 27 September I960’. PRO 371/151061, p. 1. The concern
had reached such a high point that the Americans and British asked the Shah of Iran to
use his influence with King Hussein. In this vein, the Iranian Ambassador in Amman,
Afshar, delivered a message from the Shah that sympathized with the King but urged
‘him not to embark on a military adventure, which would be likely to prove disastrous’.

51 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO, 15 September I960’. PRO FO371/151048,

p. 2.

52 ‘Amman [Kocher] to WDC, 2 September I960’. NACPM, 785.13/9-260 HBS, p. 2.

53 ‘London [Whitney] to WDC, 8 September I960’. NACPM, 785.13/9-860 CAA, p. 1.

54 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO, 27 September I960’. PRO FO371/151061,
p. 1. The fact that Talal, Hussein’s father, was certifiably mad was a point lost on few in
the Arab world, and almost no one in Jordan.

55 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 584-585. President Eisenhower’s memoirs describe the
meeting with Nasser as ‘a highly interesting experience’, while not even mentioning a
meeting with King Hussein that occurred at the White House after the UNGA on
October 7, 1960.

56 ‘Herter to Amman, 12 October I960’. NACPM, 785.11/10-1260, pp. 1-2.

57 ‘Amman [Kocher] to Herter, 8 October I960’. NACPM, 785.11/10-860, p. 1.

58 ‘Minute by R.K. Nehru to F.S. Dutt and Prime Minister Nehru, 1 November I960’.
INA, 8A (2) W ANA/60.

59 ‘Memcon Roger Stevens and US Under Secretary Dillon, 10 December 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142141, pp. 1-3. This entire file is an excellent source for the early phases of
what would become an ongoing battle over who had to pay for propping up Jordan.
The British had managed to get the US committed to the idea of maintaining the
Jordanian state, and now they wanted to limit their exposure. For London, despite its
old ties to the regime, Jordan had never been the real issue; the heart of the matter was
Iraq, the IPC and Kuwait.

60 ‘Memcon Selwyn Lloyd and Acting Secretary of State Dillon, 26 September I960’.
NACPM, 785.11/9-2660, pp. 1-2. See also ‘Operations Memorandum “Basic Data on
Jordan” from US Embassy Amman to WDC, 28 July 1961’. NACPM, 785.5 MSP/7-
2861, p. 8. Total US aid to Jordan from 1951 to 1960 totaled $188 million. Of this
amount, $119 million was in direct budgetary support, with $20 million in PL 480 grain
and $49 million in economic and technical aid. The British contributions since 1951 was
considerably less.

61 ‘Operations Memo “Basic Data on Jordan” from Amman to WDC, 28 July 1961’.
NACPM, 785.5 MSP/7-2861, p. 3. See also ‘Memcon Finance Minister Erhard of West
Germany, and Acting Secretary of State Dillon, 26 September I960’. NACPM, 785.5

Notes

389

MSP-/9-2660, p. 1. Erhard attended a dinner on the same evening as the Dillon-Lloyd
meeting. Both took this opportunity to press the Germans on the issue of aid, pointing
out that West Germany had become the largest commercial supplier to Jordan. Erhard
replied that he ‘thought something would be possible’ along the lines of $5 to $7 million
in direct aid. The Chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Karl Blessing, who was also present,
concurred that they could probably manage the problem.

62 ‘Memcon Selwyn Lloyd and Dillon, 26 September I960’. NACPM, 785.11/9-2660, pp.
1 - 2 .

63 Lacy, Robert, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1981, pp. 310-371. The author offers a set of chapters that provides a well-
organized domestic and international context for the period of the Arab Cold War.
Although brief, the chapter on ‘Colonel Nasser’s New Way’ gives an overview of the
impact of Nasserism on the Saudi world. The book makes two particularly important
points. First, it briefly discusses the role of Egyptian teachers in Saudi Arabia and the
grassroots influence that they exerted on the Kingdom. Second, Lacey discusses the
impact of Nasser’s July 1956 visit to Dhahran and Riyadh, and the humiliation of the
Saudi royal family: ‘There could be no face-saving rationalizations of the hysteria that
swamped the Egyptian leader when he arrived. . . . Riyadh had never seen anything like
it. No member of the house of Saud had ever inspired such spontaneous displays of
passion.’ Lacy also takes a look at the exact circumstances in which the decision to place
Feisal in charge of the government occurred. In the chapter entitled ‘Enter the Crown
Prince’, Lacy states that the meeting occurred immediately after Nasser’s radio
broadcast announcing Saud’s attempt to bribe Sarraj and wreck the Syrian union (p.
320). No reference is made to an Arab Cold War, but the substance of these two
chapters, and to a degree also the ‘OPEC’ chapter, place the internal situation in Saudi
Arabia in the broader context of the Arab Cold War period. See also Holden, David and
Richard Johns, The House of Saud: The Rise and Rode of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab
World. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1981, pp. 203-205. The House of Saud is a
popular history of the Saudi Kingdom. It deals with the period of the Arab Cold War in
terms of the problems besetting the Saudi royal family, during the transition from Saud
to Feisal. The book also provides a useful outline of the controversy surrounding Tallal
ibn Saud and his attempts to secularize the Saudi state along Nasserist lines. The
original author David Holden, a correspondent of The Sunday Times was shot and killed
by unknown assailants on a trip to Cairo on December 7, 1977. Richard Johns then
took over the partially-finished manuscript and completed the work. The authors treat
the 1959-1960 period, in a chapter entitled ‘A House Divided’, as the beginning of more
disciplined rule by Feisal following the erratic actions of King Saud in 1957 and 1958.
They pointed out that Feisal’s rapprochement with Nasser sharply reduced the shock of
the Iraqi coup of 1958. ‘Amidst the furor, [Feisal] believed, rightly, that the safest policy
for the kingdom was one of non-alignment.’ After an August 1958 visit to Cairo and
nine hours of talks with Nasser, Feisal allegedly commented: ‘Thank God our relations
are so good now that if there was a cloud in the sky it has passed by.’ The book
provides a useful look at the transition of authority in Saud Arabia during the late 1950s
and early 1960s, but not much analysis of the broader context that drove these events.
The book is after all a history of the Saudi family.

64 ‘Discussion 406th NSC Meeting, 13 May 1959’. DDEL, Box 11, p. 2.

65 ‘Annual Political Report on Saudi Arabia 1959 from Indian Embassy Jidda [M.K.
Kidwai] to MEA New Delhi and Nehru, 12 October I960’. INA, MEA, 15-A (9)
WANA/60, pp. 1-2.

66 Lacy, Kingdom , p. 338.

67 ‘Jidda [Heath] to WDC, 25 July 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 730-732.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

68 Salibi, History of Jordan, p. 201. See also ‘Jidda [Heath] to WDC, 25 July 1958’. FRUS,
1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 730-732. US Ambassador Heath met with Crown Prince
Feisal and ‘For nearly an hour, listened to an almost unadulterated Nasserian exposition
of the situation in the Arab Near East’. Like Nasser prior to his falling out with Qasim,
Feisal defended the revolution in Iraq. After the Egyptian-Iraqi break, Feisal mirrored
UAR rhetoric and attacked Qasim. Heath commented: ‘I have the impression that while
Faisal is fully conscious of the danger Nasser represents to the monarchical regime in
Saudi Arabia he is determined on reconciliation with Nasser in order to buy temporary
relief from radio attacks and, he hopes, defer an Egyptian plot to overthrow the Saudi
regime. I believe in order to buy time and possibly temporary security against an
Egyptian-guided coup he is willing to put Saudi Arabia, like Yemen, into the UAR.’ See
also ‘SNIE: The Outlook in Saudi Arabia, 9 September 1958’. FRUS , 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 735.

69 ‘Minute by Sir Roger Stevens on Anglo-Saudi Relations, 13 September I960’. PRO,
F0371/ 149244, pp. 1-9. This particular file contains a very good record of the various
disputes between Saudi Arabia and Britain, the obstacles to settling those disputes, and
to the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations.

70 ‘Memo Australian High Commission London to Canberra, 8 December 1959’. NAA,
MEA, A1838 67/1/4/35, Part 1, p. 1. The connection between Saudi Arabia and the
UAR was strong enough for The Times to argue that diplomatic relations with Egypt
would bring diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis’ retention of Azzam
Pasha, the former Secretary General of the Arab League, reinforced this view. The
suggestion that Saudi Arabia would follow the UAR lead was so strong that the Saudis
felt compelled to deny it, stating: ‘Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom
and the U.A.R. [were] not irrelevant to the Saudi attitude.’

71 ‘Brief on Saudi-British Relations prepared by FO for President Ayub’s visit to Riyadh,
21 October I960’. PRO, F0371/149247, p. 2. See also ‘Minute FO on Ayub
discussions with Saudi leaders on issue of British relations, 5 and 20 October I960’.
PRO, F0371/ 149244, p. 1-2. In minutes between Walmsley and others, FO officials
discussed how an upcoming visit of President Ayub of Pakistan might be used to
further the cause of diplomatic relations between London and Riyadh. An effort
through the UN was underway to find a compromise on the issue of Buraimi. R.A.
Beaumont at the FO felt that an approach by Ayub might complicate DeRibbing’s UN
effort. Beaumont finally decided that Ayub could assure the Saudis of Macmillan’s
desire to see a settlement, but London wanted Ayub to point out the process of solving
this problem was a long one, and one that had proven intractable for over eight years.
For additional background on the UN role in the negotiations, see also the documents
in ‘Saudi Dispute with the United Kingdom, 1959’. PRO, F0371/ 140367.

72 ‘Annual Political Report on Saudi Arabia 1959 from Indian Embassy Jidda [M.K.
Kidwai] to MEA New Delhi and Prime Minister [Nehru], 12 October I960’. INA,
MEA, 1 5-A (9) WANA/60, p. 4.

73 ‘British Embassy Amman [Johnston] to FO [Stevens], 16 September 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142131, p. 1.

74 ‘Annual Political Report on Saudi Arabia 1959 from Indian Embassy Jidda to MEA and
Nehru, 12 October I960’. INA, MEA, 15-A (9) WANA/60, p. 4. Kidwai, the Indian
Ambassador in Jidda, stated that the Saudi Arabia ‘loudly proclaims that she will have
no truck with Britain until the Bopurimi [sic — Buraimi] question was settled to her
satisfaction’.

75 ‘NIE Outlook for Saudi Arabia, 19 April I960’. FRUS , 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 759.

76 Ball, George W. and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with
Israel, 1947 to the Present. New York: Norton, 1992), pp. 47, 42-49. George Ball was
Undersecretary of State in the Johnson and Kennedy administrations, as well as

Notes

391

Ambassador to the United Nations. The authors entitled the chapter on the period 1952
to 1960 ‘The Eisenhower Administration Halts the Retreat’. They were referring to the
propensity for the Truman administration to enunciate a position on the Middle East,
and then to back away from it under Israeli-orchestrated pressure. This work argues
that Eisenhower, who was elected by a landslide with the vast majority of Jewish voters
supporting the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, faced no such handicap in
pursuing Middle East policy. In reaction to Suez, Eisenhower embargoed $26 million in
aid to Israel and threatened to end the tax exemption for contributions to American
Zionist organizations, in order to pressure Israel to accept UN observers. The authors
take a highly negative view of Israel’s ability to influence US policy. They describe
Israeli explanations for the Kibya raid on the West Bank of 14-15 October 1953 on the
West Bank in the following manner: ‘Here again — as was to happen so often in the
future — America was subjected to a mirage of untruths and bureaucratic obfuscation.’
Both give Eisenhower high marks for his unwillingness to budge in the face of Israeli
and American Zionist pressure, and for his television address to the nation in 1957, in
which he issued an ultimatum to Israel to either withdraw from Sinai or face a total cut-
off of US monetary and aid support. The authors present a picture of frantic and
fanatical American Zionist political efforts to force the President to back down, and
laud his refusal. The Balls argue that the major failing of the Eisenhower administration
was fixation on Communist influence, and its inability to understand that a
comprehensive Middle East peace was the only real protection against Soviet inroads.
Additionally, the authors state that the death of John Foster Dulles weakened the drive
for a solution in the region. This work is largely an indictment of Israeli and American
Zionist influence on the policies of the United States toward the Middle East. It argues
that, fundamentally, Israel used Holocaust politics and the cry of anti-Semitism to
deflect any real attempts to solve the problems in the region. The authors quote Dulles’
statement on the subject: ‘I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to
carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews. Marshall and Forestall learned that.
I am going to have a try. That does not mean I am anti-Jewish, but I believe in what
George Washington said in his Farewell address that an emotional attachment to
another country should not interfere.’ Dulles added: ‘We cannot have our policies made
in Jerusalem.’ While critical of Arab missteps, the authors view Eisenhower as the last
American president to pursue US national interests in the Middle East. Many of the
quotes used in this short chapter came from Neff s Warriors at Sue%. Neff obtained them
from the notes and minutes of meetings made by Eisenhower’s chief of staff Brigadier
General Andrew Goodpaster. The overall work is clearly anti- Zionist, anti-Israeli and
highly concerned with what it views as the undue influence of Israel and the American
Jewish community over American foreign policy. Mark Tessler, in A. History of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1994) makes little mention
of the 1959-1960 period except to argue that despite Israel’s military performance
during the Suez war, it was Nasser that reaped political gains in the region. Other than
brief comments about the impact of the Syro-Egyptian union on Israel, and the fact
that Tel Aviv always continued to view Nasser as the primary threat, the period is hardly
mentioned.

77 ‘Analysis of the Nasserist Movement in its Relations with East and West attached to
Memo from Australian Legation Tel Aviv [B.C. Ballard] to Canberra, 25 November
1958’. NAA, A1 838/2 175/11/20 Part 9, pp. 1, 6-7. These papers included a list of all
Nasser’s transgressions in the region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared the
paper for a visiting representative of the Italian Prime Minister. The Ministry liked it so
much that they handed it out to other Western embassies and legations. From its very
inception, the Israelis viewed the UAR as the primary threat. They could only thrive in
the disunity of the Arab world, and the union of Syria and Egypt suggested that Arab

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

nationalism might be strong enough to unite it. The Israelis predicted that Syria was
only the first step, and that attempts to include Lebanon and Jordan would surely
follow.

78 Alteras, Isaac, Eisenhower and Israel: US —Israeli Relations, 1953-1960. Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1993, pp. 311-312. Alteras’s work is a good narrative,
examining the complicated relationship between the Eisenhower administration and
Israel. Hoever, it does not discuss the last two years of that administration, and the
author makes sweeping judgments that are in fact incorrect in that regard. Based on US
funding for purchases of British tanks, electronic equipment and ‘1,000 recoilless guns’,
Alteras concludes that: ‘Israel’s role in stemming Nasserite and Soviet influence had not
won the whole-hearted support and recognition of the United States.’ This is simply not
the case. As we have seen, Nasser and not Israel was the chosen vehicle for stemming
the Communist tide in 1958-1960. While useful from time to time, Washington viewed
Israel as a policy albatross, an impediment to Western interests in the Middle East.
Between 1959 and 1960, the Israelis gained something of a break from violent Nasserist
attacks, but Israel saw its principal benefactor as what the British called the United
States, ‘the rich uncle’, encouraging and supporting Nasser’s policies in the region.
Additionally, Alteras fails to ask hard questions about issues like Ben-Gurion’s fear of a
Soviet attack. The high probability, almost a certainty, is that Israel had little or no fear
of a Soviet attack, and merely used Soviet bluster in an attempt to gain a policy goal —
namely a security guarantee from the United States. This is an interesting work that is
reasonably good on facts up to 1958, but woefully short on analysis.

79 Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel , p. 312.

80 ‘FO Comment [Hadow] on Correspondence on Arab-Israeli Relations, 13 January
1959’. (Vrl052/10) PRO, FO371/142304, pp. 2, 4.

81 ‘Minute by Hoyer-Millar FO Comment [Hadow] on Correspondence on Arab-Israeli
Relations, 23 January 1959’. PRO, FO371/142304, p. 5.

82 ‘Letter British Embassy Tel Aviv [Rundall] to the FO, 20 April 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142293, pp. 1-2. The antipathy that the Israelis and Zionist organizations held
for Byroad was pronounced, primarily because he outspokenly supported a solution to
the Palestinian refugee problem and refused to criticize Arab efforts to use the refugees
as a political issue against Israel. Byroad saw no difference between Zionists using the
stateless-person argument to justify the founding of Israel and Arab leaders using the
plight of Palestinian refugees for their political ends. Byroad’s position on the refugees
is summed up in the following: ‘A breath of fresh air would be given the world if all
concerned would simply admit the fundamental facts that these people are homeless,
are in desperate want and are uncompensated for their property and other losses that
they have suffered. Can anyone benefit by the continued compression of these people
in tiny areas and in other circumstances that make for moral degeneration and the
making of a new generation fed on bitterness and hate?’ Lilienthal, Alfred M., There Goes
the Middle East. New York: Devin- Adair, 1957, p. 38.

83 ‘Letter British Embassy WDC [Weir] to the FO [Rothnie], 29 April 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142293, p. 1.

84 Cohen, Avner, Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 78,
81-84. Cohen’s book is an excellent look at the Israeli nuclear program. While the early
years remain sketchy due to the non-availability of documentation, Cohen does a solid
job of outlining the highpoints in the decision process that made Israel a nuclear power.
In his short chapter ‘Dimona Revealed’, Cohen relates the story of how the US
intelligence community had the information that could have led them to discover
Israel’s intent in the 1958-1960 timeframe, but failed to put it all together. Cohen use of
interviews provides an interesting dimension to the story. His discussion of the
Kennedy period is considerably more detailed because by 1960 the US government was

Notes

393

both alarmed and aware that Israel was probably intent on creating a nuclear-weapons
capability. The book is well-written, well-researched, and a fascinating read. It is
particularly useful in understanding the process by which intelligence organizations
seem to overlook the obvious due to an imperfect intelligence ‘fusion’ process. Cohen
points out the evidence offered by NPIC consisted of a large site with a security fence
around it, a large road network, significant provision for electrical power and, most
suspiciously, what appeared to be an attempt to ‘hide the dirt’ from the excavation.
While it had all the earmarks of a nuclear site, there was no way of telling what the exact
nature, scope and purpose of the site would be. Additionally, NPIC personnel briefing
senior government officials tended to be very conservative in their presentations. They
presented only the facts and offered little speculation about a given site. Saying that it
was a ‘probable’ nuclear site was going about as far as NPIC personnel would go in a
senior briefing. Had the President or Strauss been privy to the private conversations at
NPIC then their concerns would have no doubt been heightened considerably. In any
case, the information received in early 1958 from all sources did result in a focused
attempt to get an answer from the Israelis.

85 ‘Memcon Scientific Counselor Israeli Embassy WDC [Lahav] and DOS Atomic Energy
Bureau [Farley], 11 May 1959’. NACPM, 611.84A97/5-1159 CS/B, pp. 1-2.

86 ‘Proposed Note attached to Memcon Lahav and DOS Atomic Energy Bureau [Farley
and Johnson], 11 May 1959’. NACPM, 611.84A97/5-1159 CS/B, p. 2.

87 ‘Statement to Israel attached to Letter from Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Atomic Energy, to the Scientific Counselor Israeli Embassy WDC [Lahav]
17 June 1959’. NACPM, 611.84A97/7-2759 CS/B, p. 2. When questioned by Senator
Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, about the
‘exception’ the administration used the ‘Arab on the inspection team argument’ to
explain Israeli concerns and provided the Senator with a portion of the official
statement provided to Tel Aviv and cited above. Charles A. Sullivan, the Acting Special
Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy stated: ‘The memorandum was phrased to
make plain our continuing strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency.’
He then added, just to make sure that everyone understood: ‘In view of the sensitive
nature of Israeli- Arab relations and the delicacy of the United States position vis-a-vis
this situation, the memorandum has been classified “confidential”.’ ‘Letter Farley,
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy, to Senator Anderson, Chairman,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 2 September 1959’. NACPM, 611.84A97/9-259
CS/TU, p. 2.

88 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb , p. 84. James Jesus Angleton was one of the primary reasons
that the ‘dots’ went unconnected. Cohen describes Angleton as the head of the Israeli
desk at the CIA. Angleton was much more than that. He was the chief of
counterintelligence for the entire agency. An orchid-growing, bizarre figure given to
regular mole hunts and counter-intelligence theories so convoluted that many thought
him mad, Angleton wielded enormous power in the agency. He carried
compartmentalization to the point that it was virtually impossible to share information.
He also saw himself as the ultimate authority on counter-intelligence and on the Israelis.
In the former persona, he failed miserably in detecting one of the greatest double agents
of that period, Kim Philby. Philby was stationed at the British Embassy in Washington
and was Angleton’s British counter-intelligence contact. He was also a Soviet spy — a
minor detail that Angleton never suspected. In the case of the Israelis, Angleton
believed that his contacts were so solid that Israel could not undertake a major effort in
any national security area without him knowing about it. This leaves an interesting
quandary. Either Angleton knew about the nuclear weapons program and did not tell
anyone in Washington, or once again, he was fooled by his own secretive arrogance.
The latter conclusion is the best bet.

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89 ‘Letter British Embassy WDC [Weir] to FO [Rothnie], 30 September 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142293, p. 1.

90 ‘Minute [Rothnie] on Letter from British Embassy WDC to FO, 30 September 1959’.
PRO, F0371/142293, p. 1.

91 ‘Dispatch Tel Aviv [William B. Lockling] to WDC, 25 August I960’. NACPM,
784A.00/8-2560, CAA, p. 2

92 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb , pp. 86, 94.

93 Shlaim, Avi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. London: Penguin, 2000, p. 208.
Shlaim’s work provides an objective look at the Arab Israeli conflict. Its objectivity has
made his work something of a lightning-rod for Israeli government criticism because it
debunks many of the myths about the Jewish state. In fact, The Iron Wall. , despite being
an excellent and well-researched piece of scholarship, had not been published in
Hebrew because of the challenge that it represented to official history. It was in effect
politically incorrect to publish the Shlaim book. Recently, a private individual paid for
the translation and publication. Because it is a very broad work, it provides an overview
of the period 1959 to 1960, but Shlaim does not go into depth in discussing the Isreali
nuclear weapons. This is unlike the detailed account of the program in the Alteras book.

94 ‘WDC [Jones] to Tel Aviv, 21 December I960’. DDEL, Office of the Staff Secretary
[Goodpaster], Box 8, p. 2.

95 ‘WDC [Jones] to Tel Aviv, 29 December I960’. DDEL, Box 8, p. 2, and ‘WDC [Jones]
to Tel Aviv, 31 December I960’. DDEL, Box 8, p. 2.

96 ‘DOD to Tel Aviv on Israeli Nuclear Program, 6 January 1961’. DDEL, Box 8, p. 2.

97 ‘Memcon Meeting with Eisenhower, 12 January 1961’. DDEL, Box 8, pp. 2-3.

Chapter 8

1 See Ziircher, Eric, Turkey: A Modern History. London: Tauris, 1998, pp. 245-249, for an
overview of Turkish foreign policy, including its ‘Atlantic’ view. Turkey joined NATO
on February 18, 1952. Membership placed Turkey on a level that none of the other
countries in the Middle East or South Asia could match. NATO was a real military
alliance designed to fight a war with the Soviet Union. The Baghdad Pact, CENTO, and
SEATO were organizations intended to maintain the pro-Western orientation of their
members at a minimum cost in economic and military aid. In contrast, Turkey’s
membership of NATO provided vast quantities of military aid and arms. Turkey may
have abutted the Middle East, but it focused on Europe.

2 Eisenhower, Waging Peace , pp. 206, 389-390. Since the Sputnik coup of 1957,
Khrushchev had periodically crowed about Soviet missile superiority and the Soviets’
ability to attack the United States. The administration took this threat seriously,
particularly when political opponents capitalized on it. Senators Stuart Symington and
Henry Jackson bombarded the administration with accusations of Soviet superiority.
While their concerns were largely exaggerated, the Eisenhower administration used
every available means of collecting information on Soviet missile development and
capabilities. Two sites in north-eastern Iran and the two in Pakistan, including U-2
operations, provided vital information Soviet test facilities in Central Asia and on
missile deployment. These sites collected telemetry data and optical information on
Soviet missile capability and thus contributed directly to the defense of the continental
United States. The airfield at Peshawar in Pakistan was also a center for U-2 operations.
Given the limited technology of the day, the US government felt that those sites were
critical to national security, and much of its policy toward Iran and Pakistan was
predicated on the sites.

3 Arora, Menon — A Biography , p. 203. Arora states that Krishna Menon supported the
move to modernize the Indian armed forces with Soviet arms because he feared a coup.
According to Aurora, Menon believed that without new arms to confront the Pakistanis

Notes

395

arms from the US, the Indian military might have staged an Ayub-like coup. While this
was no doubt a rationalization in large part, there is some indication that Menon may
have genuinely feared the military because senior commanders detested him and many
had served the British.

4 ‘Memo Board of National Estimates to CIA Director Dulles, 10 November 1958’.
FRUS , 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 597-600. The intelligence estimates, concerning the
Shah, reflected the administration-wide overreaction to perceived intelligence failures,
of which Iraq was viewed as a massive example. Many also feared that the Badhdad
Pact intelligence files lost to the Qasim government provided a bonanza for the
opponents of Western interests in the region. See also Weintal, Edward ‘Intelligence
Disaster in Iraq’. Newsweek , 4 August 1958, p. 20. In the aftermath of Iraq 1958, Iran
logically became the next concern. The intelligence estimates lurched in the opposite
direction, taking a more pessimistic view of the situation. Should Iran succumb to a
revolution or coup, the intelligence community wanted to be able to say that the
administration had been warned. Thus as 1959 arrived, warning of disaster and listing all
the potential reasons for impending implosion in Iran were in vogue.

5 ‘Discussion 386th NSC Meeting, 13 November 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII,
pp. 600-604.

6 ‘NSC Report, 15 November 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 607, 612, 614.

7 ‘Memcon on Iranian Budgetary Situation, 9 December 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, pp. 619-621.

8 ‘Letter Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State John H. Irwin II, AsstSecDef,
16 |anuary 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, (Box 1), p. 1.

9 ‘WDC to Tehran, 16 January 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 622.

10 Yapp, M.E., Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan, 1798-1850. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1980, p. 124.

11 ‘Letter Murphy DOS to Irwin, DOD, 16 January 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 1 , p. 1 .

12 ‘WDC to Tehran, 16 January 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp. 622, 624.

13 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC [Rountree], 17 January 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII,
Footnote No. 6, p. 624

14 ‘Discussion 394th NSC Meeting, 22 January 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII,
Editorial Note, p. 626.

15 ‘Minute on Telegram British Embassy Tel Aviv to FO, 12 June 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142289, pp. 1-2. On June 4, Ambassador Rundall, in Tel Aviv, cabled that the
Israelis were once again asking for British help in getting Tehran to recognize Israel.
The British viewed such a move as ‘ill-advised’. ‘In Nuri’s time [the British had opposed
Iranian recognition] because it would embarrass [Nuri] in his dual role as Arab patriot
and member of the Baghdad Pact, and after the Iraqi revolution because it would give
more ammunition to anti-Western members of the Qasim regime.’ They left the matter
up to the Iranians, who had to date always in the end rejected it. Apparently the Israelis
viewed the Shah’s negotiations with the Soviets in January and February as an indication
of Iranian insecurity and isolation, and were preparing another attempt at recognition.
D.T. West at the Foreign Office commented: ‘Neither country would derive any
material benefit, and the furore likely to result from such a step, besides providing grist
to the anti-Western mills in Baghdad and Cairo, who would for one be united on an
issue, might well imperil the supply of Iranian crude to the Haifa refinery.’ In ‘Letter
British Embassy Tehran to British Embassy Baghdad [Hiller], 14 July 1959’. PRO,
F0371/142289, p. 1, the British in Tehran took the view that such a move by the Shah
could happen and might be a positive thing. The Iranians ‘on the rebound from
traditional dislike of the Arabs’ might want relations with the Israelis just to
demonstrate their independence to ‘an ungrateful and unfriendly Arab world’. With its

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

eye on Iraqi petroleum and not wanting this line of reasoning to get out of hand, A.K.
Rothnie in the Foreign Officer responded in ‘Letter FO [Rothnie] to Baghdad, Tehran
and Washington, 27 July 1959’. PRO, F0371/142289, p. 1. ‘What is much more
important however from our point of view is the stability of Iran. Recognition by Iran
of Israel will obviously not contribute to that; and if we thought it was imminent, any
influence that we felt could be exerted would probably be against it.’ Gestures of
‘independence’ were one thing; oil was distinctly another.

16 ‘Letter Eisenhower to Shah, 30 January 1959’. DDEL, International Series, Iran, Box
31, pp. 1-4.

17 ‘Ankara to WDC, 9 February 1959’. NACPM, 787.00/2-559, p. 1.

18 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 9 February 1959’. NACPM, 787.00/2-559, p. 1. See also
‘Baghdad to WDC, 14 March 1959’. NACPM, 787.00/3-1459, p. 1. Trevelyan, the
British Ambassador in Baghdad, informed US Ambassador Jernegan that despite a
downturn in relations between Qasim and London, he intended to recommend the sale
of arms to Iraq. Trevelyan stated that the Iraqi army constituted the only stable, reliable
force, and the arms might cultivate pro-Western sentiment. Trevelyan argued that
because the actual delivery dates were well into the future, the arms agreement could
always be broken if the situation in Baghdad worsened. ‘Tehran to WDC, 19 March
1959’. NACPM, 787.00/3-1459, p. 1. In an effort to reduce the potential for an angry
reaction, Ambassador Wailes wanted the British to approach the Shah, as a courtesy,
before the official announcement of arms sales to Iraq. Wailes expressed this concern
after Iranian talks on a non-aggression treaty with the Soviets had collapsed. Wailes was
no doubt concerned that arms sales to Iraq would spark even greater demands for arms
from the Shah. In a ‘Circular Telegram, 24 February 1959’. NACPM, 787.00/3-1459, p.
1, Washington informed all posts in the region that Prime Minister Macmillan and
President Eisenhower had talked and that the US concurred with the British plan to sell
additional arms to Iraq. The circular stated that the US had no intention at this time of
selling further arms to Baghdad, and that Baghdad had not raised the issue of
previously-approved military assistance. See also ‘SNIE: Consequences of a Soviet-
Iranian Non aggression Pact, 3 February 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp.
632-635. This SNIE stated that the overthrow of Nuri Said, Soviet aid to Afghanistan,
Soviet influence with Qasim, and the fear that the US was moving toward an
‘accommodation’ with Nasser had heightened the Shah’s predisposition toward
‘insecurity’. The report stated that the Shah was probably trying to get a limited
agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce pressure on his regime from that quarter
while not rupturing his relations with the United States. The SNIE concluded that an
agreement with the Soviets would be a major propaganda coup, but that they only real
casualty would be the Baghdad Pact arrangement.

19 ‘Recent Trends in Iranian-Soviet Relations, July, 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Assistance, Box 1, pp. 8-9. Although not dated, this document offered the best
blow-by-blow account of what actually transpired between the Soviets and the Iranians
in February 1959. On 29 January 1959, a Soviet delegation led by A.P. Semeonov
arrived in Tehran to negotiate the agreement. The talks quickly ran into trouble over
two points: the Soviets wanted Iran to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact; and the
Iranians wanted to cancel Articles V and VI of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. The
reason for the Soviet position on the Baghdad Pact is obvious. The Iranian position
however was linked to two articles in the 1921 agreement that under the Soviets’
interpretation allowed ‘them the right to dispatch troops to Iran in the event forces of
third power are present on Iranian territory for the purposes of aggression against the
USSR which Iran was unable to prevent’. At this point pressure from the Western
powers and Baghdad Pact allies forced the Shah to reconsider. The Shah, who was
‘surprised’ by the Western reaction, now hoped that the Soviets would reject his original

Notes

397

position and leave him a way out of the situation. In a surprise move, the Soviet
delegation contacted Moscow and on the specific orders of Chairman Khrushchev gave
in on both points. The pact was ready to be signed, at which point the Iranians changed
the rules and stated that they wanted the right to conclude a bilateral defense
arrangement with the US. ‘Since there had been a clear understanding on both sides at
the beginning of the negotiations that Iran would not go through with the bilateral
agreement, the changed Iranian position introduced a new element.’ This action resulted
in a heated exchange on February 10 in which Semeonov became ‘bellicose and
insulting’. The Russian pointed out the ‘dangerous consequences of Iran’s actions’,
accused the Shah of ‘bad faith’, and left for Moscow the next day.

20 ‘Letter Murphy DOS to Irwin DOD, 16 January 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 1, pp. 1-2. The Kurdish situation was of particular concern in both
Iran and Iraq. Washington feared a ‘Kurdish land-bridge’ from the Soviet Union across
Turkey and Iran into Iraq. The Iraq Desk concluded that the immediate target of any
instability fomented by the Soviets would be Iran. See ‘Joint Memo Iraq Desk
[Lakeland] and Iranian Desk [Harrison Symmes] to NEA [Armin H. Meyer], 24 April
1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Asst, Box 1, p. 1. See also in ‘Memo Iraq
Desk, 27 May 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Asst, Box 1, p. 5. The Iraq Desk
followed up with a report on the Kurds that outlined a brief history of the issues and
conflicts. The report did not have an addressee on it, but given the content, it probably
resulted from a request at the Secretariat level. It provides an interesting overview and
assessment of the situation in Iran as well as that in Iraq. It stated that the Kurds of Iran
were ‘quiescent at present’ and ‘still entertain a traditional loyalty to the institution of
the monarchy’ for the most part. But, the report added that the poor quality of Iranian
administration coupled with endemic corruption had bred resentment. ‘The Iranian
Government is now showing a belated awareness of the importance of the Kurds to the
internal stability of the country and, in the last year, has taken some positive steps
toward winning their support. Efforts are being made to improve the quality of officials
and army officers assigned to Iranian Kurdistan.’

21 ‘Recent Trends in Iranian-Soviet Relations, July 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 1, p. 13.

22 ‘Memo Herter to Eisenhower, 23 February 1959’. DDEL, International Series, Iran,
Box 31, pp. 1-4. Herter also mentioned that there were issues yet to be ironed out with
regard to the wording of the bilateral agreements. Iran wanted the agreement to state
that the US would deal with an attack on Iran as if it were an attack on US territory;
Washington, of course, declined such wording. Most interestingly, Pakistan wanted to
include any attack upon Pakistan. It was an obvious attempt to enlist US aid in the
event of an Indian attack. That wording was also rejected, but it clearly demonstrates
the linkage between Iraq 1958 and relations on the subcontinent.

23 ‘NIE: The Outlook for Iran, 3 March 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 643.

24 ‘Discussion 413th NSC Meeting, 16 July 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII,
Editorial Note, p. 645.

25 ‘Recent Trends in Iranian-Soviet Relations, 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military
Assistance, Box 1, p. 17.

26 ‘The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against Iran’. In Roi (ed.), From Fncroachment to
Involvement, pp. 326-327.

27 ‘Memo Iran Desk to NEA [Jones] — Radio Moscow Persian Language Broadcasts to
Iran, 21 July 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, Box 1, p. 2.

28 ‘Karachi [Langley] to WDC, 27 July 1959’. NACPM, 788.00/7-2459, p. 1. Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan wanted to see the Baghdad Pact adopt a formal military command-
structure. The Shah wanted to be appointed Commander-in-Chief. While his often-
cited militaristic megalomania no doubt fed this proposal, there is also an argument to

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be made that the Shah felt slighted by the Americans in the aftermath of his turning
down of the Soviet overtures about non-aggression pact and his rejection of non-
alignment. The Shah wanted something to show for his cooperation that included
increasing his own stature in the region and at home.

29 ‘Karachi [L a ngley] to WDC, 27 July 1959’. NACPM, 788.00/7-2459, p. 2. Ayub also
pointed out that, in his view, British opinions vis-a-vis Baghdad Pact policy were
suspect. He argued that the British were merely using the Pact to maintain their
dwindling influence in the region and to manipulate the US. He added: ‘Why can’t you
fellows see it?’ Ayub obviously saw British involvement at the policy level as an
impediment to greater US military support for Pakistan. London wanted to protect its
economic and commercial interests in India, and arming Pakistan through the Baghdad
Pact was not the way to do it.

30 ‘Tel Aviv [Reid] to WDC, 9 August 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 648.

31 ‘Memo NEA (Jones) to Acting Sec State (Dillon), 23 July 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 646.

32 ‘Letter British Embassy Tehran [Russell] to FO [Hiller], 23 July 1959’. PRO,
FO371/140814, pp. 1-5.

33 ‘British Embassy Tehran [Russell] to FO [Hoyer-Miller], 25 [uly 1959’. PRO,
FO371/140814, p. 1.

34 ‘Memcon Audience with the Shah on 25 July 1959, 3 August 1959’. PRO,
FO371/140814, p. 1.

35 ‘British Emb Tehran [Harrison] to FO, 8 August 1959’. PRO, FO371/140814, pp. 1-3.

36 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 5 September 1959’. NACPM, 788.00/9-559, pp. 1-2. The
interview actually occurred on August 26 1959 at Hekmat’s home. The capital letters
reflect those in the actual telegram.

37 ‘Memo Iran Desk to NEA — Analysis of Khrushchev’s Remarks to the Iranian
Ambassador in Moscow on September 2, 1959, 18 September 1959’. NACPM, Iran
Desk, A/1 Military Asst, Box 1, p. 1.

38 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 433.

39 ‘Memo Iran Desk to NEA [Jones], 25 September 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 1 , p. 1 .

40 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Iranian PM Eqbal, 9 October 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 657.

41 ‘Memo Iran Desk to NEA 0ones), 25 September 1959’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 1 , p. 1 .

42 ‘Paris [Goodpaster] to WDC [Herter], 20 December 1959’. DDEL, Staff Secretary,
International Trips and Meetings, Box 9, pp. 1-3.

43 ‘Memo Herter to Eisenhower, 31 December 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p.
660. See also ‘Letter DOD [Irwin)] to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
[Merchant], 20 February I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 667. DOD reported
that the Shah had greatly overstated his requirements and the potential threats from
Afghanistan and Iraq. The report added that the cost of the Shah’s proposed military
aid would exceed $600 million. Defense concluded that any significant increase in the
size of the Iranian military establishment ‘could be counterproductive’ and “would
complicate our relations with other countries in the area increasing their demands for
U.S. aid’.

44 ‘Editorial Note on Eisenhower’s Letter to the Shah, 2 January I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 662.

45 ‘Official-Informal Letter Economic Counselor [Taylor] Tehran to WDC Iran Desk
[Mouser], 16 January I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, Box 1, p. 1.

46 ‘NIE: The Outlook for Iran, 16 February I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, pp.
664-665.

Notes

399

47 ‘Tehran to WDC, 7 June I960’. NACPM, 788.00/6-760, p. 1.

48 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 6 June I960’. 788.00/6-760, p. 1. This dispatch contains a
very detailed look at both parties and the principal politicians in each.

49 ‘Airgram Tehran to WDC, 21 June I960’. NACPM, 788.00/6-2160, p. 1.

50 ‘Report on Land Reform in Iran from British Embassy Tehran [Harrison] to FO
[Lloyd], 4 July I960’. PRO, FO248/1580, pp. 1-2. The assessment in Washington and at
the US Embassy in Tehran agreed that land reform had only succeeded in alienating the
landowners in Iran. ‘Discussion 440th NSC Meeting, 7 April I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 671. See also the files contained in FO371/140856; these chronicle the
impressive British study and tracking of land-reform efforts in Iran and the practical
effects of the program. It charts the demise of fundamental reform as the Shah faced
increasing pressure from many of his most loyal supporters.

51 ‘CIA Staff Memorandum No. 54-60 - Warning Flag on Iran, 10 August I960’. DDEL,
National Security Staff, NSC Registry Series 47-62, Box 3, pp. 1-2. See also ‘Discussion
440th NSC Meeting, 7 April I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p. 671, in which
Acting CIA Director, General Cabell reported that General Bakhtiar was preparing a
contingency plan in the event of the disappearance of the Shah from the political scene.
Some argued that Bakhtiar’s plan in fact constituted preparations for a coup.

52 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 24 September I960’. NACPM, 788.00/9-2460, p. 1. Just
that fact that the Shah survived the turmoil of the failed election surprised some. The
CIA had predicted that unrest during the election could trigger a coup from within the
military and the security services: ‘If any mass agitation got underway, the Shah would
probably not survive it.’

53 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 1 1 October I960’. NACPM, 788.00/6-760, p. 1.

54 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 15 October I960’. NACPM, 788.13/10-1560, pp. 1-2, 8.

55 ‘NSC Report: U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 6 July I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII,
pp. 681-684.

56 ‘Memo — The Financial Outlook for Iran - from Iran Desk [Mickles] to NEA, 7
September I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, Box 2, pp. 1-4.

57 ‘Editorial note on the 453rd NSC Meeting, 25 |uly I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XII, p. 691.

58 ‘Memo Herter to Eisenhower, 19 September I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p.
701.

59 ‘Memcon British Embassy WDC [Weir and Speares] and NEA Iran Affairs [Bowling],
19 |uly I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, Box 2, p. 1.

60 ‘Partial British Telegram from Foreign Office attached to Memcon British Embassy
WDC [Weir and Speares] and NEA Iran Affairs [Bowling], 19 July I960’. NACPM, Iran
Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, Box 1, p. 2. See also ‘Memcon British Embassy WDC
[Speares] and DOS Iranian Desk [Bowling], 3 October I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 1, p. 1. The Soviets made another proposal for a ‘demilitarized zone’
on the Iranian border, and the United States and Britain were trying to come up with an
argument against such an arrangement. The Soviets kept Washington and London on
edge with a barrage of proposals to the Shah. He, quite naturally, made certain that the
Western allies knew about them.

61 ‘Memo Iran Desk [Bowling] to NEA, 22 September I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Assist, Box 2, p. 1.

62 ‘Memo NEA [|ones] to Acting Sec State [Dillon], 20 September I960’. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Volume XII, p. 702.

63 ‘Memo Iran Desk [Bowling] to NEA [Hart], 21 November I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, pp. 707, 710. Bowling concluded that to bring Iranian military forces up to
the same level as the Turkish forces would take $500 million per year for five to ten

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

years. He also saw little to be gained: ‘Even a 400,000 man army with a billion dollars in
new equipment would (little) more than delay the Soviets for a few days.’

64 ‘Memo Iran Desk [Miklos] to GTI [Miner] on Economic Factors in the Iranian Political
Equation, 28 December I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1 Military Asst, Box 2, p. 1.

65 ‘Memo Iran Desk [Bowling] to NEA, 22 November I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
MilitaryAsst, Box 1, p. 2.

66 ‘Revisions to the Mil Asst Plan for Iran, 2 December I960’. NACPM, Iran Desk, A/1
Military Asst, Box 2, p. 1.

67 ‘Memo Iran Desk [Bowling] to NEA [Hart], 21 November I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XII, p. 711.

68 Kux in The United States and Pakistan , pp. 98-100, argues that the US attempted to
prevent the coup in October 1958. He cites instructions from Washington to
Ambassador Langley to tell Mirza ‘there was insufficient cause for abandoning the
democratic path’. Kux most likely misapprehends what occurred. Langley was well
aware of the plotting. He had asked that his name not be put on Mirza’s calendar
because local newspapers published the calendar, and Langley was in Mirza’s office
almost every day. In addition, other US agencies, not under the control of the
Ambassador, were quietly reassuring Mirza and Ayub of US government support come
what may. The threat of collapse in Pakistan and of a virtual secessionist movement on
the frontier with Soviet-influenced Afghanistan by Abdul Qayyum Khan, the leader of
the Muslim League, met what Kux described as the criteria for Rountree’s ‘last resort.’
Despite some misgivings in Washington, the Ayub takeover obtained quick American
support.

69 ‘Letter Karachi [Langley] to NEA [Rountree], Karachi, December 27, 1957’. NACPM,
790.00/12-2758, pp. 1-3.

70 Bhargava, G.S., Pakistan in Crisis. New Delhi: Vikas, 1971, pp. 69, 89. Bhargava provides
a useful overview of the development of Pakistani politics, in particular an interesting
analysis of the linkage between the ‘controlled democracy’ of the Ayub regime and the
outright military dictatorship of later regimes. His analysis also explains the
development of Ayub’s concept of political participation. In Bhargava’s presentation,
Ayub had an approach to political parties that was similar to Nasser’s, i.e. it progressed
from no political parties to officially-sanctioned ones that could be controlled. Ayesha
Jalal makes the same point in The State of Martial Rjile: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political
FLconomy of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 303: ‘Ayub hoped
to bolster central authority without being constrained by parties and politicians with
provincial bases of support. This was part of a grand strategy to industrialize and
militarize Pakistan in the quickest possible time; the general had lost no time negotiating
a multi-million dollar agreement with the United States to help finance the rural
development program and give a fillip to his basic democracies system.’

71 Interview of General Andrew Goodpaster, 7 August 2003. According to Goodpaster,
‘Eisenhower saw Ayub as the hope for Pakistan.’ Goodpaster stated that in the same
vein the Iranian military was viewed as the key not only to the Shah’s rule but also to
continued pro-Western policies in Iran. In fact, should the Shah no longer be able to
govern effectively, then military rule would become perhaps the only viable option. See
also ‘Dispatch Tehran [Bowling] to WDC, 11 September 1956’. NACPM, 788.13/9-
1156, p. 2, in which Bowling argued that many elements in Iran viewed the army as an
instrument of ‘greater justice’ than the civilian authorities: ‘Most poor men would rather
take their complaints to a military government official than to a civilian official.’ The
report added: ‘The great landlords and merchants, the conservatives of Iran, have long
tended to regard the Army as a real or potential enemy, since, to the extent that it is
able, it often cuts across the traditional conservative lines of influence.’ This is only one
of numerous reports supporting the view of the army as a potentially progressive

Notes

401

alternative in the region. See also Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkg: Reform, Revolution, and Republic, 1808-1975. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 413-414. The military coup in Turkey on 27 May
1960 fell into the same category as had Ayub’s. Given the paralysis and political chaos
created by the Turkish Democratic Party and the Menderes regime, the army, under the
leadership of General Cemal Giirsel and the National Unity Committee (NUC), took
temporary control of the government. In effect, the military became a political
watchdog, ensuring that the politicians acted ‘responsibly’. See also Ziircher, Turkey, p.
253. Ziircher points out that military elements had planned the coup for years. A group
of ‘radical’ mid-level officers had decided to ‘extricate the parties from the irreconcilable
situation into which they had fallen.’ The author states that while General Giirsel
headed the government, Colonel Alpaslan Tiirkes was initially the most influential
member of the NUC. Tiirkes had no confidence in the politicians or the political
process, and demanded reforms in the shape of curbs on political activities. From the
US point of view, key Cold War allies could not be allowed to succumb or be
incapacitated by irresponsible political elements, and in such an event ‘temporary’
military rule was both acceptable and desirable. See also ‘Discussion 402nd NSC
Meeting, 17 April 1959’. DDEL, DDEL, Box 11, pp. 1, 8-1 1. In the discussion of what
to do about Iraq, Nixon wanted a ‘Mossadegh type operation’ to overthrow Qasim and
put pro-Western military officers in power. Military rule had become a favored option.

72 ‘Special International Report: Pakistan — A Leader Gets Things Done’. Newsweek, 18
April 1960, p. 57.

73 ‘Letter, “Secret - Eyes Only” from Bunker to Bartlett, Delhi, December 3, 1958’.
NACPM, Lot file No. 62, D 43 (1 of 3), 790.00/12-358, p. 2.

74 ‘Dispatch Karachi to WDC, February 26, 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 702.

75 ‘New Delhi [Bunker] to WDC, April 17, 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp.
709-711. Ambassador Bunker in New Delhi quickly weighed with the view that US
furnishing of ‘more modern aircraft or “Sidewinders’” (heat seeking air-to-air missiles)
to Pakistan would be met with ‘consternation’ in India and be viewed as an ‘unfriendly
act’. Because the US had agreed not to increase aid to Pakistan above the levels of the
1954 agreement, the Indians would view modern weapons as a serious breach of faith.
See also ‘Memo Assistant Sec State for Policy Planning [Smith] to Herter, April 23,
1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 711-12.

76 ‘Memo US Delegation to SEATO Conference in Wellington, New Zealand on April 8-
10, 1959, March 25, 1959’. Records relating to Kashmir, Box 1, 59-150-69-22-7/3-2659,
p.l.

77 ‘Karachi to WDC, October 31, 1958,’ FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 682.

78 Dupree, Louis “West Pakistan Revisited, August 27, 1959’. AUFS-SAS, Vol. Ill, No. 1,
p. 6. This is a lengthy report to the AUFS on the situation in Pakistan. It glorifies Ayub
as ‘a strong ruler’ and the leader of a ‘revolution’. The use of ‘revolution’ to describe the
coup was more sleight-of-hand to improve Ayub’s image. It should be noted that when
Dupree wrote this article, he was working for Phillips Talbot, Executive Secretary of
AUFS and soon to be Assistant Secretary of State for NEA in the Kennedy
administration.

79 ‘NIE, The Outlook for Pakistan, Washington, May 5, 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume
XV, pp. 713-714.

80 ‘Memo NEA [Rountree] to Dillon, Washington, |uly 2, 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XV, p. 737.

81 ‘Airgram Karachi to WDC, September 23, 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p.
776.

82 ‘Memo NEAA [Rountree] to Herter, January 30, 1959,’ NACPM, 786b.il/l-3059. See
also ‘Policy toward the Near East, August 19, 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, p.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

149, and ‘NSC Report - 5820/1, U.S. Policy toward the Middle East’. FRUS, 1958-
1960, Volume XII, p. 195.

83 ‘Karachi [Langley] to WDC, 24 July 1959’. NACPM, 788.00/7-2459, p. 2.

84 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 103.

85 ‘Minute by Borthwick dated 30 September 1959 on a Letter from Australian High
Commission Karachi [A.R. Butler] to Canberra, 16 September 1959’. NAA, Series No.
A1838/2, Control No. 169/11/148, Part 9, p. 1. See also ‘Minute by Assistant Division
Secretary dated 29 September 1959 on a Letter from Australian High Commission
Karachi [A.R. Butler] to DEA, Canberra, 16 September 1959’. NAA, Series No.
A1838/2, Control No. 169/11/148 Part 9, p 1. In response to the suggestion that
Australia offer some private encouragement for a gesture on the part of Nehru to Ayub,
the DEA in Canberra flady stated: “With respect, . . . the relations between India and
Pakistan touch upon interests and emotions altogether too sensitive for there to be
room for any useful Australian intervention, however benign our intentions.’

86 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Pakistani Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, 9 October 1959’.
DDEL, IS, Pakistan, Box 62, p. 3.

87 ‘Memo Herter to the White House, President’s Trip, Itinerary, November 25, 1959,
attached Memo from Frederick F. Bartlett, SAO, November 19, 1959’. NACPM, Lot
file No. 62, D 43 (3 of 3), 790.00/11-2559, p. 1.

88 ‘Bartlett Memo, November 19, 1959’. NACPM, Lot file No. 62, D 43 (3 of 3),
790.00/11-1959 p. 2.

89 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Ayub, December 8, 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV,
pp. 781-795.

90 Discussion with Rostow, November 6, 2001, Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) Library,
Austin, Texas. This conversation between President Eisenhower and Walt Rostow
apparently occurred after the latter had begun to work with the Kennedy campaign. It
seems to provide another indication of the interchangeability of key Eisenhower and
Kennedy advisors and policies.

91 ‘WDC to Karachi, February 19, I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 799.

92 ‘WDC to Karachi, 3 March I960’. DDEL, Staff Secretary, Box 13, p. 1.

93 ‘Karachi to WDC, 8 March I960’. No. 2095, DDEL, Staff Secretary - Goodpaster, Box
13, p. 1.

94 Kux, United States and Pakistan, p. 112.

95 ‘Australian High Commission Karachi to Canberra, 29 July I960,’ NAA, Series No.
A1838/2, Control No. 914/3 Part 2, p. 1. See also ‘Memo Australian High Commission
Karachi to Canberra, 14 March I960’. NAA, Series No. A1 838/1, Control No.
175/11/1 48, p. 1. Ayub argued that Pakistan could only maintain de facto neutrality with
regard to Israel by continuing its policy of non-recognition. Pakistan’s official position
was that Israel was a foreign provocation that exacerbated Arab problems, and as such
should not be recognized by Pakistan.

96 ‘Telegram on CENTO from Indian Embassy Jidda to MEA New Delhi, 6 November
I960’. INA, MEA, 23-A (21) WANA/60, p. 1.

97 ‘Letter British Embassy Baghdad IP.T. Hayman)] to FO [Hiller, 12 july I960’. PRO,
F0371/149874, p. 1.

98 Jalal, State of Martial Rule, p. 305.

99 ‘Letter British Embassy WDC [H.S.H. Stanley] to FO [F.A. Warner], 4 August I960’.
PRO, F0371/152225, p. 1. The Afghan government, with Soviet and perhaps even
Indian collusion, supported the creation of a ‘Pushtunistan State’. This was directed at
weakening the government of Pakistan and creating leverage in the border areas. The
situation was so acute that the United States and Britain discussed the possibility of
tripartite talks with Pakistan on the Pushtunistan issue. The British were very wary of
such an approach, fearing that it would drive the Afghan government into closer

Notes

403

alignment with the Russians. See ‘Minute by B.CJ. Warnes on Afghan-Pakistan
Relations’. 18 March I960’. PRO, F0371/152215, p. 5. Khrushchev viewed the
Pushtunistan issue as a means of pressuring and punishing the Karachi regime for its
cooperation with Washington. The Soviets called for a referendum by the tribes in the
border region on the creation of a state. This Russian pressure on Ayub had the side
benefit of generating pro-Soviet sentiment in New Delhi. See also ‘Memcon
Eisenhower and Prince Sardar Muhammad Naim, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, 5
October I960’. DDEL, Diary, Box 53, pp. 1-3. The border flare-ups between Pakistan
and Afghanistan evolved into an issue that was addressed in a meeting between
President Eisenhower and Prince Naim, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. The
President encouraged Naim to seek an agreement with Ayub and to align Afghanistan
more closely with Pakistan and Iran. See ‘Telegram from US Embassy Karachi to
WDC, 6 October I960’. DDEL, IS, Afghanistan, Box 1, Section I, p. 1. There was
particular concern about a widened border war. Recent defeats of Afghan Fashkara by
Pushtun tribesmen loyal to Karachi had raised the possibility of a wider war, perhaps
involving the regular armies. Washington feared that attempting to remain neutral in the
dispute had hurt its relations with Pakistan, and wanted to avoid that development by
not making any moves that would appear to legitimize the Pushtunistan claims.

100 ‘Airgram Karachi to WDC, December 3, I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 822-
823. See also ‘Memo NEA [Jones] to Hare, December 2, I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XV, pp. 819-821.

101 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Nehru, 10 December 1959’. DDEL, Staff Secretary,
Goodpaster, Box 9, pp. 2-3.

102 ‘Athens [Eisenhower] to Herter, 15 December 1959’. DDEL, Staff Secretary -
Goodpaster, Box 13, p. 3.

103 ‘Karachi [Rountree] to WDC Eyes Only White House [Eisenhower], 23 December
1959’. DDEL, IS, Pakistan, Section II, pp. 2-3.

104 Gopal, Nehru, p. 104.

105 ‘NIE: The Economic and Political Consequences of India’s Financial Problems, 2
September 1958’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 460. See also ‘New Delhi to WDC,
8 January 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 475. Washington feared that a
Soviet aid offensive in India, targeting high-visibility projects, would be a propaganda
bonanza for Moscow. As a result, the aid situation came under review in an attempt to
identify ‘useful’ but ‘more visible’ development projects for which the United States
could get more political credit. Concern existed that the diffusion of US aid throughout
the Indian economy reduced the ability of the Embassy to ‘get across’ the extent of US
aid to the average Indian.

106 ‘Nehru on Communism: An Awakening, December 1958’. CIA, CRES, CIA-RDP78-
02771R000400010002-2, pp. 1-15. See also ‘New Delhi to WDC, 28 May 1959’. FRUS,
1958-1960, Volume XV, pp. 494-496. See also ‘Letter New Delhi [Bunker] to WDC
[Bardett, SOA], 9 December 1959’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 473.

107 ‘Discussion 408th NSC Meeting, 28 May 1959’. DDEL, Box 11, pp. 6-10.

108 Neville, Maxwell, India’s China War. New York: Pantheon, 1970, p. 96. Neville’s work
on the Sino-India border dispute that led to the border war in 1962 is the most
comprehensive and best-balanced on the subject. As the author points out, the Indians
and Chinese, specifically Nehru and Chou En-Lai, exchanged significant
correspondence and discussed the matter on more than one occasion. Neville quotes
Nehru’s 1950 statement: ‘All the maps of China for the last thirty years have shown a
certain portion of that north-east frontier which is now part of India as not part of
India.’ Neville also cites the 1954 discussion in which Nehru raised the issue of the
currency of Chinese maps of the area, and suggested that the Chinese change their maps
to reflect India’s view that the McMahon Line accurately represented the border.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Chou’s replied that the Chinese intended to resurvey the border at the first opportunity
and then any differences could be negotiated bilaterally between Beijing and New Delhi.
In short, the Chinese were ceding nothing unilaterally, and expected negotiations prior
to a confirmation of borders. The idea of negotiation over territory flew directly in the
face of the Indian policy since 1950. The northern borders ‘must not be opened to
negotiation’. The obvious specific implication of negotiations with the Chinese would
set a precedent and provide Pakistan ammunition on the issue of Kashmir.

109 Mullik, B.N., The Chinese betrayal: My Years with Nehru. Bombay: Allied, 1971, pp. 190-
208. Mullik was the director of the Indian Intelligence Bureau from 1950 to 1964. While
obviously colored by his own interests and opinions, this work provides an excellent
insight into not only the actual events and relationships leading up to the Chinese War,
but also the Indian governmental processes. For example, the lack of any real border-
monitoring in the regions adjacent to Tibet in the mid-1950s resulted in New Delhi
learning of the Chinese penetration through the local rumor mill. Additionally, it took
almost 18 months, from the confirmation of the Chinese presence to March 1958, for a
formal report with recommendations to be issued by the Bureau.

110 Ibid, p. 214.

111 ‘Letter British High Commission New Delhi [Anderson] to CRO [H.A. Twist], 21
August 1959’. PRO, F0371/141264, p. 1.

112 Neville, India’s Chinese War ; p. 103. See also Mullik, Chinese Hetrayal, p. 224. Mullik states
that Nehru was also motivated by the need to maintain security on the northern
frontier, and particularly in the Ladkah area. The central government hoped that
sympathy toward the Dalai Lama would in turn increase its support among Buddhists in
Dikkim, Nepal and Bhutan.

113 Neville, India’s Chinese War , p. 103. See also Nehru, Jawaharlal, ‘Letter to Chief
Ministers, 25 March 1959’. In Parthasarathi, C. (ed.), Tetters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964.
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 227. In what were planned to be ‘fortnightly’
letters, Nehru lays out his position on the revolt in Tibet. He states that while he is
sympathetic with the Tibetans, the situation is fundamentally an internal Chinese matter
and India has no case for direct involvement. He also states that the Indian government
is not suppressing stories of the uprising to reduce the pressure on his government to
get involved. It is a clear attempt to be viewed as sympathetic, while maintaining
separation from the dispute.

114 Nehru, ‘Letter to Chief Ministers, 26 October 1959’, Parthasarathi (ed.), Tetters to Chief
Ministers 1 947-1 964, p. 307. See also ‘British Embassy WDC [Caccia] to FO, 4
December 1959’. PRO, F0371/141264, p. 1, in which appears Eisenhower’s answer to
a question about the border dispute. The President replied that no one really knew
where the border or the McMahon Line was. He added that the important issue was the
settlement of disputes by ‘negotiation’: ‘We must do it by negotiation.’ Ironically the
President appeared to agree with Chou En-Lai and Mao Tse-Tung.

115 ‘Minute by R.W. Benson attached to the Letter date 10 November 1959 from Chinese
Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Nehru, 11 November 1959’. PRO, F0371/141273, p. 2.
The date on this letter is somewhat confusing because Gopal (in Nehru , Volume III,
p.127) refers to the letter dated 17 December from Chou in a footnote. The source of
the British copy of the letter was the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in London, raising the
possibility that the Chinese published the letter in advance of any Indian announcement
that they had actually received it. This supports the Foreign Office’s view that the letter
was a ‘clever move’ designed to place China in a favorable light.

116 Neville, India’s Chinese War ; p. 98. See also ‘Letter Nehru to Macmillan, 30 November
1959’. PRO, F0371/141264, p. 1, Cover Sheet. Nehru clearly expected the Chinese
rebuff; ‘If we get a favourable reply to our proposals, then the question will arise of my
meeting Chou En-lai. But I am by no means sure that Chou En-lai’s reply to me will be

Notes

405

such as leads to a meeting in the future.’ Nehru was clearly shopping for support as
well; Tt is heartening to us in India to know that we have your sympathetic
understanding and the friendship of the people of Britain not only in our present
troubles, but in our endeavours to build a better future for our people.’ In the attached
Minute, P.G.F. Dalton at the Foreign Office commented about the ‘unusually warm
tones’ of the letter, which indicated: ‘that Mr. Nehru does not, in fact, expect to get very
far with Mr. Chou En-lai’. See also ‘Memo CRO to the FO, 3 November 1959’. PRO,
F0371/141273, pp. cover sheet, 1-5. In this letter and its cover sheet, the CRO is
‘encouraged’ by the Soviet attitude on the dispute and the fact that they have not
automatically sided with China. The text of the memorandum pointed to the fact that
the Indians were also pleased with the Soviet position. This foreshadowed the
relationship to come.

117 Neville, India’s Chinese War , p. 101.

118 ‘Letter British High Commission New Delhi [Anderson] to CRO [H.A. Twist], 21
August 1959’. PRO, F0371/141264, p. 2.

119 Akbar, Nehru , pp. 533, 550-552. Akbar argues that the responsibility for the Chinese war
and subsequent debacle lies squarely with Nehru. First, Nehru trusted the Chinese:
‘Nehru described the China war as a stab in the back. He was wrong. It was a stab from
the front. He had only closed his eyes.’ Second, Nehru’s appointment of Krishna
Menon as Minister of Defense was an unmitigated disaster for the military command
structure and for defense preparedness: ‘Menon tried out his leftism in the ministry least
suited to it.’ See also ‘Intelligence summary from the British Foreign Office, 29
September 1959’. PRO, F0371/141273, p. 1. The British concluded that both sides had
‘dug in their heels and showed no indication of wishing to reach a compromise’. It is
interesting that the perception from London failed to take into account the possibility
of a Chinese ploy for bargaining purposes, while later Indian biographical accounts did.
See also ‘Memcon British Sec State for Foreign Affairs and the Indian Defense
Minister, Krishna Menon, 10 November 1959’. PRO, F0371/144186, p. 1. This
memorandum indicated that Menon was feeling the political pressure, and to some
degree personal insecurity, from criticism leveled at him in New Delhi. He downplayed
any differences with the Indian armed forces Chief of Staff, General Thimayya, stating
that ‘he could not understand the criticisms made of him’ over his handling of the
military. He also stated that he was willing to accept the Chinese incursion in the
Ladakh area, but that the McMahon Line should be held everywhere else. He was highly
concerned about his personal position, requesting that the British Secretary of State
support his contention that British unwillingness to see him on his last trip was a result
of scheduling problems and not British ire. The Secretary summed it up stating: ‘I got
the impression that the main reason for Mr. Menon insisting on my seeing him today
and for his desire to see the Prime Minister was this Indian Parliamentary criticism that
he had fallen out in some way with the British.’

120 Brown, Nehru , p. 321.

121 ‘Biweekly Propaganda Guidance — Significant India-Pakistan Accord, 26 September
I960’. CIA, CRES, CIA-RDP78-03061A0001 0002001 0-9, Item No. 293, p. 1.

122 Gopal, Nehru , Volume III, pp. 133-134, 139. Gopal described Nehru and Chou as ‘the
world’s two most intellectual Prime Ministers’. The author added, however: ‘But Zhou
had always a clearer idea than Nehru of where power and interest lay.’ Gopal’s view of
the events leading to the Chinese war is highly critical of Nehru, and particularly of his
faith in Krishna Menon and his theoretical views on Asian cooperation.

123 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Bunker, 25 April I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p.
536. It had yet to dawn on the administration that India might go to the Soviet Union
for modern military equipment. The speculation was that if the United States did not
sell the equipment to the Indians, then, they would buy it from the British.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

124 ‘Memo Office of India, Ceylon and Nepal Affairs, 7 June 1960’. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Volume XV, p. 542.

125 ‘Letter NEA (Lewis Jones) to New Delhi [Bunker], 13 June I960’. FRUS , 1958-1960,
Volume XV, p. 546.

126 Gopal, Nehru , Volume III, p. 131.

127 ‘Mem from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense [Gates], November 15,
I960’. FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XV, p. 577.

128 ‘Memcon Eisenhower and Nehru, New York, 26 September I960’. DDEL, Diary
Series, Box 53, p. 6.

129 ‘British Embassy New Delhi to FO, 14 October I960’. PRO, F0371/ 153638, p. 3.

Chapter 9

1 Grose, Peter, The Gentleman Spy: The Fife of Allen Dulles. New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1994, p. 508. Probably the most famous campaign issue in 1960 was the ‘missile gap’.
The Kennedy used the dubious claims of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev about
Soviet missile superiority over the United States and transformed them into a campaign
issue. In reality, no such gap existed. In an interesting twist, Allen Dulles, Director of
the CIA, flew to Hyannis, Massachusetts on July 30, 1960 to brief Kennedy on
intelligence matters. Rather than putting the ‘missile gap’ issue to rest, as the Nixon
camp wanted, Dulles referred Kennedy’s questions to the Pentagon. The Nixon camp
later charged that Dulles, an old friend of the Vice-President, intentionally ducked the
issue in an attempt to preserve his position at the CIA. The Democratic candidate even
used the occasion to take a jab at the Eisenhower White House by asking Dulles in
front of reporters as he was leaving: ‘Haven’t you got any good news in that black bag
of yours?’ Dulles and Kennedy independently commented later that the briefings
include nothing that could not be found in The New York Times. From Nixon’s
perspective, his friend Allen Dulles had let him down, and the non-existent ‘missile gap’
lived on as a campaign issue. Attacks on Eisenhower policy in the Middle East and
South Asia were of the same ilk, if not so prominent. All contributed to a strategy that
painted the US as bogged down and strategy-less in world where the Communists were
gaining on all fronts.

2 ‘Who Likes Dulles — Who Doesn’t’. Newsweek, 27 January 1958, p. 28.

3 ‘Address delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington,
D.C., 13 April I960’. Vital Speeches of the Day, June 1, 1960, No. 26, p. 485.

4 ‘Memo DOS/LR [Louis A. Cherry] to GTI [Bolting], 26 July I960’. NACPM, Iran
Desk, 3-A/l Military Assistance thru 1961/4 Internal Security 7 , Box 2, p. 8. The Iran
Desk requested excerpts from campaign speeches to use with the Shah of Iran to show
that all the candidates were committed to confronting Soviet aggression. The Nixon
quote came from US News and World Report, 13 June 1960, p. 51.

5 ‘Special National Report: Candidate Nixon’s Insiders’. Newsweek, 13 June 1960, p. 37.

6 Interview with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2002. The Kennedy campaign carefully avoided
mention of Eisenhower policy in the post-1958 environment, because the facts did not
fit their campaign strategy. There was virtually no difference between the policies
advocated for the Middle East and South Asia by Senator Kennedy and those that had
been in effect, to one degree or another, since early 1958. Those post-1958 policies did
not make good campaign issues, and the new Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had a
close association with a principal Kennedy foreign-policy advisor, Chester Bowles. As a
result, differences had to be almost manufactured, or the focus had to be kept on the
turmoil of the 1955-1958 period.

7 ‘Memo Cherry to Bolting, 26 July I960’. NACPM, Box 2, p. 4. This quote is an excerpt
from a statement given by Senator Kennedy in Democratic Digest, May 1960, p. 4.
Kennedy repeated this theme time and again. In a speech entitled ‘Time of Decision’, in

Notes

407

the Congressional Record, June 14, 1960, p 11631, candidate Kennedy stated: ‘We must,
in collaboration with Western Europe and Japan, greatly increase the flow of capital to
the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America —
frustrating the Communist hopes for chaos in those nations — enabling emerging
nations to achieve economic as well as political independence and closing the dangerous
gap that is not widening between our living standards and theirs.’ This almost quotes
verbatim Eisenhower’s statements in 1953.

8 Interview with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2002. Rostow was an important advisor to the
Eisenhower administration on foreign economic development from 1953 to 1958. He
stated that Eisenhower never went as far as he should have with foreign aid because
The president was a captive of the Republican right.’ Interestingly enough, Rostow
stated that during Herter’s tenure there was ‘no difference’ between Republican and
Democratic foreign policy goals. In fact, Rostow stated, the amount of foreign aid
included in the last Eisenhower budget was so substantial that the incoming Kennedy
administration did not have to ask for more than Eisenhower had provided.

9 Oral History - Chester Bowles, Assistant Secretary of State. JFK Library. Interviewed by
Robert Brooks in New Delhi, India, February 2, 1965, pp. 17-20. In this account,
Bowles states that President Kennedy, in common with his brother Robert, ‘had a
rather deep sense of skepticism about the Foreign Service and the State Department.
He wanted the Department to run efficiently but he wanted to do the foreign policy
making.’

10 ‘Memo Herter to Eisenhower on Arab-Israel Problem and US Presidential Campaign, 6
July I960’. NACPM, UAR Policy, 59-786b.il/7-660.

11 Kennedy, John F. ‘Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky, October 8, I960’. Freedom of Communications — Final Report of
the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate. Prepared by the subcommittee on
communications, pursuant to S.R. 305, 86th Congress. Part I, ‘The Speeches, Remarks,
Press Conferences, and statements of Senator John F. Kennedy, August 1 through
November 7, I960’, p. 522.

12 Lenczowski, George, American Presidents and the Middle Hast. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1990, p. 73.

13 Kennedy, John F. ‘Question and Answer Session, Statewide TV Appearance of Senator
John F. Kennedy, Civic Auditorium, Seattle, Washington, September 6, I960’. Kennedy
Speeches, Part 1, p. 141.

14 Kennedy, John F. ‘Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, Roosevelt Field, Norristown,
Pa., October 29, I960’. Kennedy Speeches, Part 1, p. 813.

15 Kennedy, John F. ‘Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Fieldhouse, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, October 23, I960’. Kennedy Speeches, Part I, p. 715.

16 Kennedy, John F. ‘Speech, Madison, Wisconsin, October 23, I960’. Kennedy Speeches,
Part I, pp. 714-716.

17 Kennedy, John F. ‘Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, Luncheon, Denver Hilton
Hotel, Denver, Colorado, September 23, I960’. Kennedy Speeches, Part 1, p. 345.

18 Judith Brown, in Nehru: A Political Life, p. 248, provides an unflattering picture of
Krishna Menon’s eccentricities and erratic behavior. ‘Menon was undoubtedly
intellectually able, and devoted to what he saw as India’s cause, and to Nehru
personally. But he was psychologically unstable, very difficult to work with, incapable of
delegating, self-willed and self-opinionated and thus liable to disastrous mis judgments.’
She attributes his appointment to the lack of sophistication in the Indian Foreign
Service, to a lack of suitable alternatives, and to Nehru’s ‘isolation at the apex of India’s
political world’. While this was true, Brown’s explanation smacks more of a
rationalization for Nehru’s lapse in judgment. Nehru knew Menon was unstable, but his
desire to find a job for an old friend — a job far away from his political detractors in

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

New Delhi — overrode his judgment. It also overrode Nehru’s personal political
interests, and ultimately the interests of India. Brown points out that Menon ‘did much
to alienate American opinion’.

19 Lall, Emergence of Modern India , pp. 136-137. According to Lall, Menon’s statements and
the vote against the US resolution on Hungary gave ‘the impression that he favored the
Soviet action in Hungary’. Lall claimed that as a result of Menon’s vote, Nehru called
Lall every morning between three and four o’clock with the ‘latest instructions on the
Hungarian situation’. Lall, in turn, passed these instructions on to Menon, ‘much to his
displeasure’. ‘Galled by the instructions from Nehru conveyed via me [Lall], he
nevertheless carried them out faithfully. But he continued to defend his vote on the first
resolution on Hungary, which rubbed salt into the wound of the Americans.’ Michael
Brecher, in India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (London: Oxford
University Press, 1968), pp. 85-91, quoted Menon as saying that the presence of US and
British forces in West Germany was the equivalent of the Soviet occupation of
Hungary: ‘In the Hungary Question the United States — the U.K. too — was most
shamefacedly using the U.N. as an instrument of the Cold War.’ Menon argued that a
compromise between the Hungarians and the Soviets might have been possible except
for the fact that Hungarian resistance ‘stiffened’. Menon blamed this on American
influence. He then complained that by standing up to the Western powers he was
labeled a ‘Communist’.

20 Emil Lengyel, Krishna Menon , p. 229-231. Lengyel’s short, superficial biography of
Krishna Menon was published in 1962, and thus forms something of a ground-level
view of him. It also contains a brief but explanation of Menon as the focal point of
media ire, particularly in the United States. Lengyel states: ‘When writing about him
[Menon], American newspapers tend to lose their manners, if not their objectivity. The
Time-Uf e-Fortune combine, particularly, does not seen to be able to utter his name
without hissing.’ Lengyel then provides some quotes: ‘Mouthpiece Extraordinary,
Trouble-maker Plenipotentiary’, ‘Krishna Menon: Wasp of New Delhi’, and the ‘Great I
Am.’ Other quotes included: ‘He has an unfortunate personality . . . He is evasive . . . He
is rude ... He meddles.’ The author quotes A.M. Rosenthal, The New York Times
correspondent in New Delhi, as being typical of media views of Menon. ‘He [Menon] is
a disaster, I tell you, that man. Why does Panditji (Nehru) keep him? What does he see
in that man?’ Lengyel also quoted the Indian press. At the time of the Chinese border
war, The Hindustani Times stated: ‘Mr. Menon must go.’ The Times of India correspondent
A.G. Gorwala plainly stated that Menon was a Communist, and even some more
moderate voices stated that although he at times served India well he should be
removed from his diplomatic post because of his ‘warped personality’. Lengyel’s
description of Menon’s relations with the press continued with further observations on
the British press as well, but the point well made is that Menon was a public-relations
disaster of the first order for India and Nehru during the mid-1950s. In this regard,
Ram Janaki, a nephew, wrote in V.K Krishna Menon: A. Personal Memoir (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1997), p. xv: ‘He was quite ineffectual at public relations and said
rather optimistically that one’s deeds were the best public relations. This might have
been true up to a point, in the British environment he was so familiar with, but in India,
where he had no roots due to his long absence, he made no effort to publicize’ his
accomplishments. Janaki argues that as a result, Menon was treated as a ‘political
upstart’ totally dependent on Nehru’s ‘patronage’ for support. ‘This is why he is so
misunderstood.’ Of course, he was dependent on Nehru’s patronage, and did lack a
political base in India.

21 Brown, Nehru , p. 248. Brecher, in Krishna Menon’s View , attempted to map Menon’s
‘hostility statements’ in a piece of 1960s-esque social science research. It is interesting to
note that Menon’s most frequent target was the United States (p. 362). Brecher also

Notes

409

states makes the following observation about Menon’s antipathy toward the United
States: ‘Menon was never an unqualified adherent of the Marxist creed; it was, rather,
Laski’s neo-Marxism of the thirties that shaped this part of his image. And, like all
radical socialists of the contemporary era, he does not regard formal colonial rule as
necessary to the policy of “Imperialism” or “Colonialism”. The characteristics of
“Capitalist” and “Interventionist”, whether overt or covert, direct or indirect, political,
economic, cultural or military, justify in Menon’s eyes the designation “Imperialist” for
the United States. Similar patterns of intervention by the Soviet Union escaped this
condemnation, though not the substance of criticism.’ (p. 301)

22 George, T.J.S., Krishna Menon: A Biography. London: Cape, 1964, pp. 218. George’s book,
while overstating Menon’s accomplishments as Defense Minister, provides some
interesting insight into what may have been Nehru’s motivation in returning Menon to
New Delhi. George acknowledges that Menon at the United Nations found himself
under attack not only from the Western media but also at home: ‘Sentiment against him
grew in the process. Powerful business interests, which meant also powerful sections of
the Press, became more and more vicious in their attacks.’ His election in 1957 to the
Indian Parliament gave Nehru the opportunity to bring him into the government as
Minister of Defense. George states: ‘Ideologically Menon brought a new element into
the Cabinet. The Congress as a party was committed to s socialistic pattern of society,
but the Cabinet contained no one, barring of course the Prime Minister, who was in
earnest about it. Menon was articulate and influential enough to make socialism felt. On
the one hand he gave Nehru the ideological support he needed. He provided a natural
rallying point to those socialists in the Congress Party who had been languishing for
want of leadership.’

23 Brown, Nehru , p. 248.

24 Gopal, Nehru , Vol. Ill, p. 129. Gopal states that Menon ‘was ineffective and an
embarrassment to Nehru and it was therefore not right that he should continue in
office’. In a magnificent understatement, the author added that entrusting Menon with
the Defense ministry ‘proved one of Nehru’s less fortunate decisions’. Brown
commented, in Nehru: A Political Life, p. 248, that as Minister of Defense Menon would
become ‘Nehru’s nemesis in 1962’.

25 ‘Letter Australian High Commission Karachi [Butler] to Canberra, 15 April 1959’. No.
537/59, NAA, 1838A/2, 169/11/148 Part 9, p. 1.

26 ‘Karachi to WDC, March 22, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 26-27.
Kennedy’s team did not diverge significantly from that of Eisenhower’s on the
respective aid packages for India and Pakistan. As pointed out earlier, Rostow stated
that the last Eisenhower foreign aid budget needed no additional funding. Interview
with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2001. The plan allotted India approximately $1 billion over
the first two years of the Third Five-Year Plan, excluding PL 480 grain. A substantial
amount of the US grant required that India use it to purchase US goods and products.
Washington slated $250 million for Pakistan, excluding grain.

27 Bill, Eagle and the Lion , pp. 130-132. Bill draws several conclusions about differences
between Kennedy’s and Eisenhower’s policies that are just not supported by the facts.
Both administrations supported and encouraged ‘peaceful reform from above’. Both
administrations believed that ultimately the Shah had to have a powerful military and
security apparatus to ensure his continuation in power. The tendency to see differences
between Kennedy’s and Eisenhower’s policies results primarily from giving too much
weight to Kennedy image-building and not enough scrutiny of the differences between
the 1958-1960 period and that of the Kennedy administration. The Eisenhower
administration faced what it perceived to be the immediate emergency of the post-Iraq
period. The initial part of this period focused on security and military issues. As the
situation became clearer and stabilized, Dulles and later Herter, with the President

410

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

directly involved, pushed ‘reform from above’ as a fundamental part of American policy
toward Iran. In fact, in 1963 the Kennedy administration’s stand on the status-of- forces
agreement for US advisors in Iran and the fiery opposition to it would result in a little-
known cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, becoming the symbol of opposition to the
Shah’s regime and to the US presence in Iran. Khomeini’s imprisonment and exile to
Iraq would lead in the end to the Shah’s fall in 1979.

28 Particularly in the 1956-1959 period, popular magazines like Time and Newsweek, in
addition to many newspapers, carried editorial and cartoon attacks leveled against the
Eisenhower administration. These included maps showing the spread of Soviet
influence in the Middle East and caricatures of Dulles, the lightning rod for criticism of
the administration. An article and map in Newsweek of May 5, 1958 is an excellent
example of the criticism.

29 ‘President’s Proposal on the Middle East, 30 January 1957’. Executive Sessions of the Senate
Foreign delations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XIX, Eighty-Fifth Congress First
Session, 1957. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 174-179.

30 ‘President’s Proposal on the Middle East, 7 February 1957’. Executive Sessions of the Senate
Foreign delations Committee , Volume XIX, 1957, p. 321.

31 Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East , p. 73.

32 ‘Memcon Rockwell NEA, and George Ferris, President of Raymond International, and
Dewey Thompson, Raymond International concerning Ferris’s Meeting with Nasser’.
NACPM, UAR Policy, 59-786b.il/12-160.

33 Oral History — Chester Bowles. JFK Library, pp. 17-20.

34 ‘Memo G. Lewis Jones to Herter on “Arab — Israeli Problem and the United States
Presidential Campaign, 6 July I960’”. NACPM, UAR Policy, 59-786b.il/7-660. In this
memo, NEA informed Christian Herter, the Secretary of State, that the overall situation
in the Middle East had improved but that the improvement was precarious. Jones cited
both UAR and Iraqi relations as evidence of the improvement, and pointed out that the
US had adhered to ‘a policy of impartiality and friendship with both sides’. He pointed
out that if the Arab-Israeli dispute became an open campaign issue then efforts to solve
the refugee problem and achieve progress on other issues could be compromised.
Interestingly he alluded to an informal understanding with the Democratic Platform
Committee about avoiding references to the Arab-Israeli problem. Jones also
recommended that the issue be kept out of the campaign. In a side note, apparently
written by Herter, the Secretary stated: ‘It will be difficult to keep it from being a major
factor if there are any serious incidents in the area during the campaign.’ ‘Memo Herter
to Eisenhower on “Arab-Israel Problem and the United States Presidential Campaign, 6
July I960’”. NACPM, UAR Policy, 59-786b.il/7-660. In a memo to President
Eisenhower, Herter reiterates his desire to avoid ‘specific actions or statements which
might harm United States’ relations with one or more of the states of the Near East’. In
his view this is a necessity given the relative ‘quiet since the events of mid-1958’.

35 Bass, Warren, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S. -Israel
Alliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 56. Bass does his best to make the
case that the Zionist lobby in the United States lacked the clout to influence policy, and
that Republican claims that Kennedy found himself pressured to take a pro-Israeli
stance was unsupportable. While Israeli influence in Washington was not what it is
today, Israel and its supporters carried enough clout for President Eisenhower to have
to go on national television to explain his reasons for demanding that Israelis withdraw
from the Sinai in 1957. Because Eisenhower took a courageously independent stand and
refused to bow to political expediency should not be used to understate Israeli political
pressure and influence peddling. In contrast, Kennedy had no choice, as he told Phillips
Talbot when he blocked plans for a state visit by Nasser. Oral History — Phillips Talbot,
Assistant Secretary of State, NEA. JFK Library, pp. 2324. As Talbot stated: ‘As a

Notes

411

consummate politician he understood the importance in our domestic politics, and to
the Democratic Party, of that body of Americans roughly categorized as friends of

Israel. These political considerations were constantly put to him ’ On Israel,

Kennedy told Talbot: ‘The trouble with you, Phil, is that you’ve never had to collect
votes to get yourself elected to anything.’ Interview with Phillips Talbot, 31 May 2002.
In a later interview, Talbot also stated that Feldman used Israeli and Zionist influence to
block pressure on Ben-Gurion over the Johnson Plan for a solution to the Palestinian
refugee problem, and to prevent a state visit by Nasser. In this same interview, Talbot
commented that Ed Bayne, a would be biographer of Ben-Gurion, stated that the latter
had described the private session between him and Kennedy, at the Waldorf-Astoria
during the UNGA in September 1961, as a meeting in which Kennedy had thanked him
profusely for Israeli and Zionist support in the 1960 election. Allegedly Kennedy also
stated that he recognized that without support from Israel and the Zionist community
Nixon would have won. According to Ben-Gurion, via Bayne, Kennedy promised that
he would not forget that debt in the future. Because of the importance of Jewish votes,
Kennedy felt obliged to have Feldman in the White House and to adjust his Middle
East policy, including the state visits of Arab leaders, to placate the American Zionist
community. In light of this, Bass’s attempt to argue a minimal Jewish influence in the
Kennedy White House seems misguided.

36 Hoopes, Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 486. During this turmoil, in 1957, Eisenhower
had a major heart attack, the seriousness of which was kept from all but a few close
aides, and in May 1959 Dulles died of cancer.

37 Hughes, Joseph V. and Holly O. Hughes, Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The
National Security decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy. College Station: Texas A&M
Press, 1998, p. 49.

38 Kennedy, John F., ‘Speech to the Zionists of America Convention, Statler Hilton Hotel,
New York, N.Y., August 26, I960’. Kennedy Speeches , Part 1, p. 48.

39 ‘7 Democrats Aid G.O.P. on Mideast’. New York Times , 2 March 1957, p. 1.

40 Kennedy, John F., ‘Partial Text of a Speech delivered by Senator John F. Kennedy in
Alexandria, VA on August 24, I960’. Kennedy Speeches , Part 1, pp. 44-45.

41 Kennedy, John F., ‘Speech to the Zionists’. Kennedy Speeches , Part 1, p. 48-49.

42 Kennedy, John F., ‘Letter to Rabbi Israel Goldstein by Senator John F. Kennedy,
August 10, I960’. Kennedy Speeches , Part 1, pp. 962-963.

43 Senator John F. Kennedy, ‘Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Zionists of America
Convention, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y., August 26, I960’. Kennedy Speeches ,
Part 1, pp 48-49.

44 Oral History — Phillips Talbot. JFK Library, December 5, 1964, pp. 23-26. Talbot states:
‘In the Senate and in his campaign speeches in 1 960 he had made a number of bold
statements about seeking peace in the Near East.’ Kennedy ‘saw the greatest challenge
in the problem of developing a relationship with Nasser’.

45 Oral Histoy - Robert W. Komer, Staff Member, National Security Council. JFK Library.
Introductory Statement, Part I, June 18, 1964, Falls Church, VA, pp. 1-2. Komer
recalled a conversation with Phillips Talbot the night after Kennedy’s assassination that
accurately summarized the formulation of US Middle East policy under Kennedy.
Talbot stated: Wou know, one of the great things about the New Frontier was the
President’s own personal handling of the affairs in which you and I, Bob, were
involved. He really was the Secretary of State. We didn’t have to deal with the Seventh
Floor on Middle East Policy very much. We dealt directly with the White House.’

46 Oral Histoy — Phillips Talbot. JFK Library, December 5, 1964, pp. 23-26.

47 Nolte, Richard ‘Getting Tough in the Middle East, A Letter from Richard H. Nolte,
Beirut, Lebanon, October 8, 1956’. HUFS, Northeast Africa Series, Volume II, No. 1,
pp. 8-10, 14.

412

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

48 ‘When I was just about to get something done, on Indo-Pakistan relations, [Talbot]
would do it in.’ Oral History — Chester Bowles. JFK Library, July 1, 1970, pp. 83-84. The
brief section on the Middle East is interesting for its impressions of personalities and
relations. Bowles thought that Badeau was confident but ‘afraid of Nasser’. Probably
Badeau, the local academic, i.e. President of the American University at Cairo, was
somewhat awed by having direct access to the most discussed man in the Middle East.
Concerning Talbot, Bowles stated that it was he who had brought him into the
administration, and that he viewed this as a mistake. Bowles preferred an approach that
placed the priority on India and Talbot ‘took the Pakistan view’.

49 Oral History - John S. Badeau, Ambassador to the UAR. JFK Library, interviewed by
Dennis O’Brien in New York City, February 25, 1969, pp. 1-2, 9. In this account,
Badeau emphasizes his distaste for Dulles’ policy in the Middle East and Kennedy’s
desire to bring ‘new blood’ into the diplomatic corps. In another response, Badeau
stated that Kennedy, during their first meeting before he left for Cairo, stated that
Kennedy told him that he did not ‘know what his policy would be’. In light of policy
statements and commitments in speeches this is curious, but it reflects the President’s
intention, confirmed by Chester Bowles, to conduct his own personal foreign policy
and use his Ambassadors and the State Department as implementation tools.

50 Al-Atasi, Jamal, Al-Thawra li Jamal Abd-al-Nasser wa ala Fikrihi al-Istratiji wa al-Tarikhi.
Beirut: Mahad Al-Agmaln Al-Arabi, p.7.

51 Al-Fadhi Shalaq, Al-Fadhi ‘Concepts of the Nation and State with Special Reference to
the Sunnis in Lebanon’. In Choueiri (ed.). State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, pp. 122,
123.

52 Abd-al-Nassar, Jamal, ‘The Principles that Guide Egypt’s Political Life’. In Karpat, (ed.),
Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 202.

53 ‘Addis Abba [Chester Bowles] to Rusk, 21 February 1962’. JFK Library, Papers of
President John F. Kennedy (PPJFK) — President’s Office Files (POF), United Arab
Republic (UAR) Security, 1962, Box 127, p. 5. On this point, Chester Bowles wrote an
assessment of Nasser and relations with Egypt on February 21, 1962, following a five-
day visit to Cairo when he met with Nasser and several key members of the UAR
government. In the telegram to Dean Rusk, Bowles describes the context in which
Nasser and the leadership function as one of a ‘colonial past, scarred by deep-seated
suspicions, frustrations, and plagued by a sense of weakness and inferiority’. Bowles
added: ‘AH this leads me to beHeve that the current US view of Nasser and his
coUeagues is oversimpHfied and defective. We have underestimated the basicaUy
revolutionary character of the regime.’ The campaign and later the administration
ignored the ideological warning indicated by past behavior and later by Bowles’
telegram. They did not recognize it as a serious motivating factor.

54 ‘Memcon Senator Hubert Humphrey and Nasser, 22 October 196T. NACPM,
786b.00/10-2261, pp. 13-15, 21-22. Hubert Humphrey’s visit to the UAR and meeting
with Nasser iUustrated Badeau’s attempts from Cairo to manage Nasser’s image. Nasser
told Humphrey: ‘I am not a Communist, I am a leftist’ and ‘I am not a Marxist in the
true sense.’ He also strongly defended African socialist leaders whom the US had
branded as Communist. The Embassy chose to emphasize this aspect of Nasser, stating:
‘On Communism, described Arab Communists as “traitors”. He was aware
Communists, directed and backed by Moscow, reviving popular front technique in Near
East and Africa.’ This was just after the Syrian coup, for which Nasser blamed his
inteUigence service and the fact that unlike in Egypt, where he locked up the capitaHsts
whose property he confiscated, he had not done that in Syria and they had forced the
coup against him. In effect, Nasser stated that he should have been more ruthless in
locking up ‘capitalist’ and ‘reactionary’ elements in Syria. He also predicted another
coup within six months in Syria — which did in fact occur, backed by Nasserist Syrians.

Notes

413

Undeterred, Humphrey briefly discussed the political prisoners and then, following the
administration line, brought up the possibility of an official visit to the US.

55 ‘Cairo, to WDC, 25 October 1961\ NACPM, 59-786b.il/10-2561, pp. 1-4. The
Embassy chose to emphasize this aspect of Nasser, stating: ‘On Communism, described
Arab Communists as “traitors”. He was aware Communists, directed and backed by
Moscow, reviving popular front technique in Near East and Africa.’

56 Oral History — Phillips Talbot. JFKL, August 13, 1970, pp. 37-38. Talbot acknowledged
this in an off-hand manner: ‘He [Nasser] just couldn’t avoid the temptation to respond
to people who were coming to him from other Arab countries and saying, “Look, with
a little help from you, we can really take over this place”.’

57 Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East , p. 69.

58 Grose, Gentleman Spy , p. 431.

59 The relationship between Jewish organizations and the Kennedy campaign had not
gone unnoticed in Cairo. Nasser, like Ayub in Pakistan, was concerned about the
political rhetoric and the perceived influence of the Israeli lobby. This is evidenced by
the UAR reaction to the appointments, following the election, of Averell Harriman and
Chester Bowles. These appointments encouraged Cairo to believe that a balanced policy
would continue, and that the real question would be how the aid dollars would be split
between Tel Aviv and Cairo. The one lingering issue troubling Nasser centered on
Kennedy’s pronouncements about ‘opening Suez Canal transit for all nations’. ‘Report
from Indian Embassy Cairo [A.K. Dar] to MEA New Delhi, 24 January 1961’. INA,
MEA, 6(5) R&I/60, p. 7.

60 ‘New Zealand Embassy WDC to MEA Wellington, 18 November I960’. New Zealand
National Archives (NZNA), ABHS, 950-206-3-12, Box 4059 - USA Presidents
November 1960, p. 9.

Part III

1 Interview with Rostow, 12 June 2002. When questioned about this issue, Rostow, who
worked as a consultant to the Eisenhower administration during this period, stated that
he saw the policies of the administrations as ‘completely different’. In explaining, he
stated that Eisenhower failed to follow through on his policy instincts, with the
exception of nuclear disarmament, because he was a ‘captive of the Republican right
wing’. When asked if he had recommended funding of the Aswan Dam following the
announcement of the Soviet-Czech arms deal, he stated that he had not been consulted
directly but that it was politically untenable. On the issue of the Herter State
Department, Rostow stated: ‘There was no difference between the foreign policy of the
liberal Republicans like Herter and that of the Democrats like Kennedy.’ At one level,
key advisors like Rostow who were well-acquainted with both administrations
understood the similarities between Eisenhower and Kennedy policy; on another level,
Kennedy’s administration, like Eisenhower’s, simply could not bring itself to give their
predecessors credit for having pursued what they themselves viewed as sound policies.
In dealing with the apparent contradictions, Rostow stated that he believed that
Eisenhower was simply unwilling to make ‘command decisions’ on foreign aid in the
face of Republican opposition. Even that required a caveat: Rostow added that
Eisenhower’s final foreign-aid package was so generous that the Kennedy
administration found it unnecessary to ask for additional funding.

Chapter 10

1 Ismael, Tariq Y., The Arab Eeft. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1976, pp. 78-
79.

2 Al-Atasi, Al-Thaivra li ]amal Abd-al-Nasser wa ala Fikrihi al-lstratiji wa al-Tarikhi , p.7.

414

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

3 Shalaq, Al-Fahdi, ‘Concepts of the Nation and State with Special Reference to the
Sunnis in Lebanon’. Choueiri (ed.), State and Society in Syria and Lebanon, pp. 122-123. In
an interview on August 8, 2003, Muhammad Hakki stated that was almost impossible to
overstate the impact of Bandung on Nasser: ‘When he left Egypt, he was first among
comrades, when he returned he was a world figure and clearly superior in his own mind
to his former comrades on the RCC.’

4 Abd-al-Nassar, Jamal, ‘The Principles that Guide Egypt’s Political Life’. Ivarpat (ed.),
Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 202.

5 Interview with General Andrew Goodpaster, August 8, 2003. According to Goodpaster,
Eisenhower once remarked that having to choose between Nasser and the Communists
was ‘like choosing between John Dillinger and A1 Capone’.

6 ‘Letter British Mission Cairo to FO [Lord Home], 9 February 1961, No. 14’. PRO,
F0371/158786, p. 4.

7 ‘Canadian Embassy Cairo to FO via Canadian High Commission London, 11 January
1961’. PRO, F0371/158786, p. 13.

8 ‘Letter British Mission Cairo to FO [Lord Home], 9 February 1961, No. 14’. PRO,
F0371/158786, pp. 4, 10.

9 ‘Canadian Embassy Cairo to FO via Canadian High Commission London, 11 January
1961’. PRO, F0371 /1 58786, pp. 2-5, 9-12.

10 ‘Memo Jones and Lee Metcalf, NEA, on “President Kennedy on the Middle East, 9
February 1961’”. NACPM, 59-786b.il/2-961, p. 1.

11 ‘WDC to Cairo, 11 May 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII, pp. 110-112. See also
‘CIA Analysis: The Arab-Israeli Situation, 6 December 1961’. CIA, CRES,
CIARDP79S00427A000400060002-8, p. 5, in which the Agency flatly states: ‘Israel,
which at one time was willing to accept token repatriation, now opposes the repatriation
of the Arab refugees, a position that on November 6, 1961 was endorsed by a Knesset
vote including opposition parties as well as those in the government.’

12 Oral History — Phillips Talbot. JFK Library, 5 December 1964, p. 24. Talbot had
suggested to President Kennedy that despite ‘pain to Israel’, the President needed to
take a more overtly pro- Arab stand to protect US interests in the Middle East. Interview
with Phillips Talbot, 31 May 2002. Talbot blamed Myer Feldman, in his role as special
counselor to the President on Jewish issues, for blocking the Johnson Plan and a
solution to the refugee problem. Talbot stated that Feldman kept the Israeli embassy
informed on everything that went on in the White House.

13 Heikal, Cairo Documents, p. 193.

14 ‘Memcon NEA Armin Meyer and UAR Ambassador Mustafa Kamel, 30 August 1961’.
NACPM, 611.84a/8-3061 (Ml 855), p.l.

15 Interview with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2002. Rostow stated that he ‘never understood
Arabs’ because they always seemed to make ‘the worst choices’. As for Nasser, Rostow
argued that just when he should have been focusing on economic development, his
‘revolutionary tendencies’ would get the best of him, and he would ‘go off on a tangent’.
In Rostow’s view, the war in Yemen was a perfect example of this tendency. Rostow’s
frustration was real, and reflected the disappointment felt in the Kennedy
administration concerning their UAR policy. They sincerely believed that Nasser had
passed through his revolutionary stage and was ready for an inward turn. They did not
interpret the situation as one in which another cycle of heightened revolutionary activity
was about to begin. When it occurred, it came as a major disappointment to Rostow,
because he had suggested to Kennedy that the United States should make a real effort
with Nasser.

16 Badeau, John S., The American Approach to the Arab World. New York: Harper Row, for
the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968, pp. 112, 173.

Notes

415

17 Oral History — Phillips Talbot. JFK Library, December 5, 1964, pp. 23-26. Talbot states:
‘In the Senate and in his campaign speeches in 1960 he [Kennedy] had made a number
of bold statements about seeking peace in the Near East.’ Kennedy ‘saw the greatest
challenge in the problem of developing a relationship with Nasser’.

18 Oral History — Robert W. Komer. JFK Library, June 18, 1964, pp. 1-2.

19 Oral History — Phillips Talbot. JFK Library, December 5, 1964, pp. 23-26.

20 ‘Memo Jordan Desk [Randall Willi a ms] to NEA [Meyer], 13 March 1961’. NACPM,
841.0085/3-1361, p. 1. The Jordanian fiscal year ran from April 1 to March 31. The
British offered an extra one million dollars. This boosted aid to Jordan from seven
million to eight million dollars for Jordanian fiscal year 1962. US and British aid for
fiscal year 1961 totaled $47.5 million, based on an agreement that the United States
footed 85 per cent of the bill.

21 ‘Amman [Macomber] to WDC, 13 May 1961’. NACPM, 785.5-msp/5-1261, p. 1.

22 ‘Amman [Macomber] to WDC, 3 February 1962’. NACPM, 885.10/2-362, p. 1.

23 ‘Dispatch Amman to WDC, 31 January 1962’. NACPM, 785.521/1-3162, p. %

24 ‘Amman [Macomber] to WDC, 3 February 1962’. NACPM, 885.10/2-362, p. 1.

25 ‘Amman [Macomber] to WDC, 7 February 1962’. NACPM, 885.10/2-762, p. 1.

26 ‘Official Informal Letter from Macomber Amman to Rusk, 6 March 1962’. NACPM,
841.00.85/3-662, pp. 1-2.

27 ‘Dispatch Amman to WDC, 15 February 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/2-1462, p. 2. See also
‘Airgram Amman to WDC, 14 March 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/3-1462, p. 1, in which
the American Ambassador opines that Tal’s attempts to include in the cabinet persons
sympathetic to the Ba’th Party were sharply criticized by King Hussein and other
conservative elements in Jordan.

28 ‘Dispatch Amm a n to WDC, 8 May 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/5-862, p.l. See also
‘Dispatch Amman to WDC, 6 June 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/6-662, p.l.

29 ‘Airgram Amman to WDC, 29 August 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/8-2962, pp.1-6.

30 ‘British Embassy Amman [Major] to FO, 14 March 1961,’ PRO, F0371/157526, p. 1.
In February 1961, King Hussein sent a letter to Nasser suggesting that they meet and
consider settling their differences. Nasser did not bother to reply until almost a month
later. This was taken as an insult by the Jordanian government, and even some pro-
Nasserist elements that had applauded the letter were unhappy that a more prompt,
positive reply had not been forthcoming. See also, ‘British Embassy Amman to FO, 27
March 1961’. PRO, F0371/157526, p. 1, ‘British Embassy Cairo to FO, 4 April 1961’.
PRO, F0371/157527, p. 1, and ‘British Embassy Amman to FO, 5 April 1961’. PRO,
F0371/157527, pp. 1-2. These telegrams raise concerns that Nasser would get the best
of King Hussein in exchanges of letters. They also point to the concerns of anti-
Nasserist elements in the Jordanian government who did not believe that the exchanges
with Nasser were a good idea. See ‘British Embassy Cairo to FO, 10 April 1961’. PRO,
F0371/157527, p. 1, in which King Hussein expressed his chagrin over the fact that
Nasser published the correspondence after being asked not to do so.

31 ‘Memcon Macomber and King Hussein, 10 April 1961’. NACPM, 785.11/4-1061 (M-
1855), pp. 1-2.

32 ‘Airgram Amman to WDC, 3 July 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/7-362, p.l.

33 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 1 May 1961’. PRO, F0371/ 156833, p. 2.
Trevelyan characterized Qasim’s statements as ‘a typically unconsidered outburst’.
Trevelyan surmised that Qasim’s statements had been a reaction to rumors that the new
treaty between Britain and Kuwait would make the latter a part of the Commonwealth
(p. 1). See also Badeau, John S., The Middle East Remembered. Washington, DC: Middle
East Institute, 1983, pp. 205-206. On the subject of Iraq and Kuwait, Badeau related a
conversation with Nasser, with Badeau speculating that the Iraqi move was to
compensate for the lack of financial success resulting from the IPC nationalization.

416

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Nasser said: ‘Yes, you are right, that is what people say, but I don’t think that is
ultimately what the reason was. I think that one morning Qasim was in the men’s room
and he met his Chief of Staff and one man said to the other: “Why don’t we take
Kuwait?” Then the other man said: “Wallahi, billahi, tallahi’ [By God that’s a good idea,
let’s do it]. That’s the way we sometimes reach decisions.’ Apparently, in more recent
times, the Iraqis are not the only ones who use that decision-making process.

34 ‘British Embassy Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO, 30 June 1961’. No. 690, PRO,
F0371/156875, p. 1. The British Embassy reported that on the night of 30 June railway
flatcars loaded with British-supplied Centurion tanks departed the Baghdad area along
with various Iraqi army units for the Kuwaiti border. See also ‘British Embassy Baghdad
[Trevelyan] to FO, 30 June 1961’. No. 692, PRO, F0371/156875, pp. 2-4, in which
Trevelyan attaches ‘overriding importance’ to the ability to deal effectively with an Iraqi
attack, but warns that the fallout from a military confrontation with Iraq would once
again excite anti-British sentiment throughout the Middle East.

35 ‘FO to Bahrain, 30 June 1961’. No. 848, PRO, F0371/ 156875, p. 1.

36 ‘Macmillan to Australian PM Menzies entitled “Threat to Kuwait”, 30 ]une 1961’. NAA,
A6706/1, 37, p. 1.

37 ‘British Emb Baghdad [Trevelyan] to FO [Hoyer-Millar], 30 June 1961,’ No. 692, PRO,
F0371/156875, p. 3.

38 ‘FO to British Embassy Kuwait, 30 June 1961’. No. 476, PRO, F0371/156875, p. 2.

39 ‘British Mission Cairo [Beeley] to FO, 30 June 1961’. No. 662, PRO, F0371/156875,

pp. 1-2.

40 ‘British Mission Cairo [Beeley[ to FO [Hoyer-Millar and Stephenson], 2 July 1961’.
PRO, F0371/1 56875, p. 1. Aburish, Said K., Nasser: The Last Arab (New York: St
Martin’s, 2004), pp. 203-204. The author claims that Nasser ‘played an anti-union role’.
Aburish, in one of several strange conclusions, argues that by opposing the annexation
of Kuwait by Iraq, Nasser ‘ceded his position as the advocate of Arab unity’. The
implication is that Qasim’s actions were motivated by the very Arab unity that he had
always resisted. It completely ignores that the fact that Qasim’s motivations vis-a-vis
Kuwait had nothing to do with pan-Arabism and everything to do with his personal
goals, the economic mess in Iraq, and Iraqi nationalism. Aburish goes on to insinuate
that the UAR position was in some way part of an American plot against Arab unity
rather than a grossly stupid misstep by Qasim. Aburish forgets that not only the
Americans but also most of the Arab world ultimately applauded the UAR position on
the dispute; thus, by the author’s logic, they must have been a part of the plot also.

41 ‘British Mission Cairo [Beeley] to FO [Hoyer-Millar and Stephenson], 2 July 1961’.
PRO, F0371/156875, p. 1.

42 ‘Letter British Embassy Kuwait [Rothnie] to FO, 8 November 1961’. PRO,
F0371/1 56894, p. 4. The Egyptians also managed to send only two companies of
troops, totaling 160 men, which compared poorly with the 1,550 British marines and
over 1,000 Saudi troops dispatched. This situation caused additional damage to UAR
prestige.

43 ‘Amman [Kocher] to WDC, 3 August 1961,’ NACPM, 785.11/8-361, pp. 1-2. King
Hussein’s bizarre proposal was for a union between Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Iraq. It can only be described as a feeble, illogical attempt by the Hashemite monarch to
isolate Egypt, which had made the decision to dispatch troops to Kuwait. Why Hussein
attempted to include Iraq, the perpetrator of the crisis, puzzled everyone.

44 Tripp, History of Iraq, p. 167. The Iraqi government accomplished this through Law 80.
This move tended to discourage foreign oil companies from investing in the new
exploration because of political uncertainties. Additionally, the IPC retaliated by
decreasing oil production and thus curtailing Iraqi government revenues. It was a trade-

Notes

417

off for Qasim. He lost revenues that worsened Iraq’s economic situation but gained
some prestige lost in the Kuwaiti adventure.

45 ‘Dispatch British Embassy Kuwait [Rothnie] to FO, 8 November 1961’. PRO,
F0371/156894, p. 13.

46 ‘Dispatch British Mission Cairo [Beeley] to FO [Lord Home], 18 July 1961’. PRO,
F0371/158786, pp. 1-7.

47 ‘Letter Kennedy to Nasser on the Congo Crisis, 3 March 1961’. JFK Library, PPJFK,
NSF, Country Series UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Box 169, pp. 1-4. On the other
side of the Atlantic, the Kennedy administration attempted to contain Egypt’s African
adventures. On February 5, 1961, Nasser wrote to Kennedy complaining about the
assassination of Lumumba and calling for a greater United Nations role in stabilizing
the country. Nasser argued that the current recognized regime in the Congo was
illegitimate, and propped up by foreign powers. He was pointedly referring to the
Congolese regime backed by strongman Joseph Mobutu, and strongly supported by the
United States. In response, Kennedy made a strong case for non-aligned support for the
UN mission in the Congo as a means of averting civil war.

48 Warren Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 1-14. To his credit, Bass identifies the Kennedy
administration as the beginning of the special relationship between the US and Israel,
but he misapprehends the significance of domestic politics and political pressure by
Jewish groups in support of Israel. The author’s statement that: ‘It was hardly
foreordained that the U.S.— Israeli friendship would strengthen so appreciably on
Kennedy’s watch’ misses the point. It may not have been ‘foreordained’ but it was
certainly highly predictable, given Jewish electoral support and the close election. For
example, Bass cites Kennedy’s concerns over Dimona and the exclusion of US Jewish
soldiers from Saudi Arabia as examples of a lack of Jewish influence. These policies had
long existed and continued into the 1980s. They were hardly indications of a lack of
Jewish influence. Bass argues that the Israeli lobby during the Kennedy period was not
strong enough to heavily impact US policy. He also states: ‘Kennedy had tried to
moderate the foremost Arab radical and failed, which meant that risking Nasser’s
friendship over deepening American special relationship with Israel was not risking
much at all.’ The author seems not to comprehend what had actually occurred during
the late Eisenhower era. Kennedy believed that the Arab leader had ‘moderated’
because of the rapprochement with the Eisenhower administration. On this basis,
Kennedy and some of his advisors made assumptions that were simply not based in
reality. The Eisenhower administration pursued an even-handed policy out of principle;
Kennedy pursued a pro-Israeli policy out of naivete over Nasser’s malleability with
regard to a settlement with Israel, and with an eye to votes in Brooklyn. It was
Eisenhower’s policy of 1953, but with additional domestic political considerations.
There are strong indications that indeed the Zionist support and Jewish votes figured
prominently in Kennedy’s policy decisions. Bass also attempts to portray the triangular
relationship between the US and Egypt and the US and Israel as one of almost equals
‘testing] the limits of what American friendship meant’. See also Oral History — Komer.
Volume II, Part V, pp. 73-85. Kennedy appointed Myer Feldman as his Special Counsel
to represent Jewish and Israeli interests in the White House. Komer states: ‘Mike
Feldman played the role of lawyer for the Israelis,’ and ‘Mike was the lawyer they [the
Israelis] wanted.’ It begs the question of why Nasser did not also have a lawyer on the
White House staff. Komer also states that Feldman was instrumental in propagating
‘the great Egyptian rocket scare’, a story fabricated by the Israelis that Egypt was
developing rockets and nuclear weapons. According to Komer, Feldman would often
have to be told: ‘Mike, you know, you’re just wrong.’ See also Oral History — Talbot. Part
II, pp. 24, 26-27. Talbot states: ‘Feldman was being used as a pipeline not just by

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

American Jewry but by the Israeli embassy, ... his contacts with the Israeli ambassador
were considerably closer than either of them talked about in public.’

49 Abd-al-Nasser, Jamal, President Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s Speeches and Press Interviews, ]anuary-
December 1963. Cairo: LIAR Information Department/Al-Shaab Printing House, 1964,
pp. 24-25,121.

50 Sayf al-Dawlah, ’Ismat, Na^ariat al-Thawrah al-Arabijah, Volume VI. Beirut: Dar Al-
Musira, 1972, pp. 10, 11. The official Ba’thist position became that Nasser’s destruction
of the union through his policies was the first in a series of steps that ultimately
separated Egypt from the ‘Arab Nation.’

51 ‘Dispatch British Mission Cairo [Beeley] to FO [Lord Home], 31 October 1961’. PRO,
F0371/158793, pp. 2-6.

52 ‘Dispatch British Mission Cairo [Beeley] to FO [Lord Home], 9 November 1961’. PRO,
F0371/158793, p. 1.

53 ‘FO and Whitehall to British Embassy Amman, 2 October 1961’. PRO,
FO371/158790, p. 1.

54 ‘British Emb WDC [Hood] to FO, 29 September 1961,’ PRO, FO371/158790, p. 1.

55 Oral History — Komer, JFK Library, |uly 16, 1964, Part II, p. 5.

56 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 27 March'l963’. NACPM, 611.83/3-2762 (M1855), p. 2.

57 ‘Damascus [Knight] to WDC, 30 April 1962,’ NACPM, 611.83/3-2762 (M1855), p. 2.

58 ‘Airgram Amman [MacComber] to WDC on US Aid to the UAR and Current Rumors,
24 May 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/5-2462, p. 1. The Commander in Chief of the
Jordanian army, Lt. General Habes Majali, also denied rumors that the US was
supporting Jordanian dissidents, but he was very concerned that the Arab Tahrir Party,
a right-wing, anti-regime religious party was using US aid to the UAR to create
problems.

59 ‘Memo McGeorge Bundy to Rusk on Policy toward Egypt and Syria, 1 6 October 1961’.
JFK Library, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), Box 332, p. 1.

60 ‘Research Memo INR, RNA-8, October 30, 1961, Outlook for Nasser’. JFK Library,
NSAM, Box 332, p. 1.

61 ‘Memo INR to Bundy Reference NSAM Number 105 of October 16, 1961, November
16, 1961’. JFK Library, NSAM, Box 332, p. 2.

62 ‘Memocon from Sen Humphrey on Nasser, 22 October 1961’. NACPM, 786b.00/10-
2261, pp. 13-15,21-22.

63 ‘Cairo [Badeau], to Washington, 25 October 1961’. NACPM, 786b.l 1/10-2561, p. 1.

64 ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy on Action Program for UAR, January 10, 1962’. JFK Library,
NSAM, Box 332, p. 1. See also ‘Memo from Humphrey on Conversations with Nasser,
22 October 1961’. NACPM, 786b.00/10-2261, pp. 13-15, 21-22. See also ‘Memo Talbot
to McGhee on Action Program for the UAR: Rationale, January 10, 1962’. NACPM,
786b.il/l-362 p. 1. This is the basis for the Rusk memorandum to the President, and
clearly shows who is pushing an aggressive UAR policy.

65 Memo George Ball to Kennedy, 31 January 1962’. NACPM, 786b.il/l-3162, p. 1.

66 Memo Robert Komer NSC to Kennedy, 5 March 1962, Nasser Correspondence’. JFK
Library, NSF, Box 169, p. 1.

67 ‘Bowles in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, to Rusk, February 21, 1962’. JFK Library, POF, UAR
Security, 1962, Box 127, p. 5.

68 Memo Komer to Kennedy on Bowles’ meeting with Nasser, February 28, 1962’. JKF
Library, POF, UAR Security, 1962, Box 127, p. 5.

69 ‘Letter Official Informal Talbot to Bowles, 6 March 1962’. NACPM, 123-Bowles,
Chester, Box 313, p. 1.

70 Oral History — Komer. JFK Library, July 16, 1964, Part II, p. 7.

71 ‘Letter Official Informal Talbot to Bowles, 6 March 1962’. NACPM, 123-Bowles,
Chester, Box 313, p. 1.

Notes

419

72 Oral History — Komer. JFK Library, |uly 16, 1964, Part II, p. 7.

73 ‘Notes on Third Plenary Session — Athens Chiefs of Mission Conference, 13 June 1962’.
NACPM, Chiefs of Mission Conferences, Lot 670457, Entry 5269, Box 1, p. 2.

74 Wall, Irwin M., France, the United States, and the Algerian War. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001, pp. 251-252. This work has not focused on the Algerian war,
because it was peripheral to the main thrust of this narrative; however, Nasser’s role in
support of the FLN was significant and pugnacious. The success of the FLN in forcing
France to accept an independent Algeria no doubt influenced his decision to pursue the
Yemen adventure and to take a more aggressive stance toward the US. See also Horne,
Alistair, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. New York: Penquin, 1979; this is the
best history of the Algerian conflict. For a detailed explanation of the role of Tunisia
and Habib Bourgiba in the outcome of the Algerian situation, see Connelly, Matthew, A
Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria ’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era.
London: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 249-275.

75 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to Kennedy concerning publication of Nasser to Kennedy
correspondence, 10 September 1962’ NACPM, 786b.il/9-1062, p. 1. To counter this,
Nasser authorized Heikal to print that portion of his letter to Kennedy in which he laid
out Egypt’s support for the Palestinian cause. Heikal stated that Saudi Arabian and
Jordanian actions required it; otherwise they would not print the excerpted letter. Heikal
told Badeau that this was the equivalent of the US providing a courtesy warning on the
Syrian recognition issue following the coup and the sale of Hawk missiles to Israel. It is
clear that Badeau was seriously aggravated and concerned by this development because
he sent his communication NIACT (‘night action immediate’) and Top
Secret/Presidential Confidential.

76 ‘Memo Bruebeck to Bundy with attached FBIS transcript of UAR broadcast, 24
September 1962’. NACPM, 786b.00/9-2462, p. 1.

77 Interview with Talbot, 31 May 2003.

78 Ball, Passionate Attachment, p. 51.

79 Eban, Abba, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes. New York: Putnam, 1992, p. 324.

80 ‘Memo Talbot to Rusk, 9 July 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII, pp. 2-5.

81 ‘Letter William Bundy, DepSecDef, to NEA [Grant], 16 July 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963,
Volume XVIII, p. 8.

82 ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy on Johnson Plan, 7 August 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume
XVIII, pp. 31, 33-50.

83 ‘Memo Talbot to Feldman — Hawks and Johnson Plan, 9 August 1962’. FRUS, 1962-
1963, Volume XVIII, p. 51.

84 ‘Memo from Feldman to Kennedy, 10 August 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII,
pp. 53-54.

85 ‘Letter Kennedy to Ben-Gurion, 15 August 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII,

pp. 60-61.

86 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 14 September 1963’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII, p. 96.
As an indication of what Feldman saw as his priorities, he told Jewish leaders ‘in
confidence’ about the negotiations over the Hawk issue and the Johnson Plan. Komer
expressed concern that the situation with the UAR over the Hawks could get out of
hand as the news spread. Feldman wanted to abandon US support for the plan, but as
Komer pointed out, ‘JFK has written Ben-Gurion, Nasser, and Hussein about it and to
retreat now would be a real loss of face.’

87 ‘WDC to Tel Aviv — Eyes Only Feldman, 20 August 1963’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume
XVIII, p. 67

88 ‘Cairo (Badeau) to WDC, 24 August 1963,’ FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII, pp. 74-
77.

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

89 ‘Ta’iz, Yemen, [Stoltzfus] to WDC, 16 November 1962’. NACPM, 786h.561/l 1-1660,
p. 1. The US Consulate lodged a formal complaint with the Yemen government about
the arrival of Soviet tanks in Ta’iz because their trip from Hudaydah on the coast had
Torn up’ the American-built road between the two cities. The Consul also described
Yemeni proficiency in driving, stating that one of the tanks had been driven over a cliff,
killing the driver and reducing by one the number that participated in a military parade
the next day. He also recounted rows of tanks, trucks, armored cars, and guns parked in
a large field near Bajil.

90 ‘Dispatch Ta’iz [Stoltzfus] to WDC, 1 April 1961’. NACPM, 786h.il/4-161, p 1. ‘Taiz
to WDC, 3 June 1961,’ NACPM, 786h.il/6-361, pp. 1-2. Stoltzfus opined on June 3
that the results of the current Yemen situation could ‘only be chaos in country and
possibly civil war’. No-one really cared about Yemen for Yemen’s sake. This was one of
the great joys of serving in Yemen.

91 ‘Minute on the Soviet Penetration of Yemen from British Legation Ta’iz [R.W. Bailey]
to FO [Walmsley], 1 July 1961’. PRO, F0371/156393, p. 2. The British found
themselves quite frustrated with US progress on various aid projects, and concerned
that Washington did not take the situation in Yemen and Soviet penetration seriously
enough. The British frustration included what, in their view, was a lack of suitable US
progress on its two major aid projects, the Ta’iz to Hudaydah road and the Ta’iz water
project. To further illustrate that the Soviets were besting the Americans, the British
Consul pointed out: ‘It is interesting to note that whereas last year the American request
to set up a small meteorological station was turned down on religious grounds
(“keeping a watch on Allah”), the Russians have now been allowed to build them.’

92 ‘Memo Meyer, NE, to William Brewer, NE, 9 January 1961’. NACPM, 786h.il/l-96, p.
1. Also see ‘Memo Meyer, NEA, to Lewis Jones, NEA, 30 January 1961’. NACPM,
786h.il/l-30-6. pp. 1-2.

93 Oral History — Badeau. JFK Library, February 25, 1969, pp. 24-25.

94 ‘British Mission Cairo [Beeley] to FO, 24 December 1961’. PRO, F0371/1 58796, p. 1.

95 Oral History — Komer. JFK Library, July 16, 1964, p. 2.

96 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 12 October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/10-1262, p. 2.

97 Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002, p. 109. Rasheed’s work should be labeled a ‘short’ history. Despite this, it is useful
as a concise reference that provides a chronological framework around which the
researcher or reader can arrange anecdotal but often more detailed accounts of specific
events found in Holden and Johns’ The House of Saud and Lacey’s The Kingdom. Rasheed’s
reference to the Sudayri Seven is a case in point. The author states that the Sudayri
Seven were allied principally to Feisal in the power struggle of the late 1950s and early
1960s, but she provides little explanation. In contrast, Holden and Johns, in The House of
Saud. , pp. 268-269, explain that the term ‘Sudayri Seven’ refers to Fahd ibn Abd-al-Aziz
and his six surviving full brothers, and that their cohesiveness proved instrumental in
maintaining the stability of the Saudi regime during the 1960s. Holden and Johns point
out that the term ‘Sudayri Seven’ is something of a misnomer in that it refers to the
seven sons of Hassa bint Ahmed al-Sudayri, when in reality Ibn Abd-al-Aziz al-Saud
had two other Sudayri wives, Jauharah bint Saad al-Sudayri and Haya bint Saad al-
Sudayri, both of whom also contributed sons to the dynasty and half-brothers to the
Fahd group labeled as the ‘Sudayri Seven’.

98 ‘Memo to Bundy, The White House, from Lucius Battle, Executive Secretary
Department of State, 7 February 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Saudi Arabian General Files
(SAGF), Box 156A.

99 ‘Memcon Kennedy and King Saud, 13 February 1962’. JFK Library, Box 156A, pp. 2-4.

100 ‘Dhahran [Talbott] to WDC, 18 February 1962’. JFK Library, Box 156A, p. 1. Feisal
indicated that he had been Nasser’s friend, but that Nasser had deceived him. He now

Notes

421

believed that Nasser was a Communist or afflicted by ‘a rabid madness or
schizophrenia’ and warned Talbot that US aid to and faith in Nasser were misplaced.

101 ‘Saudi Arabian Arms Request, NSAM No. 73, 20 August 1961’. JFK Library, NSAM,
Box 331, p. 1. Slow deliveries of arms also concerned President Kennedy, and he sent a
note to Secretary of Defense McNamara asking why it took so long for the US to
deliver promised military aid. Kennedy told McNamara: ‘Guevara said in Montevideo
the other day that everything that the United States does is strangled in the Washington
bureaucracy. It seems to me that we could speed this up.’

102 ‘Airgram Jidda [Kidder], to WDC, 15 August 1962’. NACPM, 786a.00/8-1562, p. 1.

103 ‘British Emb Cairo [Beeley] to FO, 18 July 1961’. PRO, F0371/158786, p. 12.

104 ‘Dispatch Tel Aviv to WDC on Political Economic Assessment of Israel January to July
1961, 17 August 1961’. NACPM, p. 1. Ben-Gurion refused to accept Pinhas Lavon in a
government coalition between the Maipai and Histadrut parties. As a result, both parties
refused to enter a coalition headed by Ben-Gurion because of his handling of the Lavon
affair.

105 ‘Memo Rusk to Talbot, 1 May 1961’. NACPM, 611.84a/5-161 (M1855), pp. 1-2.

106 ‘Memo Bowles to Kennedy, 30 March 1961’. NACPM, 611.84A45/3-3061 (M1855), pp.
1 - 2 .

107 ‘Minute by A. Brooke Turner on Letter from British Embassy Beirut [Crosswaithe] to
FO [Hoyer-Millar], 23 June 1961’. PRO, F0371/157286 (LAE 4153/40), pp. 1-2.

108 ‘Attachment to Memo Talbot to Kennedy on visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Golda
Mier, 9 October 1961’. NACPM, 611.84A/10-961 (M1855), pp. 1, 4.

109 Tessler, Mark, s\ History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington: University of
Indiana Press, 1994, p. 313.

110 ‘WDC to Tel Aviv, 22 June 1961’. NACPM, 61 1.84A/6-2261 (M1855), p. 2.

111 ‘Tel Aviv to WDC, 27 June 1961’. NACPM, 61 1.84A/6-2761 (M1855), p. 1.

112 Shlaim, The Iron Wall \ p. 211. As Abba Eban is rumored to have once commented: ‘The
Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.’

113 ‘CIA Report: The Arab-Israeli Situation, 6 December 1961’. CIA, CRES, CIA-
RDP79S00427A000400060002-8 (No. 2050/61S), p. 5.

114 ‘Memo Talbot to Kennedy on visit of Meir, 9 October 1961’. NACPM,, 611.84A/10-
961 (M1855), pp. 1-4.

115 ‘Memcon Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, of the UNPCC and NEA [William R. Crawford], 6
February 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII, pp. 460-465.

116 ‘Policy Directive: Jordan Waters, 26 February 1962’. JFK Library, Komer, Box 429, p. 1.

117 ‘Tel Aviv to WDC, 3 May 1962’. NACPM, 61 1.84A/5-362 (Ml 855), p. 1.

Chapter 11

1 Oral History — Bowles JFK Library, p. 18. Bowles noted that both President Kennedy
and his brother Robert had ‘a rather deep sense of skepticism about the Foreign Service
and the State Department. . . . President Kennedy was always determined to dominate
. . . foreign policy making.’

2 Summitt, April R., ‘For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran’.
Middle East Journal, Volume 58, No. 4, Autumn 2004, pp. 560-575. Summitt’s article on
Iran and the Kennedy administration deals better with the reality of the situation from
1961 to 1963. Summitt states, correctly, that the Shah manipulated the Kennedy
administration into continued support for his regime. The author makes the argument
that the Shah exaggerated external threats to his regime, and as a result Kennedy and
the State Department, fearing Communism and instability, moved away from support
for ‘a fresh approach in American relations with Iran’. The author leaves the impression
that she believes there was some real alternative. Summit is aware of the bureaucratic
battles in Washington, but her understanding would be greatly enhanced by a closer

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

examination of the Eisenhower years. Eisenhower, Dulles, Herter, and Kennedy knew
that the Shah exaggerated external threats. They understood that he had serious faults
that might bring regime collapse at any time. They wanted a reform-minded, more
liberal alternative to the Shah, but they were dealing with Iran — no such alternative
existed. In fact, Kennedy’s ill-advised decision to identify the US with Prime Minister
Ali Amini was a major shift in US policy. The Eisenhower administration had
steadfastly avoided identification with any Iranian faction. In fact, Ambassador Wailes, a
holdover from the Eisenhower years, lobbied strongly against the Kennedy decision. He
urged that Washington go no further than Eisenhower’s position, guaranteeing the
territorial integrity and independence of Iran. Kennedy’s decision to back Amini
personally drastically altered the dynamic of US-Iran relations. It led Washington down
a torturous path to making similar commitments to the Shah. It placed the interests of
the US squarely in the Pahlavi basket. This decision lashed Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and
later Carter to an inherently unstable regime and left the US with no alternatives in
1979. Summit states: ‘If American diplomats had studied and understood both the Shah
and the needs of the Iranian people, perhaps the 1978 revolution could have been
avoided.’ The problem is ‘American diplomats’ did study and understand, but they
could see no alternative given the Cold War and the commitment to containment. In
addition, the Shah, not the United States, should be viewed as the proactive driver in
the equation. He really was in charge of his own destiny. It was the Shah’s
understanding of the Iranian situation that allowed him to survive until 1979, and it was
the Shah’s miscalculations that led to his downfall. The mullahs of 1979, who are still in
charge in Iran, say that the Shah’s regime fell because he was not harsh enough in his
suppression of the opposition. To date, they have elected not to make that same
mistake.

3 Fischer, Michael M.J., Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980, pp. 187-188. In describing the events of 1961 and 1962, Fischer
points to the very reform programs supported by Washington as the catalyst for anti-
Shah activities. He cites the election issues of 1960 and 1961, and nullification by the
Shah because of corruption. He points out that Ayatollahs Behbahani and Borujerdi
opposed land reform. In November 1962, the ulama launched a campaign against the
Shah’s attempt to create a grass-roots political movement through the Local Council
Election Bill, because it allowed women to vote and did not mention the Koran. In
effect, many of the liberalizing reforms that the US urged on the Shah became the
catalyst for growing traditional and religious opposition to the regime.

4 ‘Official Informal Letter Amman [Macomber] to Rusk, 6 March 1962’. NACPM,
841.00.85/3-662, p. 1.

5 ‘Memo Iranian Desk [Bowling] to NEA [Hart], 22 September I960’. NACPM, Iran
Desk, A/1 Military Assistance, 1958 Status of Forces through 1960, Box 2, p. 1.

6 Interview with Phillips Talbot, New York City, 31 May 2002.

7 Lippmann, Walter, The Coming Tests with Russia. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1961, p. 16.

8 Interview with Talbot, 31 May 2003. See Oral History — Chester Bowles, JFK Library, p.
6, in which Bowles relates the views of Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State under
Truman. Acheson believed that Kennedy was ‘unqualified and simply the wrong man’
for the presidency. The new White House knew about these views in various quarters
and was most sensitive about them.

9 Bill, Eagle and the don , pp. 113-116, 128, 131-132-153, 156-157. Bill criticizes the
Eisenhower administration, stating that the large US subsidies for the Shah’s regime
resulted in Iranian resentment of US influence: ‘It was in the 1950s that the Iranians
began to view themselves as the underdog, confronted by an American imperial giant.’
Bill argues that Kennedy in contrast pushed for reforms from above, the ‘White
Revolution’. In fact, Eisenhower’s administration consistently pushed for reform from

Notes

423

above, and attempted to limit the Shah’s appetite for weapons and military
expenditures. Bill’s work on Iranian-US relations distorts the real relationship between
Eisenhower and Kennedy’s policies toward Iran. In particular, he borrows from the
State Department memos and telegram traffic of John W. Bowling, the Iran desk officer
in the NEA Bureau. Bowling wrote the same kinds of plans for Iran during the
Eisenhower administration. In fact, during the Eisenhower administration, Bowling
made the statement that no one wanted to push the Shah too far and become known ‘as
the man who lost Iran’. Virtually all of the points made by Bowling in the plan cited by
Bill were, at one time, goals and policy plans of Eisenhower foreign policy, whether
under Dulles’ or Herter’s management. A closer reading of Bowling’s positions during
the Eisenhower administration would have revealed that Bowling was a weak choice to
use to support the idea that Kennedy’s focus and plans for Iran was different from
those of his predecessor. In the case of T. Cuyler Young, the Princeton University
expert, Bill credits the professor with having alerted the Kennedy administration to the
problems and to rising anti-Americanism in Iran. The problem with the Shah was only
too well known to the Eisenhower administration, as were Young’s views on the
situation. Many if not most of his views on the situation in Iran were shared by the
Eisenhower administration, which actively tried to push the Shah toward reform. Bill
also cites Kennedy efforts to alter aid to the Shah from military to economic; the
Eisenhower administration used the same tactics. None of Kennedy’s policy analyses or
strategies were new. They had all been tried before, between 1953 and 1958. Bill also
laid the controversial ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ of October 1964 at Lyndon
Johnson’s doorstep when in fact the US positions on the agreement were clearly
established on Kennedy’s watch. Bill states: ‘There is little doubt that during the
Kennedy presidency the United States pressured the shah’s regime to begin a program
of dramatic selective and controlled reforms.’ These conclusions may reflect the use of
FRUS without examination of the actual archival materials. Be that as it may, this is
misleading vis-a-vis what had gone before and what actually occurred during the
Kennedy years. As in the Eisenhower years, pressure from the United States for social
and economic reforms and political liberalization caused the Shah to go through the
motions of reform, just as he had under Eisenhower. In reality, he worked assiduously
to undermine any real attempt to alter the status quo or to liberalize the political system.
Kennedy followed the same policy path trodden by Eisenhower and, like his
predecessor, learned that reform in Iran could not be purchased at a price that
threatened the stability of the country. The Shah was just as determined not to
relinquish his power, and to use whatever means were available to extract the military
aid that he desired for the regime. Kennedy ended up in the same situation that faced
Eisenhower: a choice between alienating the Shah, with unknown consequences, and
more or less going along with the Shah’s approach to governance, which latter included
significantly increased amounts of military assistance. In addition, US military support
finally reached a crisis point during the Kennedy administration, in which the solution
insisted upon by Washington would ultimately lead to 1979. The idea that the United
States could have controlled the Shah smacks of ‘Salvationist’ superiority. At a
minimum, it infers that the Iranians were not responsible for their own actions. It
should be remembered that most Iranians, including the clerics, supported the 1953
coup against Musaddiq. It also infers that a better policy strategy existed, and that an
improved situation would have emerged had the Shah fallen. In all likelihood, just
another corrupt regime would have taken power, touting the interests of its supporters
over the rest of the country. But, most of all, it insinuates that United States owed
something to Iran. The Iranians understood the game from their support of the 1953
coup to the 1979 revolution. Without that support, the coup would never have
succeeded, just as the United States was unable to prevent 1979.

424

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

10 ‘Letter Shah to Kennedy, 26 January 1961’. NACPM, 3-A/l Military Asst., Internal
Security (Box 2), p. 2.

11 ‘Memo attached to the Letter from the Shah to Kennedy, 26 January 1961’. NACPM, 3-
A/l Military Assistance thru 1961/4, Internal Security, Box 2, p. 2. This is the
document on which Bill relied so heavily in his interpretation of Kennedy
administration policy and the ‘so-called’ fourteen-point ‘blueprint’ for Iran by Bowling,
the Iran desk officer. In fact, at State, desk officers do not have ‘blueprints’. They may
offer opinion papers to the branch chiefs, who then in turn may pass the documents to
the Assistant Secretary level, but the Bowling document is not a ‘blueprint’. It offered a
shopping list of options, most of which had been tried under Eisenhower and all of
which the Shah had managed to circumvent. The analysis that Bowling offered about
the nature of Iranians and of Iranian society at that particular juncture was very
interesting and perceptive. Bill also overlooks the fact that Bowling concluded that there
was no element of Iranian society capable of leading the country and preventing chaos
other than the Shah. Bill, Eagle and the Eton, p. 133.

12 ‘Memo on the Characteristics of the Iranian Urban Middle Class and Implications for
U.S. Policy, 14 March 1961’. NACPM, 1962 Prime Minister-1962 Iranian Good
Offices, Iran Desk, Box 5, pp. 5, 9, 11. In Washington, intelligence and foreign policy
analysts had two anchors for political stability along the northern tier, Turkey and
Pakistan. In both, unstable but democratic governments had succumbed to more
reliable, benevolent military dictatorships. Analysts looked for patterns when practicing
the ‘art’ of intelligence and foreign political prognostication. The military had become
the vehicle for modernization. Fundamentally, the assumption was that the potential for
a military takeover was not only possible but also likely. Therefore, if a military takeover
was a foregone conclusion, then what kind was preferable? During this period, the new
nationalist governments that came to power by military coup tended to be composed of
younger officers with new radical nationalist ideas and ideals — Nasser and Qasim were
examples. These types of military governments created problems for Western policy,
particularly given their penchant for non-alignment or even left-of-center policies.
These types of coups seemed to occur in countries where the higher echelons of the
military had become closely associated with the ruling elite. In other words, the senior
military leadership became as much of a target to be disposed of as the political regime
itself. In countries where coups occurred and the political orientation remained largely
pro-Western, it was usually the senior military leadership that took the initiative to
change the government before the building pressure from below had reached critical
mass. See also Kux, United States and Pakistan, pp. 95-101. For example, on October 27,
1958, after months of stewing, General Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan, with the
support of the Pakistani Chief of Staff Ayub Khan, overthrew the government of Prime
Minister Noon. While ostensibly opposed by the US government, in reality this coup
became something of a model for ‘controlled democracy’ in the region. See also
Henderson, K.D.D., Sudan Republic. New York: Praeger, 1965, pp. 105-110. Later in the
year, events in Sudan further reinforced this trend. On November 17, 1958 a military
coup led by General Ibrahim Abboud prevented what appeared to be a pact between
the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the National Unionist Party (NUP), and pro-
Nasserist elements to initiate a ‘National Socialist revolution’ in Khartoum. See also
‘Khartoum [Moose] to WDC, 17 November 1958’. NACPM, 745W.00/1 1-1758, p. 1.
Initial reporting on the coup quoted General Abboud as saying that the army had taken
over the country because of ‘corruption’ and the fact that ‘too many members of parties
had been seen visiting foreign embassies’. ‘Khartoum [Moose] to WDC, 17 November
1958’. NACPM, 745W.00/1 1-1758, pp. 1-2. The new Abboud government reinforced
the idea that the pro-Nasserist plotters included mid-level officers in the military. On
November 26, former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdulla Bey Khalil told newspaper

Notes

425

reporters in Khartoum: ‘General Abboud freed country from foreign interference . . .
they had bought press and delivered country to anarchy according to methods which
have become classic since they have been adopted about everywhere in Arab world. . . .
And I shall not conceal fact there was subversive movement shaping up within fraction
of army officers which if successful would have endangered independence of country.’
When asked by a Lebanese reporter what ‘interference’ specifically meant, Khalil asked:
‘Why are you asking that question? Such an obvious fact should not escape an Arab
newsman like yourself. You have come from Lebanon, haven’t you? You are in a better
position than 1 to understand meaning of constant interference of a certain state in
internal affairs of its neighbors. It suffices, in Middle East, simply to allude to this
aggressor in order that everyone will point his finger at him.’ The point learned in
Washington was that coups by conservative general officers were preferable to those of
their potentially more radical subordinates.

13 ‘Memo GT1 Desk [Miner] to NEA [Jones], 8 February 1961’. NACPM, Task force on
Iran 20, Box 3, p. 1. See also ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 11 February 1961’. NACPM,
Box 2089, pp. 1-6, in which the Embassy in Tehran describes the unrest associated with
the riots. Despite the alarm in Washington, it appeared that SAVAK had the situation
well in hand: ‘Throughout the disturbances the security authorities acted firmly and
showed generally good discipline and restraint, though it is known that some students
were beaten severely.’ The Embassy concluded the situation was ‘nearing equilibrium’,
despite leaving a ‘residue of bitterness’ that appeared to have ‘detracted from the
regime’s standing’.

14 ‘Memo NSC [Halla] to Bundy, 8 February 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p.

15 ‘Briefing Paper on Iran for Ambassador Harriman, 23 February 1961’. NACPM, 1962
Prime Minister— 1 962 Iranian Good Offices, Iran Desk, Box 5, p. 3.

16 ‘Memo NSC [Belk] to Bundy Attached CIA Analysis, 24 February 1961’. JFK Library,
NSF, Iran, Box 11 5A, p. 1.

17 ‘Karachi [Harriman] to Kennedy, 19 March 1961’. NACPM, 123 Harriman, Averell,
Box 320, pp. 1-2.

18 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy and Rostow, 27 March 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Meeting
Series, Komer March 15-29, 1961, Box 321, p. 1.

19 ‘Memo - Notes on Iran from NSC [Hansen] to Bundy, 20 March 10, 1961’. JFK
Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1.

20 ‘Memo from the Vice-Chair Policy Planning Council [Morgan] to Bundy, 27 March
1961’. FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII, p. 65.

21 ‘Memo NSC [Rostow] to DOS [McGhee], 28 March 1961’. JFKL, NSF, Iran, Box
115A, pp. 1-2. See also Oral History Bowles, pp. 92-93, where Bowles took credit for
‘rescuing’ Holmes and ‘rehabilitating’ him by putting him in Tehran. Bowles stated that
Holmes had been ‘fired out of the department for some shipping deal in Taiwan’.
Bowles lamented that Holmes had become an impediment to new policies with regard
to the Shah because he ‘wanted to bring all these planes in all the time to please the
Shah. So we were on opposite sides again. But at least he was deservedly put back to
work.’ See also ‘WDC [Bowling] to Tehran [Holmes], 17 May 1963’. JFK Library, NSF,
Iran, Box 116A, p. 1, in which an Iranian informer claimed to have photocopies of
cancelled checks from the Pahlavi Foundation made out to a number of US officials,
including Ambassador Holmes. Also included in the payments were Allen Dulles and
three former Ambassadors to Iran. These were provided to the McClellan committee
investigating the Foundation. When a New York Times reporter attempted to write an
article accusing the committee of ‘gullibility’, the paper refused to print it.

22 ‘Iran: Discussion with Professor T. Cuyler Young, 3 April 1961’. JFK Library, NSF,
Komer Series, Box 424, p. 1.

426

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

23 Ibid, pp. 1, 2.

24 ‘Letter Professor Young to Rostow, 19 April 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 1 15A,
pp. 1-6. See also ‘Letter Orson Cox to Rostow on the Shah of Iran’. JFK Library, NSF,
Komer Series, Box 424, p. 3. Rostow’s search for answers netted responses that were
just as unpalatable. Cox, an attorney with business interests in Iran, told Rostow: ‘The
present Shah is a disruptive rather than a unifying influence in Iran. . . . The Shah should
resign and a regency be established to govern for the Crown Prince as the Shah.’

25 ‘Editorial Note No. 41’. FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII, pp. 98-99.

26 ‘Memo for Talbot, 5 May 196T. NACPM, 1961 Task Force on Iran - 20, Iran Desk,
Box 3, Cover Memo.

27 ‘Defense Attache Tehran to WDC, 5 May 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, pp.
1 - 2 .

28 ‘Memo for Talbot, 5 May 196T. NACPM, 1961Task Force on Iran - 20, Iran Desk,
Box 3, Cover Memo.

29 Interview with Talbot, 31 May 2002. Talbot was a naval liaison officer based in
Bombay, India during the Second World War. His wife got a job in Calcutta at CBI
headquarters. Her office was in the same building and near that of Dean Rusk, who was
an OSS officer. Rusk and Talbot met from time to time when Talbot was in Calcutta
visiting his wife. There was no lasting or close relationship that flowed from this prior
to the Kennedy years, but they did know each other personally and by reputation.

30 ‘Report from Iran Task Force, 7 May 196T. NACPM, Task Force Iran — 20, Iran Desk,
Box 3, pp. 5, 23, 26, 29.

31 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 18 May 196T. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1. The
underlining is Komer’s.

32 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 10 May 196T. NACPM, Task Force Iran, Iran Desk, Box 3,
Section I, pp. 2-3.

33 ‘Record of action No. 2427, 484th NSC Meeting, 19 May 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1962,
Volume XVII, p. 120.

34 ‘Attached Report NSC Meeting Agenda, 19 May 196T. NACPM, Task Force on Iran,
Iran Desk, Box 3, p. 1.

35 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 13 May 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, pp. 2-3.

36 ‘SNIE - Oudook for Iran, 23 May 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII, p. 123.

37 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 16 May 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1.

38 ‘Airgram Tehran to WDC, 17 May 1961’. NACPM, 788.00/5-1761 HBS, p. 1.

39 Boroujerdi, Mehrzad, Iranian Intellectuals and the West. Syracuse, NY: University of
Syracuse Press, 1996, pp. 67-68. The author argues that it was under Derakhshesh that
systematic and implacable opposition to the West took root in the Iranian educational
system. Following his appointment in May 1961, Derakhshesh formed the Commission
on the Aim of Iranian Education. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, a polemicist, wrote a report for the
Commission, which was reviewed in November 1961 and again in January 1962. It was
a ‘nativist’, anti-regime, and anti-Western work, and the Commission decided against
publishing it. Following this rejection, Al-e Ahmad managed to get it published under
the tide Gharb^adegi. It enunciated the ‘nativist’, ‘ethnic’, and ‘national’ responsibility for
all Iranians vis-a-vis colonialism, and demanded that Iranian intellectuals reexamine
their ‘passive and servile embrace of Western ideas and culture’. Boroujerdi describes
Gharb^adegi as the first to seriously attack Western intellectual modes of thought and to
offer an Iranian alternative. Al-e Ahmad viewed Western thought and culture as a
pandemic that threatened ‘the eradication of Iran’s cultural authenticity, political
sovereignty, and economic well-being’. The author states that because Gharb^adegi
‘questioned the basic foundations of contemporary Iranian social and intellectual
history’ in ‘blunt’ style, it was an ‘intellectual bombshell’ ‘transformed into the holy
book for several generation of Iranian intellectuals’. This raises an interesting question:

Notes

427

without Amini, would Derakhshesh have come to power, and without Derakhshesh
would Al-e Ahmad and Gharb^adegi have had the impact that they did? In attempting to
foster reform, did the Kennedy administration helped to plant the seeds that bore fruit
in 1979? There is simply no way that any American administration could understand the
variables in attempting to change the fundamental nature of Iranian society, and that is
exactly what Kennedy and his White House hoped to do. In so doing, they failed to
realize how limited US options were in this regard. They tied themselves directly to the
programs and person of Amini, who was in turn just as tied to the Shah. When Amini
failed, the only option was an even tighter relationship with the Shah or, at best, a
neutralist, anti-Western Iran. At the same time, the events of 1961-1962 would set in
motion the ultimate unraveling of the pro-Western regime in Tehran. Gharb^adegi is just
one example.

40 ‘Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 27 May 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1.

41 ‘Airgram Tehran [Wailes] to WDC, 8 June 1961’. NACPM, 788.13/6-861 HBS, p. 1.

42 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 15 June 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, pp. 1-4.
In early June 1961, Julius C. Holmes replaced Edward T. Wailes as Ambassador to
Tehran.

43 ‘Tehran (Holmes) to WDC, 4 July 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1.

44 ‘Tehran (Rockwell) to WDC, 29 July 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1.

45 ‘Memo Hansen to Rostow, 13 June 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 1 15A, p. 1.

46 ‘British Embassy Tehran [Harrison] to FO on Land Reform, 17 January 1962’. PRO,
F0248/1588, p. 7.

47 Hooglund, Eric J., Land and devolution in Iran 1960-1980. Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1982, p. 43. Arsanjani had long been an advocate of land reform, calling for it in
an article in Darya on January 15, 1951.

48 ‘British Embassy Tehran [Harrison] to FO on Land Reform, 17 [anuary 1962’. PRO,
F0248/1588, p. 7.

49 Hooglund, Land and devolution in Iran 1960-1980, pp. 52, 50.

50 ‘Dispatch Tehran to WDC, 29 July 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, pp. 1-5.

51 ‘Memo from Komer to Talbot, 5 June 1961’. NACPM, Task Force on Iran - 20, Iran
Desk, Box 3, p. 1.

52 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 4 August 1961’. ]FKL, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, p. 1. The
administration used these ‘special task forces’ to circumvent the normal diplomatic and
intelligence channels. This often resulted in ‘hyper-active’ reactions to anything
resembling a crisis and in some less than balanced interpretations of various situations.
The key to Vietnam may be found as much in the information-interpretation processes
emanating from the ‘task force syndrome’ as from other sources.

53 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 4 August 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 115A, pp. 1,

2, 3.

54 ‘Memo — Task Force Recommendations [Peyton Kerr, Acting Chairman], 2 August
1961’. NACPM, Task Force on Iran, Iran Desk, Box 3, pp. 1-2.

55 ‘Memo Bundy to Rusk, 7 August 1961’. NACPM, Task Force on Iran, Iran Desk, Box

3, p. 1.

56 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 1 1 August 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, pp. cover
memo, 1.

57 ‘Letter Official Informal NEA (Meyer) to Holmes, 11 August 1961’. NACPM, 3 — A/1
Military Assst thru Internal Security, Box 2, p. 2.

58 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Meyer, 27 August 1961’. NACPM, Task Force Iran,
Iran Desk, Box 3, p. 1.

59 ‘Memo Discussion at the DOS - JCS Meeting, 31 March 1961’. FdUS, 1961-1962,
Volume XVII, p. 75.

60 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Meyer, 27 August 1961’. NACPM, Box 3, pp. 3, 5.

428

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

61 ‘Meeting of the Iran Task Force, 7 September 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1962, Volume XVII,
pp. 245-253. See also ‘Comments on Iran [Komer], 7 September 1961’. JFK Library,
NSF, Komer Series, Box 425, pp. 1-2, in which Komer made it clear that he wanted a
crisis no matter what Holmes and Talbot reported. ‘Even if we accept the Embassy’s
somewhat reassuring estimate of the prospects, is there not still sufficient risk of a
potentially damaging blow to US interests to justify a more than normal effort to assure
Amini’s success? Should we not consider measures, which under more normal
circumstances we would hesitate to take? Can we afford in view of the risks inherent in
failure of the Amini experiment, not to do everything possible to make it a success?’

62 ‘Comments on Iran (Komer), 7 September 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer, Box 425,
p. i.

63 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Rusk, 13 September 1961’. NACPM, 788.11/9-
1361, pp. 1,2, 4.

64 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 28 October 1961’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, pp. 1, 2.

65 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Talbot, 31 October 1961’. NACPM, 3 - A/1
Military Asst., Box 2, p. 1.

66 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy on Cut in Military Assistance, 7 November 1961’. JFK
Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, p. 1.

67 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Talbot, 7 December 196T. NACPM, 3 - A/1
Military Asst, Box 2, pp. 1-5.

Chapter 12

1 ‘Airgram Tehran to WDC, 3 January 1962’. NACPM, 788.10/1-562, pp. 1-2.

2 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Rusk, 22 January 1962,’ NACPM, 788. 10/ 1-562,
pp. 3, 2, 6.

3 ‘Memo Komer to Kaysen, 19 January 1961,’JFKL, NSF, Komer, Box 424, pp. 1, 2.

4 ‘Airgram Tehran [Holmes] to Kennedy and Rusk, 13 February 1962’. JFKL, NSF, Iran,
Box 116, p. 5. One cannot help but be impressed by Holmes’ bureaucratic expertise.
Holmes knew that Bowles would express a very positive view of Amini and complain
about the Shah’s focus on the military. By sending a telegram straight to the White
House and Secretary, he made certain that they heard his version of the discussion with
the Shah before Bowles had an opportunity to comment on it. In fact, it appears to
have been sent while Bowles was in the air.

5 ‘Telegram Tehran [Holmes] to Kennedy and Rusk, 18 February 1962’. NACPM,
788.5/2-1862, pp. 1-2.

6 ‘Letter Official Informal Holmes to Talbot, 4 March 1962’. NACPM, 1962 Helman
River - 1962 Oil and Petroleum., p. 2. On March 4, Holmes cited a conversation with
General Pakravan in which the general stated that US praise for Amini had left the Shah
in a state of ‘depression’. Attempting to enlist Talbot in his efforts. Holmes stated:
‘Quite frankly, I am fearful, from what I have been told by recent visitors, that some
people in Washington might construe such suggestions as a ploy to get my way about
the Military Program on which I have been so insistent.’ He then went on to say that he
needed Talbot’s help in advancing the date of the Shah’s visit, because that might
improve the situation at the palace. ‘Until I have in hand a Military Program, or more
usefully, combined military-economic one, I can do little to reassure the Shah. I have
done this many times and, of course, can offer my shoulder again, but it has become
pretty wet!’ Holmes then warned that the Shah’s mood could have ‘dangerous
consequences’ for ‘American diplomacy in Iran in the very near future’.

7 ‘Memo Lucius Batde, DOS to Bundy, 8 March 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer, Box
425, p. 1. In effect, the MAP Steering Group had decided to offer Iran $300 million in
military aid over the fiscal year 1962 through fiscal year 1967. This included training and
logistics support, but not a thorough modernization program. Ambassador Holmes and

Notes

429

Amini, most probably with the Shah’s support, wanted a $424 million program. This
program included a thorough modernization of the Iranian military accompanied by a
reduction in overall force levels from 205,000 to 1 50,000 men.

8 ‘Memo Battle to Bundy, 8 March 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 425, p. 2.

9 ‘Memo Talbot to McGhee, 28 February 1962’. NACPM, Political Files, Iran, Box 8, p.
1. On his way to Vietnam, Taylor attempted to convince the Shah of ‘the growing
capability of the U.S. to wage limited war and to support friendly nations against
communist-based subversive and guerrilla aggression’.

10 ‘Letter Official Informal Talbot to Holmes, 9 March 1962’. NACPM, 1962 Helman
River, Box 6, p. 1.

11 ‘Memcon Rusk and PM Amini, 13 March 1962’. NACPM, 788.5/3-1362, pp. 1-5.

12 ‘Memo Komer to NSC Staff, 20 March 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box
425, p. 1. See also ‘Memo Komer on Visit of Shah of Iran, 27 March 1962’. JFKL, NSF,
Iran/Iraq, Box 117, p. 1, in which Komer states: “We support a reformist government
in Iran in its effort to achieve sweeping change and progress and to forestall an
uncontrolled revolution. The Shah’s presence in Iran and his support — or at least
tolerance — of a reformist government like the present one is essential. The immediate
alternative would be chaos, leading at best to a weak, ineffectual, neutralist Iran which
would be easy prey for the Soviets.’ Holmes’ message that the Shah was the essential
element for reform had now taken root. Personal support had shifted from Amini to
the Shah.

13 ‘Memo Komer to NSC Staff, 20 March 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer, Box 425, p. 1.

14 ‘Memo Talbot to McGhee on NSC Mtg on Iran, 22 March 1962’. JFK Library, NSF,
Meetings Series, Box 314, p.l.

15 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to Rusk, 30 March 1962’. NACPM, 788.11/3-3062, pp. 1, 2.

16 ‘Memo by Komer, 2 April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 425, p 1.

17 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 9 April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 425, p

18 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 28 March 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran-Iraq, Box 117, p 1.

19 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 9 April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 425, p

20 ‘Memo Hansen to Kennedy, 10 April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 425,
p 2, in which Hansen, fearing the Shah would raise the issue of preferential treatment
for Turkey and Pakistan, put together a comparison sheet of the MAP with the
economic-assistance levels of each. The briefing memorandum points out that Turkey
had a larger population, and as a member of NATO provided a potential staging-area
for US troops and intermediate range ballistic-missile sites, and that this accounted for
any differences in aid. Pakistan was much poorer than Iran, with a larger population. In
addition, Pakistan had been able to absorb more modern weapons than Iran because it
‘inherited a trained cadre of specialists from British India’.

21 ‘Memo Bowles to Kennedy, 10 April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 425,

p2.

22 ‘Memcon Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara and the Shah, 12-14 April 1962’. JFK Library,
NSF, Iran, Box 116, pp. 4-5.

23 ‘Memcon McNamara and the Shah, 12 April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series,
Box 425, pp. 4, 8. In talks with McNamara, the Shah made it clear that the 150,000-man
force envisioned by the US was insufficient and that higher force-levels would be
required. McNamara agreed that this could be discussed, and implied that a 10,000-man
increase over that number might work. The Shah readily accepted a ‘planning team’
from the Pentagon proffered by McNamara.

24 ‘Memcon the Shah and Harriman, 13 April 1962’. NACPM, 788.11/4-1362, p 1.

430

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

25 Keddie, Nikki R., Modern Iran. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 140-148.
Keddie’s work on Iran is a general history, but in a brief eight pages she attempts to
provide detail on the relationship between Amini and the Shah. Most traditional
interpretations of this period tie Amini’s tenure to the Shah’s jealousy over US support
for Amini’s reforms, and his clashes with the Shah over those reforms; and In reality,
Amini was little different from the Prime Ministers that went before him. The Kennedy
view that Amini was more independent was flawed. Amini was just as dependent on the
Shah’s support as those that went before him. . A careful examination of the source
materials reveals considerably more calculation on the part of the Shah. Amini’s ability
to attract US aid was the key. The Shah is clearly in control of the situation with Amini
from the very beginning. In fact, one could argue that he appointed Amini instead of
Teymour Bakhtiar, the Chief of SAVAK, to the Prime Minister’s position because he
believed that more US aid would result.

26 ‘Tehran [Holmes], 25 May 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran/Iraq, Box 116, p 1.

27 ‘WDC to Tehran [Holmes], 25 May 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran/Iraq, Box 116, p 1.

28 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 1 June 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 424, p 1.
Presidential diplomacy often caused problems. The fact that Kennedy held one-on-one
discussions with foreign leaders left the substance of the meetings open for discussion.
It gave foreign leaders the opportunity to ascribe something personally to the President.
As we shall see, something similar happened with President Ayub Khan.

29 ‘Memo on “Our Current Dilemma in Iran” from Iran Desk [Bowling] to DOS/GTI
[Miner], 5 June 1962’. NACPM, NEA, Iran Desk, Iranian Prime Minister 1962, Box 5, p
1.

30 ‘Memo “Our Current Dilemma in Iran” Iran Desk [Bowling] to DOS/GTI [Miner], 5
June 1962’. NACPM, Iranian Good Offices - Prime Minister 1962, Box 5, pp. 1-2.

31 Keddie, Modem Iran, p. 143.

32 ‘Memo ‘Our Current Dilemma in Iran’ Bowling to Miner, 5 June 1962’. NACPM, Box
5, pp. 1-4.

33 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 24 June 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, Section 2,
P 2.

34 ‘CIA Current Intelligence Memo: The Resignation of Amini, 18 July 1962’. JFK Library,
NSF, Iran, Box 116, pp. 1-2. The report commented that the British were happy to see
Amini go because they viewed him as ‘too close to the Americans’ and believed that his
policies had ‘cut into their political and commercial interests in Iran’.

35 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 18 July 1962’. No. 76, JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, p
1.

36 ‘CIA: The Resignation of Amini, 18 July 1962’. JFK Library, Box 116, p 2.

37 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 18 July 1962’. No. 74, JFK Library, Box 116, p 2.

38 ‘CIA: The Resignation of Amini, 18 July 1962’. JFK Library, Box 116, pp. 1-2.

39 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 16 July 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII, p 10.

40 ‘Memo from Komer to President Kennedy, 18 July 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Near East,
Volume XVIII, p 11. This memorandum from Komer to President Kennedy illustrates
the problem in selecting documents for publication. Komer’s suspicion that ‘Amini had
to turn to blaming the US’ because of the ‘Shah’s refusal to back him in cutting the
military and civil budget’ contributes to the view that the Shah was entirely to blame for
the situation. Broader reading in the archives indicates otherwise.

41 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 18 July 1962’. No. 76, JFK Library, Box 116, p 2.

42 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 19 July 1962’. No. 86, JFK Library, Box 116, pp. 1-2. On
page two of the telegram, Holmes also quoted his earlier speculation that Amini was a
‘spent force’. Amini was ‘mentally exhausted and psychologically worn out’. Holmes,
ever mindful of his prerogatives as Ambassador, made sure that Washington
‘remembered’ that he had predicted the possible fall of Amini two weeks earlier. He

Notes

431

added that, given Amini’s condition that: ‘it would therefore be unproductive make any
attempt resuscitate Amini now.’ Holmes had believed almost from the beginning that
the Shah, not the Prime Minister, was the right political horse to bet on in Iran.

43 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 19 July 1962’. No. 90, JFK Library, Box 116, p 1.

44 ‘CIA Tehran to WDC Alam Appointed Iranian Prime Minister, 20 July 1962’. No. 90,
Box 116, p 1.

45 ‘Tehran [Holmes] to WDC, 21 July 1962’. No. 96, JFK Library, Box 116, p 2.

46 ‘CIA Tehran to WDC Alam Appointed Iranian Prime Minister, 26 July 1962’. No. 90,
JFKL, Box 116, pp. 1-4. This report also noted the criticism that Alam was pro-British.
‘It is true that many of the personalities, including Alam, have or have had British
connections and may have been under British influence. However, British influence is
not what it used to be, and in any case if there is no important divergence between
British and American policy, this should create no difficulties.’

47 ‘Letter Official Informal Talbot to Holmes, 7 August 1962’. NACPM, Helman River
1962, Box 6, pp. 1, 2.

48 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy on Letter to the Shah, 27 July 1962’. NACPM, Prime
Minister 1962, Box 5, pp. 2-3.

49 ‘CIA SNIE 34-62 - Political Prospects Iran, 17 August 1962’. JFK Library, NSF,
Komer Series, Box 424, pp. 1-9.

50 ‘Memcon the Shah and Colonel Gratian Yatsevitch, 6 August 1962’. NACPM, Prime
Minister — 1962 Iranian Good Offices, Box 5, p. 3.

51 ‘CIA SNIE 34-62, 17 August 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Komer Series, Box 424, p. 9.

52 Bill, Eagle and the Lion , pp. 139-141, 154-155, comments on the Vice-President’s visit.
Bill portrays Johnson as ‘particularly blunt’ with the Shah over the need for reform, and
quotes Ambassador Holmes as saying that progress toward economic and social justice
was the only real insurance against subversion and the Communist threat. With regard
to military reductions, Johnson pointed out that even the United States with its global
commitments and the Berlin Crisis had to demobilize two army divisions because of
budget considerations. According to Bill: ‘Johnson left no doubt about the thrust of the
American message to the shah’s government. “We realize the extent to which our views
and those of your farsighted leaders are parallel. We all agree on the necessity for
programs of responsible change. We have seen that the status quo alone provides no
safeguard for freedom.’” However, in the next breath. Bill makes a series of ‘Kennedy
Legacy’ statements, insinuating or stating outright that the Shah duped Eisenhower,
Dulles, Herter, Johnson, and Nixon but not John Kennedy, a position at considerable
variance with documentary evidence. Three statements by Bill underscore this view.
Firstly: ‘The Shah, on the other hand, took the measure of Johnson and, smothering
him with Persian hospitality convinced Johnson that he was a firm, reliable,
anticommunist ally.’ The Shah had done this with every senior US official. In addition,
Kennedy’s personal support for Amini, aside from the fact that it involved the US more
deeply in internal Iranian politics than ever before, was out of concern that the Shah
would fall and that the US would need a strong anti-Communist alternative. Once the
hysteria in the NSC and White House subsided, the Shah became the ‘indispensable’
element for stability in Tehran. With regard to political repression, secondly, the author
argues: ‘With the death of John F. Kennedy, ... the Shah of Iran began another period
of entrenched and repressive political rule.’ The Shah’s rule, and for that matter,
Amini’s as well, always had used heavy doses of repression. Shortly after his
government came to power, Amini banned demonstrations and authorized the use of
force on university students. The Shah and Amini jointly agreed upon the tough anti-
riot measures of January and June 1962, and it was Amini, with strong Kennedy
backing, who ruled unconstitutionally by not calling for elections. Thirdly, and of most
interest, is Bill’s statement that: ‘In the end, it was his relationship with the Shah and not

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

his understanding of the Iranian people that determined Johnson’s foreign policy
toward Iran.’ What else could it have been? Very few in Washington, or in the Tehran
Embassy for that matter, could truthfully state that they had an ‘understanding of the
Iranian people’. Which Iranian people? The National Front? Which National Front? It
was so divided. The Tudeh? The Shah’s supporters? What group of supporters? The
bottom line is that those American officials with an understanding of the Iranian people
believed that the Shah’s survival and ability to ‘control’ the situation were essential to
stability. These included John Bowling of the Iran Desk. For a final example, Bill states:
‘Johnson was deeply impressed by the supportive [sic\ of every Asian dictator he met.’
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson viewed the situation in the same way. Asian
dictators were always preferable to instability or Communist expansion. In fact, there is
a good argument to be made that at least one Asian dictator, Ngo Dinh Diem, would
earn a bullet in the back of the head, with the knowledge of President Kennedy, for
entertaining an arrangement with the National Liberation Front in Vietnam. We will
also get around to discussing how impressed Kennedy was with Ayub Khan during his
visit to Washington in 1961. See interview with Phillips Talbot, May 31, 2002. The point
is that Kennedy, like his successors, was trapped within the confines of US interests.
Kennedy’s problems with the Shah were no different from those of Eisenhower or
Johnson. The Shah served a purpose, and there was a price attached to that. Bill’s work
on Iranian-American relations is a classic, but in understanding the actual dynamics of
the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, it tends to place too much responsibility on the US.
In reality, the United States never had any real control over events in Iran. For 25 years
everyone in Washington wanted an alternative to the Shah; the fact is that it took until
1979 for the Iranians to produce one.

53 ‘Scope Paper for Vice President’s Visit to Iran August 24-26 1962 from
NEA/GTI/Iran Desk [Bowling], August 1962’. NACPM, Helman River 1962 to Oil
and Petroleum 1962, Box 6, pp. 1, 4.

54 Bill, The Lion and the Eagle, p. 141.

55 ‘Report VP Johnson to Kennedy on Shah of Iran, 28 September 1962’. FRUS, 1962-
1963, Volume XVIII, p. 72.

56 “Personal’ Holmes to Rusk, 14 September 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, pp.
1-3.

57 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 15 September 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran — Iraq, Box 116,
P 1-

58 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, 17 September 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran - Iraq, Box
116, p 1, and ‘Rusk to Holmes, 17 September 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran — Iraq, Box
116, p i.

59 ‘Memcon the Shah and Holmes, 19 September 1962’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume,
XVIII, pp. 104-105.

60 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 24 September 1962,’ JFK Library, NSF, Iran, Box 116, p. 1.

61 ‘Memo NEA to Talbot, 21 September 1962’. NACP, Helman River to Oil and
Petroleum 1962, Box 6, p 1.

62 ‘Background Paper on Special Problems for Visit of Shah of Iran to Washington, DC, 2
April 1962’. JFK Library, NSF, Iran — Iraq, Box 116, p. 4. See also ‘Memo on Status of
American Personnel in Iran from Alfred Rubin, DOS/International Affairs to M.D.
Smith DOS/GTI, 23 February 1961’. NACPM, 3-A/l Military Asst thru Internal
Security (Box 2), pp. 1-2. This document is a history of the status of the US military
personnel issue, including the informal arrangements for jurisdiction, and argues that
the time had come for a more formal arrangement to be put in place.

63 ‘Letter Official Informal Tehran [Armitage] to WDC, 26 September 1962’. NACPM,
Helman River 1962 to Oil and Petroleum 1962, Box 6, p. 1.

Notes

433

64 ‘Letter Official Informal Tehran [Harry H. Schwartz] to WDC, 26 July 1962’. NACPM,
Helman River 1962 to Oil and Petroleum 1962, Box 6, p. 1.

65 ‘Letter Official Informal from DOS/GTI [Miklos] to Tehran [Armitage], 12 October
1962’. NACPM, Helman River 1962 to Oil and Petroleum 1962, Box 6, p 1.

66 ‘Memo for the Record by Stuart Rockwell, DCM, Tehran, 5 November 1962’. NACPM,
Helman River 1962 to Oil and Petroleum 1962, Box 6, p 1.

Chapter 13

1 Bowles was well known for his pro-Indian views and sentiments. In his book,
Ambassador’s Report (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 99, 111, 252, 320-321, 386-387,
Bowles criticized everything from US aid to immigration policies. He made it clear that
he believed that Nehru was the real influence in Asia. We must make no mistake about
it, when Nehru speaks on world issues, right or wrong, he expresses not only his own
convictions but also the yearning and attitudes of the vast majority in free Asia and in
Africa.’

2 Kennedy, John F., Strategy for Peace. New York: Harper, 1960, p. 142.

3 Gopal, Nehru , Volume III, p. 187.

4 Wilber, Donald N., Pakistan. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1964, p.
320. See also Jalal, State of Martial Rude, pp. 299-301. Jalal argues that Pakistan’s growing
involvement in the American defense structure after 1954 severely hampered economic
development efforts. The author states that maintenance and administrative costs
placed a serious burden on already limited amounts of economic investment funds. He
contends that the coup of 1958 was less reflective of the political chaos claimed by
Generals Mirza and Ayub, and more indicative of an attempt by the Punjabi-dominated
ruling groups to ‘thwart the growth of organised political parties’ and to ‘depoliticise
Pakistani society before it slipped into the era of mass mobilisation’. K.K. Aziz, in Party
Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and
Cultural Research, 1976), traces the development and programs of the principal
Pakistani political parties. He argues that the nation did indeed face political chaos and
paralysis, and that Ayub took the only course possible in abrogating the 1956
constitution. In fact, both Jalal and Aziz are probably correct in the sense that each man
identified elements that contributed to the 1958 coup and ‘controlled democracy’, but
each, having an individual axe to grind, over-simplified and excluded other contributory
factors that might complicate their particular arguments.

5 Jalal, State of Martial Rule, p. 301. Apparendy, Ayub had toyed with the idea of
‘controlled democracy’ as early as 1954 when he was Defense Minister in Bogra’s
cabinet. Jalal speculates that that the idea might have been prepared with the backing of
senior Punjabi civilian bureaucrats.

6 Bhargava, G.S., Pakistan in Crisis. Delhi: Vikas, 1971, pp. 103, 110-115. Bhargava argues
that the entire structure of Pakistani foreign policy revolved around a desire to obtain a
military advantage over India, and the ‘megalamaniacal [sic]’ designs of the Pakistani
military. While the author is over-the-top in his accusations leveled at Ayub Khan, he is
undoubtedly correct about the real purpose of Pakistani military programs and about
Ayub’s view of economic aid to India.

7 Interview with Phillips Talbot, 31 May 2002. Talbot was probably the most experienced
and best prepared of all the Kennedy appointees to deal with the intractable problem of
India and Pakistan. In addition, he displayed remarkable appreciation of the situation in
both countries, while never forgetting that his primary mission was to act in the best
interests of the United States. Despite his many ties to India and his sympathy for
Indian nationalism, Talbot also understood and appreciated the conflicted emotions
that drove Muslim separatism. In the late 1930s he had attended Aligarh College, also
known as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, founded in 1870 by Sir Sayyid

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Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Ahmad Khan, a Muslim reformist. He also wrote a paper in 1956 entided: T am a
Pakistani’. The paper provided Talbot’s view of the emerging Pakistani national identity
and the motivations that had driven the creation of the Pakistani state. This included
the author’s view of Muslim reactions to the Congress Party, Nehru, and Hindu-
dominated identity. See Phillips Talbot, ‘I am a Pakistani’. AUFS -South Asia Series , 28
November 1956, found in the Ian Stephens Papers at the Archives of the Centre for
South Asian Studies, Cambridge University. Surprisingly, Talbot consistently provided
the policy balance missing among those who more blindly supported the pro-Indian
position within the Kennedy administration.

8 Grafurov, B.G., Politika USA na Biishchnem i Srednem Vo stoke. Moskva: Akademiya Nauk
CCCP - Institut Narodov Azii, 1960, pp. 53-65, 299-313, 339-343. Grafurov’s work
provides a discussion from the Soviet perspective on the relationships between NATO,
CENTO, and SEATO, and the key role of Pakistan in the alliance system directed at
the Soviet Union. To emphasize the linkages, the author cites the February 1959 visit of
McGhee and Admiral Radford to Karachi as an example of the close collaboration
within the western alliance system. The author also points to the direct link between the
situation in post-coup Iraq and the massive influx of US aid. The overall work, of
course, is an indictment of Anglo-American imperialist designs on the region and of the
Ayub regime’s complicity in those efforts. Grafurov also argues that Anglo-American
designs on the region and exploitation of economic need and military dictatorship flew
in the face of the ideas embodied in the Colombo Plan.

9 Ziircher, Turkey: A Modern History , pp. 248-261. In effect, political unrest and economic
dislocation created a situation in which the democratic government of Menderes found
itself attempting political reforms and launching an anti-corruption campaign that
included formerly influential army officers. These moves further alienated an
increasingly estranged army, segments of which had been attempting to piece together a
coup since 1955. It coalesced in May 1960, spurred by the anti-corruption campaign.
Ironically, the coup occurred the day before a planned state visit by Indian Prime
Minister Nehru.

10 Kux, United States and Pakistan , pp. 101-104.

1 1 Interview with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2002.

12 ‘Memo Ball to Kennedy, Washington, April 19, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIX, p.
33.

13 ‘Reports from A.K. Dar, Consular Indian Embassy Cairo to MEA New Delhi, 24
January 1961’. INA, MEA, 6 (5) R&I/60, p. 7. ‘Notes from the Meeting of the External
Affairs Committee on the Afro-Asian Bloc, 25 October 1961’. NZNA, MEA, ABHS,
Series: 950, Item: 56/2/3, Box 1407, p. 1.

14 ‘British High Commission, Karachi [L.B. Walsh Atkins] to CRO [Neil Prichard] on
Pakistani Foreign Policy, 3 March 1961.’ PRO, FO371/159703, pp. 2-5.

15 ‘CIA Intelligence Summary ]anuary-]une 1961,’ TFKL, Komer Series, NLK-01 -429-7-6-
4, Box 429, pp. 1-2.

16 ‘Letter B.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador WDC regarding his talks with Averell
Harriman on 21 February 1961 to New Delhi [L.K. Jha, Secretary for Economic
Affairs], 22 February 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (37) AMS/61, pp. 3-4.

17 ‘Karachi to WDC, March 22, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 26-27.

18 ‘Dispatch Lahore to WDC, 31 March 1961’. NACPM, Trips 123 — Harriman, Averell,
Box 320, pp. 1-2.

19 ‘Letter CRO to FO referencing the Pritchard Letter of 3 March 1961 on Pakistan, 14
April 1961’. PRO, FO371/159703 (SEA 48/6/1), p. 1.

20 ‘Karachi [Harriman] to WDC, 22 March 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 29.
See also ‘Minute by G.F. Hiller, FO to Lord Landsdowne on Afghan-Pakistan
Relations, 13 April 1961’. PRO, F0371/157415, pp. 1-2.

Notes

435

21 ‘Letter CRO to Karachi referencing Pritchard Letter, 3 March 1961, 14 April 1961’.
PRO, F0371/1 59703, p. 1.

22 ‘New Delhi [Harriman] to WDC Eyes Only Kennedy and Rusk, March 24, 1961’.
FRUS , 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 31. Never a fan of the Shah, Nehru refered to the
US position in Iran by observing how ‘unfortunate’ it was that the US backed
‘unpopular governments’.

23 Brecher, Michael ‘Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon’s View of
the World’. Pacific Affairs , Vol. 40, No.1/2, Spring-Summer 1967, pp. 60-92), p. 77.
Brecher’s article provides an excellent insight into Krishna Menon’s highly anti-Western
views. Brecher calls Menon the ‘principal aid of Nehru in policy formulation from 1953
[perhaps earlier] until 1962’ (p. 62). He argues that Menon saw problems with both
power blocs, East and West, but that ‘The Western bloc is invariably the greater culprit;
this part of his image can be traced to his acceptance of the Leninist theory of
Imperialism as a phenomenon of expansion liked to the stage of “Monopoly
Capitalism’” (p. 63). ‘The tone and sweep of Menon’s derisive comment on “American
Imperialism” suggest an intense emotional antipathy, as well as intellectual disdain’ (p.
64). ‘American Imperialism is unquestionably the pre-eminent evil force’ (p. 66).
Brecher provides a solid overview of the inconsistencies of Menon’s views, and of how
they influenced and in many cases drove Indian foreign policy in the 1950s and early
1960s.

24 ‘Memcon Harriman and Yezdezard Dinshaw Gundevia, Commonwealth Secretary,
New Delhi, 18 March 1961’. NACPM, Trips 123 - Harriman, Averell, Box 320, p. 1.

25 Galbraith, John Kenneth, Ambassador’s Journal. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1969, p.

100 .

26 Oral History — Bowles. JFK Library, p. 72. Bowles commented that ‘the Pentagon and
the more sterile members of the Foreign Service’ forced the United States ‘to pay this
outrageous price for that base in Pakistan’.

27 Pazhwak, Rahman, Pakhtunistan: A New State in Central Asia. London: Royal Afghan
Embassy, 1960, pp. 1-28. The Soviet Union supported the Pushtunistan national
movement: ‘The millions of people of Pakhtunistan who resisted the combined might
of the British Empire in upholding their national freedom and entity, cannot be
expected to acquiesce to the encroachments of Pakistan.’

28 ‘Letter Dep Sec Def Gilpatrick to Bowles, June 12, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
XIX, pp. 57-58.

29 ‘Memcon VP Johnson and Nehru, 18 May 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p.
42.

30 ‘Athens (Berger) to WDC (Bowles), 22 May 1961’. JFK Library, Trips & Conferences,
Box 242 A, p. 1.

31 ‘Memcon Johnson and Nehru, 18 May 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p 42.

32 ‘Athens [Berger] to WDC [Bowles], 22 May 1961’. JFK Library, Trips & Conferences,
Box 242 A, p. 1.

33 ‘Memcon Johnson and Nehru, New Delhi, May 18, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
XIX, pp. 48-49.

34 ‘Karachi [Rountree] to WDC [Rusk], 22 May 1961.’ JFK Library, Trips & Conferences,
Box 242 A, p. 1.

35 ‘Memcon Johnson and Nehru, May 18, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 48-
49.

36 ‘Memo Johnson to Kennedy, 23 May 1961’. JFKL, Trips & Conferences, Box 242A, pp.
8-9.

37 Brecher, Krishna Menon’s View, pp. 182-183. On the topic of detente with the Soviet
Union, Menon commented: ‘I think the contribution of the late President Kennedy will
be found, historically, to have been much exaggerated.’ Menon’s comments and

436

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

attitudes are important particularly in light of the fact that Nehru followed the June
meetings very closely and that much of the reporting on the |une meetings came from
one of Menon’s long-time proteges, Arthur Lall.

38 Gopal, in Nehru, Volume III, p. 101, argues: ‘It was galling that, at the time when the
United States and the Soviet Union were seeking to improve relations and Khrushchev
had visited the United States, India’s relations with China were deteriorating.’

39 Ibid.

40 ‘Telegram on Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting from Arthur Lall, Indian UN Delegation,
to New Delhi [M.J. Desai], 8 June 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (56) AMS/61, p. 1. This view
of the situation was seconded in a Minute to Desai by Y.D. Gundevia in the Indian
MEA on 19 June, which is attached to the same document. Gundevia, born in 1908,
joined the Indian Civil Service in 1931. He served as Ambassador in Switzerland 1953-
1954; High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, 1957-1960; Commonwealth Secretary, 1961-
1964; and rose to become Foreign Secretary, 1964-1965.

41 Nehru, Jawaharlal, ‘Letter to Chief Ministers, New Delhi, 27 June 1961’. In
Parthasarathi (ed.), Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, Volume V, 1958-1964. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 478.

42 ‘Karachi to WDC, 22 March 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 26-27.

43 Ora/ History - Talbot. December 5, 1964, p. 19.

44 Kux, United States and Pakistan, 121.

45 ‘Memo NEA to Talbot, President Ayub’s Bilateral Talks on Kashmir, July 7, 1961’.
NACPM, Kashmir, Entry 5252, 1 50-69-22-7/7-76 1 , Box 1 , p. 3.

46 ‘SNIE on Pakistan’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 65.

47 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Ayub, 11 July 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 68,
71.

48 Oral History — Komer, Part V, JFK Library, p. 14.

49 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Ayub’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 70.

50 Nehru, ‘Letter to Chief Ministers, New Delhi, 23 July 1961’, in Parthasarathi (ed.) Fetters
to Chief Ministers, p. 478.

51 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Ayub, 11 July 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p 74.

52 Oral History - Talbot, JFK Library, p. 20.

53 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Ayub, 11 July 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 74.

54 ‘Memcon Bowles and Nehru, 8-9 August 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp.
81-86. See also Oral History — Komer, JFK Library, No. 5, p. 1 5, and ‘Memcon Kennedy
and the Afghani Ambassador Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal, July 21, 1961’. FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 75-76. The problems between India and Pakistan appear
to have entered an almost dormant stage at this point, and did not come to the fore
again until 1962, but pressure was building. The Afghanis argued that because of
Pakistani ‘taunting’ Pushtun tribes and Kabul, with US weapons barring military and
economic aid from the US, they had no alternative but to turn to the Soviet Union.

55 ‘New Delhi to WDC, August 4, 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 79-80.

56 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, pp. 187-188,195-197.

57 Nehru, ‘Letter to Chief Ministers, New Delhi, 27 June 1961’, in Parthasarathi (ed.)
Fetters to Chief Ministers, p. 449.

58 ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, p. 1.

59 ‘Desai to Nehru attached to Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 26 August 1961’. INA,
MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61 , p. 1 .

60 ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, p. 1.

61 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, p. 203.

62 ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, pp. 1,
6, 7. According to Desai, Galbraith’s frustration was evident when: ‘He stated that it
sometimes seemed as if the opposition was running the government in the USA. The

Notes

437

Ambassador did not elaborate on this point but he was referring to the press report that
Washington would henceforward take a hard look at the attitude of neutral nations
towards various world problems while considering their appeal for U.S. financial aid.’
Desai then commented to Nehru: ‘The Ambassador was with me for about an hour and
he did appear rather disturbed. It appears that he has got urgent summons from
Washington for consultations.’ Desai’s report on Galbraith’s grousing about the
political opposition in Washington provides insight into the Indian perception that the
Kennedy administration found itself constrained by the Republican opposition in its
dealings with India. Later, Desai described Galbraith’s concern that Indian policy would
‘discredit the liberal group in the United States’, as ‘repeating] his familiar theme’.

63 ‘Memocon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, pp.
1-5. See also Lall, Emergence of Modem India , p. 144, in which Lall, apparently oblivious to
Harriman’s total disdain, commented that there was ‘excellent cooperation between
Kennedy’s representative Averell Harriman and myself.

64 Lall, Emergence of Modern India , preface and p. 160. Lall also claimed that he had been
selected to succeed Menon as Minister of Defense, when the Chinese War resulted in
Menon’s ouster, thus destroying Lall’s opportunities as well.

65 Cooper, Chester L., The Tost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970,
p. 186. Cooper’s work on the Vietnam conflict provides some interesting, if limited,
views of India’s role and also of Ambassador Galbraith’s early involvement on behalf of
the administration. It also reinforces the view that Galbraith was a duck out of water as
a diplomat. Just as his suggestions that the US allow the recognition of Communist
China proved unpalatable, Galbraith suggested ‘strong medicine’ for the Diem regime
in the form of a demand that they liberalize politically or face reduced US aid. Galbraith
did suggest that a change in government might be in order, as long the United States did
not initiate it.

66 ‘Comment by Desai on Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 26 August 1961’. INA, MEA, 73
(92) AMS/61, p. 1.

67 ‘Minute Nehru to Desai on Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 26 August 1961’. INA,
MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, p. 1.

68 ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, pp. 1-
5.

69 SarDesai, D.R., Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Taos, and Vietnam, 1947-1964. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968, p. 205.

70 ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 26 August 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, p 1.

71 ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September 1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, p 5.

72 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, pp. 195-203. Galbraith’s ‘rather disturbed’ demeanor,
and what appeared to be transparent insecurity in requesting that Nehru not respond to
Kennedy’s letter until after Nehru and Galbraith, had talked caught Desai’s attention.
This was reflected in Desai’s comments in ‘Memcon Galbraith and Desai, 8 September
1961’. INA, MEA, 73 (92) AMS/61, p. 7. Some of this concern probably resulted from
the battering that Galbraith took over his suggestion to Kennedy on August 26 that the
US should allow Beijing to be admitted to the UN. If Rusk, Talbot, and Rostow had
been waiting for an opportunity to bring Galbraith down a notch or two, the latter
could not have done a better job of offering himself up. Galbraith stated that to oppose
the ‘inevitable’ would put the Kennedy administration in a position where ‘The New
Frontier will get credit only for continuing the Old Frontier policy with the difference
that with use it failed.’ Desai had managed to convince Galbraith that no matter what
happened, the Chinese would be admitted to the United Nations, and Galbraith, in
turn, advised the President: ‘There is no happy solution to this problem but wise men
have long been told . . . the proper reaction to inevitable rape. We should take a passive
attitude on the Chicoms, making a token vote against them but no impassioned pleas.

438

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Our prestige should not be put on the block.’ On August 27, Galbraith noted in his
journal: ‘My China cable brought one of the rudest and certainly the promptest
response in the history of the Department. “To the extent that your position has any
merit it has been fully considered and rejected”.’ Interview with Phillips Talbot, 31 May
2002. Talbot stated that Galbraith never understood the bureaucracy or how to use it.
Galbraith’s views on China were simply unacceptable. Talbot believed that Galbraith
over-estimated and over-stated his influence with the President and, when he became
aware of this, he grew more frustrated with the situation and ultimately left India.
Talbot also commented that Galbraith’s personal behavior bordered on the bizarre at
times. He cited one instance when the Ambassador left his post in India unannounced
and turned up at a military installation in Hawaii, also unannounced. In Oral History —
Talbot, pp. 67-68, when asked about Galbraith’s ‘special pipeline’, Talbot stated: ‘In
fact, it amused me. Here was a man who regarded himself as very close in, who had
obviously been put halfway around the world for a reason, who was subject to his great
flights of prose.’ Interview with Philips Talbot, 31 May 2002. Talbot stated that
Galbraith had an ‘enormous ego’ and was totally inept at managing the bureaucracy. As
a result, he seldom achieved his goals because he alienated the very people with whom
he needed to work. Interview with Walt Rostow on 12 June 2002. Rostow was even
blunter in his assessment of Galbraith: ‘Galbraith was not taken seriously.’ ‘His personal
contacts with JFK were overrated.’ Galbraith was viewed as a ‘nuisance’ with a massive
ego. ‘Rusk despised Galbraith almost as much as he despised Bowles.’ ‘Like Bowles,
Galbraith would not listen.’ In addition, he had some ‘unproductive ideas’ about how
policy with India and China should be conducted. Rostow believed that his suggestion
about allowing China into the UN was ‘ludicrous’, given Mao’s domination and his
policies at the time in Southeast Asia. Showing the level of mutual distaste, Galbraith
stated in Ambassador’s Journal ' p. 199: ‘It is hard in this job not to develop a morbid
dislike for the State Department. It is remote, mindless, petty and, above all, pompous,
overbearing and late’ (p. 199).

73 Akbar, Nehru , p. 491. Akbar lays the blame for the failure of the talks with Kennedy
squarely at Nehru’s feet. The author, a Muslim who remained in India because of his
commitment to the Congress Party, pointed out that Nehru’s 1949 and 1956 visits had
been ruined by external factors. He listed ‘anti-communist hysteria’, Dulles’ pro-
Pakistani policies, and ‘the backlash against Krishna Menon’s acerbic, and garrulous,
speeches’. He laments: ‘When the USA did get a President who admired Nehru, John
Kennedy, Nehru himself spoiled the opportunity by lecturing the younger man rather
than turning his sympathy to advantage.’

74 Gopal, Nehru , Volume III, p. 188.

75 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Nehru, 7 November 1961’. FRUS , 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p
129.

76 Brown, Nehru , p. 248.

77 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Nehru, 7 November 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX,
pp. 129-130. See also Gopal, Nehru, Volume III, p. 189, who states that in the middle of
Nehru’s Washington visit, the Kennedy administration announced that it would expand
the military advisory team in South Vietnam and that the United States would assume
‘combat support roles’.

78 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Nehru, 7 November 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX,
pp. 128-132, 134.

79 Oral History — Talbot, p. 18. The only animated conversation that the two men had
pertained to religion, during a banquet at the Indian Embassy in Washington. See also
Oral History — Komer, No. 5, p. 14.

80 Gopal, Nehru, Volume III, pp. 189-190. Gopal stated: ‘It was, curiously, Eisenhower
with whom Nehru got on best. Truman’s vulgarity had grated on him; and so did the

Notes

439

affluence and glitter with which Kennedy was surrounded. ... But Eisenhower’s
sincerity and goodwill, especially in contrast to the blinkered preachiness of Dulles,
struck a chord.’

81 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 526.

82 Gopal, Nehru , Volume III, p. 188.

83 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Menon, 21 November 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX,
p. 139.

84 Interview with Walt Rostow, 12 June 2002. Judith Brown, in Nehru: A Political Fife, p.
248, offers an interesting and probably fairly accurate view of Nehru’s clinging to
Menon: ‘Nehru’s support of Menon, despite so much evidence that he was often a
political liability to his country, indicates not only his talent for personal loyalty, but also
his isolation at the apex of India’s political world, where few were his intellectual
companions, as Menon was, and even fewer were prepared to confront him with
possibly unpleasant truths.’

85 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Menon, 21 November 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX,
pp. 139-142.

86 Gopal, Nehru, Volume III, p. 201.

87 ‘Memcon Talbot and B.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador, WDC, 29 January 1962’.
NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252 (Box 1), p. 1.

88 Gopal, Nehru, Volume III, p. 202.

89 ‘Memcon Henry Kissinger, NSC Staff, and Krishna Menon, 8 January 1962’. JFK
Library, Komer Series, Box 418, pp. 2-3. Menon also launched into a tirade about the
American press, American officials, and even President Kennedy, ‘who he said were
ether reporting about him invidiously or had treated him in a high handed fashion.’
Because of US UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s attack on the Goa action, Menon
described him as ‘conceited and arrogant’ and worse than Henry Cabot Lodge,
Eisenhower’s UN Ambassador. Menon made sure that Kissinger understood that
Kennedy was not exempt, stating: ‘This was particularly true of the President. . . . The
President’s rude behavior to him had not been directed against him personally, but
against the Prime Minister. People who were afraid to tackle Nehru tackled him.’

90 Oral History — Talbot, p. 66. Talbot points out that Galbraith thought that the Indians
would not move on Goa. For his part, Galbraith provides a detailed account of a
telegram from the State Department telling him that the Indians were about to move on
Goa, and then of his rushing around trying to convince the Indian government to stay
the operation. Of course, it was to no avail. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pp. 280-285.
On December 21, four days after the Goa operation, the Indians approached the
United States about military aid. The timing was so bad that Galbraith believed Menon
intentionally arranged it in order to justify the Indian plan to produce supersonic
aircraft. Ambassador's Journal, p. 290. In reality, Menon probably proposed the military
purchases knowing that Washington would turn them down. He could then argue that
the United States had refused military aid once again, and thus begin his planned
campaign to find another source in Moscow.

91 ‘New Delhi [Galbraith] to WDC, 28 December 1961’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX,
pp. 164-166.

92 ‘CRO New Delhi to FO on Nehru’s Press Conference, 29 December 1961’. PRO,
F0371/166356, p. 1.

93 ‘British Embassy WDC [Ormsby-Gore] to FO, 3 January 1961’. PRO, F0371/166356,
p. 1; ‘British Embassy New Delhi to CRO, 8 January 1961’. PRO, F0371/ 166356, p. 1;
and ‘British Embassy New Delhi to FO, 5 January 1961’. PRO, F0371/166356, p. 1.

94 ‘FO to British Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi, 2 January 1961’. PRO,
F0371/166356, p. 1.

440

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

95 ‘Memo Talbot to Rusk on Kashmir, January 6, 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir,
59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252 (Box 1), p. 1.

96 ‘British Embassy Karachi to CRO, 24 January 1962’. PRO, F0371/166357, p. 3. See
Eisel, Braxton, ‘The FOBS of War’. Air Force Magazine, June 2005, p. 74, for an
explanation of one aspect of the value of the intelligence sites in Pakistan and Iran.
Khrushchev threatened the US with missiles that would approach North America from
the south, thus evading early warning radars directed toward the North Pole.
Development of the Global Rocket No. 1 (GR-1) began in 1960, with development
approvals in April 1962. It was a derivative of the SS-9 heavy-lift ICBM. These low-
trajectory missiles armed with 2.2-megaton warhead could strike US command and
control targets, with less than five minutes’ warning from US-based space surveillance
assets. The GR-1 was silo-based at Tyuratam in Soviet Central Asia. This is one
example of the strategic US requirement for information-gathering and missile early
warning across the ‘northern tier’ in Pakistan and Iran that directly contributed to the
US strategic defensive posture.

97 ‘Memo T. Eliot Weil to Talbot, Washington, January 3, 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC,
Records Relating to Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252, Box 1, p. 1.

98 ‘Memo Jackson NEA to India Desk [Ludlow], 10 January 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC,
Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252, Box 1, p. 1.

99 ‘Memcon Talbot and B.K. Nehru, 17 January 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Records
Relating to Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252, Box 1, p 2.

100 ‘Memo from NEA (Talbot) to White House (Ball), 22 January 1962’. NACPM, India,
NEA/INC, Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252, Box 1, p. 1.

101 ‘Memcon Ashoke Chib, Indian High Commission, and David Linebaugh, US Embassy,
Karachi, 5 February 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252,
Box 1, p. 1. See also ‘Attachment dated March 15, 1962 to Memo from Talbot to Ball,
16 March 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Box 1, p 1.

102 ‘Karachi [Rountree] to WDC, 14 January 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p.
1. See also ‘Memo from Kashmir Working Group to Talbot, 15 January 1962’.
NACPM, NEA/INC, Records Relating to Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry
5252, Box 1, pp. 1-7. The Administration had formed another of its vaunted working
groups, the Kashmir Working Group. The group viewed the potential for Security 7
Council debate as damaging to India and Pakistan, as well as to the interests of the
United States. The objective was to get an alternative proposal on the table before the
Kashmir debate began at the United Nations.

103 ‘Letter CRO [Stanley Martin] to FO [Philip F. de Zuluete], 19 January 1962’. PRO,
F037 1/1 66357, p. 1.

104 ‘British Embassy Karachi [Snelling] to CRO, 24 January 1962’. F0371/166357, p. 2.

105 ‘British Embassy New Delhi to CRO, 20 January 1962’. PRO, F0371/166357, pp. 1-2.
See also ‘Letter from Ayub to Kennedy, 18 January 1962’. JFKL, Komer Series, Box
429, pp. 1-4.

106 ‘British Embassy New Delhi to CRO, 23 January 1962’. PRO, F0371/166357, p. 1.

107 ‘Karachi to CRO, 22 January 1962’. PRC/ F0371/166357, p. 2.

108 ‘NS AM No. 125, 22 January 1962’. NACPM, NSAM 125, p. 1.

109 ‘Memo Abram Chayes to McGhee entitled “Undertaking of the United States
Government Relating to Possible Armed Aggression Against Pakistan and India”, 16
February 1962’. NACPM, GRDOS-59, Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal and
Maldives Islands (NEA/INC), Records Relating to Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-
7, Entry 5252 (Box 1), pp. 4-6, 8. The report pointed out that it might be very difficult
to determine who started the conflict and, therefore, whom the United States was
obliged to support. Looking for a loophole, it concluded: ‘None of our commitment,
however, is such as to oblige us to take appropriate action without having full and

Notes

441

adequate opportunity to investigate all the circumstances.’ The report observed that the
best course might be to side with the state that was willing to ‘order a cease fire’.

110 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 29 January 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, pp. 1-2.

111 ‘Memcon Talbot, NEA, and B.K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador WDC, 29 January 1962’.
NACPM, NEA/INC, Records Relating to Kashmir, 1952-1964, 59-150-69-22-7, Entry
5252, Box 1, p. 2. Talbot met with the Indian Ambassador the same day that the letter
arrived from Prime Minister Nehru. Ambassador B.K. Nehru, in an attempt to put the
best face on matters, ‘praised’ the straightforward nature of the letter. Talbot told him
that he hoped that ‘straightforward communication’ might salvage Indo-US relations
‘which [were] in somewhat fragile condition now’.

112 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, Washington, 6 January 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
XIX, pp. 179-181.

113 Oral History — Komer, No. 5, p. 16.

114 ‘Paper Prepared by NEA, undated’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 183.

115 ‘Memo Talbot to Rusk, Washington, 6 January 1962’. NACPM, Kashmir, Entry 5252,
Box 1, p. 2.

116 ‘Telegram from US Embassy Karachi [Hall] to WDC, 5 March 1962’. NACPM, NEA,
123- Bowles, Chester, Box 313, p. 1.

117 ‘Memo Talbot to Ball, Washington, 27 March 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir,
59-150-69-22-7, Entry 5252, Box 1, p 1.

118 ‘Research Memorandum (RNA-19) from Hilsman, INR, to Rusk, 6 April 1962’. JFK
Library, Komer Series, Box 418, pp. 1,11. INR speculated that Menon, perhaps for the
first time, actually thought that succeeding Nehru might be possible. Only time would
tell, but Hilsman speculated: ‘However, one straw in the wind suggesting a new, and
ostensibly more responsible, view of himself may lie in the manner in which his
criticism of the West and its positions has been tempered in recent weeks.’

119 Jalal, State of Martial Faw, p. 305.

120 Wilber, Pakistan, pp. 245-252. This is a collaborative survey that has little interpretive
value; however, it is a period work and some of the commentary reflects contemporary
evaluations of the situation.

121 Bhargava, Pakistan in Crisis, p. 89.

122 Ayub Khan, Muhammad, ‘Pakistan Perspective’. Foreign Affairs, Volume 38, No. 4, July
1960, pp. 547-556. The constitutional experiment in Pakistan was a much-watched
phenomenon in the US. Ayub appeared to have brought stability to a failing state, and
his apparent success brought him much acclaim as a model military ruler. His article in
Foreign Affairs portrayed his paternalistic approach as the only reasonable methodology
for representative government in the region. He laid out four requisites for the success
of democracy ‘in a country like Pakistan’: simplicity and low cost of maintenance were
paramount; voting had to be based on simple issues that the average uneducated
Pakistani could understand ‘without prompting’; participation had to be limited, based
on intellectual and ‘mental horizons’; and the system had to produce ‘strong and stable
governments’. Ayub’s experiment was the model that the Kennedy administration
pursued in Iran. It became a standard for ‘controlled reform’.

123 ‘Memcon Talbot and Aziz Ahmad, Pakistani Ambassador WDC and Sir Zafrulla Khan,
Pakistani Permanent Representative to the UN, 12 April 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963,
Volume XIX, pp. 230-233.

124 ‘Letter Ayub to Kennedy, 20 April 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 234-236.

125 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy on Kashmir Resolution, 17 May 1962’. JFK Library, Komer
Series, Box 429, p.p. 1-2.

126 Kux, United States and Pakistan, p. 126.

127 ‘New Delhi to WDC, May 8, 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 240-242.

442

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

128 ‘CIA/FBIS Report on India Jet Plane Purchase, 21 May 1962’. JFK Library, Komer
Series, Box 420, p. 1.

129 ‘Memo Rostow to Komer on MIG purchase, 29 May 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series,
Box 420, p. 1.

130 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 22 May 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 420, p. 1.

131 ‘Memo from Talbot to Rusk, 5 June 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 420, p. 1.

132 ‘Memo Talbot, NEA, 13 May 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 243-245.

133 ‘CIA Memo for the National Intelligence Board, 5 June 1962’. JFKL, Komer Series,
Box 420, p. 2.

134 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal , p. 399.

135 ‘The Periscope’. Newsweek, 6 August 1962, p. 9. See also, Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal,
p. 399. There is an argument that Galbraith had always intended to leave after two
years, and that his resignation was not a direct result of the failed US arms deal for
India. Given the frustration, not only with the policy issues but with the bureaucracy as
a whole, Galbraith most likely was simply fed up and decided to quit. There is no record
of anyone in the administration being upset to see him go.

136 Kux, United States and Pakistan, p. 128. It was during the visit to the farm that Ayub and
the First Lady spent a well-publicized afternoon horseback- riding. Jacqueline Kennedy’s
horse was one presented to her by Ayub. See also ‘Memcon Kennedy and Ayub at
Newport, Rhode Island, 24 September 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 326-

331.

137 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 26 September 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p.

332. In September 1962, Ayub stopped briefly in Washington on his way to a
Commonwealth meeting in Canada. Oral History — Komer. Vol. V, p. 16. According to
Komer, nothing really transpired during the meeting with the exception that Ayub
accused the Indians of overstating their problems with China. This did not particularly
help Ayub’s credibility, because a border war broke out within a matter of months.

Part IV

1 See ‘Mr. Kennedy is Ready to Negotiate’, ‘Indian Soldiers in Better Position Against
Chinese,’ and ‘Forces on North Border of Yemen’. The Age, 28 October 1962, p. 1.

2 Oral History — Komer. 18 June 1964, Part 1, p. 1.

Chapter 14

1 Oral History - Badeau, pp. 24-25.

2 Oral History — Talbot, pp. 28-29.

3 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to Rusk and Kennedy on publication of Nasser-Kennedy
correspondence, 10 September 1962’. NACPM, 786b.i l/9-1062, p. 1. See also ‘Memo
Brubeck to Bundy with attached FBIS transcript of UAR broadcast, 24 September
1962’. NACPM, 786b.00/9-2462, p. 1.

4 ‘Jidda to WDC, 27 September 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/9-2762, p. 1. Yemen Radio told
everyone to stay indoors because people on the streets ‘will be shot immediately’, and
instructed the police and military to ‘arrest them [members of the old regime] even if
they are innocent’. See also ‘Jidda to WDC, 27 September 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/9-
2762, p. 1.

5 Douglas, J. Leigh, The Free Yemeni Movement 1935-1962. Beirut: American University of
Beirut, 1987), pp. 234-236. Baydani was born in Cairo, and his wife was a close friend of
Anwar Sadat’s wife. Thus Sadat became Baydani’s friend and a powerful patron within
the Egyptian regime. The Ba’thists had supported the September 1961 coup against
Egyptian rule in Syria; thus Nasser could hardly be expected to look the other way when
his Yemeni proteges took a Ba’thist tilt.

Notes

443

6 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 5 October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/10-562, p. 1. Pressing for
early YAR recognition, Badeau told Washington that the UAR, USSR, Algeria, Tunisia,
Syria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, Sudan, Bulgaria and Hungary had
recognized the YAR.

7 ‘Jidda [Hart] to WDC, 31 October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/10-162, p. 1. Jidda pointed
out that the new YAR Prime Minister, Abdullah al-Sallal, could not have pulled it off
without UAR support. The Embassy also suspected that the propaganda from Radio
Sanaa was directed by the UAR because it was a ‘slick professional job and not the usual
humdrum programs normally sent out from Yemen’.

8 Oral History — Komer. July 16, 1964, Part II, pp. 9-10.

9 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 27 September 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/9-2762, p. 2.

10 Nasser, Speeches and Press Interviews , pp. 44-45. See also ‘Memo from Harrison M.
Symmes, NE, to Talbot, NEA, on Diefenbaker Report on Nasser Meeting, 30
September 1962’. NACPM, 786.02/9-3062, p. 1. In another meeting a year after the
coup, Nasser stated that the revolution in Yemen was a historical necessity and that the
‘feudal’ regime could not be allowed to return.

11 ‘Consulate Aden to WDC, 9 October 1962.’ NACPM, 786h.56/10-962, p. 1.

12 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 12 October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/10-1262, p. 1.

13 ‘US Mission UN [Stevenson] to WDC on meeting with YAR foreign minister, 18
October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/10-1862, p. 1; and ‘Cairo [Badeau] to Washington, 18
October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/10-1862, p. 1.

14 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 22 October 1962.’ NACPM, 786h.02/ 10-2262, pp. 1-2.

15 Oral History — Komer. Part II, pp. 9-10.

16 ‘Cairo to WDC, 2 October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/ 10-262, p. 2. A paratrooper officer
who was a member of the prominent Yemeni Zabarah family stated that he supported
the Republic despite the fact that they had shot some of his relatives. He believed that
the revolution was a necessity, but perhaps all the executions were not. He also
predicted that the Royalists would ‘cause trouble’ but that the YAR would survive. He
urged US recognition of the YAR as a counterbalance to the Soviets and Chinese, a
typical UAR argument. This was typical of numerous reports coming out of Yemen
following the coup, and no doubt influenced Washington’s view.

17 Oral History — Komer. July 16, 1964, Part II, pp. 9-10.

18 ‘Memcon Talbot and Feisal, 4 October 1962’. NACPM, 786a.il/10-462, pp. 1-3.

19 ‘British Embassy Amman [Willie Morris] to FO [Figg], 19 October 1962’. PRO,
F0371/ 164094, p. 1. See also ‘Airgram Amman [Houghton] to WDC, 24 October
1962’. NACPM, 785.13/10-2462, (Box 2063), pp. 1-2, 4, in which Jordanian Prime
Minister Wafsi Tal made it clear that Jordan continued to recognize and support Imam
Badr, because he ‘was still alive and in control of a large section of his country’. Tal
added: ‘This decision is based on conviction and we don’t care who recognizes [Yemeni
Republican Premier] Sallal or not.’ Tal also pointed out that some ‘republics’ were ‘no
better than the old Yemeni Imamate’. The Jordanians threatened to act on behalf of the
‘legitimate’ government of Yemen against foreign intervention if asked to do so. Tal
also tried to assuage the gap between government policies and ‘local opinion’. Calling
for reform in Yemen, he stated that the new government was opposed not because it
promised reform but because of the ‘large-scale outside intervention.’ The US Embassy
in Amman commented that most Jordanians believed that the government was backing
the ‘wrong horse’ in Yemen.

20 ‘Army Attache Amman to WDC, 5 October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/10-562, p 1. The
Saudi Royal family must have shuddered at the thought of the Hashemite Arab Legion
protecting the Holy Places. It was the Saudis who had driven the Hashemites, who were
direct decendants of the Prophet, out of Mecca and Medina in the 1920s. The
Hashemites still viewed themselves as the legitimate protectors of the Holy cities.

444

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

21 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 4 October 1962’. JFK Library, SAGF, Box 157, pp. 1-2.
See also ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, October 1, 1962’. |FK Library, PPJFK, Box 157, p

22 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 4 October 1962’. JFK Library, Feisal Briefing Book, Box
157A,p 1.

23 ‘Memcon Crown Prince Feisal and Kennedy, October 5, 1962’. JFK Library, Box 157,
pp. 1-4.

24 ‘Memo about Discussion: UAR — Saudi Relations, October 1962’. JFK Library, Box

157A, p 1.

25 ‘WDC to Jidda and London, October 6, 1962’. JFK Library, Box 157, p. 2.

26 Holden and Johns, House of Saud, p. 227.

27 Safran, Nadav, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1985, p. 95.

28 Holden and Johns, House of Saud, p. 227. Prince Talal, either on October 17 or the
following day, renounced his royal title in protest. On October 23 he called for a ‘revolt’
in favor of a ‘national democratic government’, proclaiming the current government
was ‘steeped in backwardness, underdevelopment, reactionary individuals and tyranny’.

29 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 18 October 1962’. NACPM, 786a.00/10-1862, p. 2.

30 ‘US Mission UN [Stevenson] to WDC, 18 October 1962’. NACPM, 786a.00/10-1862,

pp. 1-2.

31 ‘Consulate Ta’iz to WDC, 22 October 1962’. NACPM, 786H.02/10-2262, (M-1855), p

32 ‘Jidda to WDC, 22 October 1962’. NACPM, 61 1.86h/ 10-22-62, (M-1855), p 1.

33 ‘Consulate Ta’iz to WDC, 9 November 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/l 1-762, (M-1855), p
1.

34 ‘WDC to Consulate Ta’iz, 9 November 1962’. NACPM, 686B.86H/1 1-762, (M-1855,
59/250/3/27/4), p. 1. Washington told Ta’iz to ‘categorically assure’ the Yemenis that
the United States was in no way supporting Saudi efforts to assist Yemeni loyalists.

35 ‘Airgram Jidda [Hart] to WDC, 6 November 1962’. NACPM, 786a.00/l 1-662, p 2.

36 ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy - YAR recognition, 12 November 1961’. NACPM,
611.86H/11-1262, (M-1855), p. 1.

37 ‘FO to the Political Office Middle East Command, 2 November 1962’. PRO,
C01015/2150, p. 1.

38 ‘Aden [Johnston] to Secretary of State for Colonies, 30 September 1962’. 713,
C01015/2150, p. 1.

39 ‘Aden [Johnston] to Secretary of State for Colonies, 8 November 1962’. PRO,
CO1015/2153, pp. 1-2.

40 ‘CRO to British Embassies in Commonwealth Countries, 2 November 1962’. PRO,
C01015/2150, p. 1. See also Badeau, Middle East Remembered, p 202.

41 ‘FO [Macmillan] to British Embassy WDC for Kennedy, 15 November 1962’. PRO,
CO1015/2153, pp. 1-2.

42 ‘Memcon Jidda [Hart] and Dr. Rashad Fir’awn, Advisor to Crown Prince Feisal, 3
November 1962’. JFKL, SAGF, Box 157, pp. 1-3. See also ‘Jidda [Hart] to WDC, 15
November 1962’. JFK Library, Box 157, p 1. The SAG published a new series of laws
and reforms, perhaps the most sweeping in history. See also ‘Airgram Jidda [Thatcher]
to WDC, 8 November 1962’. NACPM, 786a.00/ll-862, p 1.

43 ‘Airgram from US Embassy Jidda [Hart] to WDC, 19 November 1962’. NACPM,
GRDOS-59, NEA, CDF 1960-1963, 786a.00/ll-1962, p. 1.

44 ‘Jidda [Thacher] to Kennedy - Letter from Crown Prince Feisal, 29 November 1962’.
JFKL, Saudi Arabia Security, Box 123B, p. 1-4. This letter was responding to a letter
from Kennedy on November 8, 1962 which strongly encouraged Feisal to continue
with his program of reforms. Feisal’s response stated that he intended to provide the

Notes

445

Kingdom with modem institutions and more responsive government. He noted
Kennedy’s advice that Saudi Arabia should not contribute to the ‘tense atmosphere’ in
the region, all the while supporting and supplying the tribal elements fighting the YAR
government and the Egyptians.

45 ‘Jidda [Hart] to WDC, 30 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/ 12-3062, p. 1.

46 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 5 |anuary 1963’. JFK Library, SAGF, Box 157, p. 1.

47 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 22 January 1963’. NACPM, 786h.00/l-2263, p. 1.

48 ‘Memcon Robert C. Strong, NEA, and British Embassy WDC Patrick Wright, 12
October 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/10-1262, p. 2. See also ‘London Jones] to WDC
“Conversation with Walmsley, FO Arabian Department, 27 September 1962’”,
NACPM, 786h.00/9-2762, pp. \ -2.

49 ‘Memocon Saad Jum’a, the Jordanian Ambassador, and Talbot, 27 November 1962’.
NACPM, 786h.00/l 1-2762, p. 1.

50 ‘Letter Kennedy to King Hussein attached to Memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy,
30 November 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, pp. 1-2.

51 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy and O’Donnell, 4 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer
Series, Box 429, p. 2.

52 ‘Jidda [Hart] to WDC, 20 November 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/l 1-2062, p. 2.

53 ‘US Mission UN [Stevenson)] to WDC, 10 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/12-

1062, p. 1.

54 ‘Airgram Amman [Wrampelmeier] to WDC, 22 December 1962’. NACPM, 785.13/12-

2262, p. 1.

55 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 10 November 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/ll-1062, p. 1.

56 ‘Cairo [Boswell] to WDC, 8 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/12-862, p. 2.

57 ‘Memo Strong to Talbot, NEA, 11 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.00/12-1162, p 1.
Ambassador Badeau was in Washington ostensibly on consultations but presumably
pressing for just this recognition. He was figuratively, if not literally, at Strong’s elbow
when this memo was written. In addition, Badeau met with President Kennedy, so a
direct appeal to the President was undoubtedly made. The rapidity of the YAR’s
recognition following this memo suggests very high-level involvement.

58 ‘Cairo [Boswell] to WDC, 20 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/ 12-2062, p. 2. A
cartoon in Al-Ahram showed Kennedy sitting with a worried British P.M. Macmillan
with the latter musing: ‘What do we do to get him to recognize Britain?’

59 ‘Cairo [Boswell] to WDC, 20 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/12-2062, p. 2. The
Administration obtained no guarantees from the YAR, and little in the way of Egyptian
goodwill, but Badeau and Talbot, with the support of the President, pushed their
Egyptian agenda forward.

60 ‘Amman [Macomber] to WDC, 21 December 1962’. NACPM, 786h.02/12-2162, p. 1.

61 Oral History — Komer, Part II, p. 11.

62 ‘Letter Political Office, Middle East Command, Aden J.C.W. Bushell] to FO
[Walmsley], 27 December 1962’. PRO, F0371/168625, p. 1. In this letter, Aden
requested that London mount a diplomatic campaign to counteract Egyptian
propaganda about the RAF bombarding the ‘peaceful population’ in Yemen and Oman.
Bushell wanted the various British missions to point out that the RAF had ‘never
dropped napalm on defenseless villagers as the Egyptians do’ or ‘explosive cigarettes’.
From London, B.R. Pridham wryly commented: ‘I wonder if Mr. Bushell is serious in
making the point in para 2 around which his letter is built. We can scarcely reply to
propaganda by saying that we kill Arabs in a much more genteel manner than the
Egyptians.’

63 Kennedy, Speeches oj Senator Kennedy, p. 48.

64 Oral History — Komer. Part II, p. 9.

446

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Chapter 15

1 Interview with Philips Talbot, 31 May 2002.

2 Maxwell, India's China War , p. 179. Maxwell’s work on the border war is by far the best.
His discussion of the role of Krishna Menon and Menon’s army protege, General Brij
Mohn Kaul, and their roles in the war with China is particularly interesting. Perhaps
most instructive is Maxwell’s narrative of Kaul’s relationship with Nehru and his rapid
rise through the ranks. In addition, the author provides an excellent examination of
Menon’s support for Kaul that resulted in the ‘promotion crisis’.

3 Maxwell, India’s China War , p. 231. While there is some debate about Nehru’s exact role
in the decision-making process, Maxwell believes that General Kaul and Menon pushed
Nehru into the occupation of Goa when he might have chosen a different option.
Others, including Judith Brown in Nehru: A Political Tife, debated this. Brown believes
that Nehru had little option but to end the Portuguese anachronism. Whether Nehru
decided on his own to take Goa or was maneuvered into doing so is immaterial; the fact
is that, without consulting Parliament, Nehru acted. This created a surge in political
support not only for the Congress Party, but also for his embattled friend, Krishna
Menon. It also encouraged a similar position with regard to China. As a result, they saw
no downside in taking a provocative position with the Chinese, believing that it would
merely increase domestic support for the government.

4 Maxwell, India’s China War , p. 231. Maxwell argues that General Kaul and Krishna
Menon intentionally hid those deficiencies from the Prime Minister. This conclusion
parallels a similar conclusion in Brown’s Nehru: A Political Biography, pp. 296, 317,
concerning diplomacy during the late 1950s and the 1960s. Nehru conducted Indian
diplomacy without significant input from others, with the exception of Krishna Menon.

5 Maxwell, India’s China War , p. 275. Maxwell states that Beijing used the argument that
Ayub and the military dominance of Pakistan represented a more developed stage in the
progression toward a Marxist state than that of India. As far as India was concerned, the
Chinese viewed New Delhi as falling more and more under the influence of the United
States. To add insult to injury, the Chinese concluded that Soviet policy actually favored
India, and that Moscow approved of the Indian alignment with the United States.

6 Maxwell, India’s China War ; pp. 298-301. See also B.N. Mullik’s The Chinese Betrayal , pp.
321-322, which defends the ‘forward policy’. Mullik, the erstwhile ‘intelligence chief,
states that the policy was later criticized on the grounds that India was militarily weak.
He objects to this, stating: ‘Because a country is militarily weak, does it follow that it
shall not defend itself?’ Mullik also claims that the army leadership agreed with the
policy and only criticized it after the defeat of 1962 became apparent. Mullik states that
the real problem with regard to the Chinese was the fact that the policy had not been
implemented two years earlier, in October 1959. He believed that much of the lost
territory could have been ‘saved from the Dragon’s clutches’.

7 Brown, Nehru , p. 319.

8 Mullik, Chinese Betrayal , pp. 362-366, 381-387. Mullik defended both himself and Menon
against charges that they had ‘caused’ the Chinese debacle. He argued that Menon was
not responsible for the state of the army at the time of the invasion, nor was he
responsible for the ‘forward policy’ that precipitated the Chinese attack. Mullik also
defended himself against ministerial level charges of failure. One unnamed senior
minister confronted him saying: ‘You have let down the country by being in league with
the Defense Minister.’ Mullik hotly denied this; he claimed that the minister was upset
became Menon had had him watched by one of the security services. The minister
assumed that it was the Intelligence Bureau when in fact it was Department of Military
Intelligence (DMI).

9 Maxwell, India’s China War ; pp. 303, 323-325.

Notes

447

10 ‘Memcon Rusk and Indira Gandhi, UNGA, New York, 4 October 1962’. JFK Library,
Komer Series, Box 418, p. 2. During the conversation, Rusk raised Krishna Menon as a
major issue in US-Indian relations. Rusk stated that Menon had been the ‘principal face
and spokesman of India’ in the United States for many years and that he was a
considerable problem in obtaining aid for India. Mrs. Gandhi replied that she
sympathized with the US position on Menon but that it was impossible for her father,
Nehru, to ‘handle’ or ‘dismiss’ Menon given his visibility and the US criticism of him.

11 Mullik, Chinese Betrayal, p. 366.

12 Maxwell, India’s China War, p. 328.

13 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, 15 October 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p. 3.

14 Maxwell, India’s China War, pp. 356-358.

15 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, p. 431. In an interview with Talbot on 31 May 2002, he
stated that Galbraith allowed personal issues to affect his conduct of government
business in New Delhi. Talbot commented that on one occasion, Galbraith absented
himself from the Embassy in New Delhi without notifying Washington and turned up
at an army hospital in Hawaii with some unspecified medical ailment. Talbot also
commented that the Chinese victory in the border war left Nehru ‘a broken man’ and
contributed to his rapid decline and death.

16 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, p. 430.

17 ‘Memo Komer to Talbot, 24 October 1962’. LBJ Library, NSF, NSC Histories, SA,
1962-66, Box 24, Tab A 1-7, p. 1.

18 ‘New Delhi, 28 October 1962’. LBJ Library, Box 24, Tab A 1-7, pp. 1, 5.

19 ‘Letter Kennedy to Nehru in Cable from Rusk to New Delhi, 28 October 1962’. LB|
Library, Box 24, Tab A 1-7, p. 1.

20 ‘WDC to US Embassy New Delhi, 29 October 1962’. LBJ Library, Box 24, Tab A 1-7,
P !•

21 ‘Memo Anglo-American meeting on Sino-Indian Conflict, 12 November 1962’. PRO,
F0371/ 164929, pp. 1,10.

22 TO to British Embassy WDC, 20 November 1962’. No. 8466, PRO, F0371/ 164929,
p. 1. See also ‘Memo Rusk to President Kennedy entitled “Request for Approval of US-
UK Recommendations Regarding Sino-Indian Conflict”, 19 November 1962’. JFK
Library, Komer Series, Box 429, pp. 1-8. This document provides the US assessment of
the London meetings and is remarkably similar to the Foreign Office and CRO
documents. It reflected the Anglo-American agreement to coordinate assistance to
India and to work together to lessen the impact on Pakistan.

23 Oral History — Komer. No. 5, pp. 16-17.

24 Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal , pp. 437-441, 455, 460. Ambassador Galbraith had
already received notice from sources in contact with the Second Secretary in the
Political Section, Albert Lakeland, Jr., that the Indian cabinet and had met and called for
Krishna Menon’s removal and that Nehru would ask for his resignation. In the
Ambassador’s view, something good had come out of the Chinese military efforts.
Galbraith took some pleasure in meeting with Menon later and seeing him desperately
fighting for his political life. Menon greeted Galbraith and said: ‘I am still sitting in the
Defense Ministry; nothing has changed.’

25 ‘Karachi to WDC, November 5, 1962’. FRUS , 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 370. See
also ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, Washington, November 12, 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963,
Volume XIX, p. 375. Komer’s memorandum describes the Pakistanis as ‘going through
a genuine emotional crisis as they see their cherished ambitions of using the US as a
lever against India going up in the smoke because of the Chinese border war’.

26 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, p. 471.

27 ‘WDC to Karachi, 28 October 1962’. LBJ Library, NSC, SA, Box 24, Tab A 1-7, p. 3.

448

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

28 ‘Letter Ayub to Kennedy, 5 November 1962,’ LBJ Library, NSC Histories, South Asia,
Box 24, Tab A 1-7, p. 3.

29 Ayub Khan, Muhammad, Friends not Masters: .A Political Autobiography. London: Oxford
University Press, 1967, p. 146.

30 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 6 November 1962’. LBJ Library, NSC Histories, SA, Box 24,
Tab A 1-7, p. 1. See also ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 12 November 1962’. LBJ Library,
NSC Histories, SA, Box 24, Tab A 1-7, p. 1, in which Komer urges the President not to
compromise with Ayub and argues that ‘our assets’, meaning intelligence facilities in
Pakistan, should survive if the situation was handled properly.

31 ‘Memo Komer to Kaysen, 16 November 1962’. LB| Library, NSC, SA, Box 24, Tab A
1-7, pi.

32 ‘WDC to New Delhi, 18 November 1962,’ FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 390,
392.

33 ‘Report of the Harriman Mission, (undated)’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 424, pp.
5-11.

34 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 23 November 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 422, p

35 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 24 November 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p

36 ‘Memo for Record from Komer concerning meeting on Sino-Indian conflict chaired by
President Kennedy, 16 November 1962’. LBJ Library, NSC, SA, Box 24, Tab A 1-7, p.
3.

37 ‘CIA Report Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 27 November 1962’. JFK Library, Komer
Series, Box 429, p. 1. See also ‘CIA Memo from the Office of National Estimates on
Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 27 November 1962’. IFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429,

pp. 1, 10.

38 ‘Letter contained in Cable Kennedy to Harriman, 25 November 1962’. JFK Library,
Komer Series, Box 422, p. 2. See also ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 26 November 1962’.
JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 422, p. 1, in which Komer reacts to the Pakistani view
that the Chinese offer to cease military operations was real and made US military aid to
India unnecessary. The Pakistanis stated that there were ‘high hopes that real cease fire
can be negotiated and that arms aid to India therefore will be promptly terminated’.
Fearing an end to military aid to India before it began, Komer wanted Harriman to
make it clear to Ayub that the aid would continue even in the event of a ceasefire.

39 ‘Report Harriman Mission, (undated)’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 424, pp. 9-10.

40 ‘Memcon Ayub and Harriman, 29 November 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir,
Entry 5252, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

41 Gundevia, Yezdezard Dinshaw, Outside the Archives. Hyderabad: Sangam, 1984, pp. 252-
255. Gundevia served in various capacities in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs
from independence to 1969. During the period of the Chinese Border War, he was the
Commonwealth Secretary. Outside the Archives is a collection of memoirs of his service.
He provides a particularly interesting description of the climate in the Indian
government during the Chinese Border war. He is very complimentary about Duncan
Sandys’ efforts during the process of establishing a basis for further discussions on
Kashmir. His description of Sandys’ meeting with himself, Nehru, and Desai on 29
November 1962 is particularly entertaining. Gundevia described it as ‘three-cornered
pencil ding-dong’, with Nehru looking on in amusement.

42 ‘Memo Talbot to NSC, Subject: Recommendations on South Asia for Nassau Talks,
December 15, 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, p 1.

43 ‘Annex 1(a) to Memorandum from Talbot for Nassau Talks, December 15, 1962’.
NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, p. 1.

44 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, p. 254.

Notes

449

45 ‘Internal Memo US Embassy New Delhi from C.C. Laise to Galbraith, 4 December
1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, pp. 1-4.

46 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 7 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, pp.
1-3.

47 ‘Memcon Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador, and Talbot, 6 December 1962’.
NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, p. 2.

48 ‘Memo Talbot to Bundy, 10 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p 1.

49 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 13 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p
2. See also ‘NS AM, No. 209, 10 December 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp.
429-430.

50 ‘Memo “Next Steps on Kashmir” from Talbot to Subcommittee on South Asia, 12
December 1962’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

51 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Indian Amb Braj Kumar Nehru, December 17, 1962’. NACPM,
NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry 5252, Box 1, pp. 1-2. Also in FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
XIX, pp. 439-440.

52 ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy, 17 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p

53 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 19 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p

54 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 19 December 1962’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, pp.

1 , 2 .

55 ‘British Emb New Delhi to CRO, 24 December 1962’. PRO, F0371/164877, pp. 1-2.
See also ‘British Emb New Delhi to CRO, 21 December 1962’. PRO, F0371/164877,
p. 1, in which the Canadian Deputy High Commissioner in New Delhi provided
information that India had submitted shopping lists of military hardware to the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union: ‘Russians had offered military assistance
unconditionally and were encouraging India to stick to her guns on Kashmir.’
According to the Indian source: ‘Russia was only Great Power which really understood
and sympathized with India on Kashmir. . . . Americans were incapable of
understanding feeling existing between Hindus and Muslims which was like attitude of
Crusaders to Saracens.’

56 ‘British Emb New Delhi to CRO, 20 December 1962’. PRO, F0371/164877, pp. 1-2.

57 ‘British Emb Karachi to CRO, 26 December 1962,’ PRO, F0371/164877, p 2.

58 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Macmillan, Nassau, December 20, 1962, 3 p.m.’. FRUS, 1961-
1963, Volume XIX, pp. 448-455

59 ‘Memcon Kennedy and Macmillan, Nassau, December 20, 1962, 6 p.m.’. FRUS, 1961-
1963, Volume XIX, pp. 455-458.

60 Gundevia, Outside the Archives, p. 257.

61 ‘British Embassy Karachi to CRO, 30 December 1962’. PRO, F0371/164877, pp. 1-2.

62 ‘Memcon Amb McConaughy and Ayub, 27 December 1962’. FRUS, 1961-1963,
Volume XIX, p. 462.

63 ‘Memo Talbot to Rusk, 27 December 1962,’ NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Entry
5252, Box 1, p. 1,

Chapter 16

1 Interview with Talbot, 31 May 2003.

2 ‘Memo from Brubeck to Bundy, 4 January 1963’. JFK Library, Yemen- YAR security
1961-1963, Box 128A,p. 1.

3 ‘Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, January 24, 1963’. NACPM, 786h.02/ 1-2463, p. 1.

4 ‘Jidda [Hart] to WDC, January 26, 1963’. NACPM, 786h.00/l-2663, p.l.

5 ‘Memo Talbot to Rusk, 7 March 1963’. NACPM, 786h.00/3-763, p. 1.

6 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, 4 March 1963’. NACPM, 786h.00/3-463, p. 2.

450

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

7 ‘Letter Kennedy to Feisal Carried by Bunker, 27 February 1963’. JFK Library, Saudi
Arabia, Box 128B, pp. 1-4.

8 ‘Aden, Sir Charles Johnston, to CO, 15 February 1963’. PRO, CO1055/3, pp. 1-3.

9 Heikal, The Cairo Documents , pp. 197-199.

10 ‘Letter Nasser to Kennedy, 3 March 1963’. JFK Library, UAR Security, Box 169, pp. 1-

10 .

1 1 Badeau, Middle East Remembered, p. 206.

12 ‘Cairo to WDC, 3 March 1963’. |FK Library, UAR Security, Box 169, Section I, p. 2.

13 ‘Cairo to WDC, 3 March 1963’. JFK Library, UAR Security, Box 169, Section II, p. 1.
See also ‘Cairo to WDC on Conversation with Muhammad Heikal, 9 March 1963’.
NACPM, Jordan, File Pol 27 Yemen Pol 1 Jordan, p. 1. Heikal, who had just returned
from Sanaa, told a US Embassy officer that the ‘UAR [was] deeply concerned over
possibility US-UAR military confrontation in Arabian peninsula’, and that ‘Faisal must
stop killing Egyptian boys’.

14 ‘Guidelines of United States Policy and Operations - Yemen, March 1963’. JFK
Library, Komer Series, Box 418, p. 6.

15 ‘WDC Eyes Only to Bunker, Badeau, and Hart, 18 March 1963’. No. 1958, JFKL,
UAR, Box 169, p. 1.

16 O’Balance, Edgar, The War in Yemen. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1971, p. 101.

17 ‘Memo Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, 27 February 1963’. JFK Library, Saudi Arabia
Security, Box 128B, pp. 1-2.

18 ‘Dhahran to WDC on Feisal Meetings, 8 March 1963’. JFK Library, Yemen Security
1961-1963, Box 128A, Sections II, pp. 1-3, Section III, pp. 1-2. Feisal not only wanted
the UAR to withdraw to its bases immediately, but also wanted a withdrawal of all
supplies, tanks, and ammunition that the UAR was supplying to the YAR government.

19 ‘Memo Talbot to Rusk, 28 March 1963’. NACPM, 786h.00/3-2863, p. 1.

20 O’Balance, War in Yemen,p. 101.

21 ‘Memo for Record by T.W. Seelye, NEA-NE, 24 October 1963’. NACPM, 786a.il/10-
2463, p. 1. See also ‘Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Strike Command, 10 June
1963’. NACPM, 786a.00/6-1063, p. 2. ‘Hard Surface’ would not become operational on
July 5th, and the deployment actually provided little real protection. Under the rules of
engagement, pilots were not authorized to shoot except in self-defense, and could not
pursue UAR aircraft. Of course, the Egyptians were unaware of the restrictions and
unwilling to press the issue to see what would happen. It did however constitute a
highly visible symbol of US support for Saudi Arabia, and a tangible signal to Nasser
that Washington would protect the Saudi regime.

22 ‘WDC to Cairo [Badeau] Letter from JFK to Nasser, 18 April 1963’. JFK Library, UAR
Security, Box 169, p. 2. See also Badeau, Middle East Remembered, p. 195. Sabry became
Nasser’s ‘alter ego’ to deal with foreign missions and emissaries during the early 1960s.
See also Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 48-49. This is that same Ali Sabry who was
humiliated in 1952 when, on a mission to the US for arms, he returned empty-handed.
During the last months of the Truman administration, US officials told Sabry that the
decision had to await the arrival of the new administration. During the intervening time,
skeptical Egyptian officers joked that ‘Ali Sabry himself will be the first shipment.’
Dulles would ultimately reject arms for Egypt. Interview with Lakeland, 23-24
September 2003, in which Lakeland stated that Sabry carried a grudge against the US as
a result of what he took as a personal affront.

23 Badeau, Middle East Remembered, pp. 212, 222.

24 ‘WDC to Cairo [Badeau] Letter JFK to Nasser, 18 April 1963’. JFK Library, No. 2474,
UAR Security, Box 169, p. 2.

25 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 2 May 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p. 1.

26 Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 200-201 .

Notes

451

27 ‘Baghdad to WDC on Qasim’s death, 8 February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran - Iraq, Box
117, p. 1. See also ‘Telegram from OUARMA US Embassy Baghdad to WDC, 13
February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran - Iraq, Box 117, Section II, p. 1.

28 ‘Baghdad to WDC on RCC, 8 February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran - Iraq, Box 117, p. 1.

29 Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 982-987. Batatu commented: ‘The Communists fought as
only men could fight who knew that no mercy was to be looked for in defeat.’ Batatu
also put Communist dead between February 8 and 10 at more than 5,000, and quoted
King Hussein of Jordan as stating that he knew ‘for a certainty’ that the coup had the
support of US intelligence. With reference to this last statement, the entire US
government supported the coup. Washington wanted to see Qasim and his Communist
supporters removed, but that is a far cry from Batatu’s inference that the US had
somehow engineered the coup. The US lacked the operational capability to organize
and carry out the coup, but certainly after it had occurred the US government preferred
the Nasserists and Ba’thists in power, and provided encouragement and probably some
peripheral assistance.

30 ‘Baghdad to WDC on RCC, 12 February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran - Iraq, Box 117, p. 1.

31 ‘Memcon Syrian Amb Abou Riche and Talbot, WDC, 12 February 1963’. NACPM,
CFPF 1963, Pol Iran - Pol Iraq, Box 3943, pp. 1-3.

32 ‘Memcon Saudi Amb and Talbot, 13 February 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol Iran — Pol
Iraq, p. 1.

33 ‘Memcon Syrian Amb Abou Riche and Talbot, 12 February 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol
Iran - Pol Iraq, pp. 1-3.

34 ‘Memcon VP of Socony Mobil Oil, William Lindemuth and Talbot, WDC, 14 February
1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol Iraq, pp. 1-2. See also ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, 15
February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran - Iraq, Box 117, p. 1.

35 ‘Research Memorandum RNA-8, “Inter-Arab Implications of the Iraqi Coup of
February 8, 1962”, 14 February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran - Iraq, Box 117, p. 1.

36 ‘Memo Brubeck for Bundy, 15 February 1963’. JFK Library, Iran — Iraq, Box 117, pp.
1-7.

37 ‘Dispatch Canadian Embassy Cairo to Ottawa, 18 February 1963’. PRO
F037 1/1 70452, p. 1.

38 ‘British Embassy Baghdad to FO and Emb WDC, 11 February 1963’. JFKL, Iran -
Iraq, Box 117, pp. 1-2.

39 ‘British Embassy Cairo [Beeley] to FO, 28 February 1963’. PRO F037 1/1 70452, p. 1.

40 ‘Damascus to WDC, 9 January 1963’. NACPM, 611.83/1-963 (M1855), p. 1.

41 ‘Letter Qudsi to Kennedy, 19 February 1963’. JFK Library, Syria, Box 124A, pp. 1-5.
See also ‘Letter Kennedy to Qudsi, 28 January 1963,’ JFK Library, Syria, Box 124A, pp.
1-4.

42 ‘Memo to Kennedy on Cover Sheet of Letter from Kennedy to Qudsi, 28 |anuary
1963’. JFK Library, Syria General, Box 124A, p. 1. See also, Malik Mufti, Sovereign
Creations, p. 141. Syrian Ba’thists had outmaneuvered their Nasserist allies by
announcing the coup for March 7. They told their Nasserist counterparts that it had
been postponed until March 10, and then executed it on March 8. The upshot was that
the Ba’thists were in control before the Nasserists realized what had happened. Ba’thist
unity talks between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the party had already been under
way, and these now picked up steam. In spite of their talk about unity with the UAR,
the Syrian Ba’thists had one eye cocked over their shoulders, determined to prevent a
repeat of their 1958-1961 debacles with Nasser and his supporters.

43 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, p. 148.

44 Kerr, Arab Cold War, p. 67. The Syrian delegates called Nasser ‘Your Excellency’ or ‘Mr.
President’, while he called them by their first names. Nasser also had the discussions
secretly taped so that at a later date he could publish the transcripts to further embarrass

452

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

and discredit the Ba’thist leadership. The meeting was ‘theater’, planned by Nasser for
public consumption without the knowledge of his Syrian counterparts.

45 Khalidi, Walid and Yusuf Ibish, .Arab Political Documents 1963. Beirut: American
University of Beirut, 1963, pp. 76, 80. This set of documents, transcripts of the
meetings published by the Egyptians, was an obvious attempt to completely undermine
the position of the Ba’th in Syria and the region as a whole. The transcripts were printed
in Al-Ahram between 21 June and 22 July 1963 and broadcast over Radio Cairo.

46 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, pp. 151-153.

47 ‘WDC to Cairo [Badeau] Letter from JFK to Nasser, 18 April 1963’. JFK Library, LIAR
Security, Box 169, p. 2.

48 ‘Memcon Dennis Speares, British Embassy WDC, and NEA [Strong and KiUgore], 27
March 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Jordan POL 1963, p. 2.

49 ‘Damascus to WDC Memcon with Saladin Bitar, 28 April 1963’. NACPM, CFPF,
Jordan POL 1963, p. 2.

50 ‘Airgram Amman to WDC, 30 April 1963.’ NACPM, CFPF, Jordan POL 1963, p. i

51 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy: Ben-Gurion note, 25 April 1963’. FRUS, 1962-1963,
Volume XVIII, p. 482.

52 ‘Circular Telegram to Middle East posts from NEA [Grant], 26 April 1963, 28 April
1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Jordan POL 1963, pp. 1-2. See also, ‘Excerpt from Transcript
of Talbot Remarks to National Foreign Policy Conference, 23 April 1963’. |FK Library,
Komer Series, Box 429, pp. 1-3.

53 Memcon Israeli Amb Harman and Acting Sec State, 27 April 1963’. NACPM, CFPF,
Jordan POL, pp. 1-4.

54 Badeau, Middle East Remembered, p. 229. Badeau had triangulation experts come to Cairo
in order to pinpoint the exact location of Sawt al-Umma al-Arabiyya. He provided the
following account of his meeting with Sharaf. ‘I said, “Sami. Come off of it. It’s the
third spur to the right of the Muhammad Ali mosque, up on the Muqattam Hills”.’ In a
meeting the next day, Nasser apologized to Badeau for Sharaf, citing his inexperience,
and for his (Sharaf s) lie about the radio broadcasts, telling him that he had told Sharaf
not to lie if the other side knew you were lying.

55 ‘Cairo to WDC, 29 April 1963’. JFK Library, UAR Security 1963, Box 169, Section I,
pp. 1-2, Section II, pp. 1-2.

56 ‘Telegram Cairo [Badeau] to WDC, 3 May 1963’. JFK Library, POF, UAR Security
1963, Box 169, Sec. I, pp. 1-3, Sec. II, pp. 1-3. Badeau expressed his concerns in a
thinly-veiled ‘hypothetical telegram’ to Moscow from the Soviet Ambassador. Badeau,
writing as though he were the Soviet Ambassador, explained Soviet setbacks in the
Middle East but then pointed out that the Kennedy administration was on the verge of
throwing it all away because of support for ‘bourgeois imperialist Zionism’. The
telegram ended with a hypothetical comment by the Soviet Ambassador: ‘Again I urge
we move immediately to take advantage of this situation which the Americans have so
kindly presented to us.’ It was a creative way for Badeau to make his point, and events
would prove it to be remarkably accuarate.

57 ‘Tel Aviv to WDC, 1 May 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Jordan POL 1963, p. 1.

58 ‘Memcon Harriman and Israeli Amb Harman, 10 May 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Jordan
POL 1963, p. 2.

59 ‘Letter Official-Informal Macomber to Talbot, 18 June 1963’. JFK Library, Komer
Series, Box 429, pp. 1-6. In this letter. Ambassador Macomber laid out both the
economic and political situation in Jordan. He argued that the US had a fundamental
choice either to wholeheartedly become the benefactor for the Hashemite regime in
Jordan or to allow political and economic forces to take their course and undermine the
Jordanian government to the point of collapse. As a result of this discussion, President
Kennedy asked for a meeting with Macomber. See also ‘Air gram Amman [Macomber]

Notes

453

to WDC, 10 July 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, NEA, Jordan POL Internal Security, Box
3960, pp. 1-2. Macomber identified the principle threat to Hussein as internal and non-
Communist. He cited the likely possible sources in the following order: first, apolitical
dissident army officers; second, Nasserists; third, Qawmiyiim al-Arab (nationalists); and
fourth, Ba’thists. In arguments reminiscent of the Dulles years, Macomber made the
case that the pro-Western orientation of the Jordanian army was the critical element for
the stability of the regime. See ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, 20 July 1963’. JFK Library,
Komer Series, Box 429, pp. 1-2. It was indicative of the shifting policies in the region
that Macomber, with his close ties to Allen Dulles through the Office of Strategic
Services and the CIA, and to John Foster Dulles, as his erstwhile special assistant,
became the single most influential voice on the situation in Jordan. See also Dann,
Uriel, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism : Jordan 1955-1967. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989, pp. 130-133. Dann’s work provides excellent insight into the
period, but his view that the Kennedy administration was willing to see the Hashemite
regime in Jordan collapse as long as Jordan retained its independence is somewhat
misleading. The author uses Talbot’s statements on the maintenance of the ‘separate
state’ in Jordan as an indication that this did not necessarily mean the Hashemite state.
Theoretically this may have been true, but the hard reality was that since the crisis of
1958 the US government had seen no real alternative to the Hashemites. The Kennedy
administration had little choice but to follow the course laid out by Eisenhower, a
course in large part determined by the efforts of Sir Charles Johnston, the British
Ambassador.

60 ‘Memo Komer to NSC staff on Jordanian Policy Issues, August 1, 1963’. JFK Library,
Komer Series, Box 429, pp. 1-2. See also ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 22 July 1963’. JFK
Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p. 1 .

61 ‘Airgram Amman to WDC, 28 August 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Jordan POL Internal
Security, pp. 1-4.

62 ‘Amman to WDC, 7 October 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Jordan POL Internal Security, pp.
1-2. See also ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 30 October 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series,
Box 429, p. 1. King Hussein’s visit was cleared through Myer Feldman, Kennedy’s
advisor on Israeli affairs. Komer stated: ‘Mike [Myer] Feldman is not unduly concerned
by a low-key visit by King Hussein next June. He agrees that of all the Arabs, Hussein is
probably the most acceptable in 1964. Mike feels, however, that we ought seriously to
consider a brief visit by Eshkol, which would also be low-key and informal. . . . Certainly
such a visit would be a domestic political plus.’ Nasser’s view of the internal political
situation in the US was not far off the mark.

63 ‘Briefing Notes for DCIA, Attachment on “Ba’th Ideology and Practice”, 30 December
1963’. CIA, CRES, CIA-RDP75-00001R000400380006-7, p. 28.

64 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 15 November 1963’. JFK Library, Iraq, Box 117A, p. 1. See
also Mufti, Sovereign Creations , p. 157.

65 ‘British Embassy Cairo [Beeley] to FO, 14 August 1963’. PRO F0371/1 72901, p 2.

66 ‘Minute attached to British Embassy Cairo to FO, 14 August 1963’. PRO
F0371/ 172901, coversheet, p. 2.

67 Mufti, Sovereign Creations , pp. 159-165. Mufti provides an interesting and detailed outline
of the events of November 1963 that led to the Aref coup.

68 ‘Briefing Notes for DCIA, Iraq Situation, 30 December 1963’. CIA, CRES, CIA-
RDP71T00730R000200020004-5, p. 7.

69 ‘Cairo to WDC, 30 November 1963’. NACPM, CFPF 1963, POL Iran - Iraq, POL 15
Iraq, p. 1.

70 Nutting, Nasser , p. 337.

71 ‘WDC to Cairo, 19 October 1963’. FRUS, 1962-1963, Volume XVIII, p. 752.

72 ‘Cairo to WDC, 9 November 1963’. JFK Library, UAR Security 1963, Box 127A, p. 1.

454

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

73 Badeau, John ‘U.S.A. and U.A.R.: A Crisis in Confidence’. Foreign Affairs, Volume 43,
No. 2, January 1965, pp. 285, 281-296

74 ‘Chiefs of Mission Conference in Istanbul, Second Plenary Session, 15-18 October
1963’. NACPM, Chiefs of Mission Conferences, Lot 670457, Box 1, Entry 5269, p. 4.

75 ‘Memo Bundy to Fulbright, 11 November 1963’. JFK Library, UAR Security, Box
127 A, p. 1.

76 ‘Memo from Komer to Bundy, 20 October 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 424,

p. 1.

77 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 20 October 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 424, pp. 3,
5. Komer was still convinced that the US had to force reform in Iran, but he lacked any
workable specifics. His disdain for Holmes was apparent: ‘Julius Holmes is one of the
most tough-minded operators in the Foreign Service. His problem is that he’s tough-
minded about the wrong things; he’s great on military aid and earthquake relief, but fails
to understand what really ails Iran.’ In fact. Holmes, shortly after his arrival, clued into
the fact that Shah was the center of power and that the National Front was no longer a
real threat to the throne. At the same time, Komer was calling Amini the ‘last hope’ and
worrying about building ‘bridges’ to the National Front.

78 ‘Airgram Tehran to WDC, 2o" December 1962’. NACPM, 788.11/12-20-62, pp. 1-3.

79 ‘Memo GT1 [Bowling] to NEA, 21 December 1962’. NACPM, 788.11/12-2162, p. 1.

80 ‘Memo William Polk to Talbot, 18 December 1962’. NACPM, 788.11/12-20-62, p 2.

81 Keddie, Modem Iran, p. 145.

82 ‘Memo Brubeck to Bundy, 21 January 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 424, p 1.

83 ‘Memo from Komer to Bundy, 29 January 1963’. JFK Library, PPJFK, NSF, Country
Files, Iran, Box 116A, p. 1.

84 ‘Res Memo RNA-6, INR [Hillsman], Iranian Referendum, 11 February 1963’. JFK
Library, Komer, Box 424, p. 1 .

85 ‘Airgram Tehran to WDC, 4 April 1963’. NACPM, CFPF 1963, POL Iran, p. 2.

86 ‘Savingram British Embassy Tehran [Sir Denis WrightJ to FO, 1 June 1963’. PRO
FO248/1590, p. 5.

87 ‘CIA: OCI - Report on Counter-Insurgency in Iran, 23 April 1963’. JFK Library,
Komer Series, Box 116A, p. 1.

88 Keddie, Modem Iran, p. 147.

89 ‘CIA SNIE No. 34-63, The Iranian Situation, 10 April 1963’. JFK Library, Meetings
Series, Box 315, p. 3.

90 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, 30 April 1963’. JFK Library, Iran, Box 116A, p. 1. See also
‘Memo Hansen to Komer, 7 May 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 424, p. 1.

91 ‘Memo Komer to Holmes: Message from Kennedy to Shah, 20 June 1963’. JFK Library,
Komer Series, Box 424, p. 1 .

92 ‘Briefing Memo for Lord Home Meeting with S.K. Dehlavi, 4 January 1963’. PRO
FO371/170639, p. 1.

93 ‘Memo Bundy to Galbraith, 7 January 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 418, p. 1.

94 ‘Memo Komer to Galbraith, 15 January 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p.
2. See also ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy on Kashmir, 20 February 1963’. NACPM,
NEA/INC, Kashmir, Box 1, p. 2.

95 ‘Letter Nehru to Kennedy, 18 February 1963’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Box 1,

p. 2.

96 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 19 February 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429,
pp. 2-3.

97 ‘Airgram Consulate Lahore to WDC, February 8, 1962’. NACPM, CFPF, Political
Pakistan to Political No. 5 Laws Pakistan, 2/1/63, p. 2.

98 ‘Airgram Consulate Peshawar to WDC, 6 February 1962’. NACPM, CFPF, Political
Pakistan to Political No. 5 Laws Pakistan, 2/1/63, pp. 1-2. See also, ‘Airgram Consulate

Notes

455

Lahore to WDC, 16 February 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Political Pakistan to Political No.
5 Laws Pakistan, 2/1 / 63, pp. 1-2.

99 ‘Briefing Memo on Kashmir for Lord Home Meeting with Indian High Commissioner
Muhammad Ali Currin Chagla, 19 April 1963’. PRO FO371/170639, p. 1.

100 ‘Memo Rostow to Talbot, 8 April 1963’. NACPM, NEA/INC, Kashmir, Box 1, p 1.

101 ‘British High Com New Delhi to FO, 16 April 1963’. PRO FO371/170638, p 1.

102 ‘Briefing Memo Lord Home and Chagla, 19 April 1963’. PRO FO371/170639, p. 1. See
also ‘NSAM, No. 22, Appraisal of Sino-Indian Situation from Bundy to Rusk,
McNamara, and McCone, 26 February 1963’ NACPM, NSAM 223, p. 1.

103 ‘Karachi to WDC, 30 April 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Political 32-1 Territory & Boundary
Disputes, Violations, Incidents India-Pak, 2/1/63-5/1/63, Box 3934, p 3.

104 ‘Attachment to a Memcon for Bundy, Conversation Between Rusk and Indian
Ambassador, B.K. Nehru, 4 May 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Political 32-1 Territory &
Boundary Disputes, p. 2.

105 ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy, 19 April 1962’. NACPM, Kashmir, Box 1, pp. 1-3.

106 ‘Letter Nehru to Kennedy, 21 April 1963’. JFK Library, Komer Series, Box 429, p. 2.
See also Gopal, Nehru, Volume III, p. 261.

107 ‘Memo NEA to Kennedy for European Trip, 18 June 1963’. NACPM, Kashmir, Box 1,
p. 2. See also ‘New Delhi to WDC, 11 July 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol 32-1 Territory &
Boundary Disputes, p. 1.

108 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 5 July 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, 1963, Political 15-1 Head of State
Executive Branch India, To: Pol 23 Internal Security India. Box 3931. 1963 Alpha
Numeric Political and Defense, pp. 1-2, 4.

109 ‘Airgram Rawalpindi to WDC, 7 August 1963’. NACPM, CFPF 1963, pp. 1-5.

110 ‘Airgram Karachi to WDC, 29 August 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, pp. 1-4.

111 ‘Research Memo INR-26, Implications of Soviet Military Aid to India, 9 July 1963’. JFK
Library, Komer Series, Box 422, pp. 1-6.

112 ‘Memo Rusk to Kennedy, 8 May 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 579-583.

113 ‘Summary 514th NSC Meeting, 9 May 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 583.

114 ‘Karachi to WDC, 8 August 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, pp. 629-630.

115 ‘Memo Meeting with Kennedy on Pakistan, 12 August 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963,
Volume XIX, p" 637.

116 ‘Tehran to WDC, 5 September 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XIX, p. 664.

117 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 153.

118 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 30 July 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol 32-1 Territory & Boundary
Disputes, p. 2.

119 ‘Karachi to WDC, 31 July 1963.’ NACPM, CFPF, Pol 32-1 Territory & Boundary
Disputes, p. 2.

120 ‘Karachi to WDC, 23 August 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol 32-1 Territory & Boundary
Disputes, pp. 1-4.

121 ‘New Delhi to WDC, 9 September 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Pol 25 Territory &
Boundary Disputes, pp. 1-2.

122 ‘Research Memo DOS/INR, 25 September 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, 1963, Political 6
Prominent Persons Pak to Political 14 Elections Pakistan, 2/1/63, p. 2.

123 ‘Memo Talbot to Under Sec State, 28 September 1963’. NACPM, CFPF, Political 6
Prom Persons, Box, p. 2.

124 ‘Memo Komer to Kennedy, 12 November 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963, South Asia,
Volume XIX, p. 689.

125 ‘Memo Komer to Dep Asst SecDef William Bundy, 14 November 1963’. FRUS, 1961-
1963, Volume XIX, p. 689.

126 Oral History — Bowles. JFK Library, p. 26.

456

Greater Middle East and the Cold War

127 ‘Memo Komer to Bundy, Washington, 23 November 1963’. LB| Library, NSC
Histories, South Asia, 1962-66, Box 24, Tab B, 1-13, p. 1. See also, ‘Memo from Komer
to Bundy, Washington, 29 November 1963’. LBJ Library, Box 24, Tab B, 1-13, p. 1.
Komer stated that despite the situation with Pakistan, the US intended to go ahead with
the military assistance to India. He was wrong: Johnson cancelled it after a study.

128 ‘Memo McCone, Director CIA, WDC, 30 November 1963’. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume
XIX p. 693. When Bowles returned later to brief the effort, Johnson turned him down.
Ora/ History - Bowles. JFK Library, p. 70. Bowles states that Johnson finally set a
meeting to discuss the India military-aid plan in late May, but Nehru died three days
before the meeting and the effort collapsed. In 1964, the Indians went to the Soviets.

Conclusion

1 ‘Diary Entry Eisenhower on conversation with Churchill, 6 January 1953’. DDEL,
Diary Series, Box 9, pp. 5-6.

2 Interview Rostow, 12 |une 2002.

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Index

Aden 54, 55, 57, 270, 273, 277,
357n74

Adenauer, Chancellor Konrad 196
Afghanistan 156, 158, 167, 168, 248,
250, 253, 402-3n99

Aflaq, Michael, Ba’th Party leader 46-
7, 300

Age, The, Melbourne 265
Ahmad, Imam, Yemeni ruler 55, 206,
268, 269

Ahmad al-Sabah, Sheikh Jair al-,
Kuwaiti ruler 199

Ahmed, Aziz, Pakistani Ambassador
261,262

Al-Ahram, Cairo 111, 196, 200, 202,
204, 277, 299
Al-Juhuriya, Cairo 276
Al-Nahar , Beirut 59
Al-Thawra, Baghdad 123
Alaa, Husain, Iranian Minister 87, 156
Alam, Asadollah 241 , 306
Alavi-Moghadam, Medi Qoli 159-60
Algeria: FLN insurrection 30, 142,
168, 200, 204, 342nl 09
Ali Khan, Liquat, former Pakistani
Prime Minister 169
Ali Razmara, General Sephabod Haj
14

Allen, George 153

‘Alwan, Jaim 303

Amer, Muhammad Abd-al-Hakim,
Egyptian Field Marshal 124-5, 201

Amin, Majid 123

Amini, Dr Ali, Iranian Prime
Minister: yields to teachers’ strike
22; claims land reform is
meaningless 159; supported by
Kennedy 212; appointed by Shah
217-18; moderate reform program
220; used by Shah as lever on US
221; must suppress National Front
223; Kennedy’s personal support
229-30; warns of Shah’s insistence
on military aid 233; last chance to
deliver 235; admits failure to
control budget 236-7; responsible
for economic projects 237-8;
forced to resign 240, 430n34

Anderson, Robert B, Treasury
Secretary 54

Anglo-American alliance 5-6

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 1954 18, 19,
23

Ansari, Masud, Ambassador 157

Aqaba, Gulf of 53

Arab Cold War 107, 127, 128, 180,
377nl

474

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Arab League: opposes any non-Arab
defensive alliance 18; throws off
last British influence 40; admits
Kuwait 200

Arab Union, Jordan and Iraq 53
Arab-Israeli dispute 20-1, 334n47
Aram, Abbas 245

Aref, Colonel Abd-al-Salam al- 72, 73,
77, 109, 112, 298, 304
Armitage, John 244
Arsanjani, Hassan 222-3, 237
Assad, Hafiz al- 300
Aswan Dam Project 33, 49, 187, 324,
351n24

Adee, Prime Minister Clement 328;
regional collective security schemes
331n4

Awqati, Brigadier Jalal 298
Ayub Khan, General Muhammad
100, 105, 149, 150, 156; criticises
British position in Baghdad Pact
156, 398n29; military rule succeeds
163; coup as revolution away from
Communism 165, 321, 40178;
proposed talks with Nehru rejected
166-7; impresses Eisenhower as
anti-Communist 167, 172;

diplomatic role a success 168, 402-
3n99; refuses to renounce military
force 169; Kennedy victory
endangers US-Pakistan relations
178, 409n26; disquiet at Kennedy’s
advisors 246, 433n7; fears aid to
India enables military build-up 247,
433n4, 433n6; needs to remind
Kennedy of CENTO and SEATO
247, 433-4n8; proposes controlled
democracy 247, 433n5; offers

troops against Laotian

Communists 250; US aid to India
prevents Kashmir setdement 250,
253; visits London and US 251;
accepts Eugene Black as mediator
259; insists Kennedy support him
at the UN 259, 440n96; calls for

Kennedy to honor promises 262;
visits Kennedy for talks 263,
442nl36, 442nl37; demands India
honor plebiscite agreements 283,
447n25; tells Kennedy India
cannot be trusted 284; no
alternative to relations with
Communist China 310
Azerbaijan 1 54
Azodi, Yadollah 159

B-57 aircraft 1 67

Badaber intelligence site: monitors
Soviet missiles 93, 105, 167
Badeau, John, Ambassador: Arabist,
but no diplomat 185, 411n49;
downplays ideological differences
with Nasser 186; argues Israel
pursues its own interests 196;
expects Nasser verbal attacks on
US 202; told not to protest attacks
on Kennedy 204; support for
monarchies plays into Soviet hands
206, 267; Feisal takeover will assist
stability 207; urged to recognize
Yemen Arab Republic 269-70, 272,
443n6; downplays Kennedy’s
support of Saudi Arabia 275; visits
Kennedy to recommend
recognition 276, 445n57; wants
Feisal to wididraw from Yemen
conflict 294; urges caution towards
UAR 296, 450nl3; informs Nasser
US aircraft exercise near Yemen
297, 450n21; pro-Israeli attempts
to cut aid to Egypt 303, 452n56;
warns Egyptians against
intervention in Jordan 303
Badr, Yemeni Crown Prince
Muhammad al- 55, 56, 268, 269
Baghdad Pact: Turkey, Egypt and Iraq
19; Pakistan is eastern pillar 31;
Iraq joins, supported by Britain 37;
US Refuses to join 48; neutral
response to Egypt-Syria union 52,

Index

475

351n29; conference 55; Britain
blocks Kuwait joining 68; if Iraq
leaves, US will join 76, 365-6n70;
India sees Pakistani’s presence as
threat 102; becomes Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) 105;
Qasim withdraws Iraq 1 1 3,
379n31; Shah demands US
commitment 152; needs military
command structure 156, 397-8n28;
a political, not military,
organization 318

Bakhtiar, General Timur, SAVAK 91,
160-1, 214-15

Ball, George 203, 205, 261, 310
Bandung Conference 1955 28, 29, 31-
3, 320

Bartlett, Fred 101
Baruch, Bernard 10
Battle, Lucius 232

Baydani, Abd-al-Rahman 269, 272-3
Beeley, Sir Harold 274, 277, 299
Beersheba 147

Ben-Gurion, David, Israeli Prime
Minister: no intention of refugee
return 21; threatens to occupy
West Bank 73, 363-4n55;

developing nuclear weapons 127;
forced to withdraw from Sinai 142;
uses Soviet threats to obtain US
guarantee 143; nuclear weapons
priority 144; announces reactor
exclusively peaceful 147, 394n93;
US is doing more for Nasser than
Iran 156; puts conditions on
Johnson Plan 205-6, 209; offers US
access to Dimona reactor 208-9;
vehemently opposes any
repatriation 209; makes no
concessions to Kennedy 210;
lobbies for new weapons after
UAR threat 302; warns of constant
threat of Nasser 303
Bergmann, Ernst David 145

Bhutto, Pakistani Foreign Minister
248,291,309

Bitar, Salah al-Din al- 125, 298, 301
Bizri, General Afif al- 50
Black, Eugene, President of World
Bank 259, 267

Borujerdi, Ayatollah of Qom 307
Bourgiba, President Habib, Tunisia
52-3, 194

Bowles: tries to get Johnson to agree
aid plan 311, 456nl27
Bowles, Congressman Chester:
opposes aid to Pakistan 167,
411n48; tells Kennedy
Eisenhower’s policy is similar 173;
champions economic aid 177;
believes Dulles policy was
mishandled 181; sees UAR as
basically revolutionary 203-4; urges
economic aid and reduced military
231; says Shah is key to stability
233; urges cap on military budget
234; foreign policy advisor to
Kennedy 246, 431nl; deplores
intelligence base in Pakistan 250,
435n26; sent to reassure Nehru
254, 436n54; pro-India policies
256; lack of aid to India opens
door to Soviet 263; give both
countries defensive weapons
equally 310; plans aid to India
without upsetting Pakistan 311
Bowling, John W 162, 163, 214, 224,
231

British: phased withdrawal from
Canal Zone 18, 334n37; cautious
attitude to Bandung Conference
30, 341nl02; reject support for
Iraqi expansion 50; predict failure
of Egyptian-Sytian union 51-2;
concern over Soviet presence in
Yemen 56, 355n58; concern over
US aid program to UAR 59; find
Dulles’ reasoning unconvincing 66,
360nl4; anger at US policy on

476

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Jordan 76, 366n72; pressing US to
join Baghdad Pact 86; expect a
coup in Iran to follow that in Iraq
90, 272n49; hopes of keeping the
Shah in power 91; encourages US
to desist from reform campaigns
92; follows US lead on important
issues 104; oil interests in Iraq
safeguarded 105; main concern is
Iraqi oil supply 115; attempt to
improve US relations with Qasim
119; continue arms sales to
Baghdad 119; neither Qasim nor
army will submit to Communists
122; view collapse of Jordan as
potential disaster 128; undermine
US plans for Jordan-UAR detente
130, 385n7; not unhappy with US-
UAR anti-Communist front 132;
soft pedal diplomatic win over US
134, 386n25; worry that Jordan
may attack Syria 137; reluctance to
blame Nasser for assassination 138;
debate on funding Jordanian
budget 139-40, 388n60; discuss
Jordan-Israeli relations 143,
392n82; dispatch aircraft and
marines to Kuwait 199, 200; wish
to keep Yemen neutral 206,
420n91; skeptical about US
inspection of Israel’s reactor 209;
treaty link to independent Kuwait
211; cautions US support for land
reform undermines regime 222;
concern at the Harriman Mission
249; against recognition of YAR
270; oppose recognition of YAR
275; recognition of YAR a mistake
277, 445n62; support US aim of a
stable India 282, 4447n22; fear
coup in Iraq will affect commercial
position 299; avoid becoming
involved in Kashmir 308
Brubeck, William 242
Brugioni, Dino A 145

Bunche, Dr Ralph 296

Bundy, McGeorge 202, 205, 215, 224,
305, 312

Bunker, Ellsworth, US Ambassador
95-6, 99, 101, 102, 103, 296, 297

Buraimi Oasis dispute 142, 390n69,
390n71

Burki, General, Minister of Health,
Welfare, and Social Affairs 258

Byroadism 144

Caffery, Jefferson, US Ambassador to
Egypt 16

Camp David talks 158

Canada 56, 209

CENTO (Central Treaty

Organization) 105, 150, 162, 215,
248-9, 262

Chaing Kai-Shek, Taiwanese
President 27

Chamoun, Camille Nimur, President
of Lebanon 50, 61, 62, 65; appeals
for US assistance 66, 360nl6;
pressured to drop second term 67

Charles River School of economic
theory 181

Chatterjee, D N, Indian High
Commissioner 28

Chehab, General Fuad 62, 67, 360n21

China: enters disputed areas on
India’s border 170, 403nl08;

aggressive moves on Indian border
251, 436n38; resents India’s ties
with US and Soviets 279-80,
446n5; unilateral ceasefire 286;
agrees border settlement 291;
repatriates 3,000 Indian prisoners
of war 309

Chou En-lai: Chinese Chairman 29,
31, 33, 38, 170; argues Sino-Indian
border is not delineated 170, 404-
5nll6; rebuffs Nehru’s appeal 170,
404nll5; meets Nehru 171

Index

477

Churchill, Winston Spencer: re-
elected Prime Minister 5, 10, 318;
opposes economic aid to Egypt 17
Colombo Conference 1954 28,

341n98

Congo conflict 194, 200, 201, 204
Cooper, Chester 255
Copeland, Miles, CIA contact 33, 62
Cuban missile crisis 264, 265, 269,
279

Czech arms deal 33, 38
Dacca 99

Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso 170
Dayan Plan 147

Derakhshesh, Muhammad 222, 237,
240, 242, 426-7n39

Desai, Shri Morarji 28, 254, 255, 259-
60, 281, 285

Dhahran, US air base 54, 200, 273,
296, 297

Dillon, Douglas 139, 140
Dimona nuclear rector 208
Din, Zakaria Muhyi al- 297
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
Tamil party 97

Dulles, Allen, CIA Director: concern
about Bandung 29; alarm after
Baghdad coup 70; Arab self-
interest will reject Nasserism 76;
predicts rising against Qasim
regime 112; fears Communist
takeover in Iraq 114; emphasizes
threat of Communist takeover 115,
118; uncertainty of Shah’s
intentions 155

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of
State: holistic view of Greater
Middle East 5, 40, 330-ln3; anti-
colonial bent 10, 330nl; talks with
Egyptian leaders 16, 333n22; hopes
to influence Bandung Conference
30; sees Arab-Israeli dispute as
security problem 46; support for
Iraqi expansion into Syria 50, 55,

351 n33; fears collapse of Saudi
regime 54, 353n49; denies

opposing Arab unity 58, 357n81;
reaffirms support for Iraq and
Jordan 60; opposes intervention in
Lebanon 612; concedes that
intervention may be needed 63;
wants Chamoun to compromise
65; warns Nasser to end support
for rebels 67; calls for immediate
aid to Chamoun 70; blames Iraqi
coup on Baghdad Pact 74; revives
'northern tier’ concept 76, 365n68;
still believes Nasser behind Iraqi
coup 76, 365n67; US will join
Baghdad Pact 76; wishes Britain to
leave Jordan 77, 366n73; refuses
arms, offers increased aid 87,
370n28; visit to Iran is contentious
87; warns Eisenhower the Shah
will press for arms 88, 370n32;
urges Eisenhower to facilitate
Kashmir problem 98; increasingly
incapacitated 104, 115; resigns 118;
accuses Israel of compliance with
Soviets 143; bilateral agreement
with Shah is unacceptable 153;
British dislike of his stytie 332-3n21
Dutt, F S 139

Ebtehaj, Abol Hassan 83, 87, 89, 151
Eden, Anthony, Foreign Minister:

concerns about Dulles 330nl
Egypt: demands British withdrawal
from Canal Zone 15; bombs
villages in southern Saudi Arabia
273

Egyptian Gazette 277

Egyptian-Syrian Union: surprise to
everybody 46, 349n9
Eisenhower, President Dwight D:
anti-colonial bent 10; concludes
Pakistan stability outweighs
political democracy 10; proposes
'northern tier’ alliance 11; rejects

478

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

joint action with Churchill 11-12;
criticizes Churchill’s paternalistic
approach 12; warns Eden against
aggressive approach 13, 331-2nl0;
supports economic aid to Egypt
15; foresees clash with non-
alignment 24; assures Nehru about
aid to Pakistan 25; British calls for
intervention is colonialism 35, 344-
5nl29; obsessed with containment
of Soviets 35, 37; Eisenhower
Doctrine speech 38, 347nl38; calls
Crown Prince Feisal pro-Nasserist
54, 354n51; more fears of

Communism 54, 353n50; regrets
not backing British at Suez 64,
358n2; will avoid intervention at
any cost 65, 66, 359n7, 359n8;
dismay at Iraqi coup 69; orders
troops into Lebanon 71, 362n41,
363n42; briefs Macmillan on joint
campaign 72, 363n44; expenditure
will rehabilitate US position 74,
364n58; agrees limited military aid
to Shah 87; discusses Kashmir with
Nehru 94; talks with Nehru 94,
372n2; tells Suhrawardy he will
support call for plebiscite 96; offers
direct involvement in Kashmir
dispute 99; sees support for
Pakistan as expedient 103, 150,
394n2; undertakes personal
diplomacy 104; grumbles at choice
between Qasim and Nasser 114;
reasons intervention in Iraq will
undermine US 118; agrees to
British arms sales 119; reaps
benefit of non-intervention in Iraq
125; aid to Jordan helps relations
with British 127; lacks confidence
in Jordan or King Hussein 130-1;
meets Nasser at UN 138, 388n55;
meets King Hussein 139; forces
Israel to withdraw from Sinai 142,
390-1 n76; opposes Suez invasion

142; agrees Doctrine covers Israel
143; continues nuclear agreement
with Israel 146, 393n87; Israel’s
reactor not for solely peaceful use
147; holds conference on Israel
nuclear issue 148; no alternative to
supporting the Shah 151, 395n4;
warns Shah of Soviet perfidy 153;
meets Iranian Prime Minister 158;
visits Iran 158; goal is stability,
even if military rule 164, 400-ln71;
peace mission to India and
Pakistan 167; agrees to Pakistan’s
weapons demands 168; rejects use
of India as counter to China 169-
70; alarmed by India’s arms deal
with Soviet 172; sees no alternative
to arms supply to Ayub and Shah
1 72-3; foreign-policy crises

handling criticised 179-80, 410n28;
containment by use of economic
aid 315; stability requirement
means military aid 316; confidence
in Shah’s ability 332nl2
Emami, Jafar Sharif 159, 217
Eqbal, Manuchehr, Iranian Prime
Minister 87, 158, 159
Eveland, Wilbur 32

F-104 Starfighters 167, 171, 254, 262,
263

Farouk I, King of Egypt 8
Federation of Rulers in the Aden
Protecorate 273, 274, 277
Feisal Ibn Abd-Al-Aziz, Crown
Prince: reform policy 53, 353n45;
progress in modernizing die
kingdom 128-9; asserts ‘positive
neutrality’ 140, 389n63; pressures
Saud to step down 140, 207; anti-
British credentials 141-2, 390n68;
fiscal restraints 141; rumored
support for constitutional
government 141; pro-Nasser
policies 142, 390n74; Nasser a

Index

479

rabid madman 207, 420-lnl00;
against recognition of YAR 270;
uses power to accelerate reform
271; warns Kennedy not to
support Nasser 271; commences
reform program 274-5, 444n42;
knows Saudi oil is indispensable to
US 275; a shrewd politician and a
stable reformer 295; agrees to
withdraw from Yemen 296;
continues clandestine support for
royalists 297

Feisal II, King of Iraq 53, 69
Feldman, Myer 182, 205, 208, 419n86
Fir’ awn, Dr Rashal 275
Fouthi, Ali 244-5

frigates, for Iran 235, 236, 243, 244
Fulbright, Senator J William 70, 167,
305

Galbraith, John K: champions
economic aid 177; appointed US
Ambassador to India 247; views
military aid to Pakistan as evil 249-
50; accuses Nehru of undermining
Kennedy 254-5, 436-7n62;

attempts to brief Indians on
aircraft shipment denied 254; Lall
an impediment to Laos talks 255,
437n65, 437-8n72; attempts to
arrange India-Pakistan talks on
Kashmir 258; learns reasons for
annexing Goa 258; offers C-130
transports to stop MIG purchase
263; resigns in frustration 263,
442nl35; suggests US aid is
financing Soviet arms 263; believes
war with China impossible 278;
blames Menon for army failure
281-2; on vacation when China
attacks 281, 447nl5; Indian arms
request has dangers 283-4; tries to
get Nehru to talk to Ayub 283,
447n24; India as a counterweight

to China 289; says Soviet arms to
India only symbolic 290
Galib, Abd-al-Hamid al-, Egyptian
Ambasador 49
Gandhi, Indira 280
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 97
Gates, Thomas S, Jr 148
Gaylani, Rashid Ali 77, 109, 1 12
Gaza, Israeli raid into 21, 31, 38, 335-
6n55

Gazit, Modechai 302
Geneva Convention on Indochina 27,
340n90

Godstein, Rabbi Israel 1 84
Gomberg, Henry 147
Graham, Dr Frank, UN Mediator 98
Grant, James 302

Greater Middle East: definitions 5, 40,
330-ln3

Gromyko, Andrei 156, 158, 162
Guardian, The, London 124
Gulf Emirates 54

Gundevia, Yezdezard Dinshaw 286,
448n41

Haaretz 303

Hammerskjold, Dag, UN Secretary
General 57, 66, 156, 360nl5
Hannah, Norman B 33
Hansen, Kenneth 234
Hare, Raymond A, US Ambassador
57, 58, 60-1, 62, 67, 132, 144
Harman, Avrahm, Israeli Ambassador
147, 303

Hardman, Averell 178, 181, 215, 235,
248, 285, 286, 290, 302
Harrison, Selig 290
Harrison, Sir Geoffrey 156-7
Hart, US Ambassador 207, 272, 274,
275

Hassan II, King of Morocco 306
Hassan, Yemeni Prince 271
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles 205, 209,
297, 302

480

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Hayden, Major General John C 243,
244

Hayter, Sir William 56, 75
Heikal, Muhammad Hussein 111, 114,
196, 200, 202, 204, 297, 299,
378nl5

Hekmat, Sardar Fakher 157
Herter, Christian 69, 116, 138, 144,
146, 148, 155, 158
Hillsman, Roger 306
Hindustani Times 170
Holmes, Julius C, Ambassador: urges
caution on land reform 22; hints to
Shah on reform 216, 425n21; sees
Shah’s role as vital 221; no
alternative to Shah 224-5; military
assistance plan for Iran 226; urges
Shah be invited to visit US 228;
warns of danger of neutralism 230;
enhanced military assistance
program 232, 428n6, 428-9n7;
masterminds Shah’s visit 233-4;
rejects Amini’s appeal for funds
239-40; urges wait and see policy
241, 430-ln42; asks for frigates for
Iran 243; warns that the Shah is
dependent on the military 307;
evaluates Shah’s visit 428n4
Home, Lord, Foreign Secretary 291,
308

Hood, Viscount Samuel 67
Hourani, Akram 1 24
Hoyer-Millar, Sir Frederick 56, 143
Humphrey, Senator Hubert 58, 59,
181,203

Hussein I, King of Jordan:
assassination plot 62; faith in
army’s loyalty 72; requests British
troops 72; faces plots in
government and military 127;
sustained by Bedouin loyalty 128,
194, 384nl; visit to US has mixed
success 129-30, 384n4; plot fails
during his absence 131, 385-6nl2;
informs Saud he cannot attend

meeting 134; recognizes Qasim
regime in Iraq 136; believes Jordan
would win a war with UAR 137,
388n48; Father’s madness 138,
388n54; denounces UAR at UN
139; appeals against subsidy cuts
197; attempts to improve
popularity 198; wants improved
relations with Nasser 198, 415n30;
Syrian coup poses threat from
Nasser 202; Yemen a renewal of
Egyptian subversion 270, 276;
indignant at US recognition of
YAR 277; dismisses Rifa’i
government 302; asserts his Arab
credentials 303; invited to US 303,
453n62

IAEA (International Atomic Energy
Agency) 145-6, 148
ibn Nasir, Sharif Hussein 302
Ilah, Abd al-, Iraqi Crown Prince 90
India: refuses to enter Western
military alliance 23; disengagement
operations in Korea 26, 337-8n72;
faces challenge from separatist
groups 96, 374n22; requests US
economic aid 96; regionalism
threatens national polity 97; relies
on Soviet veto in UN 97; political
problems 101, 376n46; US support
for Pakistan dictator causes
disappointment 102; criticises
Qasim and Iraq 123-4, 382n81; will
not intervene between Hussein and
UAR 139; remains non-aligned
169; establishes military posts on
China border 171; Harriman calls it
the greatest ally 248; annexes
Portuguese enclave of Goa 258;
purchases MIG-21 fighters 262;
under-equipped army with
demoralized command 279; rejects
Chinese call for negotiations 281;
reduced Chinese pressure removes

Index

481

Kashmir urgency 290; Soviet arms
deal could lead to modem air force
310

Indus water agreement 167, 169, 249,
261

Iran: assassination of moderate Prime
Minister 14; Communist Tudeh
suppressed 14, 82; General Zahedi
coup, August 1953 14; joins

Baghdad Pact 34; US sites
observing Soviet missile tests 80;
land reform is contentious issue 81,
368n4; security agency SAVAK
created 83; Soviet pressure to
withdraw from Baghdad Pact 86,
369n20; US aid benefits
landowners not peasants 87,
370n22; anti-Shah rumors
widespread 89, 371 n44; confidence
in Pahlavi regime shaken by coup
89, 371 n42; recognizes new Iraqi
government 89, 371 n43; US

military support increases
dramatically 105; rising

dissatisfaction among population
157; Majlis elections fiasco 159,
399n52; security forces may depose
the Shah 159, 399n51; economic
collapse possible 161; anti-Shah
riots 214, 424nl3; Third

Development Plan 216, 222;

teachers’ strike, cabinet resigns
217; land reform program 222;
National Front opposition threat
223, 224, 225, 226; referendum
approves White Revolution 306;
clergy brand Shah an American
puppet 307; religious opponents
and nationalists rioting 307

Iraq: joins Baghdad Pact 37;
Hashemite dynasty toppled 40;
wishes to expand into Syria 50,
351-2n33; British analysis of
situation 67-8, 360n22; Bastille Day
coup against Hashemites 69, 321,

361n29; Rashid Ali coup 69, 361-
2n30; internal debate isolates pro-
Nasserists 73; opposition to Nasser
grows 77; Communist influence
demonises US and Nasser 78, 366-
7n81; calls for Kurdish National
rights 91, 372n51; Qasim

dependent on Communists 105;
Qasim uncovers revolutionary plot
109; Russian influence grows 110;
Sarraj arranges coup against Qasim
112, 379n21; Syrian backed coup
bloodily suppressed 112; Qasim
resists Communist demands 121;
accuses US of collaborating with
Nasser 122, 381n68; power of
Communists curbed 122; military
courts tty Ba’thists 123; military
court shows leniency 124, 382n87;
British sell additional arms 154,
396nl 8; Ba’thist officers overthrow
Qasim 298; Communists hunted
down and killed 298, 451n29; Aref
displaces Iraqi Ba’thists in a coup
305; Aref invites Nasser to visit
Iraq 305

Iraqi Communist Party 73, 77, 105,
109,112,124,298

Iraqi Petroleum Company 79

Israel: a liability for US policy in die
region 6; if Jordan collapses, will
take West Bank 73-4, 363-4n55,
364n56, 364n57; diverts US aid
into nuclear program 129; US
forces withdrawal from Sinai 142;
rejects any compromise with
Nasser 143, 391-2n77; fury at US
pro-Nasser policy 144; nuclear
weapons program 144-5, 194, 392-
3n84; demands exemption from
nuclear inspection 146; requests
conventional arms 146; French
assist with nuclear weapons
program 147; purchases Hawk
anti-aircraft missiles 205, 209, 297;

482

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

seeks alternative sources of
uranium 209; express concern over
possible overthrow of Jordan 302

Jadid, Salah 300

Jarring, Gunar V, UN Security
Council 95, 96

Jawad, Hashim, Iraqi Foreign Minister
113, 122, 124, 382n85
Jernegan, John D 33, 114, 117
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 97
Johnson Plan: for Arab-Israeli peace
204, 205,209, 210, 267, 297
Johnson, Vice-President Lyndon 243,
250-1, 311, 312, 327, 431-2n52,
456nl28

Johnston, Eric 21

Johnston, Sir Charles 76-7, 366n72;
disagrees with US policies 128,
131, 384n3, 385nll, 386nl8;

appalled at idea of Hussein-Nasser
detente 130; fears instability in
King Hussein’s absence 131,
385nl0; advises Hussein against
meeting Saud and Nasser 133;
dislikes reliance on US financial aid
133, 386nl9; seeks to stop

Hussein’s military action 137; Aden
protest makes recognition of YAR
unlikely 273-4; castigates US policy
in Arabia 295
Jones, G Lewis 195, 225
Jordan 54, 62, 63, 357nl05; US
advises rapprochement with UAR
129-30; Prime Minister Rifai’
expresses Jordan’s hatred of
Nasser 131-2; dangers of Nasser
takeover 132, 386nl8; anti-Nasser
propaganda campaign 134-5;
internal power struggle 134,
386n28; foments trouble in Syria
135; Prime Minister Majali
assassinated 135, 387n40;

additional funding for regime 197,
415n20; US denies supporting

Jordan dissidents 202, 418n58;
against recognition of YAR 270,
275-6, 443nl9; offers troops to
assist Saudis 271, 443n20; supplies
arms aid to Yemen royalists 275;
three pilots defect to Cairo 276
Jordan River water use 20-1, 22, 207,
210, 334n47, 334-5n50, 336n57
Jundi, Abd-al- Karim 300

Kashmir dispute: Nehru’s hard line
24, 337n65; US observers leave 26,
339n79; Nehru’s position is status
quo 94; India declares Kashmir
part of India 95; India refuses
plebiscite 95, 257; Pakistan

threatens to cut ties with US 95;
Pakistan wants UN Security
Council mission 95, 253, 373n8;
US stays out 165; Ayub’s proposal
rejected 166-7; Ayub has concerns
248; Ayub calls for UN plebiscite
249; Indian-Pakistani talks at
Rawalpindi 291
Kaul, General B M 280
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald: policies
mirror Eisenhower’s early plan 4,
191, 210-11, 41 3nl ; wins

Presidential election 147; blamed
for supporting India 167; missile
gap campaign tactic 174, 406nl;
accuses Eisenhower of insufficient
aid 175, 407n8; claims policies are
out of date 175, 323-4, 407n9;
creates ‘facts’ for his campaign 175,
406n6; exaggerates neglect of aid
for India 176-7; support for the
Shah a necessity 179, 409-10n27;
uses Arab Middle East as campaign
ploy 180-1; blames Eisenhower for
coolness to Nasser 181-2; ignores
Eisenhower’s hard-earned lessons
181, 188; attacks Eisenhower

Doctrine 182; private talks with
Jewish leaders 182, 410-1 ln35;

Index

483

seeks support from Jewish and
Zionist groups 182, 188, 410n34,
413n59; personal diplomacy 184,
259, 265, 41 ln45; promises Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations 184, 196,
415nl7; tries to charm Nasser 184,
411n45; hopes China threat will
make India anti-Communist 191; A
Strategy for Peace 195; writes to
Arab Leaders 195; needs Zionist
votes 196, 201, 414nl2, 417-18n48;
sells Hawk missiles to Israel 205;
bored by correspondence with
King Saud 207; finds no alternative
to the Shah 211, 214, 421 -2n2,
424-5nl2; excludes Foreign Service
from decisions 212, 421nl; ties US
to support of the Shah 212-13,
325-6, 422n3; reform tactics similar
to Eisenhower’s 213, 422-3n9; still
believes only reform can save Iran
regime 213, 422n8; concern about
Amini government in Iran 223;
doubts about Iran Task Force 227;
fails to charm Shah 236; makes in-
person promises to visitors 236,
430n28; refuses to back Amini
240-1; sees India as key to foreign
policy 246-7; foreign-aid budget,
Five Year Plan 247; appoints pro-
India officials 249; talks with
Krushchev 251, 436n40; gives
Ayub false impression of support
253; uses India to counterbalance
China 256; tries personal approach
to Nehru and Ayub 259;
guarantees assistance to Pakistan if
attacked 260, 440-lnl09;

concludes personal diplomacy a
failure 265; drives UAR and India
into Soviet camp 265; inclined to
recognize YAR 270; tries to calm
Saudis without upsetting Nasser
271; hedges in support for Feisal
275, 444-5n44; promises full

support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity
275; learns from Yemen civil war
277; welcomes increased tension
between India and China 281;
assures Ayub US will not be used
against him 284; sends military
mission to India 286; tells
Harriman not to push Ayub too far
286, 448n38; believes Chinese
invasion has changed India’s
attitudes 288; orders plan for
Kashmir settlement 288; sets up
Kashmir Working group 288; talks
with Macmillan at Nassau 290;
questions impact of Pakistan
leaving CENTO 291; calls on
Feisal to end support for royalists
294; denies special relationship
with Nasser 294; accuses Nasser of
destabilizing the region 295;
promises to defend Saudi Arabia
296, 450nl8; tells Nasser US policy
is unchanged 297, 450n22; denies
US officials support UAR
subversion in Syria 300;
congratulates Nasser on forming
new UAR 301; wants Saudis to
withdraw support from Yemeni
royalists 301; sends two aircraft to
Jordan on exercises 304; full policy
review for Iran 307; realises Shah’s
White Revolution challenges
Iranian society 307; cautions Shah
against too rapid reform 308;
hopes China threat will make India
settle Kashmir 308; understands
Ayub’s concerns over India 310;
assassination 311; all hopes for
greater Middle East unravelled
312-13; failure to learn lessons of
Eisenhower’s setbacks 316-17;
proactive approach causes
miscalculations 317
Kerr, Malcolm 107, 377nl
Kerr, Peyton 24

484

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Khayyal, Sheikh Abdullah ah 298
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 307
Khurshid, Muhammad 165
Kirkuk: oilfield pipelines 68, 117,
361n27; US forced to close
Consulate 91; Communist rally
suppressed 122

Kiselev, Evgeny, Soviet Ambassador

110

Knight, Ridgeway B 1 65
Kohler, Foy D 154

Komer, Robert ‘Blowtorch Bob’:
Near East policy troika 184-5, 196;
on recognition of Syrian coup 202;
advises inviting Nasser to US 203;
boring correspondence with King
Saud 207; urges greater pressure on
Shah 215-16; accepts Amini regime
must be supported 220; unable to
see Amini is only a front for die
Shah 221; predicts Iran crisis 223-
4, 231, 428n61; concedes Shah is
indispensable to stability 233,
429nl2; urges cap on Iran military
aid 234; urges Kennedy to save
Amini 241, 430n40; lack of aid to
India opens door to Soviet 263;
Cairo is key to new wave 267;
Yemen no problem 269; Yemen a
vortex for regional issues 270;
Yemen crisis a peanut 277; sees
opportunity to sour India-Soviet
relations 282; US is now prime
supplier of arms and economic aid
283; advises Kennedy not to
compromise with Ayub 284-5;
complains of slowness of aid to
India 285-6; regrets the end of
Chinese confrontation 287; wants
to keep India’s anti-Chinese tide
flowing 288; Indians can’t defend
India, much less SEA 289; no aid
without progress on Kashmir 289;
no alternative to the Shah and
reform cabinet 306, 454n27; keeps

China threat visible to India 308;
not much lost if Bowles aid plan
fails 311

Krishnamachari, Tiruvallur Thattai,
Indian Minister 96

Krushchev, Nikita, Soviet Premier:
supports India against Pakistan 34;
replies to UAR anti-Communism
110, 378nl0; chagrined by Nasser’s
attacks on Iraq 120, 380n61; Shah’s
ending of negotiations an affront
154; propaganda attacks on Iran
156; continues propaganda attacks
on Shah 157; attempts to improve
relations with Shah 161; assures
India of support 171; says Iran ripe
for revolution 213; talks with
Kennedy 251, 435-6n37; Qasim a
client who does not hang
communists 322
Kurdistan 90, 154, 397n20
Kuwait 54, 68, 75, 79, 198, 200, 202,
299, 360-ln25

Ladakh 281
Laise, Carol C 287
Lakeland, William 114, 123, 131
Lall, Arthur 251, 255, 256, 437n63,
437n64

Langley, James M, US Ambassador
99, 100, 156, 163
Laos 250, 255, 257, 258
Lavon Affair 208 421nl04
Le Jour 49

Lebanon: impending crisis 48, 49,
351n27, 351n34; crisis grows 61,
357n92; unrest spreading 65
Lintcott, Sir H J B 56-7, 356n66
Lippmann, Walter 213
Lloyd, Selwyn, Foreign Secretary 74-
5, 75, 88, 116, 139, 140, 365n61,
365n62

London Declaration, July 1958 153
Luce, Sir William Henry Tucker 75,
365n64, 365n65

Index

485

Lumumba, President Patrice 201

Lundahl, Arthur C 145

McClintock, Robert Mills, US
Ambassador 67

McConaughy, US Ambassador 283,
291

McCone, John A 148, 310, 312

McElroy, Neil 152

McMahon Line 170, 280

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime
Minister 44; relationship with
Eisenhower 5; Britain still a Great
Power 8; views Nasser as threat 54;
believes US will intervene in
Lebanon 65; talks with Eisenhower
66, 115, 359nl 1; shocked that Nuri
threatened Kuwait 68, 361n26;
shock at Iraqi coup 69, 362n33;
urges caution after the act 72; finds
Qasim a bastion against
Communists 79; warns Hussein of
consequence of war 137, 388n50;
gets support from US and
Dominions 199; suggests neutralist
course 251-2; urges Kennedy not
to recognize YAR 274; concern at
Pakistan’s reaction to arms for
India 290, 291

McNamara, Robert Secretary of
Defense 234

Macomber, William B., US
Ambassador 197-8, 213, 303, 452-
3n59

Mahdawi, Colonel Fadhil Abbas al-
114, 123

Majali, General Habis al- 131, 137,
198

Majali, Hazza al-, Jordanian Prime
Minister 133, 134, 135, 136, 137

Makins, Sir Roger, UK Ambassador
in Washington 30

Malaviya, KD 309

Malik, Charles Habib, Lebanese
delegate 32, 51, 66

Mansfield, Senator Mike 234
Marshall, George G: Secretary of
State 19-20

MEDO (Middle East Defensive
Organization) 4, 10-11
Meir, Golda, Israeli Foreign Minister
144,146,205

Menderes, Adnan, Turkish Prime
Minister 247

Menon, Vengali Krishnan Krishna:
Indian UN delegate 27, 339-40n85,
340-ln93; at Colombo Conference
28, 341n98; attacks Britain and US
39; diplomatic shortcomings 94,
373n4; categorically rejects report
on Kashmir 96, 374nl9; ponders
military relationship with Soviet
150, 394-5n3; Minister of Defense
171, 177, 405nll9, 407-8nl8;

initiates talks with Soviet 172;
inexplicable actions at UN 177,
408nl9; labels US imperialist 177,
408-9n21; pro-Soviet leanings 177,
250, 408n20; abuses Pakistan 249,
435n23; supports Chinese over
Indochina 255; impediment to
cooperation 256, 257; dismisses US
criticism as imperialism 258,
439n89; meeting with Kennedy
258; increased influence prevents
Kashmir compromise 261,
441nll8; defeats Pakistani
resolution in UN 262; on military
collision course with China 279,
446n2; widely blamed for military
failure 281; resigned but still anti-
West 285, 290; no longer balances
conservatives 309
Meyer, Armin 224
MIG-21 fighters 262, 290
Miklos, Jack 244

Mills, Sheldon T, US Ambassador 133
Mir, Ahmad al- 300
Mirza, General Iskander, Pakistani
President 97, 99, 100, 101

486

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

modernization theory 2
Morgan, Thomas E 216
Morris, Willie: British Embassy 33,
135

Morrison, Herbert, Foreign Minister:
deplores Indian non-alignment 28;
lack of trust in Dulles 330n2
Mosul, Iraq 112
Mountbatten, Lord Louis 97
Muhammad Ali, Pakistani Prime
Minister 28

Mullik, Bhola Nath 170, 280, 446n8
Murphy, Robert 72
Musaddiq, Muhammad, Iranian Prime
Minister 7, 13-14, 149
Muslim Brotherhood: revolt over
Canal treaty 1 8

Nachal Soreq 144, 147
Nagi, Abdul Ghani 272
Nasser, Gamal Abdel: controls
Revolutionary Command Council
8; power behind Neguib 15;
believes US will provide arms 16,
333n25; refuses to join MEDO 16;
removes Neguib and takes control
18, 34n2; tries to isolate Iraq 19;
attends Bandung Conference 31;
returns as world leader 31,
343nll7, 414n3; proclaims non-
alignment 33; reaction to
Eisenhower Doctrine 40, 43, 320,
348nl; obtains arms from Soviets
41, 319; becomes symbol of Arab
nationalism 43, 348n3; ideological
principles 43, 348n4; Philosophy of
Revolution 43, 186, 193, 348n5;
attempts control of United Arab
Republic 47, 349nl 3; proclaimed
the new Saladin 47, 349nl5;

declares Communist Party illegal
48, 350n21; propaganda attacks on
King Saud 52, 352n41; forges
Yemen-UAR alliance 55; official
visit to Soviet Union 61; denies

fomenting unrest in Lebanon 62;
denied Soviet intervention 72;
makes pact with new Iraqi regime
72, 363n46; agrees with US on Iraq
78, 367n82; asserting authority
creates strain in the Arab world
105; confident that Iraq will
become ally 108, 377n2; hostility to
Qasim develops 109; challenges
Khrushchev on Iraq 110, 378nll;
relations with Soviet undermined
110; defends his right to suppress
Communists 111, 378nl2; sees
Qasim as personal threat 111,
378nl6; attacks British for aiding
Communist Iraq 113; launches
virulent attacks on Qasim 1 1 3;
accuses Qasim of handing Iraq to
Communists 120, 380n60;

responds angrily to Krushchev
criticism 120, 380-ln64; lumps
British policy in with Soviets 121;
removes Ba’thists from key
positions 125; will renew relations
with British 142, 390n70; ideology
186, 187, 193, 412n53, 413n56;
consistent anti-Communist 187,
413n55; believes Israel is last
vestige of colonialism 188;
revolutionary policy losing
momentum 194; domestic
radicalization program 196,
414nl5; has to support Kuwait
against Qasim 200, 416n42; policy
shifts to focus on Africa 200,
417n47; purges reactionary
elements in Egypt 201-2; assures
Kennedy and Humphrey he is not
Communist 203; publishes abuse
of Kennedy’s correspondence 204,
419n75; US Hawks to Israel creates
arms race 206; publishes
Kennedy’s offer of conditional aid
268; calls coup triumph of anti-
feudal forces 269, 442nl0; prepares

Index

487

coup in Yemen 269, 442n5;

supports Yemen Arab Republic
269, 270, 443n7, 443nl6; accuses
Kennedy of military intervention in
Yemen 295; concludes Kennedy
has double-crossed him 297; token
withdrawal of troops from Yemen
297; announces new United Arab
Republic 301, 320; humiliates

Syrian Ba’thist delegation 301, 451-
2n44, 452n45; attacks US policy
305; insufficient US arms to
challenge Israel 319; support for
FLN in Algeria 419n74

Nation, The 48, 74, 364-5n59

Neguib, General Muhammad 8, 15,

Nehru, Braj Kumar 248, 259, 260,
288, 441 nll l

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime
Minister: preaches neutralism 8;
committed to non-alignment 23,
27; distrust of Great Powers 23;
opposes US arms for Pakistan 25;
attacks US actions 26, 338n74;
emphasises independence from US
27, 28, 339n84; attends Bandung
Conference 30, 32, 342-3nll0;
entices Nasser to Bandung 31,
343nll5; aids Nasser with Czech
arms deal 33; incites world opinion
against Suez War 38, 345nl33;
pursues political priorities 40-1;
antagonistic to US-Pakistan
rapport 93; urges Eisenhower to
support Nasser 94, 373n3; rejects
meeting with Pakistani Prime
Minister 98; stalls at Eisenhower’s
offer of talks 99; disagrees with US
policy in Middle East 102, 376n50;
uneasy about US support for
Pakistan 103, 377n56; worried by
conflict with China 104-5, 249; will
not meddle in UAR-Jordan detente
139; ponders threat posed by

Pakistan 150-1; rejects Ayub’s
proposals for talks 166, 402n85;
tells Eisenhower of fears over
Pakistan 168-9; attempts to avoid
involvement in Tibet 170,
404nll3; must support the Dalai
Lama 170, 404nll2; presses China
to recognize McMahon Line 170,
404nll4; could not believe conflict
with China possible 171; meets
Chou En-lai 171, 405nl22; brings
Menon back from UN 178,
409n22, 409n24; refuses to take a
position on SE Asia 250; hopes for
improved US-Soviet relations 251,
435-6n37; condemns Ayub’s
statements in US 253; attends
Non-Aligned Conference 254;
visits Washington 255, 438n73;
asks Kennedy to meet Menon 257-
8, 439n84; rejects plebiscite in
Kashmir 257; hopes Goa
demonstrates independence from
West 258, 439n90; claims Kashmir
as sovereign territory 259; rejects
Eugene Black as mediator 260;
mutual rivalry guarantee against
attack 278; believes India can
defeat China 279, 446n4; Goa
annexation leads to parallel with
China 279, 446n3; forward policy
unchallenged 280, 446n6; claims
withdrawal is desire for peace 282;
India has been living in a dream
285; claims he is being blackmailed
290, 449n55; moves to closer
cooperation with Soviet 293; can
offer nothing in Kashmir 308; ill
health and reduced power 309;
opposes any compromise on
Kashmir 309

New York Times 134, 178

Newsweek 48

Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missiles
167

488

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Nixon, Vice-President Richard M 20;
defies domestic Jewish vote 20,
334n45; argues for arming Pakistan
25, 337n70; advocates intervention
in Iraq 113, 115, 117-18, 125;
believes British prefer a deal with
Iraq Communists 119, 121;

advocates continuing containment
policy 174-5, 406n4; identities with
Nasser’s policies 187, 412-13n54
Nkrumah, President Kwame 201
Non-Aligned Conference: condemns
nuclear testing 254

Noon, Malik Firoz Khan, Pakistani
Foreign Minister 87, 96, 97, 98,
100, 164

‘northern tier’ concept 4, 11, 24, 76,
365n68

Numan, Abd-al-Rahman 272
Numan, Ahmad Muhammad 269, 272
Nuri Sa’id, Iraqi Prime Minister 19,
55; desires union with Kuwait 55,
68; plans to detach Syria from
Egypt 55; murdered 69
Nutting, Anthony H 122, 381n71

oil 6-7, 68, 72, 73, 105, 115, 117, 275,
361n27
Oman 142

Operation Hard Surface 273, 296,
297, 450n21
Operation Leghorn 280

Pakistan: US supplies arms 25, 26, 31;
in Baghdad Pact 31, 93; in SEATO
(South East Asia Treaty
Organization) 31, 93; reopens

Kashmir issue at United Nations
39, 259; US intelligence sites
monitor Soviet missiles 93, 105,
167, 259, 440n96; US support
damages relations with India 93;
instability blamed on British 97-8,
375n25; political instability and
corruption 98, 375n26; military

takeover forecast 99-100, 375n38;
Ayub Khan leads military coup
101; containment ensures US
support for military government
150; instability and corruption 163;
Ayub regime ‘controlled
democracy’ 164, 400n70, 433n5;
wants modern weapons 165, 167,
401n75; Kennedy on notice about
policies 248; receives F-104
shipment 254; Ayub Constitution
introduced 261, 441 n 122; sees
India as sworn enemy 286;
domestic economy downturn 308;
questions CENTO and SEATO
benefits 309

Palestinian refugees 139, 168, 195,
196, 207; right to return 20-1, 209,
414nl 1

Pegov, Nikolai Mikhailovitch, Soviet
Ambassador 86, 158, 162
Peres, Shimon 205
Phillips, Horace 57, 356n72
PL 480 wheat grants 59, 187, 194,
247, 305, 324, 388n60, 409n26
PSB (Psychological Strategy Board)
328n3^

Qasim, Brigadier Abd-al-Karim: leads
Baghdad coup 69, 362n32; forms
pact of support with Nasser 72; no
intention of joining UAR 73; relies
on Communist support 73, 78,
109; growing ties with Soviets 110;
foments unrest in Syria 111;
accuses Nasser of complicity in
coup plot 113; resists Communist
demands 122; assassination
attempt by Ba’thists 123, 381n75;
encourages anti-Communist

movement 123, 381n76; isolated,
but opposition weak 124; licences
split in Communist Party 124,
382n83; revives claim to Kuwait
198, 415-16n33; moves army to

Index

489

Kuwait border 199, 416n34; acts
against foreign investors 200, 416-
1 7n44; executed after coup 298
Qudsi, President Nazim 300
Quwatli, Shukri al-, Syrian President
46, 47

Radford, Admiral Arthur W 180, 181
Reza Shah 84, 161

Rhee, Sygmund, South Vietnam
President 27
Riches, D M H 56, 75
Rifai’, Samir al-, Jordanian Prime
Minister 62, 130, 131-2, 134, 301,
302

Rockwell, Stuart W 229, 245
Rogers, Attorney General William P
175

Roosevelt, Kermit 31
Rostow, Walt W: economic and
development aid thwarts

Communism 3, 328-9n3;

emphasises economic aid 12, 81,
175, 177, 181, 331 n7, 406n7;
discusses aid with Eisenhower 167,
402n90; frustration at lack of
response in reforming 215, 216-17;
Kashmir talks a stone wall 309;
Europe After Stalin: Eisenhower's
Three Decisions 328-9n3; rebuts
Soviet peace campaign 328n3
Rountree, William M: resumption of
aid to Egypt 58; rapprochement
begins 59; complains about British
action in Lebanon 67, 359nl2;
visits Baghdad and Cairo 78; covert
encouragement of anti-Communist
Nasser 117; opposes intervention
in Iraq 118; replaced at NEA by
Hare 144; reminds Shah that
Russian guarantees are unreliable
153; warned that Russians are
chagrined 154; asks Ayub to
renounce military force 169;

discouraged by Indian stance 259,
440nl02

Rundall, Francis 144

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State:
queried on policy after Syrian coup
202; advocates systematic aid to
UAR should continue 203; puts
Johnson peace plan to Ben-Gurion
205-6, 419n86; submits Johnson
Plan to Kennedy 205; deplores sale
of Hawks without Johnson Plan
206; asks for Check List for Iran
226; tells Amini of reduced military
aid 233; arranges Shah’s address to
Congress 234; recommends
recognition of YAR 273; tells
Galbraith to keep Pakistan onside
285; fears Ayub expects US to
force India to settle 288-9;
reassures US support for India 380,
44710

Russell, John W, US Chargee 91-2,
156

Sadat, Anwar 269

Sa’id, Nuri, Iraqi Prime Minister 50,
53

Sallal, Colonel Abdullah 268, 272

Samir 131

Sanaa Treaty, 1934 275

Sandys, Duncan 154, 286, 290, 291,
309

Sarraj, Abd-al-Hamid: Nasser’s Syrian
intelligence chief 49; Syrian
intelligence chief 49; meets Nasser
for Iraqi pact 72; head of security
in Syria 111; plans plot against
Qasim regime 112; Nasser blames
him for failure 113; attempts to
purge the military 125; fear he may
try to destabilize Jordan 131;
blamed for assassination of
Jordan’s Prime Minister 135;
attempt to subvert him by King
Saud 140

490

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Saud, King ibn Abd-al-Aziz: told
Nasser is saving Syria from
Communists 50; opposes UAR
union 52; plots to assassinate
Nasser 52, 54; unable to intervene
in Lebanon 63; dismisses Iraqi
offer of union 68; demands Kuwait
is saved from Iraqi coup 70; forms
united Arab front against
Communism 133; bungles attempt
to subvert Sarraj 140; struggles to
regain power 141, 207,

275;complains about US aid to
Nasser 207; slowness of US aid
207, 421nl01; visits Washington
207; collapses and hands over to
Feisal 271; had taken Najran and
Asir from Yemen 272
Saud, Prince Tallal ibn Abd-al-Aziz
141,207, 271, 444n28
Saudi Arabia 75; anti-Communist
alliance with Nasser 128; feudal
institutions 140; moves troops to
Kuwait-Iraq border 200; power
struggle between King Saud and
Feisal 207, 420n97; three air force
planes defect to Cairo 271
SAVAK91, 160-1,214-15
Sawt al-Arab radio (see Voice of the
Arab Nation)

Scott, Sir Robert, British Embassy 33
SEATO (South East Asia Treaty
Organization) 31, 93, 150, 248-9,
260, 262

Shabib, Talib 299-300
Shah Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza:
cannot face down National Front
13; exorbitant demands 33; cannot
effect social reform 34; plays off
US against Soviets 34, 150; visits
Moscow 34; aspires to dominant
military power in Persian Gulf 81,
151; receives internal security
weaponry only 81; exacts high
price for joining Baghdad Pact 82-

3, 368n8; moves to placate secular
conservatives 82; represses
religious factions 82, 368n6; central
planning intensifies nationalism 83;
his program creates widespread
dissent 83, 368nl0; attempts to
create political support 84;
personal involvement in projects
risks survival 84-5, 369nl7; visits
US for talks 87, 370n29; Baghdad
coup enhances his demands for
arms 88; opposes US aid to Nasser
88, 371n37; leverage with US for
aid increases 91; laments no
assistance to Iraqi anti-communists
123, 382n80; presses for military
aid 149; resists US pressure for
reform 150 improves relations with
Soviets 153, 395-6nl5; talks with
Soviets fail 154, 396-7nl9;

complains about British lack of
support 156-7; plans for major
military buildup 158, 398n43;

announces two-party elections 159;
land reform lacks credibility 159,
399n50; Soviet proposals renewed
161-2, 399n60; expects military
parity with Turkey 162, 163, 399-
40063; would prefer Nixon to win
179; plays neutralist hand to
Kennedy 213-14, 424nll; makes
overtures to Soviet Union 215;
uses Prime Minister Amini as cat’s
paw 221; no reduction in military
without modernization 228; exerts
control over Amini 229; invited to
visit US 231; presents shopping list
to Kennedy 234-5, 429n23; gives
Amini one more chance 235,
430n25; appoints Asadollah Alam
Prime Minister 241, 431 n46; lip
service only to reform 242;
threatens to abdicate 242; starts
reform program 306
Shahab, Qudratullah 166

Index

491

Shara, Major General Sadiq 131
Sharaf, Sami 303
Shastri, Lai Bahadur 287
Shatt al-Arab 156

Shawwaf, Colonel Abd-al-Wahhab
al- 112

Shishakli, Adib, Syrian Prime Minister

Shoaib, Muhammad 1 67
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles 167, 171
Singh, Sardar Swaran 291
Solod, Daniel, Soviet Ambassador to
Egypt 33

Soviet: breaches understanding with
Czech arms deal 33, 344nl22;
demands Israel stop US overflights
143; reaction to failure of talks
with Shah 154, 397n20;

propaganda campaign against Shah
155; threat to Pakistan 250,
435n27; resumption of nuclear
testing 254; vetoes Kashmir
negotiations 262; offers India
massive arms deal 310
Stevens, Sir Roger Bentham 86, 90,
91, 135

Stevenson, Adlai, Ambassador 258
Strauss, Lewis 145
Sudan 54, 354-5n54
Suez: British, French and Israeli
attack 5, 38, 346nl34
Suez Canal 8, 38

Suhrawardy, Huseyn, Pakistan Prime
Minister 95, 96, 97

Sukarno, Achmad, Indonesian
President 31 , 32

Symington, Senator Stuart 242, 285
Symon, Sir Alexander 98
Syria: Ba’th Party agrees Union 46;
creates trouble in Lebanon and
Jordan 62, 63, 357n95;

disillusioned with Egyptian rule 73;
Ba’th quarrel with Nasser and lose
office 111; Nasser fails to see
Syrian discontent 111-12, 378-

9n20; quarrel with Qasim affects
trade 111, 378nl9; Ba’thist

politicians resign 125; military
officers will lead coup against
union 125, 383n97; Sarraj starts
purge of military 125; Viceroy
Amer blocks Sarraj purge 125,
383n96; Ba’thists claim Nasser
caused the split 201, 418n50;
military coup dissolves UAR 201;
Ba’thists overthrow government
300, 451 n42; call for tripartite unity
with UAR and Iraq 300; Military
Committee in power 300;
Nasserists attempt coup which fails
303

Talbot, Phillips, US Universities Field
Staff: reports on Tamil separatists
in India 96-7; Raising A Cry for
Secession 97; NEA policy troika
184-5; Kennedy appointee controls
diplomacy 186; believes Nasser
problems due to Dulles’ prejudice
196; explains cancellation of
Nasser visit 204; opposes sale of
Hawk missiles to Israel 205; visits
Riyadh and discusses reform 207;
chairs Iranian Task Force 213;
produces options for dealing with
Iran 219; visits Iran and defuses
emergency 225-6; rejects Shah’s
visit to US 228; Holmes uses him
to lobby for Shah’s visit 232; says
Kennedy not impressed by Nehru
257, 438-9n80; hopes for Indian-
US relations 260; US needs both
India and Pakistan 261; predicts
Ayub not secure enough to talk on
Kashmir 286-7; Kashmir talks will
need diplomatic pressure 288;
senses relation between Kashmir
and military aid to India 291;
thinks India can become an asset
against China 296; states UAR no

492

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

threat to Israel 302; worried by
Kennedy’s personal diplomacy 353
Talhouni, Bahjat, Jordanian Prime
Minister 135-6, 197
Taylor, General Maxwell 232, 429n9
Tell, Wasfi, Jordan Prime Minister
197,198, 276, 277, 301
Thag La Ridge 280, 281
Tibet 170, 291
Time magazine 7
Times of India 178

Tito (Josip Broz) Yugoslav President
32, 119

Tolkovsky, Dan 145
Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey, British
Ambassador: Suez costs Britain
dominance in Middle East 38, 346-
7nl35; Iraq withdraws from
Baghdad Pact 113; encourages US
relations with Qasim 119-20;
assures Qasim US is not creating
hostile front 122, 381n72; plays
down Qasim’s threats to Kuwait
198; warns an Arab dispute may
fuel anti-British mood 1 99
Truman, President Harry S 4, 8, 314
Turkey: military coup 190, 247, 433n9
Turkish-Iraqi defensive alliance 1955
19, 319

Turkish-Pakistani Pact 18, 25, 36-7,
394nl

Twining, General Nathan F 152

U Nu, Burmese Prime Minister 29
U-2 ‘Blackbird’ surveillance flights 93,
145, 167

‘Umran, Muhammad 300
United Nations: talks on Aden-
Yemen border 57; Security Council
peace initiatives 66; General
assembly 138-9, 203, 261
US: intelligence failure Iraq 114-15
US intelligence sites in Pakistan 93,
105, 167, 259, 289, 312, 316,
440n96

US policy: British influence tilt
towards monarchies 5, 330n4;

concludes Pakistan needs political
stability 10, 375-6n40;

Eisenhower’s priorities 13; fear of
Communist take-over in Iran 13-
14, 332nl4; use of Islamic

influence in the Cold War 15,
332nl 9; defensive military
agreement with Pakistan 24-5;
internal security arms only for
Nasser 33, 344nl21; sees economic
aid as key to stability 34-5;
abandons support for nationalism
35, 345nl30; loyalty of security
forces key to stability 37-8;
condemns any coup against Nasser
38; continues economic aid to
India 41; more modest targets for
1958 42; Egypt-Syria Union better
than Communist takeover 47,
349nl7, 349-50nl8; refuses to join
Baghdad Pact 48, 351n24;

overtures to Egypt 49, 351 n29; will
not interfere in Syria 52, 352n38;
moves to regain influence in Cairo
54, 354n53; intends to recognize
UAR 57; renewed attempt at
economic aid for leverage 58,
357n80; rapprochement with
Nasser 59, 357n87; criticism leads
to pressure to act 70, 362n37;
concern about Nasserism recedes
77; will normalize relations with
Nasser 77-8; return to containment
of Communism 78, 366n77;

economic aid to Iran, not military
80, 367-8n2; encourage reform for
Iranian people 84; doubts Shah will
survive xenophobia 85; relies on
Iranian military to support reform
85, 369nl9; fears disaffection in
Iranian army 89; warns Tehran
against using Kurds to upset
Baghdad 90, 272n50; fears Soviet

Index

493

influence on Kurds 91, 372n53;
split between pro-Indian and pro-
Pakistani policy 102; aiding military
rule in Pakistan is an exception
103; for containment, with security
aid as well 104; flexible
containment adjusts to regional
issues 107; concern about Iraq
becoming a Soviet satellite 114;
considers working with Nasser
114; agree with British on non-
intervention in Iraq 116-17,
380n45; approaches Nasser in joint
anti-Communist effort 119; delight
at Nasser’s friction with Moscow
121; sees success of pragmatic
policies 126; disagreement with
British over Jordan 128, 384n2;
presses Jordan to come to terms
with UAR 129-30; tells Hussein to
cease propaganda campaign 135;
deplores Jordan’s anti-Nasser
propaganda 136, 387n41; pleased
with Majali’s departure 136, 387-
8n45; will withdraw funding for aid
to Jordan 139, 388n59; chooses
containment over Arab-Israeli
peace 142-3; welcomes Feisal’s
improvements in Saudi Arabia 142;
ends grant-in-aid for Israel 144,
392n82; monitors Israeli nuclear
program 146, 393n88; agrees

military aid to Pakistan 150, 394n2;
bilateral security agreement with
Iran 154-5, 397n22; assessment of
Shah’s position 161; proposes
Kennedy invite Shah for state visit
163; military rule is necessary 164,
400n68; Pakistan considered
benevolent dictatorship 166; fears
Soviet influence in India 169,
403nl05; refuses modern fighters
to India 171, 405nl23; allows
Nasser’s visit to lapse 204; reform
and change for Yemen without

involvement 206; search for ways
of galvanizing reform in Iran 217,
426n24; Iranian Task Force
continues Eisenhower policy 219-
20, 223, 427n52; Rusk sets up
Iranian Task Force 219, 426n29;
overt support for Iranian land
reform 222; support of Amini
creates breathing space 222;
permanently tied to supporting die
Shah 226; military assistance
program to Iran 231 -2; military aid
to Turkey and Pakistan 234,
429n20; across the board cuts in
grants to Iran 239; US jurisdiction
over US military personnel 244-5,
432n62; solution to Kashmir
problem not possible 252; to
strengdien ties with Pakistan 263;
assures YAR Saudi forces are not
active in Yemen 273, 444n34;
sends combat aircraft to Dhahran
273; recognizes Yemen Arab
Republic 276-7, 445n58, 445n59; if
Feisal widi draws from Yemen, so
will UAR 294; maintenance of
Jordan serves US interests 303,
452-3n59; threatens to end PL 480
wheat to Egypt 305; containment
policy 314; poor intelligence over
Egypt-Syria Union 349n8

Vietnam: North infiltrates Laos 255,
257, 258; US intervention in Soudi
257, 438n77

Voice of the Arab Nation Radio,
Cairo 55, 137, 138, 303, 452n54

Wailes, Edward T, US Ambassador
88, 152, 154, 220, 221,223
Washington Post 290
West Berlin crisis 251
West Germany 140, 196, 338-9n61
Whitney, John Hay ‘Jock’, US
Ambassador 74

494

The Greater Middle East and the Cold War

Wilson, Charles E, Secretary of
Defense 20

Wright, Edwin M, US Charge 132
Wright, Sir Michael 68

Yapp, Malcolm E 152
Yemen: declines US aid package 54-5;
threatens Aden 55, 355n56; plot to
overthrow Imam Ahmad 56, 206,
356n60, 356n63, 420n90; places
artillery on Aden border 57; claims
to Aden 206; Soviets supply arms
206, 420n89; Jordan and Saudi
Arabia back royalists 265, 294, 295;

UAR sponsors republican
government 265; coup creates
Yemen Arab Republic 268, 442n4;
new Iraqi regime supports UAR
and YAR 299

Young, Professor T Cuyler 217, 231

Zafrullah Khan, Sir 258, 262

Zahedi, Ardeshi, Iranian Ambassador
215

Zahedi, General Fazlullah 14, 15

Zubayri, Muhammad Mahmud al- 55,
269

Zuhur, Abd-al-Karim 301

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